Warfare and society: archeology and social anthropological perspectives by Otto, Ton et al.
www.ssoar.info
Warfare and society: archeology and social
anthropological perspectives
Otto, Ton (Ed.); Thrane, Henrik (Ed.); Vandkilde, Helle (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Otto, T., Thrane, H., & Vandkilde, H. (Eds.). (2006). Warfare and society: archeology and social anthropological
perspectives. Aarhus: Aarhus Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-318122
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
archaeological and Social anthropological Perspectives 
Warfare and Society 
e d i t e d  b y  t O n  O t t O ,  h e n r i k  t h r a n e ,  a n d  h e l l e  V a n d k i l d e
WARFARE AND SOCIETY 
K L U M M E . 3
A A R H U S  U N I V E R S I T Y  P R E S S  2 0 0 6
E D I T E D  B Y  T O N  O T T O
H E N R I K  T H R A N E  A N D  
H E L L E  V A N D K I L D E
WARFARE AND SOCIETY 
Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives 
WARFARE AND SOCIETY 
Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives
© Aarhus University Press, Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane 
& Helle Vandkilde 2006
Editors: Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane & Helle Vandkilde
English revision: Stacey Cozart, Nick Thorpe, 
Mary Waters Lund
Proofreading: Steffen Dalsgaard
Layout & cover: Hanne Kolding
Type face: Stone Serif, Stone Sans
Aarhus University Press
Langelandsgade  177
DK-8200 Aarhus N
Denmark
www.unipress.dk
Cover: ”War Magic”, 1975, screenprint by the Papua New Guinean
artist Timothy Akis (deceased 1984). The picture illustrates the con-
nection between warfare and social identities. In some Melanesian
societies war magic is used to transform men into warriors, so that they
can kill people and thereby establish group identities and social
boundaries.
4 . K L U M M E
ISBN 87 7934 935 8
1 Warfare and Society: Archaeological and Social Anthropological 
Perspectives  · 9
Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane, and Helle Vandkilde
2 Conceptions of Warfare in Western Thought and Research: 
An Introduction · 23
Ton Otto
3 Laying Aside the Spear: Hobbesian Warre and the Maussian Gift  · 29
Raymond Corbey
4 Aspects of War and Warfare in Western Philosophy and History  · 37
David Warburton
5 Archaeology and War: Presentations of Warriors and Peasants 
in Archaeological Interpretations  · 57
Helle Vandkilde
6 ‘Total War’ and the Ethnography of New Guinea  · 75
Erik Brandt  
7 War as Practice, Power, and Processor: A Framework for the Analysis 
of War and Social Structural Change  · 89
Claus Bossen
W A R F A R E  A N D  S O C I E T Y . 5
Contents
8 Warfare and pre-State Societies: An Introduction · 105
Helle Vandkilde
9 War and Peace in Societies without Central Power: Theories and
Perspectives · 113
Jürg Helbling
10 Fighting and Feuding in Neolithic and Bronze Age Britain and Ireland · 141
Nick Thorpe
11 The Impact of Egalitarian Institutions on Warfare among the Enga: 
An Ethnohistorical Perspective · 167
Polly Wiessner
12 Warfare and Exchange in a Melanesian Society before Colonial
Pacification: The Case of Manus, Papua New Guinea · 187
Ton Otto
13 Warfare and Colonialism in the Bismarck Archipelago, 
Papua New Guinea · 201
Chris Gosden
14 Warfare and the State: An Introduction · 211
Henrik Thrane
15 War and State Formation: What is the Connection? · 217
Henri Claessen
16 Warrior Bands, War Lords, and the Birth of Tribes and States in the First
Millennium AD in Middle Europe · 227
Heiko Steuer
17 Chiefs Made War and War Made States? War and Early State Formation 
in Ancient Fiji and Hawaii · 237
Claus Bossen
18 Warfare in Africa: Reframing State and ‘Culture’ as Factors of Violent
Conflict · 261
Jan Abbink
19 Warfare, Rituals, and Mass Graves: An Introduction · 275
Henrik Thrane
20 Semiologies of Subjugation: The Ritualisation of War-Prisoners in Later
European Antiquity · 281
Miranda Aldhouse-Green
21 Rebellion, Combat, and Massacre: A Medieval Mass Grave at Sandbjerg
near Næstved in Denmark · 305
Pia Bennike
6 . W A R F A R E  A N D  S O C I E T Y
22 Society and the Structure of Violence: A Story Told by Middle Bronze 
Age Human Remains from Central Norway · 319
Hilde Fyllingen
23 The Dead of Tormarton: Bronze Age Combat Victims? · 331
Richard Osgood
24 Funerary Rituals and Warfare in the Early Bronze Age Nitra Culture of
Slovakia and Moravia · 341
Andreas Hårde
25 Warfare, Discourse, and Identity: An Introduction · 385
Ton Otto
26 Warriors and Warrior Institutions in Copper Age Europe · 393
Helle Vandkilde
27 From Gilgamesh to Terminator: The Warrior as Masculine Ideal 
– Historical and Contemporary Perspectives · 423
Sanimir Resic
28 The (Dis)Comfort of Conformism: Post-War Nationalism and Coping 
with Powerlessness in Croatian Villages · 433
Stef Jansen
29 Violence and Identification in a Bosnian Town: An Empirical Critique 
of Structural Theories of Violence · 447
Torsten Kolind
30 War as Field and Site: Anthropologists, Archaeologists, and the Violence 
of Maya Cultural Continuities · 469
Staffan Löfving
31 Warfare, Weaponry, and Material Culture: An Introduction · 483
Helle Vandkilde
32 Swords and Other Weapons in the Nordic Bronze Age: Technology,
Treatment, and Contexts · 491
Henrik Thrane
33 What Does the Context of Deposition and Frequency of Bronze Age
Weaponry Tell Us about the Function of Weapons? · 505
Anthony Harding
34 Warfare and Gender According to Homer: An Archaeology of an
Aristocratic Warrior Culture · 515
Helle Vandkilde
Index · 529
W A R F A R E  A N D  S O C I E T Y . 7
8 . K L U M M E
…you can’t understand what the war has done to us. At first sight everything may look
normal, but it’s not. Nothing is normal. The war has changed everything.1
The present book deals with the interrelationship between society and war seen
through the analytical eyes of anthropologists and archaeologists. The opening
quote – spoken by an informant to Torsten Kolind and published in his thesis
about discursive practices in Bosnia just after the war in 1992-95 – captures the
problems we face when we study war. Archaeologists and anthropologists alike
rarely possess war experiences of their own: we study past and present wars, but
remain total outsiders who depend on numerous and complex discursive layers
– material, written, and spoken – to bring us insight on this subject, so demand-
ing and so necessary to deal with. War is a ghastly thing, which unfortunately
is thriving almost everywhere in the world at present: we need to understand
better what war does to people and their societies. We are trained analysts, but
to insiders war is mostly chaos and death and hence in a sense beyond analysis.
It is a challenge in our studies to both ignore and include the compassion and
feeling this subject is also about. Nevertheless, under the chaotic conditions of
war and its aftermath people are fully aware of the changes happening to their
world even if they cannot describe them sociologically. Doubtless, war always
affects society and its agents. War does produce change, and archaeologists and
anthropologists are analytically equipped to pinpoint its direction, patterning,
scale and content. The perspective – and filter – of time provides one important
tool, context and comparison other tools. Looking at the history of war studies,
war is quite often perceived of and treated as something set aside from other
practices; almost personified. However, the results published in this book allow
us to say that it is never autonomous and self-regulating. War always forms part
of something else. Numerous questions arise and at least some answers, often
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tentative and multifaceted, are provided in the collection of studies published
below. They certainly add to an ongoing debate, hopefully qualifying it as well. 
The book is the end product of the research project ‘Archaeological and Social
Anthropological Perspectives on War and Society’ at the Institute of Anthro-
pology, Archaeology and Linguistics at Aarhus University, Moesgård. This project
formed part of the Danish Research Council for the Humanities’ special initia-
tive on the subject of ‘Civilisation and War’. It began the 1st of January 1999
and was officially concluded by the end of 2002, but continued on a lesser scale
throughout 2003 and 2004. This book reports on the results, and in so doing
incorporates a series of edited articles originating from seminars and work meet-
ings that took place within the framework of the project. Most of all, the book
presents the research conducted by members of the research team from about
1999 to 2004. The publication deals with a series of related research fields,
notably war in the context of theory, philosophy, and research history, but also
takes up the discussion of the position and role of war in non-state and state
societies. In addition, the relationship to rituals, social identification and mate-
rial and non-material forms of discourse are among the themes discussed,
notably on a cooperative basis across institutions and across the two major dis-
ciplines of archaeology and anthropology. The curriculum and outcome of the
War & Society project are summarised below. 
The research team
The research team on the project consisted of an average of five or six members.
The project was headed by Professor Ton Otto, Professor Henrik Thrane and
Associate Professor Helle Vandkilde, who all contributed with co-financed
research, the last-mentioned as coordinator of the project and the day-to-day
work. Ton Otto held the primary administrative responsibility for the project.
These three researchers have contributed to the project in particular through the
working meetings. The project group also comprised two doctoral students,
Andreas Hårde and Torsten Kolind, who began their work on the project on 1
August 1999 and 1 November 1999, respectively. The latter recently defended
his doctoral dissertation at the University of Aarhus (Kolind 2004). At the begin-
ning of the project, anthropologist Dr. Kristoffer Brix Bertelsen made his mark
on the project but left it in favour of a position with the Research Council for
the Humanities. Anthropologist Dr. Claus Bossen was employed as a research
fellow on the project until 31 January 2001, but fortunately continued his
involvement and participation through working meetings and seminars.
In addition, visiting researchers contributed to the project: curator Nick
Araho, Dr. Erik Brandt, Professor Polly Wiessner and Professor Jürg Helbling,
who have all served as external supervisors for the doctoral students and as
resource persons in various fields (cp. chapters 6, 9, and 11). Furthermore, the
project has drawn on a number of researchers associated with the project as
external resource persons. In particular, Dr. David Warburton (cp. chapter 4)
should be mentioned by name for having contributed with his theoretical
expertise and knowledge of the Middle East, and Jürg Helbling for his thorough-
going assistance with the editorial work as peer-reviewer.
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Seminars and workshops
The project invested considerable energy into organising seminars and working
meetings where war and warriors were discussed thematically and from various
angles. Invited guests and the project members presented their thoughts and
research results at international seminars that resulted in many fruitful and in-
depth discussions as well as substantial contributions. More informal working
meetings for the project members were held on a regular basis and created a
fruitful basis for developing concepts and interpretations. In this way the proj-
ect created a common platform for the individual projects under the general
umbrella of War and Society. Personal opinions and points of view were typi-
cally greatly influenced by the debates that took place at the seminars and work-
ing meetings, which also rubbed off on the content of the written production,
especially the present book. It is characterised positively by a combination of
archaeology and social anthropology. Even though it was not always simple to
direct archaeology and anthropology towards each other, it certainly proved to
be worth the effort. A close collaboration between the two fields has in reality
not occurred in Denmark in recent times, but the War and Society project has
allowed for mutual enrichment, which may be considered one of the important
outcomes of the project. This will hardly be the last project where both fields
are involved on equal footing. Beyond the productive collaboration between
anthropology and archaeology, the project has also received considerable input
from history, politology and philosophy.
The English-language seminars have included the following activities:
1. ‘Civilisation and war’ (focus on source materials and theory), 18.6.1999.
2. ‘Warfare and Social Structure’ (warfare, violence and social structure; warfare
and warriors in prehistory). 28.-29.4. 2000.
3. ‘Warfare and State Formation’. 5.10. 2000.
4. ‘Warrior Identities and Warrior Ideals in Past and Present Societies’. 26.01. 2001.
5. ‘Warfare and Sacrificial Rituals’. 10.5. 2001.
6. ‘Identity and Discourse in Post-War Communities’.  9.11. 2001.
7. ‘The junction between archaeology and anthropology’ was the main heading for
four activities that took place in connection with a visit by Professor Polly
Wiessner and Professor Chris Gosden, 30.4.-6.5. 2002 at Moesgård.
A. ‘Material Culture, the Individual and the Collective’. 30.4. Seminar.
B. ‘Anthropology & Archaeology: A Changing Relationship’. 2.5. Lecture. 
C. ‘Warfare in the South Pacific: Strategies, Histories, and Politics’. 3.5. 
Seminar.
D. ‘Changes in Economy, Social Networks, Material Culture and Identity among
the Bushmen in the 20th Century’. 6.5. Lecture. 
Visiting scholars
Quite a few foreign researchers have contributed to the project. Below is a list of
these researchers, five of whom – Erik Brandt, Ivana Macek, Polly Wiessner, Jürg
Helbling and Nick Araho – were part of the project for a period of time, ranging
from one week to one month. Several of these researchers do both archaeologi-
cal and anthropological work and have therefore been able to give a high degree
of positive input to the project (cp. chapters in this volume).
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• Jan Abbink, Professor, African Studies Centre, University of Leiden and
Department of Anthropology, Free University of Amsterdam.
• Miranda Aldhouse-Green, Professor, Department of Archaeology, University 
of Wales, Newport.
• Nick Araho, Curator, the National Museum of Papua New Guinea, Port
Moresby.
• Martijn van Beek, Associate Professor, Department of Ethnography and Social
Anthropology, Moesgård, University of Aarhus.
• Pia Bennike, Senior Researcher, Laboratory of Biological Anthropology,
University of Copenhagen. 
• Erik Brandt, Ph.D, Department of Anthropology, University of Nijmegen.
• Henri Claessen, Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of
Leiden.
• Raymond Corbey, Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology,
Universities of Leiden and Tilburg.
• Chris Gosden, Professor, Pitt Rivers Museum Oxford, Department of
Anthropology, Oxford University.
• Anthony Harding, Professor, Department of Archaeology, University of
Durham.
• Jürg Helbling, Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Zürich.
• Christian K. Højbjerg, Senior Researcher, Danish Institute of Advanced
Studies in the Humanities, Copenhagen.
• Stef Jansen, Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of
Hull.
• Kristian Kristiansen, Professor, Department of Archaeology, University of
Göteborg.
• Staffan Löfving, Assistant Professor, Department of Cultural Anthropology
and Ethnology, University of Uppsala.
• Ivana Macek, Assistant Professor, Peace and conflict research group,
University of Uppsala.
• Ron May, Senior Research Fellow, Research School of Pacific and Asian
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra.
• Lena Holmquist Olausson, Assistant Professor, Department of Archaeological
Science, University of Stockholm.
• Michael Olausson, Curator, Swedish National Heritage Board (RAÄ),
Stockholm.
• Richard Osgood, Archaeologist, South Gloucestershire Council.
• Sanimir Resic, Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Lund.
• Henrik Rønsbo, Associate Professor, Rehabilitation and Research Centre for
Torture Victims, Copenhagen.
• Heiko Steuer, Professor, Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte & Archäologie
des Mittelalters, University of Freiburg.
• Marie Louise Stig Sørensen, Associate Professor, Department of Archaeology,
University of Cambridge.
• Nick Thorpe, Associate Professor, Department of Archaeology, King Alfred’s
College, Winchester.
• David Warburton, Research Assistant, Department of the Study of Religion,
University of Aarhus.
• Polly Wiessner, Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Salt
Lake City, Utah.
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The individual projects
The War and Society project served as an umbrella for six individual projects that
included the disciplines of archaeology and anthropology and in some cases both.
Claus Bossen’s studies concerned the connection between early state formation
and war in Hawaii and Fiji (chapter 17) and recent theories of war within social
anthropology (chapter 7). On the one hand, according to his studies it appears
probable that war plays a role in state formation but, on the other hand, that
war and military organisation cannot stand alone. Military power should be
combined with ideological, economic and political power in order for a state to
form. Subsequently, the question arises of how people come to accept a ruler’s
sovereignty and power?
Andreas Hårde studied war in the Early Bronze Age cultures of Nitra, Úneˇtice-
and Veˇterˇov-Mad’arovce in Eastern Europe, in particular in Moravia and Slovakia
(chapter 24). The main issue of concern to him was how to identify acts of vio-
lence within a prehistoric material by regarding war as a social phenomenon
rather than as military history. It was also important to consider warfare as a
phenomenon divided into several phases, of which the preliminaries to war and
its effects are just as important to study as the act of war itself. War, just like
other means of power, requires a social decision-making which for one thing
is expressed in social rituals. The employment of violence can thus create or
strengthen a socio-political identity. The work on war in the early Bronze Age
consists of two studies, the first of which concerns the relationship between
warriors and social change, and the other violence – in the form of human sac-
rifices – as a means of power.
In sum, Andreas Hårde’s studies show that warfare within the Early Bronze
Age was closely connected to economic and political power. Evidence of war is
most obvious in the periods when socio-political changes occur. The frequency
of skeletal trauma, grave plundering and warrior cenotaphs increases along with
changes within burial customs among the social elite and with the introduction
of new prestige goods and objects of metal. In addition, violence in the form of
human sacrifice was used as a means to gain power over life and death.
Torsten Kolind’s work in the Warfare and Society project resulted in his recently
completed doctoral dissertation about ‘Post-war identifications. Counter-discur-
sive practices in a Bosnian town’, based on six months of field work among a
Muslim population in ethnically mixed Stolac (a town in southwest Bosnia).
Kolind examined the connections between war-related violence and identifica-
tion analysing the informants’ experiences of a world in ruins, destroyed by war,
and the politically over-heated post-war situation. Focus was on the most central
identifications of ‘the others’ that the Muslims in Stolac employ, the general
conclusion being that these can be regarded as part of a counterdiscourse char-
acterised precisely by the rejection of the nationalistic and ethnic categorisa-
tions and explanations existing in the public and political sphere (chapter 29).
The conclusion here is that the nationalistic as well as religious identifications
that were key to the war have lost their relevance. Instead, people identify them-
selves in respect to a local patriotism, an ideal of tolerance, the discursive con-
struction of the Balkans as part of Europe, and the role of the victim. Apart from
the role of the victim, these identifications can also be seen as part of the
Muslims’ everyday counterdiscourse. 
Ton Otto was especially involved in the theoretical discussions, in particular
in developing a conceptual framework for comparatively analysing war as a power
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factor and as a cultural phenomenon. He was Torsten Kolind’s main supervisor.
In addition, Ton Otto presented and worked on empirical material from Manus
(Papua New Guinea), especially historical data concerning war in a society with-
out central authorities (chapter 12). It is normally assumed that exchange unites
while war divides, but this is too simple. War creates not only groups of allies
and enemies, but it also leads to networks of connections, inasmuch as there
exists a responsibility to either retaliate (otherwise lose prestige and status) or
mediate between fighting parties (achieve prestige). In pre-colonial Manus, war
was a factor that maintained relatively small political units (through fission) but
that at the same time created connections between the units and therefore inte-
grated the region into a larger system of exchange relations. War was a strategic,
but risky possibility for local entrepreneurs to increase their status. The colonial
power’s policy of pacification put a stop to this option. Therefore, the focus for
status politics shifted entirely from waging war to organising great exchange cer-
emonies.
Henrik Thrane’s research focused on territorial organisation and armament in
the Scandinavian Bronze Age, above all in the study of sword production and
sword function on the basis of quantitative methods (chapter 32). It has been
quite a few years since active research has been carried out on this subject; in
part the material has become more accessible, in part the theoretical apparatus
and viewpoints concerning context and social roles have changed decisively in
recent years. Henrik Thrane’s principal interest was to relate the sources to the
theories and understandings of war and warrior roles on which the project has
worked, considering it essential to reveal how the sources support or contradict
these. He was Andreas Hårde’s main supervisor.
Helle Vandkilde examined warrior identities in the European societies of the
later Stone Age and Bronze Age. Organised warrior bands often seem to have
played a decisive role. It is probable that these warrior groups were recruited
according to hierarchical principles, not unlike, for example, the system that
can be deduced from Homer’s Iliad and that is also evident in a large number of
ethnographically studied cases (chapters 26 and 34). Vandkilde’s analysis of the
history of research (chapter 5) furthermore points out that war and violence do
not really enter the archaeological interpretations until c. 1995. Two opposing
myths have generally characterised archaeology – one of them regarding pre-
history as populated with potentially violent warriors that repeatedly changed
society, the other presenting prehistory as populated with peaceful peasants in
harmonious and static societies. It is finally suggested that both the ideal and
real sides of war and warriors in prehistory should be studied, and also that
interpretative stereotypes can be avoided through the use of theories that view
humans as participating both routinely and strategically in societal frameworks.
Consequently, another dimension of her work has concentrated on writing war
and warriors into sociological theories of material culture, social practice, power,
and social identity such as notably gender.
Project outcome – an outline
The subprojects typically covered more than one subject area. Below is an out-
line of some of the general considerations and results.
Within social anthropology war has long been an object of study. In archae-
ology, however, war did not become an established area of study until the past
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decade, and it must be assumed that the many ethnic wars and genocides of the
1990s as well as the massive media coverage have played a decisive role. The
horror and awful chaos of war are now analysed in social anthropological
studies, but shall henceforth also be incorporated in archaeological studies,
which still do not portray prehistoric war realistically enough. This is especially
due to the fact that the discourse is still influenced by some myths of heroic war-
rior elites.
War should be understood as a collective and violent social practice which is
always based on a cultural logic and therefore cannot merely be explained with
reference to biology, genetics or evolution. Warriorhood is a social identity
closely connected to military actions, but also motivated by stereotypic myths
of men and war. Helle Vandkilde’s studies focus in particular on this aspect.
Warrior organisations are clubs with a military objective that generally have male
members. A certain degree of support is found for the hypothesis that warrior
organisations themselves carry a potential for social change, but apparently it
can only be activated during crises and considerable external pressure. The war-
rior institutions can be separated into three categories on the basis of whether
the access is regulated through the criteria of age, status/prestige or social rank.
The first category is found, for instance, among nomadic tribes in Eastern Africa,
the other among prairie Indians and the Central European Corded Ware
Culture. All three categories integrate elements of ‘Gefolgschaft’ in the sense of
a long-term reciprocal relationship between a leader and his group of warrior-
followers, who are bound by economic interests and moral rules. Gender is a rel-
evant aspect to study. War is waged as a rule (but not always) by men. Often
women take on the responsibility for the families’ and the society’s honour and
contribute by rousing to war and by assisting before, during and after the acts
of war. The border line between soldier and warrior is rather fluid, but the role
of the warrior is decidedly more marked by an individualistic mode of thought
and organisation.
Material culture and personal appearance organise and maintain all kinds of
identities, among these warrior identities as they exist in many prehistoric, his-
torical and ethnographic contexts. Weapons and special dress and body atti-
tudes are strategically used to form and manipulate the image of the warrior as
identity and ideal within the warrior group, between warrior groups, and in
respect to the outside world, but at the same time have an effect on the indi-
vidual warrior by influencing his self-understanding and personal appearance.
Furthermore, advances in weapon technology can escalate conflicts and in some
cases (e.g. horses and swords) actually precipitate social change. 
Ritual war is a rather unclear concept that has been misused to postulate
peaceful conditions in societies without centralised political power. It must be
pointed out that ‘ritual war’ will always merely be one facet of a military reality,
with all its implications of human suffering and death. On the other hand, war
is almost always related to different kinds of rituals carried out before, during
and after acts of violence. Sacrifices of weapons and people in prehistory can be
regarded as part of a series of actions that includes war. In addition to this, there
are certain religious aspects by which appeals are made to ‘higher powers’ for a
positive intervention. Through his Bronze Age case study (chapter 24), Andreas
Hårde shows that violence in the shape of human sacrifices was used by the
political elite as a means to consolidate their control over life and death and to
frighten outer and inner enemies. The mass graves that mar the past and the
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present should on the one hand be associated with military acts, but they also
have distinct functions in the way of debasing and deterring defeated enemies
as well as demonstrating power.
Power is a key concept in the understanding of war and warriors. Power – i.e.,
dominance – can be achieved either through persuasion or force; in the case of
the latter, through war and violence or threats of violence. War can certainly be
part of groups’ and individuals’ strategic effort to achieve overall dominance.
On the other hand, there are a number of examples where war is carried out by
warrior groups operating autonomously and in isolation in respect to the more
primary authorities of society and here it is not directly related to dominance.
In certain decentralised societies war is not directly accessible as a source of
dominance, but these societies are nevertheless often extremely marked by war
that seems to have the effect of maintaining rather than changing the society.
War is a key ingredient in social change and for this reason alone it is rele-
vant to study. There is no one-sided relationship between input and output, and
perhaps more than any other kind of strategic act war tends to create unintended
effects. Since war is a violent form of social practice, it can be said to always con-
tribute in some measure to social change even if its aim is maintaining the polit-
ical status quo. War is thus in a very general sense a processual force. States have,
for instance, always attempted to maintain themselves through war. Also other
kinds of centralised societies have used war and the military as a source of power,
for instance, to strengthen an existing base of power. This was true, for example,
in the complex Bronze Age societies in Southern Scandinavia and the so-called
chiefdoms on Fiji, Hawaii, and in the Grand Chaco. War is therefore often used
for reproductive purposes, but can war also change society more radically?
This question has in particular been discussed in connection with theories of
state formation. Claus Bossen (chapters 7 and 17) evaluates the relationship
between war and state formation, and concludes that there is a connection, but
that many other factors come into play. The same question is, however, relevant
to discuss in cases where the social structure in ‘egalitarian’ societies quite sud-
denly moves in the direction of institutionalised hierarchy, such as in north and
central Europe with the emergence of the Battle-axe or Corded Ware cultures
(2800-2500 BC) or in certain hot spots in the Early Bronze Age of Central Europe
and the Balkans (2000-1500 BC). War was also, for example, a strategic but risky
opportunity for local entrepreneurs on New Guinea to develop their status, but
egalitarian institutions pulled hard in the opposite direction. In this area, our
studies have not been able to indicate clear regularities or patterns in either the
archaeological or the social anthropological material, but it should be empha-
sised that the topic deserves further illumination. Warfare is part of most state
formations and of the formation of the above-mentioned hierarchies, but other
factors enter into a complex interaction with war. Furthermore, there are a num-
ber of cases, historically and in recent times, in which war has wiped out soci-
eties rather than contributed to creating something new. A regularity that can
be pointed out, however, is that war tends to create more war. 
This particular logic of war has been scrutinised by Jürg Helbling among tribal
societies (chapter 9). Contemporary tribal wars always take place in the context
of expanding or deteriorating states and in the wider context of the world econ-
omy influencing the course and intensity of war, but it is nevertheless impera-
tive to search for the internal logic of these indigenous wars. Two structural con-
ditions may explain the high level of war in these societies. First, the local
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groups operate autonomously in a political system that can best be described as
anarchic. Second, these local groups are relatively immobile being dependent
on locally concentrated resources. People do not wage war because they are fond
of it. Despite high economic and personal costs and despite the fact that peaceful
cooperation will yield the highest gain for all groups, each group is compelled
to adopt a bellicose strategy. Game theoretical considerations may explain this
apparent paradox: engagement in peaceful strategies is simply too risky because
a one-sided bellicose strategy will potentially bring the highest gains while a
one-sided peaceful strategy may lead to the highest losses. Only when both par-
ties engage in peaceful strategies, both will gain, but none can be certain of this.
Therefore the military superiority of one group inevitably constitutes a threat to
the others, forcing them to attempt achieving superiority in turn. Helbling con-
cludes that the two structural conditions of tribal societies create an environment
in which war is prevalent. The societies adapt to this social environment and this
explains a number of their characteristics which often – but according to Helbling
mistakenly – are considered as causes of tribal warfare, such as the centrality of
warrior values, political status competition and conflicts over scarce resources. 
War is always waged against ‘the others’, and in this sense it may be said that
war often originates from narrowly defined groups, but on the other hand war
often appears to strengthen these groups as well as create new groupings. The
connection between war and identity is thus quite complex as demonstrated by
Torsten Kolind concerning the Bosnian material (chapter 29). His conclusion is
that everyday identifications can be regarded as part of a counterdiscourse –
against the nationalistic and religious categorisations that on the public and
political level were the reasons and aims for the war in Yugoslavia. The direction
and kind of the changes can seldom be pinpointed in advance due to the pres-
ence of crucial unpredictable elements, in part because identity is formed in var-
ious ways at several levels ranging from everyday life to overriding political
authorities.
New problems and questions
The Warfare and Society project can, qua the perspectives and results described
above, point out a number of new problem areas and questions that require pro-
found study through new research. In particular, three complexes of problems
should be mentioned:
More research is necessary in the limitations that seem to be in force in soci-
eties with egalitarian institutions – as on Papua New Guinea – , especially the
potential of war to create political inequalities and structural social change. It is
also necessary to further analyse the qualitative changes in war brought about
by the use of firearms or other new technology. In Papua New Guinea a desta-
bilisation of the existing exchange systems occurred and as a result an accept-
ance of the colonial power and its efforts at pacification; in fact, an external
state’s monopolisation of violence. In general, it must be considered relevant to
theorise warfare as a form of transaction unlike, yet in many ways also comple-
mentary to, other forms of exchange in societies without centralised power.
Violence and war articulate existing identities and create new identities often
in a determining way, but it is also important to analyse the discursive strategies
that people use to adapt these general identities to everyday life, which is
precisely where a need exists to create new exchange relations and connections.
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The relationship between the formation of social identities and material culture
needs further illumination. The understanding of war and the role of warriors
in prehistoric societies is still not profound enough, and henceforth the focus
should be directed more toward using the archaeological material and relevant
theoretical tools interactively; along the lines of Vandkilde’s proposal in this
volume (chapter 26). The creative and preserving role of material culture in
respect to a large number of violent and non-violent identities within and across
lines of gender, age, family, status, rank, occupation and ethnicity still requires
thorough investigation. Concrete investigations with theoretical superstructures
can clearly occur through interdisciplinary collaboration, especially between
social anthropology and archaeology. The warrior is for instance often particu-
larly visible in European prehistory, especially in the funerary domain, but the
question remains of the extent to which these presentations represent contem-
porary ideals and myths. Other questions that remain unanswered are when the
first warrior institutions appeared in Europe and what their social and economic
background was. The appearance of institutionalised warriorhood (probably in
certain hotspots around 5000 BC and again, more massively, around 2800 BC)
seems to coincide with three other phenomena, namely, a clear gender differ-
entiation in funerary etiquette, the formation of an elite, and a drastic expan-
sion in the use and production of copper objects. But for the present this must
remain a qualified hypothesis.
About this book
The structure of this book reflects the six areas upon which the project activities
and debate were focussed during the four years it ran: war as presented in phi-
losophy, social theory and the discourses of anthropology and archaeology;
war in non-state societies; war and the state; war, rituals and mass graves; war,
discourse and identity, and war and material culture. The publication gathers in
total thirty-four contributions from a selection of seminar participants, among
these the project participants. Included in these are the editors’ introductory
articles, which serve as critically annotating introductions to each of the six
subject areas.
Both archaeologists and anthropologists have contributed to the subject
areas, which occur quite mixed in this respect. It also appears that many of the
authors are inspired by their ‘neighbouring discipline’ and consequently incor-
porate other perspectives. Several articles are definitely situated in the intersec-
tion between archaeology and anthropology. Through its seminar activities and
this book, the War and Society project has demonstrated a potential for new
insight to be gained through combining theories, methods and results from dif-
ferent disciplines. The essence of archaeology is by nature far-sighted and mate-
rial, although when operating in historical periods it is able to add the evidence
of written discourse. Social anthropology is more contemporaneous and based
especially on spoken discourse. The data patterns of the disciplines should how-
ever be interpreted within a social context, and in this way it becomes possible
to compare and integrate results.
Considering the scope and quality of the contributions, the three editors also
consider the book an important contribution to the international discussions in
this field, which are increasing currently due to the escalating situation in the
Middle East and disturbing reports from other war-stricken areas in the world.
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Warfare and Society
Conceptions of Warfare 
in Western Thought and Research /2-7

This section addresses the overall conceptual frameworks that have informed
Western thinking about warfare and explores how these frameworks have
impacted on anthropological and archaeological research into war and violence.
One of the central questions, of course, concerns the origin of war: has it always
existed, if not in reality then as a potential of human nature, or is it a product
of the development of human society? It is clear that in order to ask and answer
such a question we must first agree on what to regard as warfare. Even though
there is widespread agreement that warfare can and should be distinguished
from phenomena such as homicide and feuding, authors, also in this section,
disagree about the nature of the political units that can wage wars. David
Warburton argues that only states make wars and he thus places himself in a long
tradition of Western thought that sees statehood and warfare as intrinsically con-
nected. One should be aware, however, that this tradition of thought arises in a
period of Western history when states were the common form of organising
polities – and thus wars. The disciplines of archaeology and anthropology, also
products of Western history, extend the empirical horizon to societies without
centralising authorities and this makes it necessary to consider whether the
violent interactions in which these societies engage should also be called war. 
In this introduction, Otterbein’s definition is used as a guideline: war is a
planned and organised armed dispute between political units (Otterbein 1985:
3). In this definition these units do not necessarily have the character of states
(cp. also Ferguson 1984: 5), thus extending the phenomenon of warfare to a
large range of societies. The idea that warfare has evolved in relation to the
transformation of human societies has strongly influenced anthropological and
archaeological research, but before I develop this central assumption further I
want to highlight another central idea that has impacted on Western thinking
(and acting) up to the present day: that of the morally justified war.
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Conceptions of Warfare 
in Western Thought and Research:
An Introduction 
T O N  O T T O /2
The idea of morally justified war
Warburton (chapter 4) sketches two main lines of thought concerning war in
the Western history of ideas. One line is exemplified by the Greek historian
Thucydides (5th century BC) as well as by the German general Carl von
Clausewitz (1780-1831). In this line of thought war is the exercise of power to
impose one’s will – ‘politics by other means’ as Clausewitz (1989) formulated it.
Thucydides emphasised that we should not have an idealised concept of war-
fare. According to him the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what
they must. Ideas of morality play no role in this perspective: war is the applica-
tion of violence to achieve one’s goals. However, there is another line of thought
that has played a dominant role in Western history, namely that of war as a
morally justified activity. Thomas Aquinas clearly formulates a concept of the
‘just war’, which among other things is characterised by the right intention to
engage in war. Warburton follows this conceptual thread among other Western
thinkers, in particular Rousseau and Hegel. Obviously we cannot find the roots
of this concept in ancient Greece, which apart from Thucydides’ cynical view of
human nature also gave rise to the older Homeric worldview of war as a game
of honour and revenge. According to Warburton the roots of this idea have to
be found in the Near East. Ancient Egyptian and Assyrian warfare was connected
with the idea that their military and political expansion was sanctioned by their
gods, who gave victory in war. 
The Hebrew bible incorporated this idea of divine justification, but here we
have a God who also used war to punish his own people. Being in fact the only
God, a concept of absolute and universal justice became connected with war-
fare. Through the Hebrew bible the idea of a just war became absorbed into
Western thought, and adapted to various forms of states: from medieval king-
doms, which had to relate to the overarching church organisation, to states
characterised by the Reformation, and later modern democratic states claiming
the right to call on their citizens to take up arms for just causes. 
Warburton continues his sketch of the history of the idea of just wars by
observing an interesting contrast between Europe and the United States of
America. European states have become weary of their numerous conflicts which
showed that territorial expansion – however morally defended – was in practice
unsustainable over time because dominated peoples always fight back. By the
end of the 20th century most European states shared a determination to avoid
the use of war as a political instrument. For many Europeans warfare no longer
was morally justified, rather the opposite. The USA however continued its belief
in the justification of war. Its conceptions were structured to a high degree by
the context of the Cold War with the communist regimes, which was seen as an
ideological conflict. At the same time it was generally conceived that real war
was impossible because of the implicit risk of total destruction caused by modern
nuclear weapons. This war was no longer territorial but based on ideological
principles. America was not seen as defending (only) its own interests, but
rather as fighting for universal values such as individual rights, democracy and
economic growth. 
While the Cold War petered out due to dramatic internal changes in former
communist societies, a new ideological war has taken centre stage: that between
fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups on the one hand, and Western states on
the other, with the USA and its allies as the central targets and combatants. This
war has taken new forms, as one of the warring parties is not organised as a state.
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This is clearly causing problems for the Western states, which continue a strategy
of attacking ‘brigand’ states, supposedly harbouring or supporting the terrorists.
Perhaps even stronger than during the Cold War, this war is informed by ideas
of justified war from both sides. Religious rhetoric abounds and one cannot
avoid speculating whether a more pragmatic attitude in line with Clausewitz
and Thucydides would perhaps lead to different, less violent, strategies.
The origin and evolution of war
Apart from the morality of warfare, another central question has occupied the
minds of Western thinkers as well as archaeologists, anthropologists and prima-
tologists, namely concerning the origin and evolution of war. Is warfare a her-
itage from mankind’s biological origin or is it rather the opposite, a result of
human history? 
Raymond Corbey (chapter 3) presents some of the key issues and key thinkers
to inform this debate, which hinges on the contrast between nature and culture.
A central figure is Hobbes, who bases his argument on the idea of an original,
natural state, where everyone could potentially be attacked by everyone else: a
‘warre’ of all against all. This original situation could only be transcended by a
social contract, investing the power of violence in the sovereign state. A newer
version of this transition from an original state of war to more peaceful interac-
tion is provided by the anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In his view, exchange is
the earliest and therefore most fundamental human solution for overcoming
warfare; relations of exchange replace and prevent violent interactions: in order
to trade one has to be able to lay aside the spear. This idea has engendered a
strong line of anthropological research and theorising, exemplified by key the-
oreticians like Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis Dumont and Marshall Sahlins. They
present a view of a cultural solution to a fundamental biological tendency in
humankind: man’s original aggression is constrained by social institutions, in
particular exchange, exogamous marriage, and collective representations (ideas
and values about altruism and collaboration).
Even though highly appreciative of this approach, Corbey also identifies a
central problem, namely its assumption of the duality of human nature: emo-
tion versus reason, primordial war versus pacifying gift. He argues convincingly
that human nature is the result of the co-evolution of genetic make-up and
socio-cultural behaviour. Culture and nature have evolved in relationship to
each other and therefore human nature is also the product of culture. He fur-
ther argues that a comprehensive approach that analyses the integration of
nature and culture in human societies would be clearly in line with Mauss’
heuristic principle: to study social phenomena and people in their totality
(think of his famous concept of the ‘fait social total’). 
I would like to point to another limitation of the Maussian line of thought,
namely that its focus on cultural ‘solutions’ does not offer an explanation for
the enormous variability of warlike phenomena that exist in human societies,
in particular concerning the frequency and intensity of war. The Maussian focus
on exchange implies a concern with more or less egalitarian, non-state societies,
but even there great variety exists. In addition, some anthropologists argue that
exchange is not always a solution to war: exchange may in fact also lead to war,
or, to put it otherwise, exchange and warfare can apparently be well integrated
in a regional system of interacting, exchanging and warring small social units
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(see Brandt chapter 6; Wiessner chapter 11; Otto chapter 12; M. Strathern 1985;
A. Strathern 1992). 
The various forms and appearances of warfare in connection with different
types of societies, in particular those characterised by a central authority (state)
and those without, is the subject matter of the next two sections in this volume.
Here I would like to draw attention to an interesting perspective that focuses on
the borderline between nature and culture and thus relates directly to the issues
raised above. 
In an important article Bruce Knauft (1991) discusses the literature concerning
great-ape and simple human societies, defining the latter as lacking recognisable
leadership roles and status differentials among adult men. Simple human soci-
eties cover by far the largest period of the evolution of Homo Sapiens, but are
represented poorly in the ethnographic and archaeological record. They have to
be distinguished from more complex pre-state societies, called ‘middle-range’,
where sedentism, property ownership and male status differentiation are more
developed, namely complex hunter-gatherer societies, ‘tribes’, and ‘chiefdoms’.
Knauft argues that simple human societies differ from both great-ape and middle-
range human societies in that they show a relative absence of competitive male
hierarchies and of systematic violence between closed social groups. They are
more egalitarian among the adult males, sexually, politically and in terms of
sharing resources. Thus, he argues, the invention of cultural rules of cooperation
and exchange has had a clear impact on the use of violence in these societies,
which sets them apart from the high level of violence in middle-range societies
and from the competition and violence observed among apes. 
There is thus not a lineal development from pre-human to human societies,
but rather something that resembles the Maussian model: a (temporary) con-
straint on competition and violence through cultural institutions that have
given simple human societies an evolutionary advantage over their non-human
environment. This is an interesting hypothesis that certainly deserves further
research, but it is complicated and possibly weakened by the observation that
lethal violence may actually be high in these societies, even though the cultur-
al ethos is against it, and even though the violence may relate more to status
levelling than to status elevation (cp. Knauft 1991: 391).
Conceptions of warfare and present-day research
The contributions in this section by Helle Vandkilde (chapter 5) and Erik Brandt
(chapter 6) are concerned with a third question, namely how different concep-
tions of warfare have impacted upon the actual research conducted by archae-
ologists and anthropologists. This question received high visibility through
the publication of Lawrence Keeley’s book War before civilisation (1996), which
argues that anthropological and archaeological research into warfare has been
hampered by the conception that primitive warfare was much less serious and
destructive than modern warfare. Keeley relates this ‘myth’ of the rather peace-
ful savage to the horrible experiences of the two World Wars, which made schol-
ars more susceptible to imagining alternatives to the horrors of modern war.
Keeley’s idea is supported by the anthropologist Keith Otterbein (2000), who
has worked on warfare for more than three decades. 
However, Otterbein wishes to correct Keeley’s historical sketch on two
accounts. In the first place the myth of the peaceful savage arose already before
26 . C O N C E P T I O N S  O F  W A R F A R E  I N  W E S T E R N  T H O U G H T
World War II and, secondly, its driving force was a framework of evolutionary
theory, later conceptually nurtured by cultural relativism. He further argues that
Keeley has produced a ‘replacement myth’ which depicts pre-state societies
as bellicose. Unfortunately this new myth has caused a polarisation among
researchers, dividing them into Hawks and Doves
Helle Vandkilde describes the situation for the discipline of archaeology in
Europe which, in her view, has been dominated by two different tales of pre-
historic society. In the one tale prehistoric society is perceived as changing rad-
ically in certain periods, caused by human agents migrating and revolutionising
existing societies. Even though this view, classically exemplified by V.G. Childe,
implies the existence of warriors, it has not emphasised warfare as an important
element of the historical changes. The other tale sees prehistoric society as
changing slowly, through gradual evolution instead of revolution. The main
characters in this vision are hunters, peasants and traders, while warriors are
apparently neglected, and prehistoric society is imagined as basically peaceful.
The later view has been dominant since World War II and this appears to accord
with Keeley’s periodisation of the myth of the peaceful savage. 
Vandkilde observes a greater interest in, and a more realistic evaluation of
warfare in recent archaeology, but finds that there is still much to do. She sug-
gests that anthropological research, which has had only a relatively modest
impact on archaeology, should be used more extensively, while research into
warrior identities should be open to conceiving more variation in the status and
role of warriors according to context and period.
With regard to anthropological research on warfare, particularly in New
Guinea, Erik Brandt’s contribution criticises and modifies Keeley’s and
Otterbein’s hypothesis concerning the impact of the myth of the peaceful sav-
age (cp. Brandt 2000; Knauft 1990). He does not deny that the myth has exist-
ed, also in relation to New Guinean research, but it has not hampered anthro-
pological research in the way envisaged by Keeley and Otterbein. Brandt shows
that Malinowski had already made a sharp distinction between modern war and
savage war. Whereas modern war was considered as total, affecting every single
cultural activity, savage war was seen rather as a form of physical exercise devoid
of political relevancy. This depiction appears to support Otterbein’s rendering of
the origin of the myth of the peaceful savage, but Brandt shows that another
view can also be detected in Malinowski’s writings, one that accepts tribal war
as a serious and destructive phenomenon for the people concerned, who try to
constrain and overcome it by means of exchange. 
This Maussian view was later reproduced and refined by the focusing of influ-
ential anthropologists, such as Andrew and Marilyn Strathern, on the role of
local leaders – ‘big men’, who engage in exchange as an alternative and pre-
ferred way of gaining status in contrast to warfare. Their work has to be seen in
the context of earlier work on New Guinea, which had not refrained from mak-
ing ethnographic descriptions of ubiquitous and pervasive warfare that in all
aspects were reminiscent of total war. According to Brandt, it was in opposition
to such a view of total war that the work of the Stratherns should be understood,
but this did not lead them to assume predominantly peaceful savages. Thus,
Brandt concludes, the concept of total war, rather than the alternative notion of
the peaceful savage, has burdened the ethnography of New Guinean warfare,
but ethnographers have equally been influenced by the realities of war and vio-
lence they met in the field. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N . 27
Empirical studies and theoretical modelling
Brandt’s conclusion is a crucial motivation and legitimation for the studies that
are included in the following sections of this volume. Research cannot avoid
being informed and partly determined by the conceptual frameworks that are
available at the time of investigation and that are in dynamic relationship with
the wider social experiences of that period. But research is also informed and
influenced by the empirical findings carefully produced by anthropologists,
archaeologists and other researchers in their various projects. 
The first four contributors in the present section reflect on the conceptual
and ideological context of research into warfare: the philosophical questions,
the history of these questions in Western thought and the treatment of them in
the disciplines of archaeology and anthropology. The final chapter by Claus
Bossen (chapter 7) is an attempt to integrate existing theoretical perspectives
into one framework. The author’s central concern is to understand the relation-
ship between warfare and social change, and the chapter provides a useful
overview of anthropological, sociological and archaeological theories of warfare.
Bossen critically assesses their potential to explain social change in relation to
warfare and argues that the analysis of war and social change involves three per-
spectives or ‘levels’: praxis, society and process. 
At the level of praxis Bossen identifies three aspects of violent acts which
comprise meaning, technology and organisation. At the level of society Bossen
adopts Michael Mann’s four fields of social organisation: economy, politics, ide-
ology and the military. Finally Bossen assesses the ways in which warfare and
military organisation can contribute to social change, namely via internal effects
within a society, via submission of one society to another, and via the general
context of a warlike environment. Bossen argues that these three perspectives
are mutually interdependent and therefore should be integrated into one con-
ceptual framework. The explanatory value of such an integrated model obvi-
ously needs testing in relation to concrete cases, but as it stands Bossen’s model
may serve as a welcome heuristic tool to ask relevant questions about possible
links and dependencies between warfare, social practice and societal change.
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Ethnologists inevitably come to their subjects with
a certain philosophical baggage which is part of
their own, North Atlantic universe of cosmological
and moral meaning, and influences the way they
gather and interpret their data. In the following, I
will examine one particular, widespread assumption
informing Maussian and structuralist theorising on
gifts and reciprocity: the idea of violence as a basic
tendency of human nature. While the other contri-
butions to this volume focus on detailed archaeo-
logical and ethnographic data pertaining to conflict
and violence more directly, the present one looks at
historical and epistemological backgrounds of one
particular, quite influential way of handling such
data theoretically and conceptually.
From violence to sociality
The notion of disorder and conflict as a ‘natural’,
‘primordial’, or ‘original’ state of humankind, and
at the same time of human nature, is continually
present in Marcel Mauss’ Essai sur le don. It guides
his empirically directed work as a conceptual or ont-
ological presupposition, linking his thought to that
of the leading social theorists of the Enlightenment.
In his analysis, état naturel refers to both humankind
before history and civilisation – its natural history –
and a state of ‘raw nature’ that is partly constitutive
for human society, as a condition that must contin-
ually be transcended to make humanness possible.
Becoming human, as Mauss analyses it, happened
in (pre)history, but it is also, ontologically speaking,
a permanent, structural feature of humans who,
according to this view, continually transcend the
state of nature, by exchanging. The ‘natural state’ is
seen as primordial, both ontologically and phyloge-
netically, and social order as discontinuous with
nature in both respects.
Mauss holds exchange to be constitutive of social
life and social order because it is the chronologically
earliest and ontologically most fundamental solu-
tion to the Hobbesian warre of all against all that, in
Hobbes’ view, ensues from man’s selfish nature.
‘Societies have progressed’, he writes in the conclu-
sion to the Essai sur le don,
in so far as they themselves, their subgroups, and, lastly, the
individuals in them, have succeeded in stabilizing relation-
ships, giving, receiving, and finally, giving in return. To trade,
the first condition was to be able to lay aside the spear. From
then onwards, they succeeded in exchanging goods and per-
sons, no longer only between clans, but between tribes and
nations, and, above all, between individuals. Only then did
people learn how to create mutual interests, giving mutual
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Hobbesian Warre and the Maussian Gift
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satisfaction, and, in the end, to defend them without having to
resort to arms. (Mauss 1990: 82, my italics)
In the ‘natural’ state which is overcome through gift
exchange the ‘fundamental motives for human
action: emulation between individuals of the same
sex, that “basic imperialism of human being”’ (Mauss
1990: 65) still had free reign, but in the end reason
overcomes the folly of unbridled primeval warre: ‘It
is by opposing reason to feeling, by pitting the will
to peace against sudden outbursts of insanity of this
kind that people succeed in substituting alliances,
gifts, and trade for war, isolation and stagnation’
(Mauss 1990: 65). Social order is conceived of as the
constraining, taming, subduing of a primitive, pri-
mordial, condition of violence and warfare; the paci-
fying gift brings about co-operation and sociality.
More recently a number of ethnologists have put
the insights of Marcel Mauss and his disciple Louis
Dumont to use in their research on a number of most-
ly tribal societies, focussing on patterns of exchange.
Time and again they show by detailed ethnographic
analysis how in such societies certain ‘ideas/values’
– idées-valeurs – perpetuate themselves beyond the life
or death of particular individuals, imposing them-
selves in all the various sorts of social relations (e.g.,
Platenkamp 1988; Geirnaert-Martin 1992; Barraud
et al. 1994). The plethora of exchanges going on in
a village every day form, and constantly renew, the
value-orientated matrix of the ‘sociocosmos’ which
is constitutive for social order and, at the same time,
for the individuals involved, including the dead and
the spirits. ‘Subjects and objects intertwine ceaseless-
ly’, Barraud et al. write, underlining one of the key
insights of Mauss’ analysis of the gift, ‘in a tissue of
relations which make of exchanges the permanent
locus where these societies reaffirm, again and again,
their highest values.’ (Barraud et al. 1994; 105).
Exchange is here not taken in a narrow economic
sense, but as symbolic exchange, as a fait social total,
a ‘total social phenomenon’, with many, non-sepa-
rated aspects, normative, economic, jural, religious,
and so on. It is, with what is probably the best
known dictum from Mauss’ Essai, ‘one of the human
foundations on which our societies are built’ (Mauss
1990: 4).
According to these Durkheimians, in small-scale
traditional, non-state societies not only social order
but also personal identity, Mauss’ personnage (Mauss
1995: 331-61), is constituted through gifts and
exchange. Persons are not primarily seen as particu-
lar biological organisms, but as coming about and
being transformed – for instance, from living to dead
– by the ritually and intergenerationally bestowing
upon each other of souls, names, titles, rights, and
duties that are part of the family clan. This happens
not only in birth ceremonies, marriages, funerals, and
other important rituals that punctuate the life cycle,
but also in the context of subsistence activities such
as hunting and horticulture, usually conceived of as
an exchange with spirits inhabiting the landscape,
as well as in the context of such seemingly trivial
everyday activities as greeting, gossiping, and shar-
ing food.
The influential structuralist approach of Claude
Lévi-Strauss shares the Maussian presupposition of
social order as a human imposition upon a relatively
unstructured, chaotic, brute state of nature:
The social life of monkeys does not lend itself to the formula-
tion of any norm ... [The] monkey’s behaviour is surprisingly
changeable. Not only is the behaviour of a single subset incon-
sistent, but there is no regular pattern to be discerned in collec-
tive behaviour (Levi-Strauss 1969: 6-7; my italics; cp. Rodseth
et al. 1991: 222, 233)
In Lévi-Strauss’ opinion, a particular animal became
human, and social organisation came into being,
only by the prohibition of incest. ‘[Humankind] has
understood very early’, he states in The Elementary
Structures of Kinship,
that, in order to free itself from a wild struggle for existence, it
was confronted with the very simple choice of “either marry-
ing-out or being killed-out”. The alternative was between bio-
logical families living in juxtaposition and endeavouring to
remain closed, self-perpetuating units, overridden by their fears,
hatreds and ignorances, and the systematic establishment,
through the incest prohibition, of links of intermarriage
between them, thus succeeding to build, out of the artificial
bounds of affinity, a true human society ... (Levi-Strauss 1956:
277-78; my italics)
Social, political, and economic order, in this view,
come about by giving; they are a consequence of
the exchange – of giving and receiving, giving and
giving-in-return – of women between male-domi-
nated descent groups. Hereby the natural state is
transcended and a truly human existence is
attained.
30 . C O N C E P T I O N S  O F  W A R F A R E  I N  W E S T E R N  T H O U G H T  
This particular way of conceptualising the relation
between society and nature is analogous to Thomas
Hobbes’ social contract theory. ‘The finall Cause,
End or Designe of men,’ Hobbes wrote in the first
part of Leviathan,
... in the introduction of ... restraint upon themselves, ... is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented
life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent to
the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to
keep them in awe. (Hobbes 1972 [1651]: 223, my italics)
Social order, according to Hobbes, is not in human’s
nature, but is installed by a social contract that con-
strains and pacifies the natural state of humankind
and the solitary individual’s brutish natural tenden-
cies. Most Hobbes commentators stress that the
natural state is but a hypothesis, an imagined, fic-
tional condition facilitating the analysis of how social
order is constituted, but Hobbes regularly alludes to
American Indians and the prehistory of humankind.
At a certain point, the analogy stops, for while in
Hobbes’ thought the state is an instrument of selfish
individuals, for the Durkheimians, the social fabric
which is constituted by exchange is a moral and
religious order. Their approach was critically pitted
against the liberal, in their view, too individualistic,
voluntaristic, and utilitarianist homo oeconomicus
approach to the foundations of society of the social
contract theorists of the Enlightenment. The Maussian
gift can be seen as ‘the primitive analogue of the
social contract ... the primitive way of achieving the
peace that in civil society is secured by the State’
(Sahlins 1972: 169, my italics).
The Durkheimian view of the ‘primordial nature’
of humans is clearly quite close to that of Enlighten-
ment authors who postulate a progress from a savage
primordial state to the civilised condition. Both
positions are heir to a typically European, dualistic
perception of humans and reality that issues from
Platonic and Christian ideas on the spirit and the
flesh, innate sinfulness and redemption (Corbey
1993; Sahlins 1996; Carrithers 1996). More specifi-
cally, the view of humans and nature underlying
Mauss’ analysis of the transition of war of all against
all to exchange of all with all, or, at least, of many
with many, is the Durkheimian one of homo duplex.
It was formulated succinctly by Emile Durkheim in
an article from 1914. The individual, in his view, has
‘a double existence ... the one purely individual and
rooted in our organisms, the other social and noth-
ing but an extension of society’ (Durkheim 1960:
337; cp. Sahlins 1996: 402; Rapport 1996).
A deep antagonism between the demands of the
individual organism and those of social order is
postulated, a conflict in which Durkheim and Mauss
are firmly on the side of the morale de la réciprocité,
which triumphs over the primordial intéret person-
nel. One particular animal species becomes human
phylogenetically, ontogenetically, ontologically, and
morally, through inculcation in a different order of
existence: the spiritually, morally, and intellectually
superior world of society, language, and culture, thus
rising above its naturally selfish animal individuali-
ty which is directly rooted in the organism. Such
and similar dualistic views of humans and society,
nature and culture, determine how most ethnolo-
gists, in the French Durkheimian-cum-Maussian
tradition, but also, along slightly different lines, in
the American Boasian tradition, conceive of their
discipline: as a human science.
Society as biology or society as culture?
There are baffling divergences in styles of scientific
explanation between, as well as within, disciplines
depending on whether natural sciences types of
approach are followed or interpretive, typically
human sciences, ones. Explanations of human vio-
lence and warfare are a case in point. Support has been
lent to the Hobbesian perception of human nature
in recent decades by a number of researchers work-
ing with biological, evolutionary approaches, in the
wake of the ethology of Konrad Lorenz, Irenäeus
Eibl-Eibesfeld, and Nico Tinbergen; the sociobiology
of Edmund Wilson; Richard Alexander’s theory of
the maximisation of reproductive success; the bio-
social anthropology of Robin Fox; as well as, more
recently, the inclusive fitness theory, dual inheri-
tance theory, and evolutionary psychology. Johan
van der Dennen, for example, in his 1995 analysis
of the evolutionary origin of war, takes a rigorously
biological approach, analysing warfare as a highly
effective, high-risk/high-gain male-coalitional adap-
tive and reproductive strategy. This is a Hobbesian
bellum omnium contra omnes; not Malthusian society
read into nature, as Karl Marx once wrote to Friedrich
Engels upon reading Darwin, but exactly the opposite.
For the Maussians, altruism means the suppression
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of selfish instincts; for inclusive fitness theory, their
articulation.
Combining human sociobiological insights with
cultural ecological ones, anthropologist Napoleon
Chagnon, in his research on the Yanomami of
Venezuela, stresses the inclusive fitness of male war-
riors in the complex interrelationship between
individuals, groups, and their natural environment
(e.g., Chagnon 1988). The more women they realise
access to, the better the proliferation of their genes.
Most cultural anthropologists, however, conceive of
their discipline as a typically human science, and,
unlike Chagnon, conceive of society as a cultural
and normative order, not primarily a biological one.
Accordingly, they interpret warfare and violence as
predominantly cultural phenomena, following col-
lective rules and values, or rationally responding to
historical or environmental circumstances such as
resource scarcity, rather than issuing from individ-
ual basic drives. ‘Indeed’, Leslie Sponsel (1996: 909)
writes,
in recent decades diverse lines of evidence have converged to
strongly suggest, if not to demonstrate, to everyone’s satis-
faction, that human aggression, including warfare, is over-
whelmingly determined by culture.
This sharply contrasts with van der Dennen’s claim
that warfare is overwhelmingly determined by biolo-
gy, and explainable only by a rigorously neodarwinist
approach.
It has been argued (by the authors contributing to
Sponsel and Gregor 1994, among others) that peace-
fulness, not war, sociality, not aggression, is the natu-
ral, normal condition. In their view, aggression and
warfare do not issue from basic human nature, but
are triggered by specific historical and cultural cir-
cumstance. The Hobbesian idea of aggression as ger-
mane to the human condition has accordingly been
criticised as social Darwinist ideology. Biologically
orientated authors have retorted to ethnologists of
that persuasion that peacefulness is but a roman-
tic, utopian dream – a case of primitivist wishful
thinking.
Controversies between, broadly conceived,
researchers who stress natural determinants and
those who favour a culturalist approach have led to
characterisations of certain peoples as explicitly
aggressive and fierce or, alternatively, unambiguously
gentle and peaceful. Against Chagnon’s vengeful
Yanomani aggressors, beating up women and war-
ring constantly, the Chewong and Semai Senoi from
Malaysia, and the Sakkudei from Indonesia, among
others, have been thrown in the balance as deci-
sively peaceful peoples. The Kalahari Desert !Kung
too were initially cast as a gentle, harmless people.
However, the considerable role of preconceived ideas
in research is shown once again by the fact that
most of such claims have been contested. Jacques
Lizot, for example, has sharply criticised the image
of the Yanomami as a ‘fierce people’ (Lizot 1994).
Biologically orientated authors, on the other hand,
have highlighted the occurrence of violence among
the !Kung as well as the Semai Senoi. Something sim-
ilar happened to Margaret Mead’s fieldwork among
Samoan adolescents in the 1920s; her underestima-
tion of the role of jealousy, abuse, rape and violence
was criticised as a culturalist bias by, again, a bio-
logically orientated anthropologist (Freeman 1984).
Violence and peacefulness as interpretive concepts
have a remarkably analogous role to play in prima-
tology. Traditionally, violence has been one of the
main ascribed characteristics not only of non-western
peoples, but also of nonhuman primates. Both cate-
gories were perceived as primitive, brute and unre-
strained, and associated with the savage beginnings
of humankind’s progress to civilisation (Corbey
1989). In recent primatology, a divergence similar to
the one just described for ethnography exists.
Primatologist Frans de Waal on the one hand, in
publications with such telltale titles as Peacemaking
Among Primates (1989) and Good Natured: The Origins
of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals
(1996), stresses mechanisms for avoiding, reducing
and resolving conflicts in the social life of all primates,
including humans. Whereas in the Hobbesian-cum-
Durkheimian view morality and reciprocal altruism
are to be found in culture as a layer superimposed
upon the violent and selfish nature of humans, De
Waal sees it as part and parcel of the biological
make-up of humans and other primates. Empathy
and sympathy, reconciliation and forgiveness in his
view are ultimately more adaptive than aggression.
Harvard primatologist Richard Wrangham, on
the other hand, sums up his, in this respect at least
diametrically opposed, Hobbesian approach in his
1996 book with Dale Peterson on Demonic Males:
Apes and the Origin of Human Violence. Males are
selected by females for exploitive and aggressive
behaviours, leading to reproductive success. Like de
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Waal’s books, this one too was written for a broad
audience, but reports on a substantial body of detailed
empirical studies. ‘We are cursed’, Wrangham and
Peterson conclude, ‘with a demonic male tempera-
ment and a Machiavellian capacity to express it – a
5-million stain of our ape past.’ (Wrangham and
Peterson 1996: 258). In the seventies, the positive
image of chimpanzees that had emerged in the
1960s had started to change to a less positive, more
ambiguous one – in much the same way as that of
!Kung Bushmen – when it was discovered that nei-
ther the Gombe reserve nor the Kalahari desert were
idyllic Shangri-La’s after all: in both cases murder
and violence turned out to be present next to gen-
tleness and cooperation. The same goes for the
Arnhem Burgers Zoo colony of chimpanzees studied
by de Waal.
Summing up, we have seen how the Maussian
perception of a violent primordial condition of
humankind which is to be transcended for real
morality and sociality to be possible is partly sup-
ported by biological approaches such as those of
Wrangham and van der Dennen. Primatologist de
Waal, however, stresses innate morality instead of
innate aggression. Most ethnologists, on the other
hand, seek to explain war and violence on the level
of culture and history, and relativise the role of
aggression, explicitly posing peacefulness as the
basic human condition.
Researchers in a functionalist, Malinowskian tra-
dition have taken issue with Durkheimian views of
social exchange stressing moral altruism. The latter
take reciprocity as elementary morality and as a
means of maintaining equality within the total
moral universe, within, in the terminology of
Dumont, De Coppet, Barraud and others, the ‘socio-
cosmos’ of ‘ideas/values’ (Barraud et al. 1994). Mauss
himself, for example, has criticised Malinowski’s
work on Melanesia as too individualist and utilitar-
ianist (Mauss 1990: 71ff). However, in spite of his
eye for agonistic aspects of ritual exchange, Mauss’
own work has in recent decades been criticised for
underestimating precisely the – indeed Hobbesian –
dimension of utility. Annette Weiner and others
have pointed to the neglect, in the Maussian camp,
of the calculation of outputs and the maximisation
of returns, and analysed ritual exchanges not so
much as adhering to basic values, but as strategic
action increasing power and inequality. Weiner re-
examines Maussian and other
classic anthropological exchange theories and the ethnogra-
phies that validated these theories [in order] to demystify the
ahistorical essentialism in the norm of reciprocity which has
masked the political dynamics and gender-based power con-
stituted through keeping-while-giving. (Weiner 1992: 17)
Here again – in parallel to the aforementioned accu-
sations of ideology between proponents of warre and
proponents of sociality – the Maussian assumption
that modern, western exchange is predominantly
Malinowskian (utilitarian), while ‘archaic’, pre-
modern exchange is Maussian (reciprocal), has been
criticised as primitivist. The Malinowskian view of
pre-modern exchange, on the other hand, has been
accused of fallaciously and ethnocentrically reading
modernity into non-modern cultures.
Regrettably, as another instance of the traditional
cleavage between biological and ethnological
approaches, the Malinowskian viewpoint is largely
out of touch with biology, even though it converges
considerably with such viewpoints as reciprocal
altruism and inclusive fitness, as a quote from socio-
biologist van der Dennen clearly shows. ‘I regard
human beings’, he writes,
as shrewd social strategists, clever manipulators, and conscious,
intelligent decision-makers in the service of their inclusive fit-
ness, operating within the constraints of their cultural seman-
tics: the signification and interpretive frameworks ... provided
by the culture they happen to be born in. (van der Dennen
1995: 9)
It is but a small step from here to Malinowski’s and
Weiner’s self-interested actors who constantly calcu-
late their costs and benefits, also on the level of
sacral and spiritual esteem. According to Weiner’s
line of argument with its stress on utility, social life
and the Maussian gift do not eclipse, but are the
very expression of, Hobbesian selfishness and
Machiavellian manoeuvring.
Anthropology held captive by homo duplex
We have by now encountered at least three different
stances with respect to the idea of Hobbesian warre as
the quintessential mark of the human beast. The first,
Durkheimian one, sees it subdued and transcended
by a holistic ‘sociocosmos’ of ideas/values, repro-
duced in pacifying gift exchange. A second, biologi-
cal one, in terms of inclusive fitness, supports it, in
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an updated and more subtle version. A third major
theoretical stance are individualist and functionalist
approaches in ethnology, which lend indirect sup-
port to the preconception of war as a fundamental
condition by regarding utility as all-important in
social life.
Of course, nobody would subscribe to such ahis-
torical essentialisations as either war or peacefulness
as the basic nature of humankind, or of certain
groups; everyone would agree that fierceness and
gentleness do not exclude one another and have
both roles to play; nobody would deny that there
are biological and environmental and cultural and
historical aspects to warfare. Still, and nevertheless,
as is clear from the foregoing, such preconceptions
are capable of creating considerable theoretical
divergence. One of the challenges for 21st-century
anthropology lies in combining the efforts of biolog-
ical and ethnological approaches. This may not be
simple, because the repudiation of biology is nearly
constitutive of much of anthropology’s disciplinary
identity, especially in the French, Durkheimian tra-
dition and the American, Boasian one. In both tra-
ditions, culture is taken as what transcends human
biology, and thus gives anthropology its own iden-
tity vis-à-vis the biological sciences.
Mauss himself has provided a starting point for
overcoming the unproductive homo duplex view –
which opposes emotion and reason, primordial war
and the pacifying gift – with his programmatic
heuristic of phénomènes de totalité and hommes
totaux. We hardly ever find man divided into several
faculties (‘L’homme divisé en facultés’), he wrote in
1924 (Mauss 1995: 303); we always come across the
whole human body and mentality, given totally and
at the same time, and basically, body, soul, society,
everything is mixed up here (‘Au fond, corps, âme,
société, tout ici se mèle’). The gift is perhaps the best
example of such a total social phenomenon (fait
social total or prestation totale).
Given what was known in Mauss’ day of behav-
ioural genetics, kin selection, reciprocal altruism,
gene-culture coevolution, the neurological basis of
cultural behaviour, and epigenetic development, it
may not be held against him that he did not entirely
live up to this valuable methodological adage as far
as corporeality and the biology of behaviour were
concerned. Durkheimian-orientated authors from
recent decades, however, are here confronted with an
exciting and important challenge. In fact, as we now
know, and as quite a few theoreticians on exchange
fail to realise, human nature results from the co-evo-
lution of genetic make-up and cultural as well as
social behaviour. Our hands, for example, were
shaped while wielding chopping tools and handaxes;
parts of our brains and respiratory tracts when our
ancestors started to use arbitrary symbols. Stone
tools and spoken language are thus integral parts of
our biological existence. Similarly, the acquisition
and intergenerational, partly symbolic, transmission
of cultural and social abilities in humans is crucially
dependent upon a whole gamut of cognitive and
motivational capabilities that are part of our specific
biological equipment. A complex, subtle, and well-
timed interaction of these capacities with social
environmental influences is of vital importance – an
interaction which can also be described on the level
of epigenetic neuronal development.
There is a clear biological dimension to various
forms of reciprocity in humans, who, as experiments
show, solve abstract logical problems more quickly
when framed in terms of compliance or cheating
with social rules. This shows the importance of
social calculation in humans, more specifically their
aptness at tallying mutual benefits as an adaptive
feature (Cosmides and Tooby 1992). Analogously,
Desmodus rotundus vampire bats in Costa Rica
exchange blood they have sucked with others in the
group according to strictly registered and respected
patterns of reciprocity. Thus they enhance their
chances of survival considerably, for not all flights
are successful, and three unsuccessful nightly flights
in order may lead to death by starvation (Denault
and McFarlane 1995). According to socioecology, the
mutual exchange of gifts, services, or women in
hominids benefits all parties in such transactions,
and is highly adaptive, for example as an ecological
safety network to fall back upon in difficult times.
Such practices are part of the sociality of hominid
and human kin, evolving through selective pres-
sures on reproductive success.
Our nature thus was, and is, social and cultural
from its very beginning. That there is a brutish, impul-
sive animal nature deep within us, in the need of
being restrained and subdued in order to make civil-
isation and social order possible, is a conviction that,
at least in this form, does not hold in the light of
recent insights. Much of what is social does not come
about through a symbolic exchange or contract that
restrains the biological, but is biological, that is,
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natural, itself. How much the Maussian perspective
underestimates the role of that purportedly ‘raw’
organic nature, both phylogenetically and ontologi-
cally, is illustrated forcefully by recent work on social-
ity, individuality, politics, motivation, and communi-
cation in nonhuman primates, for example, chim-
panzees (Rodseth et al. 1991; Quiatt and Reynolds
1993; Ducros, Ducros and Joulian 1998). The chal-
lenge here is to understand better the interaction
between biology, sociality and cultural meaning.
Evolutionary perspectives dealing with biological
aspects of living together cannot replace cultural
interpretive ones which deal with subjective, sym-
bolic dimensions of life, but they can supplement
them in approaches which focus on the interaction
and reciprocal relations between biological, symbolic,
sociodemographic, politicoeconomic, and other
dimensions of the wielding and the laying aside of
spears, of conflict and contract.
In general, evolutionary-biological approaches
have adduced solid evidence that human individuals
‘favour genetic over classificatory kin, that patterns
of residence, descent and marriage are in part affected
by reproductive considerations, and that wealth and
status are converted into reproductive advantage’
(Borgerhoff Mulder 1987: 8; cp. Betzig, Borgerhoff
Mulder and Turke 1988). Napoleon Chagnon’s
aforementioned work on the Yanomami provides a
convincing example of this line of argument, as does
the analysis of kinship and marriage in humans and
other primates in Quiatt and Reynolds (1993: Ch. 9
and 10; cp. Fox 1989). In addition, and more specifi-
cally, Robert Trivers’ (1985) reciprocal altruism the-
ory, which claims that individuals may donate
resources to nonkin if equivalent aid is returned in
the future, provides an interesting complementary
perspective on patterns of exchange as analysed in
detail by Maussian and other ethnographers.
Conclusion
Mauss’ and the Maussians’ stimulating views of
exchange can be put to good use in confrontation
and concurrence with recent biological insights
such as the aforementioned. To some extent this
goes beyond what Mauss intended, but it remains
faithful to his heuristic principle of a ‘totalising’
approach which must take the natural into account
too, against the grain of homo duplex approaches. It
is worthwhile to try and bring homo symbolicus,
constitutive of much of cultural anthropology as a
discipline, back down to earth, to nature, by bringing
the richness of evolutionary biology to bear upon
the idea of man the symbolic and cultural animal.
Such approaches as dual inheritance theory, behav-
ioural socioecology, and evolutionary psychology
are ‘total’ in Mauss’ sense and well in tune with the
traditional holistic intention of anthropology, while
approaching cultural symbolism as a biological phe-
nomenon. They can help in taking human culture,
sociality and society not too one-sidedly as a pre-
dominantly Darwinian instinctual order, nor as an
exclusively Durkheimian normative order, but as a
complex and subtle interaction of both.
The Maussian paradigm, valuable though it is, is
flawed by a too radically dualistic view of man, and
stands in the need not so much of being over-
thrown, but of being rethought and updated. While
for Durkheim and Mauss altruism meant the cultural
suppression of selfish instincts, for evolutionary
biology it is precisely the opposite: the expression of
such – altruistic, but on another level of analysis
selfish – instincts. More can be learned by asking
how the symbolic behaviour, altruism and Maussian
gifts that make human societies and identities pos-
sible may be rooted in nature than by asserting that
they constitute the difference that sets humans apart
from nature (cp. Quiatt and Reynolds 1993: 265).
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Western philosophy of war: 1000 BC-1900 AD
In the Melian dialogue, Thucydides (460?-395? BC),
one of the first European observers to comment on
the character of war, has the Athenians state the
laws of international relations. Obeying this law in
the 5th century BC, the Athenians pursued a war of
conquest in the Aegean. The Melian dialogue ended
when the Athenians massacred the adult men and
sold the women and children into slavery; the war
ended when the Spartans destroyed the Athenian
fleet.
In the 19th century AD the Prussian general Carl
von Clausewitz (1780-1831 AD) viewed war as an
act of political violence, with the object of imposing
one’s will on the enemy (Clausewitz 1991; 1989).
Political organisation, goals, territorial borders,
strategic method, hostility and violence were basic
to warfare as understood by Thucydides and
Clausewitz. Of equal significance for Clausewitz was
the concept of reciprocity: that both parties observed
the same reciprocal and symmetrical attitude to war.
The limits on violence were the character of the
political goals and the activity of the enemy. The
political goal of compelling the enemy to obey one’s
will was fundamental. The method was the utmost
use of violence; the clash of armies.
Clausewitz realised that this ideal form of warfare
was never achieved. Among the principal reasons
given in the published form of the book were the
importance of intelligence, logistics, friction and
luck. Obviously, these had an impact, diminishing
the pure violence in warfare. Clausewitz was also
conscious of other forms of warfare, and the ‘limited
war’ in particular, where the goal was not total vic-
tory and thus the total application of force was not
required. This did not play a major role in the book
as published. Before his death, however, Clausewitz
had begun to develop a dual approach to the analy-
sis of war, assuming that it would be possible to
view two types of war, one with the object of total
victory, and the other with the object of limited
conquests. He intended to revise the entire work,
taking account of this dichotomy, distinguishing
‘total’ and ‘limited’ war (Clausewitz 1991: 179).
Thucydides (V: 89) has the Athenians state that
‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must.’ As Clausewitz’ book stands, it for-
mulates the principles this implied, and Thucydides’
categorisation of war as the utmost use of force for
the pursuit of political goals was his testament to his
heirs, as the European philosophy of war for more
than two millennia.
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Aspects of War and Warfare 
in Western Philosophy and History
D A V I D  W A R B U R T O N /4
Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they
rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon
it when made; we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist forever after us…
(Thucydides V: 105, 2)
Introduction
Archaeologists and anthropologists are perfectly
aware that Clausewitz’ assumptions about political
goals, territorial frontiers, reciprocal responses, etc.
may not characterise all activity classified as ‘war-
fare’, whereas Thucydides’ observation about the
‘strong’ and the ‘weak’ would appear to be so accu-
rate that it is virtually a tautology. 
In neither approach is there any implication of
‘morality’ or ‘social responsibility’, whereas ‘warfare’
in the West today is understood as being a ‘moral’
activity. This remains true whether or not the
observer is opposed to the use of war, or in favour of
it: it is invariably associated with some ‘higher pur-
pose’ and not just ‘interest’ and ‘policy’. At the same
time, ‘warfare’ is associated with ‘violence’, and par-
ticularly the use of force for achieving goals without
recourse to reason or negotiation.
One of the central assumptions implicit in the
current argument is that the origins of warfare can
lie in inter-communal violence, but that this vio-
lence itself is not necessarily warfare, i.e., the ‘origins’
and ‘character’ of warfare are two separate issues. The
use of violence in human communities doubtless
preceded the appearance of states and the pursuit of
power and political interest. In this chapter I suggest
that inter-communal violence be distinguished from
‘warfare’, and argue that the distinction be made by
distinguishing the ‘political’ character of warfare. 
‘Warfare’ as treated in the current chapter is
essentially that reflected in the last five millennia of
recorded history, as this chapter is devoted to the
changing character of warfare in Western philoso-
phy, and not to the origins of warfare. This chapter
aims to explore the development of the Western
understanding of war, and how ‘policy’, ‘interest’,
‘morality’, ‘justice’, ‘violence’ and the ‘state’ came to
play the roles that they do, as well as the impact
that this has had on the conduct of war. 
Origins and development 
of European concepts of warfare
Although among the first to analyse warfare,
Thucydides was not the first European known to
have recorded it. According to the poet Homer, war-
fare involved honour, revenge and bloody carnage.
Fear, anger, courage, pauses, and divine interven-
tion play an important role in his narrative, while
goals, policy and absolute force do not. Divine
behaviour – in their own world and among humans
– could be as arbitrary as the activity of the humans. 
The political purpose of Homeric warfare is not
evident. The utmost use of force is avoided. Nor
would the war appear to have involved a policy of
territorial expansion. Although plunder did play a
role, it is not clear that the concept of calculated
gain underlies either the goal or the execution.
Homeric warfare would, therefore, appear to defy
the criteria set by Clausewitz. The interruptions in
the Trojan War – due to pride etc. – would also appear
to be quite foreign to Clausewitz. With his pithy
description, however, Thucydides would appear to
have grasped the character of war, as applied both
in his own time – for imperial expansion – and in
Homer’s (where it was apparently a form of amuse-
ment).
Those European philosophers who approached
the subject of warfare from the Middle Ages
onwards had access to the works of Thucydides and
Homer, as well as Arrian, Polybius, Livy, and Caesar.
Like Thucydides and Clausewitz, none viewed war
as a moral activity. For them, warfare was a commu-
nal activity involving violence with the object of
subjecting the weaker to the will of the stronger.
Courage and deception were equally valuable in
contributing to victory. Neglect of ritual observances
was mere pretext – or ruse. Divine guidance was only
required to aid in strategy; victory was herself a god-
dess. This is the character of war as understood by
Europeans as the Roman Empire began its gradual
decline. 
The situation was quite different when Europe
began its gradual re-awakening in the Middle Ages.
In contrast to Clausewitz, St. Thomas Aquinas
insisted on the absolute minimum use of force, even
in war. Aquinas advocated a ‘just war’, declared by
a monarch and pursued with a right intention in
support of a just cause. Aquinas’ concept of the ‘just
war’ included three principles, (a) a declaration, (b)
a just cause and (c) a right intention. The declaration
should be produced by a monarch and self-defence
was among the better ‘causes’. In discussing Aquinas’
doctrine of the ‘just war’, Sigmund (1997: 227) sug-
gested that precedents could be found in Augustine
and Cicero. It is striking that Aristotle – who could
usually be relied upon to turn up as a reference for
almost everything in medieval philosophy – signal-
ly failed Aquinas here. Aquinas’s concept was quite
outside European tradition. His concept of war was
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expressed in terms of monarchy, but this alone did
not suffice to guarantee that war was just, even if the
monarch was the divinely selected administrator of
the commonwealth. Aquinas insisted on a just cause
and a right intention as well. 
Precedents for details can be found in Augustine’s
justification for the use of violence by Christians. St.
Augustine assumed that a ‘just war’ was possible;
assuming that war carried out in obedience to the
Christian God would be a ‘just war’. This allowed him
to absolve Moses of making war, for Moses could
hardly be expected to refuse a command of the Lord
(Paolucci 1962: 170). Defining the state as ‘a multi-
tude of men bound together by some bond of accord’,
and assuming that Christianity could provide the
spirit of concord, Augustine had a doctrine whereby
the Christian state could wage a just war with the
support of God. This allowed ample precedent for a
theory of just war as Aquinas understood it. 
Rousseau to Hegel
As is to be expected of the translator of Thucydides,
Thomas Hobbes viewed civil society as the only
means of protecting the weak from the strong.
Hobbes assumed that ‘the life of man was nasty,
brutish and short’. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Hoffmann
and Fidler 1991: 1-100) took issue with Hobbes
quite strongly, (a) seeing no reason why he should
believe that people were as greedy as Hobbes
assumed, and (b) assuming that people only came
into armed conflict under duress. Rousseau assumed
that the state was not confined by the natural
boundaries set by nature. Instead, the state was
bounded only by other states and a state of war
would exist between them as the natural form of
frontier separating artificial entities without natural
boundaries. He assumed that existence gave the state
power to coerce individuals into warfare. Whether
he viewed this as a violation of either their natural
rights or inclinations is immaterial. Given the various
limits imposed on the state by its size and the might
of its neighbours, Rousseau assumed it would be
impossible for a European monarch to assemble an
army large enough to defeat all of the other powers.
He therefore concluded that world conquest was
impossible.
While denying a natural tendency towards vio-
lence and greed, and recognising the concept of a
legitimate war which was just, Rousseau also appre-
ciated that avarice and selfishness could lead a
democracy to wage an unjust war. Rousseau not
only conceded the existence of avarice, but that it
could undermine the state, and therefore he
appealed to patriotism. While dismissing Hobbes’
view of human nature, Rousseau recognised that the
behaviour of states corresponded to the behaviour
of the individual posited by Hobbes. 
Rousseau proposed an alternative role for the
state itself, assuming that truth and justice guide
the state, assuring freedom to its citizens. Rousseau
recognised the right to self-defence and revenge.
Ultimately, the idea that service to the state could
be construed as morally correct depended upon self-
lessness. Based on private property, Rousseau assumed
that the state could guarantee the rights of citizens
by providing regular income from public funds for
its magistrates. He contended that the ‘triumph of
private over public good’ could be marginalised.
Arguing that Hobbes’ state of nature did not corre-
spond to the reality of mankind’s social bonds,
Rousseau assumed that deficiencies were due to
injustice, rather than flaws in human nature. 
For Rousseau, therefore, the state can be trans-
formed from an instrument of despotic oppression
into a public corporation and an instrument of good,
which can wage just wars. This was not, however,
the natural state of the state, merely an ideal. The
natural state of the state was to oppress and to wage
wars, bounded only by the powers of other states,
largely as Thucydides had perceived it.
While likewise arguing that humans need not be
completely bestial, Kant also associated violence and
unruliness with pre-state and non-state societies.
However, Immanuel Kant joined his predecessors
in making the heads of states responsible for war,
thus linking war to the state. He complemented his
ambivalent view of human nature with the observa-
tion that despite the allegedly evil nature of the
human race, statesmen invariably attempted to
accompany their declarations of war with legal and
moral arguments. To this realistic assessment – that
humans are violent and states wage war – Kant
advocated an agreement among states that could
lead to ‘perpetual peace’ (Kant 1917). The agreement
of states would guarantee its success, since states
alone caused war. In this seemingly Hegelian dialec-
tic, Kant, like Rousseau, was able to transform an
instrument of oppression and war into an instrument
of peace. 
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G.W.F. Hegel (e.g. Hegel 1999a; 1999b) viewed
Kant’s project of ‘perpetual peace’ with disdain.
Hegel assumed that states would resolve conflict
through war, and that any possible peace would
depend upon the consent of the governments of the
states and that this was not a reliable basis. Whereas
Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant viewed the state as a
convenience, Hegel viewed it as the end of history.
Through reason and science, Hegel argued that the
states of the Germanic peoples would allow the state
itself to take its rightful place as a manifestation of
the divine, alongside the natural and ideal worlds. 
For Hegel, the basic principles of the world were
‘spirit’ and ‘power’. The state was the substantial
form of both ‘freedom’ and ‘will’. Hegel viewed the
state as the ‘unification of the principle of the family
and civil society’. While recognising that ‘the state
is divine will’, Hegel specifically refuted the princi-
ple that the state was based on religion. Religion was
the sphere of the absolute truth, and ‘state, laws and
obligations’ corresponded to the ideal norms, but
not any specific form of religion providing a foun-
dation for these norms. ‘State’ and ‘religion’ were thus
different forms of divine will. Hegel assumed that a
nation without a monarch would be a formless mass
and no longer a state, which allowed him to identify
the ‘person of the monarch’ as the ‘sovereignty of
the state’. Legitimacy came through birth.
Given its absolute worldly moral authority, the
state was the source of the rights and obligations of
the individual, meaning that the individual was
subordinated to the state. The constitution of the
state was the codification of the conscious substan-
tial realisation of the will of civil society. The state
could thus expect and demand taxes on property
and military service. In return for guaranteeing
property and protection, the state could abolish the
individual’s right to property, freedom and life. 
While assigning the state absolute power, Hegel
assumed that war ‘was not an absolute evil’ but
rather a ‘necessity’ which should be viewed as ‘inci-
dental’ and inevitable in the concert of nations. The
state was the absolute power on earth and depend-
ed upon recognition for its existence, and it was
therefore obliged to assure its recognition. Conflict
between states was resolved by war, which threat-
ened the state’s independence. The two forms of
state merged: the internal role meant the state was
assured the support of citizens, while the external
role demanded that it be recognised by other states.
The obligation to perform military service in the
standing army of the state was no different from the
necessity of observing civil or commercial laws con-
cerning marriage or business. The state had the right
to depend upon people to defend its borders, and
successful application of force could transform a
defensive war into a war of conquest.
Thus, while Rousseau assumed that humans were
peaceful by inclination and that the state was the
source of evil, Hegel viewed the state as the ideal
combination of power and spirit, assigning it a
higher moral power. Rousseau perceived that the
power of the state lay in its people; Hegel assumed
that the power of the state lay in its divinity. In
either case, the state was given the highest moral
position and responsibility for warfare: in the one
case in violation of alleged human nature, in the
other case as part of the state’s moral responsibility
to protect the citizens of a civil society.
War as policy and the just war
For diametrically opposing reasons, Rousseau and
Hegel viewed war and the state as a moral issue
related to property and rights, whereas Kant did not.
Although Kant’s intent was to establish ‘perpetual
peace’, it effectively opened the way for Clausewitz’
understanding of war as a political instrument
employed in the pursuit of power, quite separate
from moral values or material greed. This revived
the notion of war familiar from Thucydides. 
The moral element has several different sources.
Rousseau’s and Hegel’s concerns for justice were part
of a European heritage. Aquinas’ use of morals to
justify war represents a different tradition, one to
which we will turn in an instant, one which can be
traced back to the Ancient Near East, through the
Hebrew Bible, and not Plato’s Republic.
Although superficially similar to Aquinas’s con-
cept of monarchy, Hegel’s view of monarchy lay not
in the medieval world, but that of the 19th century
nation-state. For Augustine, the Christian state was
not a concept but a real political possibility, and
thus the unity of ‘justice’ and the ‘state’ went hand
in hand. The feudal order brought about the end of
the unitary Christian state, but not the unity of the
Christian world. For Aquinas, aristocracy and church
were legitimate constraints on the absolute power
of the monarch, while the importance of belief
and adherence to the Catholic faith was absolute.
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For Hegel, the church and the aristocracy were not
recognised limits and the importance of any partic-
ular religious faith was of no import. Hegel’s state
and Hegel’s monarch were thus powers in them-
selves, not different from Augustine’s. 
By combining Hegel’s state with the ancient doc-
trine of power and eschewing morality and justice
and any restrictions on the use of force in the inter-
est of state policy, Clausewitz had opened the way to
pure military power as pure political power. By
maintaining Aquinas’s concept of the just war while
rejecting the limits he imposed on the use of force
and adopting Clausewitz’ doctrine of absolute force,
by the end of the 20th century AD, warfare had
become an absolute, involving the absolute use of
force and absolute justice.
It is conceivable that there was a transformation
in European warfare between the heroic futility of
Homer and the imperial arrogance of Athens, but
Thucydides was correct in letting the Athenians
state that they found their laws of domination exist-
ing when they began their program of conquest (see
above). 
Aquinas’ theory of the ‘just war’ can be geneti-
cally traced back through Augustine’s, but not to
Thucydides. Although ostensibly citing Cicero and
the New Testament, Augustine was elaborating a far
older tradition in which religion and state were
identified as one, with the ‘just war’ sanctioned by a
supreme national deity. Ultimately, Aquinas’ just
war can only be understood when traced through
Augustine, Jesus, the Old Testament, the Egyptians,
and the Assyrians. Wars in this age were divinely
inspired and merely executed by monarchs, thereby
differing from Aquinas’ which were only just when
the conditions were met. In antiquity, gods and
men sought domination: strong and weak were
divided by defeat, whether gods or men; justice was
divine, correct and absolute, not based on equity.
The origins of western war: 
the Near East and the Mediterranean
Virtually all philosophers build their theories on
assumptions about the origin of war. Despite an
abundance of archaeological evidence, it remains
idle to speculate about war among early human
communities, and we can leap through early prehis-
tory. The end of the Palaeolithic in the Near East
was a long affair, lasting from ca. 20,000 B.P. to ca.
10,000 B.P. during which individual groups settled
the mountains of the Levant before the develop-
ment of agriculture. The sedentary life preceded –
but led to – food production and the Neolithic, hes-
itantly beginning from ca. 12,000 B.P. 
Arrowheads are found in a number of human
skeletons buried together in Egypt around 10,000
BC, with several projectile points in each of several
skeletons (Hendrickx and Vermeersch 2000: 30). At
Wadi Hammeh 27, in contemporary Palestine, ‘many
burnt skull fragments’ lay among the settlement
debris. A ‘skull with atlas and axis’ lay on a living
floor beside a hearth at Mallaha, likewise in Palestine.
A cranial cap ‘cut off, apparently deliberately’ lay on
another floor at the same site (Valla 1998: 176).
Inter-communal violence was increasing before the
Neolithic.
The abundance of arrowheads in the Neolithic of
the Levant is such that they are used to distinguish
chronological and social boundaries (Gopher 1994).
Examining the defensive settlement structures and
the typology of the period, the terms ‘raiding’, ‘con-
quest’ and ‘warfare’ were used in a discussion of the
late Levantine Pre-Pottery Neolithic (Eichmann,
Gebel and Simmons 1997). Cauvin (2000: 126) dis-
missed the evidence of early warfare, remarking that
‘One arrow-head retrieved here or there stuck in a
human vertebra is perhaps not as adequate proof as
has been claimed’. 
The logic of such an argument escapes the cur-
rent author, as does Cauvin’s (2000: 126) suggestion
that arrowheads had a ‘symbolic’ significance,
while disputing that arrowheads had any specific
meaning. If arrowheads were ‘symbolic’ they must
have had a ‘meaning’ to the farmers of the early
Neolithic: elsewhere arrowheads are frequently found
in human bones. In the literate societies of the
Bronze and Iron Ages, armour-piercing arrowheads
played a political role. The wide-spread ‘skull cults’
of the late Levantine Pre-Pottery Neolithic indicate
that death was a primary concern in this age. In the
Near East, the evidence is still coming in, and some
argue that the evidence supports an interpretation
in terms of inter-communal warfare, even if Cauvin
rejects the interpretation.
Virtually from their appearance near the end of
the Upper Palaeolithic, arrowheads have left their
traces in human bones (Bachechi et al. 1997). It is
possible to assume that the arrowheads of the
Neolithic represent an explosion of improved hunting
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technology. However, this would imply that sub-
stantial effort was going into hunting technology at
precisely the moment when the greater part of sub-
sistence concerns were dedicated to transforming
economic life from hunting and gathering to farm-
ing. Such an argument would reverse the interpreta-
tion of the economic transformation in the Near
Eastern Neolithic, which is considered to be among
the most significant in human history. 
Not only is it invalid to claim that arrowheads are
exclusively hunting tools, but one can plausibly link
their invention and development to inter-communal
violence: (a) arrowheads are the typical typological
artefact of early sedentary societies and (b) they are
found in human bones. Other evidence of conflict is
not absent. Although unparalleled for another three
millennia, the walls of Jericho were erected at the
very start of the Neolithic, possibly suggesting a
defensive purpose. Certainly, the tactical location of
subsequent Neolithic villages suggests that villagers
were conscious of security (Gebel and Bienert 1997). 
If warfare is communal violence involving the
deliberate death of humans, then this would indi-
cate the beginnings of warfare. The symbolic use of
arrowheads can be linked to the social consciousness
and recognition of their role. The context would be
simple – but fatal – conflict between competing
groups. It would be difficult to allege that disputes
over land or property could antedate the era of sig-
nificant food production, and yet this lethal inter-
communal violence clearly antedates the era when
property and land became significant. The gradual
development of projectile points can be linked to
earliest sedentary communities in Palestine, which
can be dated to the ten thousand years preceding
the Neolithic revolution. The Neolithic was the cul-
mination of a development whereby the movement
of individual hunting communities was increasingly
limited by the presence of neighbouring groups
(Goring-Morris 1998; Valla 1998). The development
of arrowheads accelerated during the era when these
human groups were living in close proximity, in
carefully protected settlements.
For the following six millennia, settlement was
determined by two main axes. On the one hand,
people moved out of the mountains and the fringes
of the desert into the plains (Matthews 2000: 12, 30,
42, 56). At the same time, more groups took up the
sedentary way of life and farming. This early seden-
tary activity culminated in a move into the plains of
southern Mesopotamia. Settlement density in the
plains increased between ca. 6000 and 3000 BC; the
first states had emerged by the end of this period.
This new settlement pattern was decisive, for the
most successful states emerged in the plains: along
the Nile Valley and in Mesopotamia. 
Walled settlements appeared in Mesopotamia
(e.g. Tell es-Sawwan) and Anatolia (e.g. Hacilar)
before the fifth millennium. By 3500 BC, small settle-
ments were scattered from the Upper Nile Valley
across the Levant and Anatolia, the plains of Syria,
and as far as the mountains of Afghanistan; aside
from the growing cities of southern Mesopotamia.
Around the middle of the fourth millennium, an
expansion from the urban centres of Mesopotamia
ended the evolution of the small pre-state settle-
ments in Syria and Anatolia. These settlements par-
ticipated in trade networks, but eventually the evo-
lution was interrupted as the settlements contracted
at the end of the fourth millennium. The distur-
bance was partly economic and partly political.
Regardless of its character, Anatolia was cut off from
developments for almost a millennium, and its
progress curtailed again as the recovery was again
disturbed at the end of the third millennium BC
(For references to the Near East one can consult, e.g.
Warburton 2001, and the relevant articles in Sasson
1995, and the Oxford Encyclopaedias of Egypt and
the Near East).
Throughout this entire period, cities and city
walls grew apace. From 3000 BC onwards, arrow-
heads, sling bullets, maces, daggers, spears, axes,
and other tools of war became more abundant and
widespread. By 2200 BC sieges were a common
activity: siege ladders and wagon-trains with logis-
tical supplies accompanied armies. Egypt was in
conflict with peoples in Palestine and Nubia; the
Mesopotamian states were in conflict with powers
in Syria, Anatolia, Iran and the Gulf. The expansion
of the Mesopotamian system of city-states and the
Egyptian Empire in the Nile represented two alter-
native modes of political development, but the two
did not come into direct conflict in the third mil-
lennium. Most of the political conflicts in the third
millennium were between small state entities, or
between the major powers and the settlements on
their periphery, as these were incorporated into
their spheres of power. The unprotected settlements
scattered across the Near East were exposed to the
power of the centres, just as the centres were exposed
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to conquest by competing entities. The most signifi-
cant military change was the wide-spread destruc-
tion following the conquests of the kings of the city
state of Agade. They managed to subdue or destroy
most of the powers in the Near East, from Syria to
Iran and the Gulf but were unable to assemble a
coherent state from the pieces. The collapse of the
empire led to a fragmentation of power throughout
the Near East.
The second millennium was characterised by
widespread warfare. In southern Mesopotamia at
the end of the third millennium, power fell into the
hands of several city-states before the city of Ur was
able to assert its pre-eminence. Nevertheless, the
kings of the third dynasty of Ur were in a virtually
constant state of warfare with their neighbours on
all sides. This unstable situation meant that weak-
ness would spell the end of their power, and thus
the dynasty was short-lived, lasting only slightly
longer than a century. Initially, political power fell
to the region straddling the trade routes between
Iran and Iraq. Eventually, however, the Assyrian king
Shamshi-Adad cut out a large empire in northern
Mesopotamia based on the fertile plains of the
North. This broke up with his death, opening the way
for the expansion of another kingdom based on the
south Mesopotamian alluvium, under Hammurabi
and his successors in Babylon. After Shamshi-Adad’s
death, Syria broke free of Mesopotamian influence;
the cities of Palestine fought each other and achieved
a temporary hegemony in the Egyptian Delta;
Babylon found itself in constant conflict with Iran.
The Indo-Europeans moved into the Aegean,
Anatolia and the Indus Region. Local and regional
conflicts characterised political activity during the
second millennium BC. 
Having consolidated their hold on Anatolia, the
Indo-European Hittites were able to expel the
Assyrians, eventually sweeping across the cities of
northern Syria and destroying Babylon. This
opened up a new power vacuum; power in southern
Mesopotamia fell to a new dynasty without expan-
sionist inclinations; power in the North fell to
another Indo-European kingdom, that of Mitanni.
This opened the way for a competition between the
Assyrians and Mitanni in the North, because the
Hittites were unable to consolidate their hold on
the North in the aftermath of their conquests.
Ultimately, however, the Egyptians placed pressure
on the southern reaches of the Mitanni holdings
while Assyria pressed it from the East and the
Hittites from the North.
The Hittites were able to destroy Mitanni, but
then faced Egypt and Assyria in the South and East.
They were also under pressure from the West after
the Mycenaean conquest of Crete and the expan-
sion to the Aegean coasts of Anatolia. However, the
Mycenaeans and the Hittites were eliminated as
political powers. Egypt was forced out of Asia and
the Assyrian expansion into Syria was halted. 
For an era at the end of the Bronze Age (from
around 1200 to perhaps 900 BC), non-state peoples
brought about the end of large scale political units.
The original epics which ultimately became the
Homeric poems were composed during this era, and
reflect such violence. It is impossible to state with
certainty that those who waged these wars against
the Egyptians and Hittites were not organised as
states, but it can be confirmed that their victory
resulted in the disappearance of imperial power in
parts of the Near East. In some cases, small states
appeared in the aftermath of the collapse, but it is
not certain that the beneficiaries of the power vacuum
were the authors of the collapse. In any case, the
Near East and the Aegean were reduced to small-
scale political units, each vying with the other in
small-scale warfare far removed from the major
imperial conflicts which characterised the Bronze
Age of the second millennium and the Iron Age
Empires of the first.
The Assyrians ultimately recovered their power in
Syria, but the expansion was preceded by a signifi-
cant contraction. For an age, Syria and the Aegean
were dominated by small states with the Assyrians
driven back to the region along the present Syro-
Iraqi border. Eventually, the Assyrians subdued the
smaller states until their empire reached from the
Nile to Anatolia and Iran. The first millennium BC
was characterised by the Assyrian expansion, and
the inheritance of their empire by the Babylonians,
Persians and Macedonians. 
The ideological underpinnings of these conflicts
are easily grasped. The pretext for the Egyptian
expansion into Asia was a desire for revenge, as the
Egyptians clearly stated that they held the leaders of
Palestine responsible for the earlier conquest of Egypt
by the Hyksos. The Assyrian conquest of Babylonia
can be traced back to feelings of inferiority, and the
expansion eastwards spurred on the Medes, who
aided the Babylonians in defeating Assyria. Since
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the earliest settled communities, eradication of ene-
mies and territorial expansion leading to political
control made conflict endemic as each expansionist
move triggered a response.
From an ideological standpoint – even when the
opponents were political entities ostensibly outside
the Egyptian sphere of influence – the Egyptians
viewed opposition to their rule as rebellion. The
Assyrians simply viewed it as unwise. For both the
Egyptians and the Assyrians, their expansion can be
linked to divine sanction, since both assumed that
the gods gave victory in war and that failure was
tantamount to a failure to satisfy the gods. Like the
Ancient Romans and the Chinese, the Babylonian
and Assyrian kings consulted oracles to determine
whether the outcome of war might be favourable.
For the Babylonians this was of the utmost impor-
tance. It is clear that the decision to wage the war
was thus explicitly political, and the god was simply
consulted to suggest whether the moment was pro-
pitious. Despite some similarities, there is an enor-
mous difference between a war waged in the name
of a god – such as Assur or Amun-Re – and a politi-
cally motivated war which a god then approves. The
concept of partial divine sanctions for war can
therefore be found in the Babylonian material.
However, Babylonian campaigns were frequently
anchored in a clear political program, ‘omens’ serv-
ing merely as guides. 
Influences on western philosophy: 
Homer, the Bible and history
Homer emerged on the periphery of the Bronze Age
empires, but most modern Europeans dismiss
Homer’s romantic view of war. Even when reading
Homer, they assume that the war must have had
some rational purpose, such as plunder, if no other.
Following Thucydides, modern observers tend to
assume a practical – state and power oriented – form
of warfare. However, basic to both Homer and
Thucydides was that justice cannot possibly be
included as a motive, purpose or feature of warfare.
This makes it incomprehensible that one of the
first post-classical European philosophers – Aquinas
– viewed warfare as a moral activity. Two aspects
contributed to this: (a) the absence of a state system
in Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire meant
that ‘political goals’ in the ordinary sense of
Clausewitz and Thucydides were impossible; (b) the
second was due to events some two thousand years
earlier.
We noted that the start of the Iron Age in the
Near East was marked by small states. The eclipse of
Assyrian power between 1100 and 800 BC can be dis-
missed as an interlude in the cyclical conquests of
the Near East. However, Western philosophy of war
would be decisively formed by the fact that among
those small states were Israel and Greece. Their epic
struggles with the Assyrians and Babylonians, and
the Persians, respectively, were immortalised for the
West, in history and philosophy.
The poets and prophets celebrated contests of
wills couched in terms of their own society. Neither
made sense in Clausewitz’ definition of war, or even
Thucydides’. The tale of the Trojan War is senseless
violence; divine intervention has no more purpose
than the violence itself. By contrast, the tale of the
Old Testament is that of national salvation through
purgatory; divine intervention is the national god
punishing his own people. 
Both contrast greatly with Assur: the name of the
god, the city, the country and the Empire were all
the same; conquest ordained by Assur was absolute.
The mirror image of this was the concept that the
gods could use foreign enemies to destroy those
who failed to comply with their wishes. In these
cases, cities feared that their gods would abandon
them, and abandoned their gods if they failed them.
Jahweh was an exception, for the god of Israel used
the gods of other lands to execute his will against
his own people. 
For the Assyrians and the Egyptians – the two most
important neighbours of the Hebrews – war was part
of national policy. Both viewed war as a divinely
driven instrument of territorial expansion. More
important than mere ‘territorial expansion’ is the
role of ‘justice’, which is firmly tied to the state and
the rulers and the gods, rather than the individual,
from the beginning of Ancient Near Eastern history.
The expansion of the Egyptians and Assyrians is
explicitly territorial, expressed in terms of extending
boundaries. The role of the state itself was, however,
ideological, expressed in terms of justice. The link
between the state, warfare and justice was thus
woven into the fabric of the Ancient Near East. This
legacy was then integrated into Hebrew traditions.
Israel was an ephemeral peripheral player,
quashed by the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Romans.
Israel could not play a major role, and thus the god
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of Israel could only act by exploiting the armies of
adjoining powers. Thus, whereas the Assyrians owed
their victories to Assur, the Prophets explained that
Jahweh was using the Assyrians to punish Israel.
This would be of no significance, had not the West
adopted Christianity. 
Christianity meant that Western philosophy
adopted ancient Near Eastern notions, including
warfare guided by justice and divine will. This was
absent from ancient Greece, where ‘Justice’ was but
one god among many. The Hebrew prophets viewed
warfare as punishment ordained by god; only god or
piety could ward off defeat. Written in the aftermath
of the Assyrian and Babylonian conquests, the Bible
brought ancient Near Eastern concepts of warfare to
the West, a West which was forsaking Thucydides
and Homer. 
The ancient Near Eastern concepts would have
been lost to us, but for their preservation in the Bible,
even if in modified form. Because of the Bible, the
Assyrian concept of warfare is quite easily recognis-
able for us. Two opposing concepts provided the fuel
for the debate about the purpose and origins of war. 
On the one hand was the Christian Church
spreading the Biblical version of world history while
simultaneously preventing the emergence of a polit-
ical entity which could be independent of the
Church. On the other were those political entities
which did emerge, and which were dependent upon
feudal arrangements with vassals. Emperors, kings,
vassals, knights and guilds represented one set of
relations, while popes, bishops, the clergy, the monas-
teries and the monks represented an alternative set.
Vassals vied with kings, kings with popes. Land
tenure was an issue for both, church and vassal alike.
The peasants were at the mercy of all. 
Ultimately, the nation-states of Europe appropri-
ated church lands while individual land-owners
increased their holdings. For Europe land tenure was
a bone of contention, contributing to the central
importance of territorial boundaries in the wars of
the 18th century, and to the concept of private
property. Territory and land tenure played a central
role for Clausewitz and Rousseau.
Before the dissolution of the feudal order, the
Church was of central significance. Pre-Christian
warfare was based on strength, honour, power and
the state. The Hebrew Bible introduced war as an
instrument of divine retribution, meaning the
defeat of the state of Israel by its own god. Although
it was in opposition to the state (for practical and
ecclesiastical reasons), Christian doctrine also
emphasised weakness. Viewing the Hebrew god as a
deity of universal appeal and relevance, and a god of
justice, it introduced the concept of absolute justice
and morality into warfare, yet tempered this with
defeat and lack of purpose. This effectively eclipsed
the role of the state. The weakness of the state was a
virtue for the Church, and thus the doctrines
matched.
Following the Reformation, power fell to the
state. Despite disagreement about the legitimacy of
the government and the distinctions between the
government and the state, there was virtually no
opposition to the concept that the state had the
capacity to wage war and ensure peace. The trans-
formation of the state from the private possession of
a monarch to a popular institution transformed war
from a state affair to a national affair. In the West,
the concept of morality and justice remained associ-
ated with warfare, even as the state severed the links
between warfare and religion. This paved the way
for the concept of just wars fought by states able to
call upon their citizens.
Napoleon appreciated Rousseau’s observation
that world conquest would depend upon assembling
a sufficiently large army. Whereas Rousseau viewed
this as impossible, Napoleon unleashed the patriot-
ism of the French Revolution. He was, however,
defeated as the other nations of Europe reacted in
the same – reciprocal – fashion. Subsequent history
has demonstrated that the ‘balance of power’ exists
in precisely this fashion, due merely to the failure of
any one actor to assemble sufficient forces to exe-
cute a design of world conquest. Rousseau’s funda-
mental observation remains valid: the state has no
natural boundaries, and existing boundaries are
defined by the powers of other states. 
In linking sovereignty and the state to popular
will and territorial boundaries, Rousseau conceded
that a democratic state could wage an unjust war.
Hegel shaved off the moral aspect of war, vesting
legitimacy in the king, assigning the institution of
the state moral superiority as a divine institution.
Hegel’s state would be incapable of waging an
unjust war. 
While conceding the possibility that ‘the Deity
is the ultimate author of all government’, Hume
differed from Hegel in assuming that no one person
could a priori represent divine will more than any
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other (cf. e.g. Aiken 1964). Authority and legitimacy
could be associated with magistrates. Rousseau
wanted the magistrates paid by the public purse,
making them public servants. The spread of democ-
racy and the concept that the people were the source
of legitimacy eventually severed the link between
the state and the divine, leaving the state responsible
for waging war, for its own purposes. Gradually,
moral rectitude became the prerogative of demo-
cratic states. 
At the same time that the ancient teachings
remained valid – that the power of the state could
only be constrained by other states – the power of the
state was now associated with justice and morality
on an international plane. In ancient Israel, justice
and morality were the domain of Jahweh. In ancient
Greece, justice and morality were the domain of the
citizens and the concern of the community; morality
did not extend to interstate conflict. In the ancient
Near East, interstate conflict was the domain of the
gods, and thus – through the ancient Near East and
the Old Testament – Jahweh’s association with
morality placed morality at the centre of inter-state
conflict in medieval Christian thought. This con-
tributed to a strain of early modern thought –
through Hegel’s association of the state’s divine
legitimacy. However, Hegel did not assume that
inter-state conflict would differ from the character
Thucydides and Clausewitz assigned to it: a conflict
of will with political goals. In the modern West,
however, the concept of democratic legitimacy and
moral rectitude came to play a similar role in under-
pinning the state, and thus also, by extension, the
behaviour of states in inter-state conflict. Rousseau
had, however, also realised that a democratic state
could wage an unjust war. The paradox was not
clearly resolved.
Warfare would be understood and defined as
Clausewitz had defined it: determined as an ordeal
of reciprocal violence among states with goals
defined in territorial terms. This was the case for
most of the period from the 17th century through
the 20th. Among others, the Swedes, Russians,
French, English, and Germans came to grief in their
pursuit of territorial expansion, at least partially due
to the reciprocal character of war. Superficially, it
was, of course, their logistical systems which were
overstretched, but in practice, it was the reciprocal
character of the opposition which rendered the
invaders incapable of consolidating their gains in
distant lands. By the end of the 20th century, most
European states had abandoned any hope of territo-
rial expansion and shared a determination to avoid
the use of war as a political instrument. 
The unification of Europe by conquest had failed.
Consciousness of the failure to make territorial gains
was enhanced by the human and material costs,
and thus warfare became associated with losses.
Previously, warfare had inspired hope of gain and
glory. Repeated defeat and fruitless victory had left
Europe weakened. Lacking hope of gain and an
appetite for military renown opened the way to a
more balanced view of warfare. For Europeans, war-
fare ceased to have a purpose, becoming synonymous
with senseless destructive violence. Unification
became a political project expressly designed to pre-
vent further wars on European territory. 
Many political commentators and observers
began to assume that ‘peace’ was the object of for-
eign policy. Quite aside from the general public,
generals (e.g. Fuller 1972) and historians (e.g. Taylor
1996) alike despaired at the growing pointlessness
of war, as planned, used, conducted and ended.
This was quite a different attitude than that which
viewed ‘warfare as the continuation of politics by
other means’. Previously, the state treasury had
existed almost solely to fund warfare; now warfare
was viewed as an undesirable expense competing
with other priorities. Warfare was a burden on –
rather than the purpose of – the treasury. This eco-
nomical attitude also extended to the concept of
sparing lives – both those of the enemy and one’s
own nation. In a paradoxical reversal of values, for
many – particularly in Germany – warfare itself
became an ‘immoral’ activity. Europe had taken
leave of ‘European war’.
The American way of war 
from the mid-20th century
‘European’ war-making was, however, pursued by
the major power across the Atlantic. ‘Warfare’ and
‘International Relations’ were viewed as one, with-
out recourse to morality. Hoffmann’s (1965) riposte
to Aron’s Paix et guerre entre les nations was simply
entitled The State of War. Whereas Europeans viewed
peace as a natural state of affairs, the USA came to
view war as the natural state of affairs (for the early
part, cf. e.g. Weigley 1973; the continuation is still
unfolding).
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Total war and the balance of power
Superficially, this appeared to represent the concept
of war as state policy. It began in the ideological
conflict with the Soviet Union; viewed as a struggle
for global dominance, it could be analysed in the
framework of territorial disputes. This particular
conflict had roots in other conflicts. The ideological
conflict between (a) the ‘East’ and (b) the ‘West’ pit-
ted communism against capitalism, with the USA
leading the ‘Western’ camp and the Soviet Union
the ‘Eastern’ camp. This ideological conflict took place
in the same global geographical and temporal con-
text as the process of de-colonisation after the Second
World War. The process of territorial expansion had
led to the occupation of large parts of the world by
France and England. In the course of (c) a liberation
struggle, large parts of the world were freed from
colonial rule. While recognising self-determination,
the USA assumed the mantle of the colonial powers,
opposing liberation movements cloaked as commu-
nist movements (or vice versa), and (d) respecting
the territorial integrity of the newly independent
states against internal and external opponents. 
The war was not just ideological and conceptual-
ly global, but also truly global in geographical terms,
due to the existence of American bases around the
world. The establishment of foreign bases was a by-
product of two separate wars. The first group were
the bases created in the aftermath of the Second
World War. Occupation of the vanquished followed
the pattern of war, except that it merged with the
global ideological conflict which followed, for the
occupying forces in Germany and Japan became the
front lines of the Cold War. The second group were
the bases established during the Cold War, never
intended as occupation, but merely as ‘support’.
Reformulating the colonial legacy, the USA aimed to
secure the Persian Gulf from the Soviets and to
oppose the advance of communism in Asia. 
This could have been viewed as ‘politics as usual’,
except for the nuance that the goals were not clear,
since the character of war itself was obscured by an
innovation transforming attitudes towards war. The
atomic bomb, strategic bomber, ballistic missile, and
the hydrogen bomb appeared against the back-
ground of the global struggle between ‘East’ and
‘West’, construed as an irresolvable ideological con-
flict in which (a) military war was impossible and
(b) the war would be won by ideological victory. For
both sides, victory was viewed in economic and
political terms. The most successful system would
produce the most goods and acquire the most allies
among the newly independent nations. 
Military war was viewed as impossible: the
thought of armies battling for victory had been
replaced by the image of civilisations reduced to
ashes. American thought was dominated by the
belief that nuclear war was the only significant war,
and that this was ‘unthinkable’. For Americans, war-
fare was ‘total’, yet in this case ‘total’ meant defeat
for victor and vanquished alike. The concept of ‘lim-
ited war’ was restricted to scenarios of ‘escalation’
(Kahn 1968), which did not offer any hope. Twice,
Americans had gone to war to end war. Now, terror
of war appeared to be the way to end war.
Although similar to the anti-war attitude shared
by many Europeans, the American one differed. In
the USA, repugnance of war was not born from the
ashes of war-torn Europe. In some cases rational
appreciation rejected violence for political purposes
as un-Christian (following Aquinas). In reality, how-
ever, it was part of an unconscious mutation: the
complement of the idea that another war was incon-
ceivable. For Europeans rejection of war was the out-
come of fruitless losses, and the despair of gain.
Total ‘limited’ war
Americans had neither suffered occupation and
defeat, nor fruitless victory. However, Americans
were persuaded that ‘nuclear war’ was ‘war’, and
‘unthinkable’ because ‘war’ meant ‘destruction’, not
victory or defeat. Policy-makers propagated the mes-
sage that war was pointless and that military prepa-
rations were to prevent, not fight, war. They failed
to develop the concept of war as an instrument for
the defence of national interests. Instead they had
developed the concept of ideological war which
could not be fought. A war pitting the USA – per-
ceived as a legacy of imperialism – against a nation-
alist movement was complicated by these doctrines,
as well as a lack of understanding of local society.
Aside from lack of purpose, the defeat in Vietnam
can be linked to (a) the modern Western attitude
about the sheer undesirability of war, (b) a failure to
prepare for ‘limited war’, and (c) a failure to appre-
ciate interests in terms of the state rather than the
ideology (cf. e.g. McNamara 1995).
The Hegelian concept of protecting civil society
was dominant during the Cold War, as political
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scientists and military strategists developed scenar-
ios of avoiding ‘unthinkable’ wars. The ‘preservation
of the peace’ became an end in itself; the ‘balance of
power’ the only means. Modern weapons necessi-
tated peace; imposing one’s will on the enemy was
unrealistic; security lay in a ‘balance of terror’.
Kissinger (e.g. 1969; 1995) employed diplomacy to
avoid war, and even to preserve the potential foe
whose existence rendered war unthinkable – until
the Soviet Union unexpectedly dematerialised. 
The disappearance of the foe did not, however,
arrest the system of thought. For decades, ideologi-
cal deadlock had accustomed Americans (a) to the
thought that victory in war was meaningless, yet
also simultaneously (b) to the idea that conflict
between nations was ideological (rather than terri-
torial). The global character of the conflict – which
had retained the territorial element – was forgotten
while savouring the ideological victory. Throughout,
war had played a prominent role in thinking. The
policy element of defence and territorial expansion
had disappeared, replaced by the concept of ideo-
logical war. ‘Limited war’ was incompatible with
ideological war, and with the notion that victory in
war would be defeat. 
Easy victory in the Cold War left the USA as the
greatest power in world history, after an unexpected
and bloodless ideological victory, for which neither
political nor military thinking had been prepared.
This was accompanied by the simultaneous easy
victory in the liberation of Kuwait for which the
Americans were not psychologically prepared. The
justice of the American cause was not – and never
had been – in doubt; America was not perceived as
fighting for its interests, but for ‘universal values’
(economic growth, democracy, individual rights)
which it wished to impose on other peoples. This
attitude survived the Cold War. America struggled
with unexpected victory. Relief at the ease of the vic-
tories was combined with unparalleled power and
self-confidence. Works on ‘just wars’ and ‘morality’ in
warfare (e.g. Walzer 1992; Johnson 1999) proliferated. 
The end of the Cold War – which had effectively
excluded the use of war in conflict – and the char-
acter of Saddam Hussein meant that the warless ide-
ological conflict of the Cold War was transformed
into a military struggle against ‘evil’, identified in
terms of ‘terrorism’ and ‘rogue states’. Conflict was
defined as ‘good’ and ‘evil’; ‘with us (and good)’ or
‘against us (and evil)’. 
The danger of war was not reduced by diminishing
potential sources of conflict. Instead those opposed
to American hegemony would be punished. The
purpose was neither territorial expansion, nor the
resolution of irreconcilable conflicts of interest. It
was simply global self-defence. While ‘self-defence’
is viewed as legitimate, there is no way in which a
nation can legitimately identify its definition of
‘security’ in a fashion which clearly threatens others.
Such a policy can only expect a reciprocal response.
Therefore, in military terms this policy is irreconcil-
able with the concepts developed by Thucydides
and Clausewitz, while also being as far from the
amoral contest celebrated by Homer as it is from
Jahweh’s national war of divine retribution. 
Clausewitz (1991: 215) stressed that war had to
end with crushing the ‘will’ of the vanquished, as
well as his armed forces. Indeed, this was the pur-
pose of war, not a mere detail. This implied defeat of
the enemy, and occupation, otherwise the ‘spirit’ of
the foe would revive to resume the ‘reciprocal’ strug-
gle. However, the USA neither sought to defeat the
enemy nor to occupy their territory. The policy
opposed governments, not states and peoples. The
philosophy of ‘firepower in limited war’ (Scales
1995) even stressed waging war with limited casual-
ties among friend and foe alike.
The policy of global self-defence pursued narrow-
ly defined interests, with foes and friends defined by
convenience. The intervention in Kuwait expelled
the army of one artificial postcolonial state from
another. However, this arguably Clausewitzian terri-
torial conflict was transformed as the USA waged
war against Iraq throughout the 1990s, with the
concepts of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ redefined. Neither
Iraq nor the USA accepted the ‘limited’ results of
1991. The ‘exit strategy’ of the ‘limited war’ failed to
provide an ‘exit’. The war for the restoration of
Kuwait’s territorial integrity was continued to prevent
Iraq from acquiring ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’,
and subsequently redefined as part of a ‘war on ter-
rorism’, against an ‘axis of evil’. 
These ideological and geopolitical changes in the
character of warfare (previously defined in terms of
‘interests’, ‘territorial expansion’, etc.) must be set
beside the unconscious transformation in attitudes
towards battlefield victory which had prevailed on
either side of the Cold War. Before the Cold War,
battlefield victory was viewed as a matter of chance.
During the Cold War, battlefield victory was excluded
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because it would result in annihilation. After the
Cold War, the technological superiority of the USA
meant that it was an issue of ‘logistics’, not chance.
However, during the Cold War, such a victory would
have ended the conflict. After the Cold War, a tech-
nologically devastating battlefield victory which
spared the lives of the enemy population could not
guarantee a similar result. And this result which was
neglected was exactly that purpose which Clausewitz
assigned to war: crushing the enemy’s will.
The USA failed to appreciate that ending a war
without complete victory meant that the spirit of
the foes was not broken; resentment would smoul-
der. In a paradoxical reversal, wars fought against
governments (e.g. Iraq, Serbia) fed the resentment
of individuals. This led to the most bizarre conflict
in world history where a single individual struck the
American heartland – not an overseas outpost. It was
an expression of personal resentment arising from a
nationalist feeling that the Saudi state failed to satis-
fy popular needs by allowing the ‘unbelievers’ to
occupy the land of the ‘holy sites’. 
This response was conceived in terms of states as
defined by the West, and it was an accident of his-
tory that the modern state of ‘Saudi Arabia’ included
the ‘holy sites’ of Islam. The American troops were
far from the holy cities, and interested not in them,
but the oil on the other side of the peninsula.
American intervention had been conceptually
defensive, yet defence became ‘occupation’ when
viewed from the opposite perspective, given the
modern state boundaries. In the same fashion, in
order to maintain the ‘war on terror’, the USA gov-
ernment viewed their foes as states allegedly har-
bouring terrorists, and thus eliminated the govern-
ments of the states of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Therefore, peculiarly, bin Laden’s concept of war as
a conflict defined by states matched the American
conception, although neither was actually pursuing
a state policy rational in terms of interest.
Paradoxically, during the ‘war on terror’, the USA
established yet more foreign bases, even while offi-
cials conceded that further attacks on American soil
could not be excluded. American military policy
ceased to follow the logic of interest – pursuing
instead the path of the possible, responding to the
actions of others, yet without attempting to under-
stand their grievances, let alone to defuse conflicts
which routinely aroused animosity towards the
USA. It was assumed that foes were acting without
motivation, and would merely act where possible,
disregarding motives and interest – exactly as the
USA was.
This attitude can only be grasped when viewing
another aspect to the American understanding of
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. The invention of
the ballistic missile and the hydrogen bomb had an
impact on American thinking about warfare, in the
sense that war was excluded due to the technologi-
cal developments rendering it senseless. American
military thinking had long been dominated by tech-
nology. The use of the Bomb against Japan was an
outgrowth of this policy, and American attitudes
towards technological development continue to
hamper strategic thinking. Technological superiority
is itself superiority; technology substitutes policy
and strategy. Although masked by ideological pre-
text, this war is based on violence by the strong
against the weak. 
Moral warfare
This attitude towards the technological character of
weapons assumes that other powers should be
deprived of access to such weapons, and that seeking
access to such weapons is eo ipso ‘evil’. Technological
and ideological components are united, while will,
purpose and interest are neglected, implying that
the purpose of warfare is the use of weapons to
impose one’s will on those with whom one dis-
agrees. Weapons are not viewed as a tool of state
interests. A corollary is that warfare does not require
absolute force, i.e., deliberate civilian casualties are
avoided. Imposing one’s will simply for the sake of
ideological differences, regardless of state interest,
means that war has some other character than that
advocated by Clausewitz and Thucydides. 
The concept of will and purpose is neglected as
much as state interest. Just as Kissinger’s policy neg-
lected Clausewitz’ understanding of the political
role of war, this new approach failed to appreciate
Clausewitz on the reciprocal nature of war. The first
reciprocal response to this form of war was the
equally irrational mirror image of American ideolo-
gy, bin Laden. It matched the most powerful state
in world history against a single individual.
Technology had failed; war became a senseless heroic
duel again.
American war is, therefore, easily recognisable as
Homeric warfare, dominated by honour, revenge,
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violence, pauses, unstable coalitions, unreliable
allies and divine intervention: titanic and heroic
violence, ‘us’ against ‘them’. While morally absolute
– expressed in Biblical terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ –
policy has stipulated that ‘evil’ foes were ‘weak’ and
politically convenient. The policy thus includes ele-
ments of (a) the Hobbesian power of the state, as the
technological expression of (b) teleological Hegelian
divine will and (c) Biblical ‘right’, as well as (d)
Rousseau’s concept that a democracy could wage
unjust war. However, Rousseau understood war as a
conflict between states. 
The fundamental problem of this rarefied form of
warfare is that it does not fit into the neat analytical
categories. Major-General Fuller pointed out the
fundamental difficulty of reconciling the concept of
rational warfare with the catastrophic results of the
first and second world wars. The experience of the
20th century AD was that the use of violence or the
threat of the use of violence was consistently
matched by a reciprocal increase in the use of vio-
lence or threat. Such a procedure itself implied that
the use of violence led to further violence, without
necessarily resolving the underlying political con-
flicts, which continue to smoulder, promising new
outbreaks of violence.
Fuller (1972: 12) cited Clausewitz to the effect
that the responsibility of the statesman and general
demanded that war be undertaken realistically, and
‘not to take it for something … which by the nature
of its relations, it is impossible for it to be.’ Clausewitz
did not consider the possibility of an ‘absolute war’
waged without reason in a limited fashion, just as
Thucydides did not consider the possibility of a war
waged without clearly defined goals and interest.
National (state) interests would be paramount, and
moral reasoning would justify, not motivate, war-
fare. The conscious link between purpose and exe-
cution would determine the end. During the 20th
century, the value of war as a tool of policy was neg-
lected. It remained, however, intimately linked with
the state, even if the state was deprived of responsi-
ble statesmen.
The nature of war
The cause of territorial expansion has been lost, and
the moral pretext has become cause, yet the ill-
defined enemy (‘terrorism’, mere ‘possession of
weapons of mass destruction’) cannot be politically
isolated. The result is the use of force in pursuit of
goals which cannot be achieved with force. 
It is, however, the state which is the precondition
for such ‘warlike’ conflict. Although the means cho-
sen to respond may be fundamentally flawed, it is the
state which unleashes the ultimate military response,
or accepts defeat. The state is the object as well as the
agent in any reciprocal military conflict of opposing
political interests, even if one actor is not a state, and
even if one state actor is not pursuing its interests.
The concept of warfare is treated here as a politi-
cal phenomenon. Surveys dedicated to mere vio-
lence can demonstrate the presence of violence at
all periods of human history. Distinguishing system-
atic violence from warfare is the issue, since human
sacrifice, executions, torture, duelling, and other
activities with lethal results cannot be confused
with warfare in any of the senses used here. 
Here the naiveté of Rousseau’s assumptions about
human nature is revealed, since the evidence implies
that violence was widespread among human com-
munities long before the appearance of the state.
Rousseau trusted that Hobbes was wrong about the
state of nature, observing that mankind did not
invariably seek to injure others. 
By identifying the individual with the group and
encouraging patriotism, the individual assumes an
identity by which the world can be divided: ‘us’ and
‘them’. As units, the individuals composing the larg-
er political units thus defined can cause injury to
neighbours, with or without cause. Self-defence is
the response to aggression, and both forms can be
associated with groups of people. This allowed Hegel
to espouse the concept of the power of the state and
compel the individual to relinquish his rights in the
interest of the community. Hegel was concerned
about the state’s right to call upon its citizens to pro-
tect themselves and the state. Clausewitz then posited
that war was the natural form of intercourse in rela-
tions between states. Clausewitz assumed that war
was the prerogative of states, completing the circle
begun with Rousseau’s assumption that the bound-
aries of the state would be defined by the power of
other states. This clearly differs from an argument
based on ideological and political conflict unrelated
to territorial conquest.
‘Religion’, ‘ideology’, ‘nationalism’, ‘civilisation’,
etc., can be subsumed under the concept of ‘identity’.
Where groups sharing a common identity also share
common geographical and ethic borders, these can
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be viewed as ‘states’ or ‘potential states’ with terri-
torial ambitions. Where conflict takes place over ter-
ritory, the expression will be similar to that
described by Thucydides and Clausewitz. Where the
destruction of the opposing group is not followed
by occupation, and was not motivated by aggression
on the part of the vanquished, this analysis fails.
The wars at the end of the Bronze Age – at least as
portrayed by Homer – are of this type. In most cases,
however, the conquerors eventually select a territory
to settle, even after wreaking seemingly senseless
havoc across wide swathes of territory. The Mongols
eventually settled in China after withdrawing from
elsewhere, and the Turks settled Anatolia as well as
Central Asia. There are few examples of a people
spontaneously, without provocation, conquering
another people, eradicating or defeating them and
then departing. State warfare is the form known to us
in historical and philosophical contexts, where a
war is a response to aggression, or leads to occupation.
Regardless of how it is perceived, the American ‘war
on terrorism’ is couched in terms of ‘self-defence’.
Bin Laden likewise views his war as a defensive war
against American aggression, interpreted as the
occupation of the land of the Holy Places.
Reciprocity returned, with the limited war in
Iraq unable to stay limited. For Clausewitz (1991:
179, 210-11) warfare was politics; violence and force
were the ultimate arbiters of political intercourse.
Clausewitz (1991: 199) stressed that the result of any
given war was ‘never absolute’, and his concept of
‘limited war’ may have been matched by ‘limited
peace’, implying that both peace and war were
determined by subjective appraisals of the power
relations at any one time. Any war which does not
end in total defeat must be viewed as ending in a
temporary balance, confirming war as being politi-
cal in character, and therefore limited in terms of
violence. If one side views the war as limited, the
other may not. A failure to match violence with
equal violence means that defeat will follow. We
may assume that Clausewitz could hardly have
reached any other conclusion than that warfare was
the ‘utmost use of violence’ to achieve ‘political
goals’ in a ‘reciprocal contest’. War only remains
‘limited’ if both sides view it reciprocally as ‘limited’;
the reciprocal character of war would be the only
relevant feature. 
Superficially, wars of identity and ‘divine will’
cannot be understood in Clausewitzian terms,
whereas Clausewitzian and Biblical wars can be
understood in Homeric terms. It is, however, possible
to assume that in some cases, aggression can be
understood merely in terms of a hostile encounter
of two groups – such as the Mycenaeans and Troy,
or bin Laden and the USA – in which territorial
expansion is not a motivation. The role of the state
is crucial in such conflicts. The American state is as
essential to bin Laden’s war as the Crusader state was
to Saladin. Two states may go to war, with the out-
come leaving one state, two states or none. In state
warfare, one participant must have a territorial
homeland and a political identity, which can be
perceived as injured – or serve as the basis for
aggression. Victory need not lead to territorial con-
quest: it can be expressed by imposing the values of
the victor on the vanquished, and thus breaking
their will.
Ultimately, a conflict originating in a contest of
two wills can take the form of Clausewitzian territo-
rial war between states, even where it does not orig-
inate in this fashion. By contrast, disparate groups
probably cannot resist the force of a state without
uniting to form one. It can, therefore, be argued that
the use of violence by state entities could not find
any other expression than the form identified by
Clausewitz, precisely because the unwise use of vio-
lence will call forth a reciprocal response: even
where there is not a state enemy before the war.
It can even be argued that there are no known
cases of state formation which did not involve a war.
Even where a state did not exist on either side prior
to the conflict, one or two states may exist after-
wards (as in Claessen’s example from Madagascar,
chapter 15). In other cases, a group will band togeth-
er to inflict defeat on an enemy, and thus form a larg-
er state, as in the first unification of Egypt
(Warburton 2001). States will also appear in political
vacuums created by state conflict, such as the
statelets after the collapse of the major Bronze Age
powers (Homeric Greece and Israel, among others).
War would therefore be a necessary precondition for
state formation, but not a sufficient condition. By
conceptually linking social violence with warfare,
the role of warfare in ‘state formation’ becomes vir-
tually incidental, either denied or assumed, but
assigned no specific role. The current writer believes
that it will be difficult to find a single example of
state formation which did not involve armed conflict,
either defensive or offensive. 
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A note on archaeological views of warfare
In my opinion some of the Western philosophical
debate on warfare has not been integrated into
archaeological theory, while some of the recent
thought has had an impact on archaeological think-
ing which is more implicit than explicit, and finally
archaeological thinking has a way of affecting its
subject matter which is highly relevant to a discus-
sion. Before proceeding to the conclusions, we will
briefly cover some of the points. 
The first note concerns this final point, about
archaeological thinking. As usual, one comes across
the idea that ‘Ancient Warfare’ (as studied by archae-
ologists) is somehow different from other types of
warfare (in the same way that, e.g. ‘palaeopsychol-
ogy’ or ‘palaeoeconomics’ apparently differ from
psychology and economics). It is possible that there
is a distinction, but the issue must be investigated in
terms of methodology and definitions, rather than
positing a difference and then establishing the char-
acteristics of the difference. Particularly important is
the fact that – if it is accepted as a definition that
‘warfare’ is a state activity – then it follows that ‘pre-
historic’ and ‘historic’ archaeology are not studying
the same subject.
This last point is a mere matter of definition, but
the treatment of archaeological data on warfare
gives the impression that more is involved. While
surveys of warfare as seen by prehistoric and histori-
cal archaeologists are dominated by violence or
evidence of violence, stressing victims, victors,
weapons, battles and fortifications (e.g. Carman and
Harding 1999; Yadin 1963), studies of ancient polit-
ical interest in historical periods concentrate on
trade and diplomacy, not purposeful warfare (e.g.
Liverani 1990; Cohen and Westbrook 2000). In my
view the implication is that the violence and
wastage visible in the archaeological record seem to
imply that the futility of war can be thrown back to
antiquity by emphasising the violence while deny-
ing that warfare had a conscious purpose. 
In this chapter, warfare has been linked to state
activity, even where the goals of warfare are not
rational or do not involve the goal of territorial con-
quest. The lethal results of social conflict cannot
legitimately be compared with execution or sacri-
fice. Evidence of violence is insufficient to demon-
strate the presence of warfare, and should not be
permitted to be mistaken for it. By contrast, purpose-
ful warfare has a political aspect. If a distinction is to
be made between ‘warfare’ and ‘violence’, ‘warfare’
should employ violence with a political purpose.
The ‘social’ and ‘territorial’ purpose is recognisable
in state conflict, and most political theory has dealt
with war as an attribute of states. This is a matter of
identification.
Explanations are another matter, and in fact, one
result of modern Western hostility to war (born of
the 20th century futility) has been expressed by
finding ‘explanations’ for it. We would argue that
this hostility to war has been integrated into archae-
ological theory. On the most simplistic level, the
explanation for the horror of war lies in its recip-
rocal character which is elementary. The essence of
state sponsored military conflict is wasteful carnage.
This does not, however, mean that it is pointless.
Therefore, this character should not conceal the fact
that warfare differs from mere violence in that war-
fare has a purpose and not a mere ‘origin’ or ‘expla-
nation’. 
Such organised violence cannot have existed
before the emergence of states, yet this does not
mean that Rousseau was correct and that violence
was unknown before states, because foreign to human
nature. Despite the prehistoric evidence of violence,
Rousseau’s assumption has been incorporated into
archaeological theory in several ways, among which
is Carneiro’s ‘Circumscription Theory’, which is
directly related to states and warfare.
Carneiro’s theory assumes that demographic
needs outstrip resources and lead to conquest.
Applied to the early development of the state in
ancient Egypt, Carneiro (Carneiro 1970; Bard and
Carneiro 1989) contends that the population density
‘reached a point where conquest became a necessity’
(Janssen 1992: 315). This appears to provide an
‘explanation’ or ‘justification’ for conquest. However,
despite the apparent certainty, there is no consensus
on the issue. For Egypt, Janssen, Bard and Carneiro
assume its validity; Kemp (1989: 31), Eyre (1997)
and the current author (Warburton 2001: 244-45,
282) dispute it. For Egypt, an equally useful alter-
native would combine Mann’s (1997) concept of
‘caging’ with Clausewitz’ ‘reciprocity’. This is impor-
tant, since (aside from Egypt) I know of no instance
where Carneiro’s hypothesis has been tested.
Obviously, the court is out on this, but this example
should advise against simply ‘applying’ it as an
‘explanatory’ model elsewhere, at least until more
evidence is in. 
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More important, however, is the fact that the prin-
ciple of the use of ‘Circumscription Theory’ excuses
conquest by combining elements of Rousseau and
Malthus, opening the way to claims that climatic
causes or demographic growth alone triggered early
conflicts. These attempts ‘justify’ the use of violence
rationally, defined in terms of economic constraints.
This logic is then extended to ‘explain’ later wars of
conquest in terms of ‘economic motives’. 
Western economic growth has encouraged
Western philosophers to associate economic growth
and material gain with ‘reason’. It is viewed as ‘rea-
sonable’ that wars are fought over economic goods.
It is occasionally argued that ancient wars will have
been fought for similar reasons (Mayer 1995: 1), yet
it is not even clear that this occurs today (although
figuring among pretexts). The origin in constraints,
and the later pursuit of conquest for economic
reasons are thus assumed to be identical, and the
character of warfare thus assigned a rational and
consistent character. Although easily recognisable to
the Western student, the logic is purely circular. Yet
there is no reason to assume that it really explains
the wars of the Bronze Age Near East in a more con-
vincing fashion than the one which Thucydides and
Clausewitz would offer.
Conversely, there are scholars who will attempt
either (a) to deny the importance of violence before
it is unequivocally documented, or (b) to deny its
purpose. The repeated denial that arrowheads of
the Levantine Neolithic were designed and used to
kill humans is symptomatic of this approach (cf.
Cauvin, above). It is true that evidence is still sparse.
However, elsewhere arrowheads are documented in
human bones, and Bronze Age armour-piercing
arrowheads served no other purpose, as the Egyptian
documents confirm. On the other hand, however,
conceding the possibility of violence while denying
a purpose compounds the difficulties of under-
standing the use of force in human societies. 
This confuses two issues: one is the issue of vio-
lence and the other is the use of violence to pursue
a ‘political goals’. An approach to ‘ancient warfare’
might better be directed at the issue of violence in
inter-communal relations, and not mere killing and
violence, with a distinction between ‘violence’ as
‘personal or social lethal interaction’ and ‘warfare’
as ‘political lethal interaction’. Among the ‘origins’
one could also seek not just ‘causes’ and ‘explana-
tions’, but also ‘purposes’. 
We would therefore advise students of archaeo-
logical aspects of warfare to pay close attention to
the definitions they use, and to appreciate that the
‘moral’ element of warfare is itself part of the history
of the philosophy of warfare, and the experience of
war, but not necessarily part of warfare itself. 
Conclusions
The capacity of a state to wage war and impose its
will depends upon ‘power’. Aron (1962) identified
territorial space, resources, manpower and capacity
for collective action as the essential attributes of
‘power’. War is therefore the expression of the spirit
of the state. According to Clausewitz, the power of a
state served a political purpose. Rousseau and Hegel
would have viewed this as a tautology.
At different times, Western philosophy has
approached the issue of state-organised violence in
terms as different as ‘interest’ and ‘morality’, with a
view to ‘justifying’ or ‘explaining’ warfare. None of
the proposed roles has matched the actual perform-
ance of warfare. In fact, therefore, it is not the vio-
lence, but the state’s use of violence which consti-
tutes the essence of warfare, rendering it distinctly
different from mere lethal conflict. The origins of
inter-communal lethal violence lie in the depths of
pre-history, and these contributed to the develop-
ment of warfare which was transformed into a new
activity with the appearance of the first states, some
five thousand years ago. This opened the path to
‘interest’, ‘policy’ and the ‘just war’.
The Hegelian assumption that the state was the
spirit of reason in substantial form depended upon
the assumption that the state was divine. This ‘divin-
ity’ can be traced back to the absolute ‘divinity’ and
‘justice’ of ancient Near Eastern warfare which fed
into Christian doctrine. This differed substantially
from the approach of Mediterranean antiquity where
state interest dominated, but the political goals stip-
ulated by Clausewitz can be used to frame any kind
of warfare: even an epic duel, with a state on one side. 
The concept of war as an instrument of policy
whereby the weak were subjected to the will of the
strong was apparent in Thucydides, and Thucydides
clearly stated that the moral reasons for the war
were merely a pretext. This view was adopted by
Hobbes, who assigned the state a role in protecting
the individual. Hegel extended this and ultimately
combined it with Aquinas’s view to form his own
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conception of the state. Clausewitz then analysed
war as state activity.
Here, Hobbes, Hegel, Clausewitz and Rousseau
were all in agreement, differing only in the attitude
with which they viewed the state and human
nature. Rousseau took leave of the others in assuming
that the individual suffered from the impositions of
the state, rather than benefiting from the rights
granted by the state. Rousseau assumed that human
beings were basically peaceful and that they did not
deliberately seek to harm others; Kant suggested
that peace could be a goal of state policy. This
matched modern Western distaste for war, born of
defeat and the consciousness of futile destruction.
While Aquinas, Rousseau and Kant described
ideals they perceived as practical, Clausewitz and
Thucydides perceived themselves to be describing
an ideal version of reality. Both types of ideals were
incorporated into modern Western warfare. At the
same time modern views of warfare – as senseless
violence which does not serve the interests of the
state – are transformed into assumptions in archae-
ological theory.
I have tried to argue that war independent of
states is virtually impossible, and that ‘state interest’
and ‘warfare’ thus move together. Given the contrast
between war as a political instrument employed to
subject the weak, and the concept of war as a moral
instrument, it is clear that the key to understanding
the Western philosophies of war is the Biblical inter-
pretation of warfare. Via Jahweh, the Christian con-
cept of a morally just and righteous god guiding his-
tory was married to the concept of the national gods
of Egypt and Assyria. The concept of the divinely
sanctioned state waging divinely sanctioned war
was then incorporated into the paradigm of war as
an instrument of policy. 
We may distinguish between (a) the origins of
warfare – probably in inter-communal conflict at the
end of the Palaeolithic before property and the first
states – and (b) the character of warfare as defined
by Clausewitz. The origins of a phenomenon do not
necessarily correspond to the character of the same
phenomenon at a later stage in its development.
History would tend to indicate that ‘state warfare’
represented an irreversible transformation in the use
of violence. Violent conflict continued to exist, but
a new form of violent conflict emerged.
Once states came into being, the rules of recipro-
cal violence in Clausewitzian warfare left little choice
in its conduct. I would argue that neglecting the
link between divine legitimacy and political power
in the earliest Near Eastern states, and the link
between policy and violence in modern warfare per-
mits some latitude in understanding and defining
‘warfare’. I would, however, argue that this approach
cannot aid in understanding the phenomenon of
‘warfare’ discussed in this chapter, nor in achieving
general agreement about the concept, as generally
understood.
‘Warfare’ is an aspect of the state, with its own
system of ‘values’. ‘Violent conflict’ is a characteris-
tic of human behaviour. Reciprocity may be present
in either, but the social system is pre-eminent and
decisive in the former, the individual in the latter.
Although organised violence and the state are essen-
tial features in my understanding of war, rational
goals are not. However, the reciprocal nature of war-
fare means that irrational goals pursued with the
systematic use of violence will meet with opposi-
tion, and thus re-introduce rationality. 
This is the defining characteristic of warfare as
opposed to mere inter-communal violence. The state
can employ force, but the state itself cannot guaran-
tee the pursuit of interest or rational goals: only a
reciprocal opposing force can compel the state to
behave rationally. Contending that ‘warfare’ is a
state activity means deciding whether this is (a) a
logical and valid conclusion, (b) a possible assump-
tion, (c) a definition, (d) a criterion or (e) a tautology.
I argue that ‘warfare’ is a state activity and that
Clausewitz would have been unable to revise his
book by assuming a form of ‘limited warfare’ com-
patible with the ‘reciprocity’ inherent in state war-
fare, which is what gives the purposefulness of war
its awful form.
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This article critically examines archaeologies of the
Stone and Bronze Ages by looking at them through
a broad contemporary framework. Although clearly
including warriors in explanations of material tran-
sitions from one culture to another, the academic
discourse of archaeology has strangely ignored war-
fare and violence as relevant aspects of past human
activity, an apparent contradiction that this article
will examine and debate.1
Power, dominance and coercion are almost
inevitably connected to warfare and its principal
actors, soldiers and warriors, brutally interfering with
human existence almost everywhere in our late mod-
ern world. These factors, embedded in a 21st century
setting, make it obvious that warfare should be an
object of archaeological study. More generally, war
seems to be a central ingredient in social reproduction
and change, which constitutes another reason for
engaging in the study of war, warfare and warriors.
However, looking back at the Stone and Bronze Age
archaeology of the 20th century, it becomes clear
that archaeologists have studied weaponry, and in
some measure warriors, but not war. There are
notable exceptions, but possible reasons for the gen-
eral absence of an interest in violence need to be
outlined and debated. Warfare and violence began
to enter the archaeological discourse only after c.
1995. Compared to the general implementation of
anthropological and sociological theories in archae-
ology (late 1960s and early 1970s), war studies thus
arrive on the scene much delayed. Even after this
date the theme is quite often embarked upon as
something set aside from the rest of social practice. 
Vencl (1984) has argued that the absence of war-
fare studies in prehistoric archaeology is linked to the
inadequacy of archaeological sources. It is undoubt-
edly true that archaeological data do not reflect the
ratio of war in prehistory. Trauma is probably under-
represented, and so are weapons of organic materials
(Capelle 1982). However, direct and indirect evidence
of war-related violence is by no means non-existent
(Figs. 1-4). The number of prehistoric weapons,
including fortifications, is huge, and iconographic
presentations of war and warriors in art and rituals
supplement the picture, as do examinations of pat-
terns of wear and damage on swords (cf. Bridgford
1997; Kristiansen 2002). Skeletal traumata are, in fact,
relatively frequent in European prehistory when it
is taken into account that skeletons are often not
well preserved, they are not routinely examined for
marks of violence and that much physical violence
does not leave visible traces on the skeleton. The
evidence is most certainly adequate as a basis for
studies of violence and war.
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The horse-mounted and axe-wielding pastoral tribes migrated into Jutland from the south,
rapidly making themselves rulers of the central and western half of the peninsula. Up
through southern Jutland the burial mounds mark the routes of colonization, which can only
be loosely followed. The oldest occurrences of axes show how comprehensive this first influx
was. The wide and leafy river-valleys of central and western Jutland became the first resort of
these foreigners, since here was abundant food for their beasts. The old fishing and hunting
folk who lived close to lakes and streams was rapidly subdued in most places, and the same
destiny undoubtedly stroke the dispersed farming communities, unless they succeeded in
reaching eastern Jutland, where their kinsfolk, the megalithic people, was densely situated.
(Glob 1945: 242, author’s translation from Danish)
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F I G .  1 : The mass grave from Wassenaar in the
Netherlands (after Louwe Kooijmans 1993) provides con-
crete evidence of war-related violence at the end of the
Early Bronze Age, c. 1700 BC. It also testifies to the bru-
tality, horror, and finality of prehistoric war hence belying
the celebrative tales of brave warriors and peaceful peas-
ants. Twelve individuals – six men of warrior age, four
adolescents and children in addition to one or two women
– had been interred in a large grave pit following a certain
regulated pattern. This suggests that despite the abnormal
burial practice the bodies had been at least provisionally
cared for by surviving kin or women taken captive by the
victors. Three of the males had received cutting blows on
their skull and arms, while a fourth male had been
wounded, probably fatally, by a flint arrowhead sitting 
in situ in the rib cage; one child had been decapitated.
The reason why war has played a small part in the
archaeology of the 20th century must be searched
for elsewhere. Insufficient evidence is hardly the core
of the matter. Rather the existent evidence has been
ignored, underestimated, rationalised, or idealised –
for example, through the use of soft metaphors for
war (unrest, troubled times, etc.). The initially weak
presence of war and the belated appearance of war
studies are arguably linked to the politics and wars
of contemporary society, but they are simultane-
ously entrenched in two myths about the primitive
other, which have persuasively influenced European
thought at least since the 17th century. These myths
have had a considerable impact on archaeological
interpretations, which are divided into two tales
positioned at either end of the scale commemorat-
ing certain stereotypical identities and societies with
contemporary political meanings; these interpreta-
tions have circulated within the discipline and have
also been communicated to the public. 
The two tales of prehistoric society are interpretive
traditions, or trends, rather than schools of thought,
inasmuch as they contain different theoretical
stances which may not consent to the classification
undertaken here. They partly co-exist and they even
compete with each other. Each trend is joined
together by a related understanding of society and of
how and to what degree social change is generated.
The first trend conjures up warriors – though not
always explicitly – and advocates prehistoric society
as an organism that changes through human
agency, often suddenly and radically. The second
trend evokes peaceful hunters, peasants and traders
– indeed the antitheses of the warrior – by proposing
a view of prehistoric society as a mainly reproduc-
tive organism, involving a stepwise or slow long-
term social evolution. 
I shall insist that it is not sufficient merely to add
war to the themes that archaeology can study. The
seriousness of the topic demands that we discuss
how war should be studied and portrayed. Is it really
indispensable to incorporate the vicious face of war
in archaeological studies of this phenomenon? This
is a relevant question because the archaeology of the
late 1990s has analysed war in a strictly rational
fashion. In this respect the newest war anthropolo-
gy can potentially inform the archaeological study
of war. Furthermore, the present contribution wishes
to promote an understanding of warfare as a social
phenomenon which cannot be studied isolated from
its social context and which needs an adequate the-
oretical framework. The position taken is, in short,
that warfare is a flow of communally based social
action aimed at violent confrontation with the other.
Being a warrior is consequently a social identity
founded in warfare.
The following account is intended to lay out the
history of research in broad brush strokes and in
doing so it draws on examples from European, and
particularly Scandinavian, Stone and Bronze Age
archaeology. No attempt is made at comprehen-
siveness.
Warriors, but little war
A vigorous tradition in 20th century archaeology has
envisioned prehistoric society as an unstable entity
which was transformed through radical events.
Sudden material changes were explained as a result
of migration or revolution, often with fierce warriors
as front figures. Economic and social forces of power,
tensions and underlying contradictions generated
revolutions, whereas invading aristocracies formed
the essence of migrations. This warrior tradition
took shape in the beginning of the century and in
its earlier phase it included first and foremost V. G.
Childe and contemporaries of the empiricist school.
Childe was indeed the inventor of revolutions in
prehistory, though not of migration, which emerged
in archaeological thought at the end of the 19th
century and continued well into the 20th (Trigger
1980: 24ff, 102ff; Champion 1990). Later, Grahame
Clark diagnosed the obsession with migrations as
‘invasion neurosis’ (Clark 1966: 173). This was no
exaggeration: especially in central Europe, deposi-
tions of valuables were associated with an unsteady
political situation in the wake of ethnic migration
(Bradley 1990: 15).
Whilst Childe characteristically drew a complex
map of social change, he also composed vivid scenes
of migrating people with armed warriors in front,
sometimes on horseback. Waves of migrating Beaker
folk, for example, put an end to egalitarian clan
society, forever changing the European societies of
the Neolithic Period (1946: 41).
The last warrior group to appear in the archaeological record
from Western and Central Europe played a far more construc-
tive part than hitherto mentioned. For though they travelled
fast and far in small well-armed bands, their objectives were
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not only pastures and arable lands, but also raw materials for
trade and industry, and smiths accompanied them. (Childe
1958: 144)
He imposed the same model upon a series of other
archaeological cultures exhibiting a sudden and mas-
sive geographical expansion, notably the forerunner
of Bell Beakers, the Battle-Axe warriors, who became
pastoral overlords of the local peasants they subdued
during their conquest of new land (op. cit.: 142f).
Despite his fondness of the warrior model, Childe
was reluctant to incorporate war as a force in histo-
ry. He nevertheless included warfare in some of his
later works, but merely ascribed it to the economic
greed of aristocrats (1951[1936]: 134; 1941: 133).  
A similar line of thought recurred in P.V. Glob’s
study of the Single Grave Culture, the Danish version
of the Battle-Axe Culture. Presumably influenced by
Childe, Glob evoked a lively scenario of invading
warrior nomads, axe wielding and on horseback
(cf. the opening quotation). In his great survey of
Danish prehistory, published first in 1938-40,
Johannes Brøndsted conjured up several intrusions
of warrior groups during the Neolithic Period. He
even employed a Marxist-Childean vocabulary, not
least when categorising the Bronze Age as a class
society with an aristocratic upper class of warriors
and an oppressed peasant class (Brøndsted I, 1957;
II, 1958: 10). War and violence were, however,
absent.
Structural Marxist approaches of the late 1970s and
1980s continued this tradition even if internal social
dynamics and structural contradictions replaced
migration as the cause of rapid social change. In
studies by Susan Frankenstein and Michael Rowlands
(1978; Rowlands 1980), warriors were in particular
related to competition for rank. Kristian Kristiansen
has similarly made use of warriors in seeking to
explain the archaeological record of the Bronze Age
(1982; 1984a; 1984b; 1991b; 1998; 1999). An exam-
ination of wear traces on Bronze Age swords showed
that they were used in real fighting as well as in
the display of social rank (Kristiansen 1984a; 2002).
The notion of the rise of a warrior class on the back-
ground of structural change was also present in my
own studies of the earliest Bronze Age (Vandkilde
1996; 1998; 1999). Yet these studies rarely men-
tioned war and violence. 
Hedeager and Kristiansen (1985) reused the struc-
tural Marxist model in their pioneering article that
made war an object of study. The article highlights
the social functions of warfare, notably describing
fighting as a route to social success. Jarl Nordbladh
(1989) resumed this thread in his study of ‘armour
and fighting in the south Scandinavian Bronze Age’.
Petroglyphs and graves alike celebrated war heroes
in a socially unbalanced society in which 
fighting was probably very ritualised and often unequal with
rules guaranteeing the safety of the most noble and prescribing
more spectacular and serious duels for persons of lower rank.
(Nordbladh 1989: 331)
What was envisioned was a rather bloodless theatre
kind of war.
It is possible to similarly categorise one branch of
the post-Processual archaeology of the late 1980s
and early 1990s because of the key role attributed to
social domination and inherent conflict (Miller and
Tilley 1984: 5ff; Shanks and Tilley 1987: 72f). This
branch considered power as central to social life, but
hardly mentioned violence and bloodshed at all. In
her studies of the Danish Middle Neolithic, Charlotte
Damm was inspired by post-processual ideas, espe-
cially Christopher Tilley’s work on the Swedish
Battle-Axe culture (Tilley 1984). Widespread social
upheavel instituted the Single Grave Culture in
Jutland:
I consider it likely that a break with the existing society in one
of these groups led to general uprising and the emergence of
a new social and material order in large parts of the North
European lowland. (Damm 1993: 202)
Damm believed her views of the Single Grave culture
to be in opposition to the earlier studies by Glob
(1945) and Kristiansen (1991a), who argued for ethnic
migration rather than cultural construction. What
they had in common, however, was an emphasis on
rapid change through human agency, and, further-
more, a lack of definite reference to the waging of
war even if their theoretical framework presupposed
such activities. 
To sum up: despite the fact that the model of
migration and revolution does not envision peaceful
interaction, warfare and violence are seldom men-
tioned, and this is regardless of the precise theoretical
persuasion. The entire explanatory trend underplays
the violence it so clearly implies. Even when the
armed individuals – implicitly males – are termed
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‘warriors’, brutality and killing do not form part of
their actions. The violent face of massive ethnic
migration and social revolution is ignored, under-
stated or simply not realised. The scholars who men-
tion or examine warfare – notably Childe, Rowlands,
Hedeager and Kristiansen, and Nordbladh – under-
play its deadly and destructive effects on human life
and society while emphasising the heroic aspect or
its socio-economic functions; hence, they describe
fighting as mostly ritualised and related to social
presentation and rivalry. Richard Bradley (1990:
139ff) similarly suggests an interpretation of the
flamboyant weapon sacrifices of the Late Bronze
Age in terms of ‘potlatch as surrogate warfare’. A
relationship between rituals and warfare is certainly
valid, but so-called ritual war is an ambiguous con-
cept. Even if it occurred it would only be one com-
ponent of a warfare pattern (Otterbein 1999: 796ff).
We are in other words presented with an idealised
image of revolution, migration and warriors in pre-
history. 
Various subjective influences may hide a key to
the lack of realism. The above portraits of Stone and
Bronze Age society, and the warrior trend in general,
undoubtedly respond to war-related events in the
contemporary world. Several of the scholars behind
the warrior tale have sympathised with left-wing
politics and ideology up through the 20th century –
maybe the most violent and warlike ever and thus
encroaching upon most people’s lives in one way or
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F I G .  2 : The gallery grave at Over Vindinge in Præstø
County in southern Zealand (after Vandkilde 2000) with
remains of several interments and a small collection of
humble grave goods. The pelvis of a mature male pre-
served the tip of a bronze spearhead, shot into his lower
back from behind (cp. close-up). The wound was not
immediately fatal since there are signs of regrowth/heal-
ing. The spearhead can be tentatively identified as of
Valsømagle type, datable to Bronze Age Period IB (1600-
1500 BC). Bronze weapons were then clearly employed 
in acts of violence and war, simultaneously however with
other potential uses and meanings in the social field.
This period saw the emergence of a new social order with
emphasis on new forms of social conduct and material
culture among an elite. Evidently, struggles for power did
not only pertain to ideology and socio-politics; warfare
violently affected people’s lives. 
the other. With the exception of extremist versions,
the left wing was from the onset tied up with anti-
war movements. One possible reason for the miss-
ing, or understated, violence could be that pacifist
attitudes coloured the archaeology of revolution
and migration; another reason could be rooted in
idealist attitudes to riots and radical social transfor-
mation. Quite possibly, these reasons have interacted.
A proportion of revolutionary romanticism does
seem to inhabit the work of Childe and contempo-
raries like Glob and Brøndsted as well as later struc-
tural-Marxists and post-processualists.
Women as prehistoric agents entered the dis-
course rather late, and then rarely mixed up with
warriors, power and migration. The later work of
Marija Gimbutas from the mid-1970s was a forceful
and feminist exception. In her vision, Old Europe
was a peaceful place ruled by women and structured
by female values. Migrating bands of horse-mount-
ed warriors from the Eurasian steppes destroyed this
paradise, and Old Europe never recovered. Social
order and cultural values were reversed, and New
Europe became a thoroughly male-dominated and
violent place (Gimbutas 1982[1974]: 9). 
This explanation of the archaeological record has
naturally not escaped criticism since it does not real-
ly agree with the evidence (Häusler 1994; Chapman
1999). It is nevertheless interesting because of its
unique position. Gimbutas treads in the footsteps of
Childe with her emphasis upon warriors and migra-
tion, but her explanation contrasts with those of her
contemporaries in two ways: firstly, it has an inherent
binary opposition of warlike maleness and peaceful
femaleness, female gender representing the domi-
nated part. This certainly recalls ‘radical’ feminist
ideology of the 1970s. Secondly, it contains an
unusually direct reference to a state of violence and
warfare, which is considered fatal for human life
and values of equality. These attitudes correlate with
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F I G .  3 : Presentations of fighting warriors, some of
them on ships. Bronze Age carvings on rock at Kville in
Bohuslän in Sweden (after Nordbladh 1989). These and
similar pictures have glorifying features, but the sport-like
duels doubtless were only one component of a warfare
pattern that included pirate expeditions, raids and other
kinds of warfare.
her feminist stance. It is also related to her life out-
side the protected sphere of Western European aca-
demics. John Chapman has convincingly traced the
origin of Gimbutas’s dichotomous perception of an
Old and a New Europe in her idealised Lithuanian
childhood as opposed to the horrors of the Russian
invasion (Chapman 1998). There is certainly no
romanticised attitude to revolutions here.
Peaceful peasants
The reverse tradition had its breakthrough between
1940 and 1950. Here we find harmonious and egal-
itarian societies described as mostly static and with-
out latent conflict or underlying contradictions.
Hardworking and peaceful hunters, peasants and
traders replaced the armed warriors of the opposite
tradition, and emphasis was placed on the agrarian,
and otherwise economic, foundation of prehistoric
society, especially in the influential work of Grahame
Clark (e.g., 1939; 1952; 1975), whose focus upon
ecology and the function of culture, rather than upon
explaining cultural change, was a distinct reaction
against Childe’s Marxist approach (Trigger 1989:
264ff). Clark and Piggott (1978[1965]) characterised
the earlier Neolithic as peasant communities and
the later Neolithic and the Bronze Age as trading
communities based upon an expanding metal
industry. 
Clark’s work inspired studies in settlement and
subsistence. A similar understanding of prehistoric
society with impact from the natural sciences under-
lay much empiricist archaeology outside the circles
of Cambridge University. Scandinavian settlement
archaeology effectively mediated a peaceful picture
of prehistoric society based on nature, subsistence
and cultural continuity (Fabech et al. 1999: 18). This
was evident in economist-ecological analyses of
Mesolithic settlement sites in Denmark. Søren H.
Andersen (e.g., 1972; 1975) described a life preoccu-
pied with the daily necessities of hunting and gath-
ering, a peaceful society in harmony with nature
and with other people. In the face of frequent skele-
tal trauma in Late Mesolithic Ertebølle burials,
Andersen, quite possibly due to his basic attitude,
underrated the significance of violence and conflict
by deeming it non-lethal, marginal and occasional
(Andersen 1981: 71f).2
A mainly reproductive vision of prehistory was
also clear-cut in studies by C. J. Becker and Mats
Malmer, who refuted that animosities between
Battle-Axe people and Funnel Beaker people ever
took place (Becker 1954: 132ff; Malmer 1962; 1989:
8ff). Becker expressed it this way:
When the two ethnic groups had the opportunity to meet –
according to our current knowledge of the finds – this proba-
bly happened quite peacefully and hardly in a warlike fash-
ion. (Becker 1954: 143, author’s translation from German)
They envisioned peaceful interaction between the
various Stone Age cultures, hence stressing cultural
and social continuity. Battle-axes were status sym-
bols, not tools of war, since prehistoric society was
inherently peaceful (Malmer 1989: 8). H.C. Broholm
used much the same vocabulary, interpreting the
Nordic Bronze Age as a primitive and peaceable
peasant culture without marked social differentia-
tion (1943-44). In the early 1980s, Poul Otto Nielsen
even claimed that society largely remained static
throughout the Neolithic and the Bronze Age (1981:
154ff). These studies clearly underestimated the
potential social significance of large-scale material
changes and ignored the possibility of warlike
encounters. This tradition correlated remarkably
with the views of the Danish social anthropologist
Kaj Birket-Smith, who in an influential study from
the early 1940s characterised the primitive other
encountered by ethnographers as essentially peace-
ful and preoccupied with subsistence (Birket-Smith
1941-42: e.g., 138ff).3
Although concerned with processes of social
change, and with explaining it, New Archaeology
performed the reorientation of the discipline with-
out warriors and war, interpreting the weapons –
undeniable there – as symbols of social status (cf.
Vandkilde 2000: 6ff). Social evolution became a core
point due to substantial influence from the neo-evo-
lutionism that developed in social anthropology
from the 1940s onwards. Prehistoric society accord-
ingly progressed towards still greater complexity in
evolutionary sequences from band to tribe to chief-
dom and eventually the state. Change was either
imperceptibly slow or occurred at the transition
between these societal categories brought about by
population pressure and ecological crises. Thus, in a
long-term perspective social reproduction was
thought to be much more normal than social trans-
formation. Jørgen Jensen’s analyses of Danish pre-
history (1979; 1982) represented a Processual – neo-
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evolutionist view; he emphasised population pres-
sure, ecology, economy and long-term social trends,
and even when he recognised war as a characteristic
feature of ethnographic tribes (Jensen 1979: 113),
this insight was not really used to explain the fre-
quency of weaponry in the Danish past. He mainly
regarded weapons as symbols of superior social rank
and performing key social functions in gift exchange
between high ranking members of society (ibid.:
147ff). 
This essentially static view of society in New
Archaeology accords with the empiricist view of pre-
historic society as largely unchanging. They agree in
describing prehistoric man as hunter, peasant and
trader rather than warrior – the female half of society
still being without a place in history. Prehistoric
society was a peaceful place characterised by evolu-
tion rather than revolution and migration, socially
balanced and economically prosperous due to the
efforts of skilled hunters, successful traders and,
most particularly, hard-working peasants. 
This major chronicle of Stone and Bronze Age
society also responded socially to important war-
related events in the contemporary world. The
described perception of the past can be linked to a
very similar ideal of modern – i.e., post Second World
War – Western society’s concern with technological
development, human progress, harmony, welfare and
peace; hence confirming it (cf. Trigger 1989: 289).
This optimistic attitude to life was ultimately a reac-
tion to years of hardship, wars and genocide, and it
had a profound impact on how European prehisto-
ry was perceived and mediated. After the Second
World War the assessment of the prehistoric being
as innately non-violent and preoccupied with sub-
sistence, production and trade became quite domi-
nant. But the opposite stance survived and had a
revival, especially in the years after c.1980 with the
Marxist recovery – now in Structuralist bedding –
and with the power-branch of post-Processual
archaeology. 
Chiefly warriors, and more war
During the last ten years the warrior tale has pre-
vailed, and social categories like warrior elite, warrior
aristocracy, warrior or martial society increasingly
inhabit archaeological interpretations. Warfare is
usually allowed, but the language often retains cele-
brative undertones:
The appearance of warrior aristocracies represents the forma-
tion of a new chiefly elite culture in Europe. It was embedded
in new rituals, in new ideas of social behaviour and life style
(body care, clothing, etc), and in a new architecture of housing
and landscape. It centred around values and rituals of heroic
warfare, power and honour, and it was surrounded by a set of
new ceremonies and practices. They included ritual drinking,
the employment of trumpets or lurs in warfare and ritual, spe-
cial dress, special stools, and sometimes chariots. It meant
that chiefs were both ritual leaders and leaders of war. 
(Kristiansen 1999: 180-81)
Similar views are being widely communicated and
also transmitted to the public, not least by scholars
studying the Bronze Age (cf. Demakopoulou et al.
1998). They mediate an elitist and heroic stereotype
of the Bronze Age, stressing cultural similarities on a
pan-European scale, and thus, incidentally, hinting
at a tie to a modern European project, which also
conceals cultural differences (Gröhn 2004; Gramsch
2000). The increasing popularity of warriors in
archaeological interpretations at the transition to
the 21st century is a follow-up of the celebrative
tale of the warrior so distinct during the previous
century, in which warriors are viewed as the brave-
hearted heads of society. There is likewise an incli-
nation to focus one-sidedly upon the privileged
upper classes as if these were the only agents of sig-
nificance. Sameness is contended in warriorhood in
Europe regardless of time and place. The paired
institution of the war chieftain and his retinue
described in later writings (such as ‘Indo-European’
sources, Tacitus’ Germania and medieval sources to
the feudal Gefolgschaft) is in the process of finding
its way back in time into the Neolithic and the
Bronze Age (e.g., Treherne 1995). In recent writings,
the warrior thus tends to be an unchangeable iden-
tity, embedded in social constancy, despite the often
underlying evolutionary idea of prehistory society
as tending towards increasing complexity. It remains
a rigid construct that is not really negotiated with
archaeological data. 
The current prevalence of the warrior tale is pre-
sumably related to the belated appearance around
1995 of specific studies of violence and war in archae-
ology. This is an important event, which is marked
by Lawrence Keeley’s influential publication War
before Civilisation: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage
(1996), followed by a veritable explosion in studies
of war. Quite possibly, the dramatic increase in ethnic
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wars and genocides of the 1990s among dissolving
national states on several continents has contributed
to this sudden escalation. Especially, the massive
media coverage may have made it difficult to carry
on ignoring or idealising archaeological data of war
and violence.
Studies of violence and war were undertaken
somewhat earlier in Iron Age research (cf. Brun
1988; Jørgensen and Clausen 1997; Ringtved 1999
with references). Research on the Late Bronze Age
and the Iron Age has been generally more willing to
incorporate war in its interpretations. I believe that
the evolutionary thinking that has also influenced
social anthropology is an important factor here. If
indigenous people without war, or with so-called rit-
ual war, are placed at the bottom of the evolution-
ary ladder then warfare has to get more common as
the complexity of society increases. 
Commemorative myths
The archaeological traditions of warriors and peas-
ants mostly pacify the past and populate it with
idealised figures of male identity. The scholars
involved in the debate, predominantly men, con-
sciously produce their views of prehistory in dis-
agreement or agreement with existent views and
this may have contributed to the academic repro-
duction of two stereotyped perceptions of prehis-
toric society positioned at each end of the scale: a
disruptive and discordant society or a peaceful and
harmonious society. As argued above they reflect a
politicised impact from contemporary events, but
much deeper-lying myths have doubtless been
influential in creating and sustaining the two tales
of warriors and peasants.
Even if war and violence are not really central to
the former of the stereotypes, I believe both of them
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F I G .  4 : Late Neolithic pressure-flaked flint arrowheads
– hafting reconstructed – from Denmark (after Nielsen
1981; reproduced with the kind permission of Flemming
Bau). Their elaborate shape suggests they were meant for
warfare, simultaneously however with other functions and
meanings relating to social identification. The number of
weapons preserved from Neolithic and Bronze Age Europe
is huge, and it is very unlikely that their uses were restrict-
ed to the sociable peace of community life and religion.
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have their origin in the history of European identity
created and recreated in the face of growing colo-
nialism. The warrior tale and the peasant tale can be
claimed to incorporate two dominant myths about
the primitive other, which have been reproduced
probably on a continuous scale at least since the 17th
century. The bellicose and brutal savage emerges in
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1958[1651]) and reap-
pears in a different form in Karl Marx’ conflicting
and latently violent society. This being is in contrast
to the noble and peaceful savage who originates in
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s romantic writings and who
in a sense recurs in Max Weber’s consensual society. 
The two tales are, in effect, a modern commemo-
ration of heroes in the same way as heroes have been
celebrated in past societies through material means
– a social presentation with limited bearing on the
real world of the past, or the present for that matter.
The past – insofar as this can be treated as a unit –
was no doubt characterised by rivalling myths about
heroes and heroines, probably in stark contrast to
the realities of most people’s lives. This is also valid
for our own time. Sanimir Resic (1999; chapter 27)
has recently identified celebrations of warriorhood
and combative actions before, during and after the
Vietnam War (1965-1973). This romanticisation
included not only the official propaganda, but also
the stories the soldiers told family and friends in
letters. Idolising warriors and the idealisation of
warlike behaviour have deeply permeated contem-
porary society as well as its interpretation of history.
It may be added here that nothing indicates that war
in so-called primitive societies should be less bloody
than in so-called civilised societies (Keeley 1996;
Helbling 1996; Wiessner and Tumu 1998: 119ff,
152f). Rather, the frequency of war and violence
varies with the specific cultural and social setting.
Keeley’s book from 1996 was pioneering in that it
helped to encourage war studies in archaeology. His
key message is that archaeologists and anthropologist
who have nourished the Rousseauian notion of the
noble savage have utterly pacified the past.5 While
this portrayal of the historiography is not entirely
wrong, it is inadequate. The recurrence of the warrior
theme throughout the 20th century supplements
the picture, as do early studies by Childe, Gimbutas,
Rowlands, Hedeager and Kristiansen, Nordbladh and
Vencl, who to varying extents incorporate or study
war. If anything, two myths have coexisted: the
peaceful savage and a fierce and potentially warlike
savage. Otterbein has expressed a similar critique
towards the anthropological part of Keeley’s book
(1999: 794, 800ff).
The history of research can now be summarised.
Two opposite tales of prehistoric society have coex-
isted, and probably still do. The warrior tale with its
emphasis on revolution and migration grew strong
during the first half of the century while the peasant
tale with its emphasis on harmonious, industrious
and imperceptibly changing societies gradually came
into focus after c. 1945 and then receded again in
the 1980s. It is characteristic that the brutal and
deadly side of the warrior tale is usually left out or
transformed into soft warfare, while the possibility
of violence and war is completely ignored by those
advocating the peasant tale. During the last decade
or so the warrior tale has resumed a predominant
position, coinciding in part with a veritable boom in
war and violence studies from c. 1995. This whole
trajectory reflects differential social responses to con-
temporary politics and wars, while simultaneously,
however, incorporating deeply rooted European
myths that celebrate opposite ideals of society and
masculinity.
Anthropology, archaeology and war
Social anthropology has likewise had ‘hawks’ and
‘doves’ advocating opposite societal stereotypes
based on the myths of the peaceful or warlike savage
(Otterbein 1999). Anthropology has, however, been
much more willing to make war an object of study.
An explosion in anthropological warfare studies
occurred between 1960 and 1980, including classic
ethnographies as well as theoretical analyses of the
causes and effects of war (ibid.). Developments in
the anthropology of war can potentially improve on
the understanding of archaeological views on the
subject and ultimately enrich archaeological studies
of prehistoric war. A comparison is therefore under-
taken below.
Otterbein (1999) operates with a four-phased
process of development in the research history of the
anthropology of war: during the Foundation Period
(c.1850-c.1920) warfare was not a central concern for
the prevailing evolutionary approaches to ethnogra-
phy, but a strong database was produced showing
that very few societies were without war. During the
Classical Period (c.1920-c.1960) these data were large-
ly ignored. The myth of the peaceful savage emerged
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from evolutionary thinking inasmuch as indigenous
people without war or with so-called ritual war were
considered to be at the lower stages of development.
During the Golden Age (c.1960-c.1980), two opposite
sides were formed: those that believed in the ‘peace-
ful savage’ and those that believed in the ‘warlike
savage’. A veritable explosion in warfare studies
occurred, classic ethnographies as well as diverse
theoretical analyses concerned with the causes and
effects of war. In the Recent Period (c.1980 onward)
the handling of warfare has been simplified to com-
prise fewer theories, and a new interest has formed
regarding ethnic wars and genocide. A controversy
has developed between ‘hawks’ arguing that man’s
nature is to wage war and ‘doves’ arguing that man’s
nature is to live peacefully. The latter position con-
siders war as a result of expanding and warring states,
the so-called ‘tribal zone theory’, or the result of
states dissolving into warring ethnic groups (ibid.). 
The differences between the historiographies of
the two disciplines are striking, even if there is also
a similarity in the fact that opposite myths have
partly coexisted and interacted. Whilst the partial
entanglement of archaeology and anthropology is
generally apparent (Gosden 1999) the two disci-
plines have informed each other surprisingly little
as regards the issue of warfare and warriors despite
the possibility that new insight might have been
achieved through a cross-dialogue. The tribal-zone
theory proposed by Ferguson and Whitehead (1992),
for instance, would not have survived unmodified
for long if archaeological sources of prehistory had
been consulted. The anthropological database of
peace and war might similarly have been used to
assess critically the two tales of warriors and peasants
in archaeology. Moreover, the dramatic increase in
warfare studies during anthropology’s Golden Age
failed to achieve any profound impact on archaeol-
ogy. It is therefore unlikely that the breakthrough of
archaeological war studies in the mid-1990s is direct-
ly linked to anthropology. Rather it is connected to
the growth in ethnic-based wars after c. 1990 as sug-
gested above. A related aspect is that neo-evolutionist
approaches in social anthropology heavily influ-
enced the first theoretical applications in archaeolo-
gy in the 1960s and 1970s and even later. According
to this view, peace ruled the lower stages of societal
development, and this state of affairs was thus auto-
matically transferred to prehistory. A general feature
is furthermore that in anthropology the emphasis
has clearly been on warfare as structure, whereas in
archaeology the focus has been upon the specialised
agent of war, the warrior, in a heavily idolised ver-
sion. The anthropology of war, by comparison, con-
tains little reference to the agents of war, notably the
warriors, who are out of focus and undertheorised.
Stereotyped understandings of society are defi-
nitely not absent in anthropology, as the debate
between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ demonstrates, but the
realist constituent has nevertheless in general been
more substantially present. This difference could be
rooted in the material sources of archaeology, which
perhaps makes it more innately disposed to produce
stereotyped visions of society. The precise handling
of war in anthropology has more recently undergone
considerable changes, thus bringing forth another
dimension of the historiography. There is generally
a development from explaining war through cross-
cultural comparisons to understanding war in its
specific social context. In addition, the realist com-
ponent has moved more and more into the focus of
research. At least four traditions can be outlined,6
even if they do not occur completely separated from
each other. 
First, a materialist-functionalist approach locates
the causes of war in the competition over scarce
resources (females, food, land, etc.). It is sometimes
argued that war has a positive effect in that it redis-
tributes agents more fittingly across the landscape.
Second, a structural approach claims that the expla-
nation of war lies in the patterns of social structures;
the individual actor is without much significance.
Warfare either results from a breakdown of social
norms, or war is capable of reproducing and chang-
ing social norms. A third tradition is the structure-
agency approach, which considers action/agent and
social structure as mutually dependent and insepara-
ble, and moreover does not see a dichotomy between
examining war as ‘verstehen’ and ‘erklären’. War
and violent conflict are regarded as strategic action
situated within the continuities of social practice.
This approach has so far only been used in modern
settings, but doubtless also has potential in studies
of prehistoric war and violence. Fourth, a fairly new
approach strives to understand war by focussing
directly upon the violent acts and their meanings in
the cultural and social contexts that created them. A
related approach is concerned with the subjective
sphere of the war victims; that is, their personal feel-
ings of pain and hopelessness when they experience
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war and post-war. One focal point has been the
breakdown of social life, another the re-building of it.
This fourth development in some ways breaks
with the classic anthropology of warfare of the first
three traditions,7 which may be summarised thus:
despite the experienced disorder of war it can be
analysed on its social and historical background and
it can be compared cross-culturally; structured and
ordered patterns will then reveal themselves in the
rear-view mirror. From an archaeological point of
view this is a reasonable approach, but it needs to be
supplemented by elements from the fourth tradi-
tion: the terrible face of war as experienced by the
participants should be added to the interpretation.
Likewise, the culturally specific meanings of war
and violence should be considered – even the possi-
bility that they may deviate substantially from our
own values in this respect. A past with deviating cul-
tural values should be allowed, but nevertheless
critically assessed. Simon Harrison has made this
important point by comparing warfare in the
Highlands and coastal areas of Papua New Guinea
(1989), illustrating how the attitude to war and vio-
lence varied even within this region. 
In the Highlands, warfare was conducted and per-
ceived in a manner that Europeans find fairly easy
to understand. Warfare was regarded simply as a vio-
lent form of sociability, and anger and aggression
were conceptualised rationally as a drive to use vio-
lence. In a strategy of revenge, killings were recipro-
cated as a harmful alternative to gift exchange,
simultaneously emphasising and confirming male
companionship (Harrison 1989: 586). By contrast,
in the endogamous villages of the Lowlands all out-
siders were regarded as enemies inasmuch as they
threatened the internal universe of everyday social
life; this demonisation of the other, however, was a
mainly male point of view. Warfare was aimed at
outsiders, legitimated through the use of hunting
metaphors and undertaken as ritual action centred
on the village male cult. Through a ritual process
each of the men became transformed into another
person: the initiated men took on a ritual mask of
war making them capable of extreme and indiscrim-
inate violence; their ‘spirits’ went ahead of them
performing the atrocities (ibid.: 586ff). This is not
aggression in the Western sense; rather it is impas-
siveness, withdrawal from emotion and suspension
of any feeling (which was probably not shared by
the victims). Marshall Sahlins explained warfare
among tribes as a total breakdown of existent nor-
mative rules of sociability, but this theory is not
valid in Lowland New Guinea, says Harrison (ibid.:
583, 590f). Through secret rituals of magic the initi-
ated men divorced themselves entirely from the
social world of their community and outsiders alike,
thus setting aside morals and norms (Harrison 1989:
591; 1993; cf. also 1996). Rituals are thus in this
context used to create a social space for the enact-
ment of violence. 
In summary, prior to 1995, when archaeology
finally broached the topic of warfare more consis-
tently, social anthropology experienced a renewal of
the subject in the direction of a marked interest in
uncovering the multiple cultural meanings of atroc-
ities committed during ethnic wars and in revealing
the human pain and disaster involved in all wars.
The archaeology of war, as performed hitherto, com-
pares best with the first and second of the above four
attitudes to war in social anthropology and sociolo-
gy. There is, however, no doubt that the remaining
positions can provide useful alternatives and sup-
plements. The structure-agency approach may prove
especially valuable to archaeology, but obviously the
fourth approach contains subjective elements that
cannot be ignored. 
Towards an archaeology 
of warfare and warriors
The question is how to avoid the pitfalls associated
with dealing with the issues of warfare and warriors
in the past? The answer can never be definite,
because we all fall victim to subjective influences. A
few suggestions should nevertheless be made. One
possibility for a better understanding of warfare and
warriors clearly lies in theoretical reflection, but of
course also in taking into account the empirical data-
base as it stands. In addition, archaeological studies
have to mediate the viciousness of war-related vio-
lence even if the participants in prehistoric wars can
no longer be interviewed. 
Archaeology must resist thinking in dichotomies,
and thus discard the historically and ideologically
rooted, contrasting pre-understandings of the other.
We are in the habit of thinking in rigid categories,
often in contrasts, as Ian Hodder points out (1997).
The possibility of a variety of in-between positions
must be considered, the growing database optimisti-
cally exercising an increasing constraint on the
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number of possible interpretations. There is evi-
dently a need to diversify a rather static view of the
prehistoric warrior by taking into account the varie-
gated social realms of this being, archaeologically,
sociologically and ethnographically. The archaeo-
logical database of the European Neolithic and the
Bronze Age, for example, possesses the potential to
gain insight into the ways of the warrior. The precise
nature of prehistoric discourses, being mainly mate-
rial and thus silent, should not be considered a dis-
advantage, inasmuch as social and material practice
always interact. People at all times have produced
and utilised material culture, which therefore
embodies visible patterns and underlying structures
of human actions and thoughts, hence also the more
violent aspects of these (cp. chapters 31-34).
Viewed across time and space, warriorhood is a
complex social institution (see Vandkilde, chapter
26) which thrives in eras of prolonged war as well as
in periods of more limited warfare and even peace.
Warriorhood as social identity feeds on very different
human qualities, notably bravery and brutality, and
interpretations have to include these. Within the
two extreme positions described above queries about
aggression or peace too easily become a question of
being: humans are by nature aggressive or peaceful
(Vandkilde and Bertelsen 1999). An alternative
approach is to regard warfare – when it occurs – as
part of social practice; one kind of social action
amongst many others. This promotes a relational
understanding of warriors as a social identity con-
stantly being negotiated with other social identities
within society. This furthermore highlights the fact
that the meaning of warfare and warriors – apart
from being culturally specific – also depends on the
perspective of the agents, and on their varied and
changing identifications in society, including
whether they are victors or victims. 
Anthropological literature sometimes describes
societies as being in a constant state of war or peace,
but these absolutist expressions may well hide vari-
ations in scale, purpose, meaning and frequency.
This point is evident in Polly Wiessner and Akii
Tumu’s recent historical-anthropological analysis of
the Mae Enga in Highland Papua New Guinea
(1998: 119ff, 152f). Throughout their history Enga
were concerned with warfare, but seen through his-
torical glasses the scale of warlike activities never-
theless fluctuated, the degree of viciousness being
dependent on the objectives of the conflicting parties.
A similar message is conferred in Simon Harrison’s
The Mask of War (1993), about the Lowland New
Guinea Avatip for whom war belonged in a ritual
dimension separated from the sociable peace of com-
munity life. Even among the notoriously warlike
Yanomami in southern Venezuela and northern
Brazil, the frequency of war varied according to the
region and time: Jürg Helbling (1996) argues that
hostility and warlike behaviour prevail in the region
merely because it is too risky to engage in a strategy
of peace. These cases accord with the suggestion
made here, namely, to regard warfare as strategy and
action rather than a trait rooted in biology. Warfare
and related social activities thus constitute an iden-
tity-forming frame that may result in identification
as warrior and, ultimately, exclusionist institutions
comprising warriors. 
Archaeology has tended to treat warfare as if
divorced from the rest of social practice (cf. Thorpe
2001). Approaches to early warfare ought to become
more nuanced with recognition of its ideal and real
aspects and examination of its social setting and his-
torical background. The same is of course valid for
studies of warriors: their real and ideal features must
be approached and related to other identities of age,
gender, rank and profession (cf. Robb 1997;
Shepherd 1999). Recent anthropology and sociology
can be used here as a source of inspiration in that
warfare is generally regarded as intentional action
situated within the continuities of social practice
(cf. Jabri 1996). The perspective of warfare as a vio-
lent kind of social action is furthermore useful
because archaeological remains are essentially frag-
ments of past social action. War and violence are,
moreover, never accidental, since they are always
embedded in a cultural logic; therefore, attention
should be paid to the violent acts themselves, the
cultural meanings they carry and the cultural land-
scape that forms them. 
At the threshold of the 21st century war finally
entered the archaeological agenda, hence making
interpretations accord better with the archaeological
sources. However, the terrible side of war has not yet
become part of archaeological histories, which are
usually written in a strictly analytical language. The
recent approach to war in archaeology recalls the
rationalisation of war that has been accomplished
in the sciences of the 19th and 20th centuries. From
Carl von Clausewitz onwards war has been system-
atically reduced to rules, procedures, functions,
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causes and effects as part of a modern political
agenda, thereby legitimising the slaughter on and
off the battlefield (Pick 1993: 165ff). Recent develop-
ments in the anthropology of war suggest that it is
possible to enhance the degree of realism. 
During the last ten years the anthropological
handling of war has changed. A concern with under-
standing the actions, experiences, motives and feel-
ings of combatants, civilians and victims under the
chaotic conditions of war and post-war has supple-
mented the impersonal political-science analysis
(e.g., Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Nordstrom 1998;
Macek 2000; Kolind 2004; this volume chapter 29).
This particular interest is thus one of expression.
Physical pain is notably considered an irreducible
bodily experience which can never be wholly com-
municated and which therefore forms an instrument
of power (Scarry 1988). Feelings of meaninglessness
and pain under circumstances of war are on the
other hand universal in character (cf. Tarlow 1999:
20ff, 138ff). This means that the human suffering
involved can at least to some extent be communi-
cated in our reports regardless whether the war took
place in Jutland during the Middle Neolithic or in
Bosnia merely a few years ago. 
Violence, hardship and death are situated at the
core of warfare and warriors; if left out the story
becomes incomplete and too easily a commemora-
tion of heroes. Skeletal trauma and weaponry in var-
ious archaeological contexts can be taken as direct
or indirect evidence of the presence of war and vio-
lence with everything it implies in terms of cultural
meaning, agency and human suffering. It is crucial
in our archaeologies to include the vicious face of war
and warriors. This is because idealisations of violent
identities and one-sided rationalisations of prehis-
toric war inevitably run the risk of legitimising the
use of violence and waging of war in our own time.
N O T E S
1 The present article is a much-extended version of
Vandkilde 2003, especially as regards the history of the
research and the relationship between archaeology and
social anthropology.
2 The increase in evidence of trauma during the transition
to food production in Scandinavia is currently being re-
examined and debated (Thorpe n.d.; 2000 with refer-
ences; cp. also the present volume chapter 10).
3 Candidates in archaeology attended Kaj Birket-Smith’s
lectures at the University of Copenhagen. Birket-Smith
was influenced by the structural-functionalist tradition in
ethnography and cultural anthropology, notably by
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955). 
4 War studies occur in the form of conference reports,
anthologies, monographs and articles: for instance,
Randsborg 1995; Carman 1997; Martin and Frayer 1997;
Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Osgood 1998;
Laffineur 1999; Louwe Kooijmans 1993; Fokkens 1999;
Earle 1997; Carman and Harding 1999; Osgood et al.
2000; Runciman 1999; Thorpe 2000; 2001; n.d.
5 Keeley (1996) renamed the Rousseauian notion of the
noble savage ‘myth of the peaceful savage’.
6 Here I am relying on Torsten Kolind (2004.) and a sum-
mary by Simon Harrison (1996 with references).
7 For example, Carneiro 1970; Chagnon 1968; Clastres
1994; Fergusson and Whitehead 1992; Haas 1990; Knauft
1990; 1991; Otterbein 1970; 1999 (with references);
Vayda 1960; Wiessner and Tumu 1998 and Wolf 1987.
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‘I may add at once that I am a convinced pacifist. I
believe that modern warfare cannot in any way be
shown to be beneficent’, Bronislaw Malinowski
wrote in 1922. Having declared so, Malinowski con-
tinued that
savage warfare is something quite different, the toll in human
life and the suffering which it takes is as a rule relatively small.
On the other hand, it provides a wide field for physical exercise,
the development of personal courage, cunning and initiative,
and the sort of dramatic and romantic interest, the wide
vision of possibilities and ideals, which probably nothing else
can replace. (1961[1922]: 212)
He illustrated his point by relating something he
had learned during fieldwork:
Round the east end of New Guinea, where cannibalism and
headhunting flourish, the natives had the unpleasant habit of
making nocturnal raids, and of killing without any necessity,
and in unsportmanslike manner, women and children as well
as combatants. But when investigated more closely and con-
cretely, such raids appear rather as daring and dangerous
enterprises, crowned, as a rule, with but small success – half-
a-dozen victims or so – rather than as wholesale slaughter,
which indeed they never were. For the weaker communities
used to live in inaccessible fastnesses, perched high up above
precipitous slopes, and they used to keep good watch over the
coast. Now, when European rule has established peace and
security, these communities have come down to the sea-coast
and to swampy and unhealthy districts, and their numbers
have rapidly diminished. (ibid.: 213)
Malinowski concluded this argument by addressing
the colonial authorities with the suggestion that
their effort to first pacify all their legal subjects was
‘by no means an unmixed blessing’ (ibid.).
Such a conclusion was no longer on Malinowski’s
mind when, in 1940, he set himself down to write
‘An Anthropological Analysis of War’, which was to
provide backup for the fight against Nazi Germany.
But however much his political concerns had
changed, the Malinowski of 1940 still maintained
that wars which were known ethnographically were
quite different to the wars of the modern era.
Comparing instances of ‘man-hunting in search for
anatomic trophies’ with ‘[w]arfare as the political
expression of early nationalism’ and ‘expeditions of
organized pillage, slave-raiding, and collective rob-
bery’, the anthropologist declared that ‘[i]n a com-
petent analysis of warfare as a factor in human
evolution, they must be kept apart’ (1941: 538-41,
538). At the evolutionary stages of ‘savagery’ and
‘barbarism’, Malinowski found that
‘Total War’ and the Ethnography of New Guinea
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most of the fighting belongs to an interesting, highly compli-
cated, and somewhat exotic type: ... it is devoid of any political
relevancy, nor can it be considered as any systematic pursuit
of intertribal policy. (ibid.: 538)
Such wars most certainly differed from ‘the cultural
pathology of today’, for Malinowski considered that
in his own time ‘[t]he influence of present warfare
on culture is so total that it poses the problem
whether the integral organization for effective vio-
lence – which we call totalitarianism – is compatible
with the survival of culture’ (ibid.: 543-44). To expli-
cate his meaning, Malinowski turned to ‘the war of
1914-1918’:
In its technique, in its influence on national life, and also in
its reference to the international situation, it became a total
war. Fighting goes on now not merely on all frontiers geo-
graphically possible; it is waged on land, on sea, and in the air.
Modern war makes it impossible to distinguish between the
military personnel of an army and the civilians; between mil-
itary objectives and the cultural portion of national wealth;
and the means of production, the monuments, the churches,
and the laboratories. ... The total character of war, however,
goes much further. War has to transform every single cultural
activity within a belligerent nation. The family and the school,
the factory and the courts of law, are affected so profoundly
that their work – the exercise of culture through autonomous
self-contained institutions – is temporarily paralyzed or dis-
torted. (ibid.: 544-45)
‘This development’, Malinowski underscored his
point, ‘is not due to the barbarism of a nation or of
a dictator. It is inevitable, for it is dictated by the
modern technique of violence’ (ibid.: 545).
Sixty years after Malinowski wrote these words,
the contradistinction that he made between ‘savage
war’ and ‘modern war’ is still much debated among
anthropologists. These days, however, authors tend
to be rather critical of the idea that anthropology
should conceptualise ‘savage’ and ‘modern’ war as
two different phenomena. Most explicit on the issue,
both Lawrence Keeley (1996) and Keith Otterbein
(2000) agree that a myth was created that has much
hampered the anthropology of war when historic
anthropologists, such as Malinowski (1941: 543),
differentiated ‘the civilizations of savages’ from ‘the
savagery of civilization’. Quoting Keeley, Otterbein
(2000: 795) asserts that ‘the myth includes three
aspects: the notion of prehistoric peace or the “paci-
fied past” (prehistoric peoples did not have warfare)
(1996: 17-24), the belief that hunter-gatherers or
band-level societies did not engage in warfare (dis-
puted by Ember [1978] and Dentan [1988]), and the
assumption that when war occurred among tribal
level societies it was ritualistic, game-like in nature’.
According to Keeley (1996: 9), anthropologists
aimed to
save the Rousseauian notion of the Noble Savage, not by
making him peaceful (as this was clearly contrary to fact), but
by arguing that tribesmen conducted a more stylized, less hor-
rible form of warfare than their civilized counterparts waged.
This view was systematized and elaborated into the theory
that there existed a special type of ‘primitive war’ very different
from ‘real’, ‘true’, or ‘civilized’ war.
Adding that modern anthropology denied thereby
‘a brutal reality that modern Westerners seem very
loath to accept’ (Keeley 1996: 174), Keeley and
Otterbein made a point that well fits the modernist
history of anthropology known from authorities
like Stocking (1992) and Kuklick, who wrote of ‘the
horrors of World War I’ that made for a ‘disen-
chantment with progress’ that ensured that ‘[p]ost-
World War I anthropologists typically portrayed the
simplest societies as the realization of a cultural
ideal’ (1991: 23, 277, 270). However, the Rousseauian
anthropology of war that Keeley and Otterbein
imagine has little resemblance to the historic
anthropology that has left its traces in the archives
and libraries of our departments. At least, the
archived texts strongly suggest that Malinowski’s
call to recognise the differences between different
sorts of war was lost on most of those, who like
him, wrote on New Guinea. Many New Guineasts,
including at times Malinowski himself, proceeded as
though all warfare is of ‘an ugly sameness’ (Keeley
1996: 173-74). Discussion of the history of the
anthropology of war should take this into account,
for New Guinea has long been one of ‘the prestige
zones of anthropological theory’ (Appadurai 1986:
357). Ethnographies relating to this area have had
much impact on the anthropology of war, and con-
tinue to do so (Simons 1999).
Where, against Keeley and Otterbein, I reconstruct
an anthropology that has considered all war as
being essentially the same, my work is not without
precedent; it recaptures one of the conclusions of a
reflective strand in the anthropology of New Guinea
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of the 1980s-1990s. But this contribution also chal-
lenges the historical narrative that has been pre-
sented by the authors of this reflective study of New
Guinea, Marilyn Strathern (1985), Simon Harrison
(1989; 1993) and Bruce Knauft (1999). Just as anthro-
pological understanding of New Guinean warfare
was not blinded by a myth about noble savagery and
primitive war, it did not fall victim to some stable
‘tradition of political thought’ either (Harrison 1993:
3). In suggesting that the anthropological analysis
of war in New Guinea derived its direction from a
traditional set of assumptions known already from
Thomas Hobbes’s (1651) Leviathan, Strathern, Harrison
and Knauft were no more accurate than Keeley and
Otterbein. As my reading of the relevant historic
ethnographies demonstrates, the anthropological
debate about war in New Guinea from roughly 1940
to 1980 was in effect a debate over whether or not
New Guinea was to be depicted as a site of ‘total
war’. Aided by Malinowski, anthropologists brought
some neo-Hobbesian ideas to bear on this issue, but
their work was not therefore a mindless reproduc-
tion of the view on war that Hobbes provided.
To suggest either that after World War I anthro-
pology transformed into a primitivist discourse on
non-violence, or that New Guineasts were mindless
Hobbesians, is to misrepresent the past. And this is
not a mere historiographic issue, for where the past
is thus misrepresented misguided visions of the
anthropology of war that is to be imagined today
may well profit. The reconstruction I present in this
paper is therefore also meant to be meaningful for
the future. Before I can articulate the lesson I derive
from the past I must, however, first detail the history
of the anthropology of war in New Guinea. Hence,
I will first present a further analysis of Malinowski’s
writing on war in New Guinea, and discuss the inter-
pretive model of New Guinean life that Malinowski
helped develop in his work on exchange. Next I turn
to the critical representation of this model that some
New Guineast came to articulate in the 1980s and
‘90s. My objections to this representation then
brings me back to the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury when not only Malinowski, but also Margaret
Mead and Ruth Benedict, wrote influential works
about New Guinea. These authors first suggested an
image of New Guinea as a site of total war. Many
studies of the next decades elaborated that image,
which, in turn, provoked others, in the 1960s, to
return to Malinowski’s work of the 1920s and 1930s.
On ‘savage war’, and the war of ethnogra-
phies of the gift
As recent historical work demonstrates, the past
offers many opportunities to doubt whether indeed
warfare in Europe and North America was more
‘total’ in the twentieth century than it was before.1
In the early nineteenth century, von Clausewitz
(1832) believed he had good reason to think that
‘absolute war’ had arrived with the Napoleonic Wars
of about 1800, and most of the European fighting
that Wright (1942) designated as ‘general war’
occurred between 1700 and 1783. With the Thirty
Years’ War of the seventeenth century civilians and
soldiers were equally vulnerable to violence, and
‘the “war aims” of all sides in this conflict addressed
fundamental questions of the social and moral order’
(Chikering 1999: 23). Concerning the American
experience of violence and destruction, it can be
argued that at least the first of the world wars was
less ‘total’ than the Civil War of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Moreover, the imperial wars that were fought
in the same period belong to the most violent wars
that modern Westerners ever initiated. Nevertheless,
a good deal of history has been written that, along
with Malinowski’s anthropology, brands the twenti-
eth century the ‘Century of Total War’ (Marwick
1967). Military historians who have subscribed to this
view have tended to proceed like the Malinowski I
quoted above, branding all warfare before 1914 as
less violent, less destructive, and less economically,
socially, and culturally consequential than the wars
of modernity. In the context of such claims, many
military historians have stated that the anthropolo-
gy of war reveals a ‘non-violent’ type of warfare.
Thus, Michael Howard wrote in The Laws of War:
Anthropological studies show that although war in some form
was endemic in most primitive societies, it was often highly
ritualised and sometimes almost bloodless. It could be a rite
de passage for adolescents, a quasi-religious ceremonial sub-
stituting for legal process, or a legitimised form of violent
competition comparable to team sports in contemporary soci-
ety (1994: 2, cp. Dawson 1996: 13-24)
Ever since Malinowski’s day the anthropological
literature on war in New Guinea has been more
complex, though. While in some of his writing he
explicitly denied the horrors of modern total war to
New Guinean warfare, specialists on New Guinea
have been more influenced by another strand in his
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work, in which he hinted at an analysis that pre-
supposes that war is a violent horror also to the
people of New Guinea. 
When Malinowski (1961[1922]) wrote about the
functions, and limited violence, of war in New
Guinea, he reproduced a claim that the influential
W.H.R. Rivers (1920) had presented just before, and
Camilla Wedgwood (1930) would soon elaborate.
In Argonauts of the Western Pacific Malinowski
(1961[1922]) hinted, however, at the possibility of
an alternative analysis, which proposed that at least
to the New Guineans themselves war was not a
functional institution of limited violence but a seri-
ous problem. Before he had gone to New Guinea,
Malinowski had worked at the London School of
Economics, where Edward Westermarck had encour-
aged his students to question the assertion by mili-
tarist anthropologists, such as Pearson, that ‘struggle
and … suffering have been the stages by which the
white man has reached his present stage of develop-
ment, and they account for the fact that he no
longer lives in caves and feeds on roots and nuts’
(1901: 27). In that context, Malinowski had come to
value arguments to the effect that among savages
war was just one more ritual, not something to be
singled out as the key to progress, but also arguments
suggesting ‘that there are among them germs of what
is styled “international law”’ (Westermarck 1910: vi).
While his writing on the functions of ‘savage war’
recaptured much of that first argument, construct-
ing premodern war as just another ritual, in
Argonauts, Malinowski returned to this second type
of argument. Formulating a conclusion that would
underline the value of his description of the ritual
exchange of bracelets and necklaces in savage New
Guinea, he suggested that his work on exchange
could well be read in search for an understanding of
‘the evolution of intertribal intercourse and of prim-
itive international law’ (1961[1922]: 515). Though in
writing so Malinowski did not yet explicate this, this
implied that war was a violent horror also in the
New Guinean experience. Those who in Malinowski’s
time concerned themselves with International Law
were, after all, interested in law as a means to prevent
war. The contemporary discourse on International
Law to which the anthropologist appealed centred
around the idea that one had to find a way to pre-
vent a second world war and that International Law
was that way, since, as a widely read interpretation
of the First World War had it, it was ‘the condition
of international anarchy’ that ‘has produced war,
and always must’ (Dickinson 1926: 47, 41, cf. 1916).2 
Whereas, in presenting exchange as primitive
International Law, Malinowski himself did not yet
explicitly articulate an interpretation of war as a
violent problem, in following years Marcel Mauss’
comments on the gift in New Guinea would make it
quite clear that Malinowski’s suggestion entailed
that New Guineans tried to avoid war, and that they
did so because their war too was a horror. Just as
convinced as Malinowski that all had to be done to
establish peace in Europe, the author of L’Essai sur le
don declared that ‘[s]ocieties have progressed in the
measure in which they, their sub-groups and their
members, have been able to stabilise their contacts
[and] people can create, can satisfy their interests
mutually and define them without recourse to arms’
(1954[1923-34]: 80). That savage people had man-
aged to do so, the French ethnologist explained as in
part derived from their reverence for their gods who
taught them to share their wealth. Nevertheless, in
the final pages of his study Mauss pointed out that
the exchange practice of savages was a rational act
inspired by dread of war and the recognition that
exchange was the way to avoid its ‘rash follies’. Here,
Mauss reported that ‘[t]he people of Kiriwina said to
Malinowski: “the Dobu man is not good as we are.
He is fierce, he is a man-eater. When we come to
Dobu, we fear him, he might kill us!”’ (ibid.: 79-80).
Following Richard Thurnwald (1912: Vol.3, Tab. 35,
n.2), Mauss related that elsewhere in New Guinea,
‘Buleau, a chief, had invited Bobal, another chief, and
his people to a feast which was probably to be the
first in a long series. Dances were performed all night
long. By morning everyone was excited by the sleep-
less night of song and dance. On a remark made by
Buleau one of Bobal’s men killed him; and the troop
of men massacred and pillaged and ran off with the
women of the village’ (1954[1923-24]: 80). According
to Mauss, it was awareness that such things could
happen that made the Savage exchange. ‘It is by
opposing reason to emotion and setting up the will
for peace against follies of this kind that people suc-
ceed in substituting alliance, gift and commerce for
war, isolation and stagnation’, he wrote, adding:
In tribal feasts … men meet in a curious frame of mind with
exaggerated fear and an equally exaggerated generosity which
appear stupid in no one’s eyes but our own. In these primitive
and archaic societies there is no middle path. There is either
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complete trust or mistrust. One lay down one’s arms, renounces
magic and gives everything away, from casual hospitality to
one’s daughter or one’s property. It is in such conditions that
men, despite themselves, learnt to renounce what was theirs
and made contracts to give and repay. (ibid.)
War is war, in this argument. Among savages, as
among moderns, war is something to be avoided in
order to allow for progress and happiness.
Highly successful at the time, this analysis was
soon also regarded as a most important contribu-
tion to anthropology by Malinowski, who, in Coral
Gardens and their Magic, made it clear that reading
Mauss had helped him to see that there was need
for further inquiries into ceremonial exchange as a
‘substitute for head-hunting and war’ (1935: vol. 2,
246). When in the mid-1930s, he wrote about the
possibility of analysing the substitution of head-
hunting by exchange, Malinowski suggested that it
would be possible to present a future study of this
issue as an ethnographic exploration of the ‘heroic’
activities of the Trobriand islanders. This suggests
that Malinowski still considered it appropriate to
describe warfare in New Guinea in the idiom of
aristocratic romance he had used in his writings
about ‘savage war’ of the early 1920s, when he had
declared Trobriand warfare ‘open and chivalrous’,
‘with a considerable amount of fairness and loyalty’,
and ‘rather a form of social “duel,” in which one
side earned glory and humiliated the other, than
warfare’ (1920: 10, 11). At the same time, Malinowski
(1933) remained explicitly critical of colleagues who
were referring at the time to ‘modern war’ in this
romanticising idiom. Even when he hinted at the
substitution of war by exchange, Malinowski thus
continued to treat ‘savage war’ as significantly dif-
ferent from ‘modern war’. Precisely how he thought
he could integrate the image of war as a problem
with an image of war as a heroic enterprise remained
unclear, however, as Malinowski never actually com-
pleted the monograph on ‘the heroic enterprise’ that
he announced in Coral Gardens. And for decades to
come no other New Guineasts would even try to fol-
low his lead, attempting to fuse the two apparently
contrasting images of war. Instead, those who in the
following decades would explore the substitution of
exchange for war would stay close to Mauss’ argu-
ment, and stress the image of war as a wasteful dis-
order over the idea of war as a domain of creative
heroism. Following Malinowski’s suggestion for
further analytical work on the social functions of
exchange, anthropologists thus came to write a body
of literature that depicts New Guinean warfare as
anything but a functional and non-violent custom. 
Widely regarded at the time as a fine contribution
to the literature by authors as diverse as Roy Wagner
(1972) and Paula Brown (1970), Andrew Strathern’s
1971 ethnography of the moka ritual of the Melpa
well illustrates the point. Just as many other experts
on New Guinea did, Strathern depicted life in the
island’s mountainous interior as a highly competi-
tive struggle for ‘a big name’ among clans and aspir-
ing leaders. That struggle often generated war, but
Strathern saw exchange too: ‘Warfare was what decid-
ed the ultimate balance or imbalance of physical
power between territorial groups,’ he wrote; ‘but
there were, and are, other ways in which competi-
tive spirit and aggressiveness could find expression.
Pre-eminent among these “other ways” is ceremonial
exchange’ (ibid.: 54). In this view, New Guineans
were motivated to ceremonial gift exchange because
exchange was a means to acquire a big name, but
Strathern also suggested that local people under-
stood, and valued, gift exchange as a ‘positive alter-
native to war’ (ibid.: 76). According to Strathern,
evidence for this understanding could be found in
local discourse on big men, which constructed the
true big man not as a war leader but as a man of
strong noman (‘social consciousness’) who did not
suffer from popokl (‘frustrated anger’) and knew how
to create exchange relations (‘ropes of moka’).
Observations made in the colonial era also indicated
that the Melpa used exchange to avoid war and fos-
ter peace, Strathern (ibid.: 54) continued, choosing
words that made it clear that he never considered
war to be a functional and harmless ritual:
In many cases in the Highlands (e.g. the Siane, Salisbury 1962)
exchange institutions effloresced and developed to a larger
scale when Europeans banned warfare. This was not simply a
result of a blockage on [fighting]; rather, it was an expression
of the interest of big-men in pursuing an avenue of self-
aggrandisement which was more effective and less hazardous
than warfare itself. Thus it is that we find Kyaka big-men
(Bulmer 1960) urging groups which were still fighting to give
up warfare and join in the massive cyclical exchange ceremony,
the tee, instead. In Hagen also one still hears frequently state-
ments of the type: ‘before we fought and killed each other,
and this was bad; now a good time has come, and we can pay
for killings and make moka’.3
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The ‘total war’ before the return 
to the war of the gift
As I will argue, the approach to war and the gift that
Andrew Strathern practiced around 1970 solved one
of the key problems in the anthropological debate
on New Guinea of his time. About a decade later, it
became the object of a serious critique among spe-
cialists on New Guinea, however.4 After Papua New
Guinea gained independence in 1975, spokesmen
for various tribes from the highlands started to claim
that warfare was a richly rewarding ‘custom’ that
they had inherited from their ancestors and that a
truly postcolonial, rather than neocolonial, ‘national’
state should thus not oppose this. In this changing
context, Marilyn Strathern (1985: 122) came to see
that the interpretation of gift exchange that had
seemed so illuminating around 1970 ‘pre-judges the
nature of violent confrontations, as they occur in
the Papua New Guinea Highlands’. In her view, time
had come for anthropologist to rethink the work on
the gift and war that they had authored in the past.
Along with this rethinking, anthropologists should
then also reflect upon their own analytic practices,
for, from Marilyn Strathern’s point of view, these
too often seemed to reproduce too much of Western
culture. The result of this double rethinking was an
interesting new body of ethnographic writing that
well fits my claim that anthropologists had certainly
not just denied war or downplayed violence. From a
historiographic point of view, the reflections on the
anthropology of war in New Guinea presented with-
in the context of this literature are not too convinc-
ing, however.
When Marilyn Strathern (1985: 122) wrote that
‘[i]f we do not pre-judge the nature of “violent”
behaviour, then we need not pre-judge the nature of
“peaceable” behaviour either’, that opened the way
for a new view of exchange and warfare. It enabled
Strathern to think that big men, calling upon com-
batants to stop fighting and exchange wealth, did
not necessarily express the normative aversion to
war that ethnographers had formerly recognised.
What now seemed to matter to local actors was the
spirited efficaciousness of these men, who, calling
for the exchange of wealth, converted the exchange
of blows and arrows into an exchange of wealth.
People valued this power, rather than the conse-
quences – peaceful conduct – that the established
anthropology had valued. This was not to say that
New Guineans did not recognise war’s harmful
effects, but that to these people such harm was not
the most salient thing about war. From a New
Guinean perspective, warfare occurs within a ritual
space, and, as Simon Harrison (1989; 1993) observed,
the men who operate within this space are expected
to sidestep the morality that structures domestic
practice. The value of their acts is measured in terms
of the amount of ancestral force that they demon-
strate. This perspective suggests that men deserve a
big name for knowing how to converse with the
ancestral spirits. What matters is the ability to get in
touch with the ‘wildness’ of the spirit world; and
this capacity can be demonstrated equally well by
a violent exchange of blows as by an impressive
exchange of gifts (cf. O’Hanlon 1995; LiPuma 2000).5
To some extent, anthropology thus returned once
more to Malinowski, who, when he wrote of the
possibility of writing of war and exchange in 1935,
suggested that both were seen in New Guinea as
forms of heroic action. For M. Strathern and
Harrison the domain of the ‘wildness’ was not to be
represented, however, in the romantic idiom that
Malinowski had used, but in Marxist terms. To
them, the symbolism of the wild presented an ide-
ology, which ensured that only some (males) bene-
fited from politics, while all suffered the hard work
of wealth production and the distress and deaths of
combat.
Though some have suggested so (Jolly 1992;
Josephides 1991; Keesing 1992; MacIntyre 1995),
this ethnography was thus not the site of romantic
fantasies of ‘noble savagery’. But if this new ethnog-
raphy of war and exchange was critical of ‘wildness’,
it was even more critical of the older ethnographic
literature that attributed a preference for peace to its
New Guinean subjects. Apparently, Marilyn Strathern
(1985) suggested, anthropologists had been less con-
cerned with the concerns of the New Guineans they
met in the field, than with reconfirming an ethno-
centric idea they knew from ‘western’ philosophy,
i.e. that all humans of sound reason understand war
as problem that they have to overcome. Supported
by references to Sahlins (1972: 176), who in the
1960s observed that Mauss’s work on war and the
gift elaborated an anthropological vision ‘brilliantly
anticipated’ already by Thomas Hobbes, this cri-
tique fits my argument. For to suggest that the argu-
ment concerning the gift as a pacifying institution
is Hobbesian, is to make it more difficult to con-
vincingly associate this argument with a fiction of
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noble savagery. Noble savagery is, after all, not what
Hobbes is known for. 
Still, I object. Sahlins’ commentary regarding
Hobbes’ reasoning and Mauss’ analysis of the gift
as a way to pass from threatening war to peaceful
sociality aids the understanding of Mauss’ text, but
it also isolates this text from its immediate historic
context, and thereby eclipses the concerns that
guided Mauss towards his neo-Hobbesian argument.6
Recapturing Sahlins’ decontextualising analysis, the
critique that Marilyn Strathern and Simon Harrison
presented of the ethnographic tradition that authors
such as Andrew Strathern extended around 1970
has a similar effect. It helps to understand the
argument of the pacifying gift, but obscures the
contemporary challenge that motivated the argu-
ments for the gift as a means of social control made
around 1970. That many ethnographers of New
Guinea around 1970 wrote of a war that was con-
trolled by gift exchange was not because Hobbesian
principles dominated their Western imagination.
These authors adopted (and creatively reformulated)
the neo-Hobbesian idea of the pacifying gift they
knew from Mauss and Malinowski, because they
recognised that idea as a valuable means to improve
the ethnography of New Guinea of their time. At the
time, much of New Guineast anthropology had come
to emphasise a specific image of war, and writing of
the gift an author like A. Strathern sought to under-
mine the stress on that image of war. And this image
of war was not really Hobbes’ image of war, for the
war that Hobbes wrote about posed a problem that
people could handle, whereas the war that spurred
Andrew Strathern’s writing of around 1970 was a
‘total war’ that effectively impaired the human
capacity to overcome the state of war. Behind this
rendering of warfare as total war lay a sense of
despair, whereas the Hobbesian vision reflects a
strong faith in human rationality. Like the ‘anarchic
war’ that was said to be overcome by the gift in the
neo-Hobbesian writings of Malinowski and Mauss,
this ‘total war’ is also a representation that must be
situated historically in relation to a public response
to the warfare 1914-1918, but this war was even
more radically different from the image of ‘primitive
war’ that anthropology is unjustly criticised for.
At the time when Malinowski and Mauss first
stressed the relevance of New Guinean exchange to
the condition of the modern world of nation-states,
in the United States public debate on World War I
and international politics had turned into a debate
on American identity. Fearful that the vengefulness
of the French and British that was expressed in the
Versailles Treaty had turned the Allied victory of 1918
into the cause for another war, many ‘Americans’
regretted that the United States had intervened in
‘the European war’. In this context, people felt that
time had come for the citizens of the United States
to develop a ‘genuine nationalistic self-conscious-
ness’, and to ‘speak the truth about American civi-
lization’ (Stearns 1922: vii, iv). Several anthropologists
joined this project, among them Ruth Benedict and
Margaret Mead. Both of them felt that it was most
important to redefine American identity in terms of
culture, rather than race, and set out to make their
compatriots think about what true American culture
should look like. The representation of New Guinea
became involved in this project when Benedict recog-
nised that the study on Dobu by (Mead’s partner)
Reo Fortune (1932) offered much she could use for
making her readers ‘culture conscious’. Comparing
Dobu life to ways of two native American tribes,
Benedict made Dobu practice appear so different as
to make the impression that culture mattered
inescapable, and that it also mattered in what direc-
tion people decided to develop the pattern of their
culture. As interpreted by Benedict, the ethnography
of the Dobu became a call to consider what American
culture should not become, and served to alert
readers to the attractiveness of Benedict’s favourite
model for American society, the ‘Apollonian’ pattern
of culture of the Native American Zuni. As rendered
by Benedict, the culture of the Dobuan formed a
‘paranoid’ pattern that ensured that ‘all existence
appears to him as a cut-throat struggle’ (1946: 159).
Introducing Dobu, she wrote:
They are said to be magicians who have diabolic power and
warriors who halt at no treachery. A couple of generations ago,
before white intervention, they were cannibals, and that in an
area where many peoples eat no human flesh. They are the
feared and distrusted savages of the islands surrounding them.
The Dobuans amply deserve the character they are given by
their neighbours. They are lawless and treacherous. (ibid.: 120-21) 
In Benedict’s account this people did ‘lack the
smoothly working organization of the Trobriands,
headed by honored high chiefs and maintaining
peaceful and continual reciprocal exchanges of goods
and privileges’ (ibid.: 121).7
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Even though these statements made Fortune
(1939) protest that Benedict’s search for patterns of
cultures had resulted in a poor caricature of Dobu
life, Mead followed the same procedure in analysing
the material that, with Fortune’s aid, she had col-
lected along the River Sepik. Whereas Benedict had
written of Apollonian and paranoid cultures, Mead
wrote of feminine and masculine cultures, for to her
the most important questions regarding American
culture all had to do with femininity and masculin-
ity. Regarding these questions, Mead asserted that
[t]he tradition in this country has been changing so rapidly
that the term ‘sissy’, which ten years ago meant a boy who
showed personality traits regarded as feminine, can now be
applied with scathing emphasis by one girl to another.
(1935: 212).
Mead wanted her readers to reflect upon the desir-
ability of this cultural change. Men became insecure
about their gender role, and what, Mead asked,
would happen if people abandoned ‘the assumption
that women are more opposed to war than men, that
any outspoken approval of war is more horrible,
more revolting, in women than in men’ (ibid.: 213).
To Mead, it was clear that this ‘meant a loss’, since
‘the belief that women are naturally more interested
in peace … at least puts a slight drag upon agitation
for war, prevents a blanket enthusiasm for war being
thrust upon the entire younger generation’ (ibid.:
212, 213). Reading about three New Guinean peo-
ples, Mead’s readers should come to recognise this.
Just as ambivalent about the meaning of masculini-
ty and femininity as the people of the United States,
Tchambuli society showed the harmful conse-
quences of men’s confusion. Arapesh culture had
the advantage that it offered a clear model for
action, but it was entirely feminine in its orienta-
tion, and thus – like Soviet Communism, Mead inti-
mated – repressive of much that Americans had
always valued in their true men. Americans should
be happy that their culture was different, but, then,
they also should not want their culture to become
like that of the Mundugumor, entirely masculine.
The Mundugumor culture that Mead depicted made
for a life much like that of the Dobuans of Benedict’s
account. As Mead wrote: ‘both men and women are
expected to be violent, competitive, aggressively
sexed, jealous and ready to see and avenge insult,
delighting in display, in action, in fighting’ (ibid.:
158). With the members of this ‘cannibal tribe’, the
most respected men were those who were known to
be ‘really bad man’, Mead reported, and feelings of
solidarity could be observed only when
head-hunting raids are planned, and the whole male commu-
nity is temporarily united in the raid and the victory-feasts
that conclude them. At these feasts a frank and boisterous
cannibalism is practiced, each man rejoicing at having a piece
of the hated enemy between his teeth. (ibid.: 134)
A horror that Americans should keep at a firm dis-
tance, the warfare thus ascribed to the Dobu and the
Mundugumor was more like the ‘total war’ that
Malinowski associated with modernity than the
‘savage war’ or ‘anarchic war’ that he associated with
New Guinea. Nevertheless, one of the ethnographic
authorities of the 1950s, Kenneth Read, called upon
all students of New Guinea’s Central Highlands to
recognise Benedict and Mead’s work on war and
New Guinean culture as paradigmatic for future
work. In his own work, he reproduced all of their
claims concerning the ‘cultural correlates’ of what
he called ‘raids and organized, concerted attacks
among [groups] which only a short time ago were,
and in some cases still are, so extremely warlike’
(1954: 22). On Read’s account,
physical aggression is not merely a corollary of intergroup
hostility. It is a more fundamental trait, the obverse of a more
far-reaching insecurity in interpersonal and group relations.
Physical violence and antagonism are the warp of the cultural
pattern; present to some extent in most important relation-
ships, they receive innumerable forms of symbolic and insti-
tutionalized expressions. (ibid.)
Stopping short of actually using the expression
‘total war’, Read thus attributed to war the same
kind of impact that Malinowski had associated with
total war. With his writing, war in New Guinea
became a social force that greatly impacted each and
every aspect of New Guinea culture. As if following
Malinowski’s account of total war in modern Europe,
Read even suggested that many of New Guinea’s
cultural institutions were no longer able to perform
their regular function, writing, for example:
At the conclusion of initiation ceremonies crowds of women
armed with bows and arrows, sticks and stones, dressed in
male decorations attack the returning procession of men and
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boys. Similar fights are staged at marriages when, characteris-
tically enough, a man is required to shoot an arrow into the
thigh of his wife. (ibid.: 23)
Inspired by such statements, one of Read’s students
invoked war as the context that made sense of all
the ethnographic details that had for long puzzled
students of Highland New Guinea. ‘In Bena Bena’,
Lewis Langness wrote,
the stated aims of warfare were the complete and total destruc-
tion of the enemy, if possible. This included every man,
women, and child, whether old, infirm, or pregnant. Although
it is true that most raids resulted in only one, or few deaths,
cases are known in which entire groups were destroyed.
(1964: 174, emphasis added)
Hence, the presence of nonagnates in putatively
agnatic clans in New Guinea:
Groups which constantly find it necessary to scatter and re-
group, which are decimated by casualties, which must take
refuge with friends (which are willing to accept them for the
same reason they want to be accepted) cannot, I submit, main-
tain lineage purity. ... if expedient, one need not be too partic-
ular about someone else’s genealogy, so long as he can fight.
Perhaps, indeed, strict unilineal descent was too costly. (ibid.)
Likewise, to Langness, war determined the antago-
nistic relation between men and women: 
Living in an hostile environment, and faced with the almost
constant threat of annihilation by enemy groups, has resulted
in, or is related to, a distinctive pattern of male solidarity
which offers what the Bena Bena perceive as a better change
for survival. Male solidarity involves the residential separation
of the sexes and a complex of beliefs and sanctions designed
to insure such separation, as well as a minimal amount of con-
tact between males and females in general. These beliefs and
sanctions that exist to buttress the social distance between
males and females, although they are functional in terms of
group survival in a dangerous and warlike environment, are
so only at some cost to the sex-and-dependency needs of indi-
viduals and thus ultimately promote hostility and antagonism
between the sexes. (1967: 163)
Just like the modern war of Malinowski’s 1940
account, the war that Langness imagined was ‘total’
in both its aims and its paralysing impact on the
culture it deformed.8
By the time Andrew Strathern first arrived in New
Guinea, so many other New Guineasts had rendered
the warfare waged in the island’s high valleys in
such terms that this had provoked advocates of the
‘modern British school’ (Kuper 1983) in anthropolo-
gy to put a premium on the creation of an alternative
account that would demonstrate how New Guinea
Guinea Highlanders ‘achieve a kind of social articu-
lation or order that outlasts the bursts of conflict’
(Glasse 1959: 289). John Barnes’ widely discussed
1962 contribution to Man was most important in
this respect. Authors like Read and Langness could
be right that ‘the disorder and irregularity of social
life in the Highlands […] is due in part to the high
value placed on killing’, but, Barnes (1962: 9) con-
tinued, an important observation pointed to a fact
that was not yet fully recognised:
the pre-contact population was large and often densely settled;
indigenous social institutions preventing excess violence and
destruction must necessarily have been effective, for other-
wise the population would not have survived. (ibid.)
Articulated in reaction to the anthropology of unre-
strained warfare and the militarisation of culture,
such writing spurred a search for effective means
towards ensuring social order. In that context, col-
leagues of Barnes and their students recapitulated the
anthropology of war and the gift that Malinowski
and Mauss had developed in the 1920 and 1930s.
Although the 1980s critics of Hobbesianism would
suggest that it was their own presuppositions that
guided authors like Strathern towards the image of
big men who preferred gift exchange over war, these
authors re-turned to the exchange of gifts only in
order to demonstrate that New Guinea was not the
site of total war that many of their colleagues
reported it to be.
The composition of Andrew Strathern’s The Rope
of Moka should leave no doubt about this, for
Strathern (1971: 53) not only discussed big men and
their gift exchange, he also discussed the anthropol-
ogy of war in New Guinea.9 Much anthropological
work had characterised interior New Guinea by
violent warfare, Strathern wrote, continuing that
indeed people there frequently went to war. Still,
he insisted that the anthropology that had made
violent warfare the key to the highland regions in
interior New Guinea ‘needs correcting in numbers
of ways’ (ibid.). Whereas it had become convenient
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for anthropologists to emphasise the destructive
violence of New Guinean warfare and to write of a
culture that valued war, ‘the stress on warlike prowess
varies in intensity throughout the Highlands’,
Strathern (ibid.: 53-54) wrote. Around 1970 Strathern
was not yet sufficiently well established in academe
to challenge colleagues such as Langness with
respect to their own field sites, but by his choice of
words Strathern suggested that the sites of total
war these authors depicted were only places of mar-
ginal importance – ‘fringe’ or ‘eastern’ rather than
‘central’:
[Stress on warlike prowess] is very strong in some of the
fringe Highland societies and in Central Highland societies of
West Irian (e.g. the Hewa, Steadman n.d., and the Mbogoga
Ndani, Ploeg 1965). It is strong also in some of the Eastern
Highland societies, for example the Kamano (Berndt 1962),
the Bena Bena (Langness 1964), and the Tairora (Watson
1971). Men of violence – whom Salisbury (1964) has dubbed
‘despots’ – seem to have arisen sporadically in a number of
other Highland societies also. But in many of the large, cen-
tral Highland areas, where population density is heavy, men
of violence were not necessarily the important political lead-
ers. And this is correlated with the fact that in these areas
there were well-developed inter-group alliances, gradations of
enemy relationships, controls on the escalation of fighting.
(ibid.: 53)
Only at that point did Strathern turn to the big
man and gift exchange as the social type and the
institution that guaranteed that central New Guinea
was not a place of uncontrolled warfare. The neo-
Malinowskian, neo-Maussian argument of exchange
rather than war that Strathern presented was thus
neither a conventional primitivist denial of violent
war, nor a straightforward Hobbesian claim. Instead,
as his text itself suggests, his argument on gift giv-
ing rather than war was born from an attempt to
overcome an anthropology that depicted New
Guinea as a site of ‘total war’.
Conclusion: possible futures
Elaborating on an image of war – ‘total war’ – that has
not so far been recollected in historicising reflec-
tions on the anthropology of war, and tracing the
debate the use of this image generated, I have
attempted to be more faithful to the complexities of
anthropology’s historic dealings with warfare than
those whose representations I have criticised. Hence,
I wrote about the complexities of Malinowski’s work,
which contain passages differentiating savage from
total war occur as well as passages suggesting that
New Guineans and modern nations face a similar
problem of war and international anarchy. New
Guineast anthropology by and large bypassed the
first, to elaborate instead upon the second of these
suggestions. This happened only because much of
the anthropology of New Guinea of the twentieth
century depicted New Guinea as a site of total war.
That suggestion made it meaningful for others to
revive the image of New Guinea as a place where
people knew an alternative to war that allowed
them an escape from the state of war. My aim was
not ‘historicist’, however – at least not in the sense
in which Stocking (1965) has taught historians of
anthropology to understand this term. With Stocking,
I agree that the anthropology of the past deserves to
be studied in its own right, but if Stocking once
considered it possible to attempt this in writing on
Boas, classical evolutionism, and early cultural
anthropology, at present a historicist perspective on
anthropology and war is out of question. Due to the
work of such authors on the past of the anthropolo-
gy of war as I have referred to, this subject is too
much infused with contemporary interests to
attempt to study the anthropology of war for purely
historicist reasons. As I sought explicitly to relate
my understanding of the material I have found
stored in our discipline’s archives of anthropology
to both the regionalist claims about Hobbesianism
and the generalised critique of the alleged attempt
to save the mythical Noble Savage by imagining
primitive war, I did so because I hope to also speak
to the future of the anthropology of war.10 
For the New Guineasts who first made the cri-
tique of Hobbesianism, this facilitated the thick
description necessary to make sense of the evalua-
tion of war in terms of ancestral power. This was
something they had to do in order to get beyond the
arguments on cultural paranoia that had first pro-
voked the counter argument of the pacifying gift. By
focussing on Hobbes, these authors could draw
attention to the need to relate understandings of war
to understandings of the person. After all, Hobbes
(1651) had made it exceptionally clear that his view
of war and peace was intimately related to a partic-
ular view of the human being, and he had first
devoted a long series of chapters to the nature of
84 . C O N C E P T I O N S  O F  W A R F A R E  I N  W E S T E R N  T H O U G H T  
Man before he turned to war and its resolution. To
recall Hobbes was a way to call upon ethnographers
of New Guinea to do the same. It offered an intro-
duction to the observation that New Guineans are
so interested in the ability to make violence since
they normally experience themselves as responding
to the moral obligations that follow from the
inborn ties that bind them to their maternal rela-
tives, and long to ‘produce admiration, fear, desire or
other types of affect in others’ (Harrison 1985: 117).
Whereas for Hobbes, and his followers, the problem
is to morally restrain each individual’s innate aggres-
siveness, for New Guineans the problem would be
to overcome morality. As has been repeatedly
observed already, this argument presents a highly
promising contribution to the ethnographic inter-
pretation of New Guinea that goes well beyond both
the discourse building upon Benedict and Mead,
and the counterargument on the peace of the gift
(Knauft 1994; Maclean 1998). On the other hand,
anthropological analysis of the practice of warfare
in New Guinea should recognise that all recent and
current warfare involved, or involves, a changing
environment, which have long since been affected
by the activities and ideas of Europeans (Görlich
1999; Knauft 1999; Macintyre 1983; 1995). By
equating the relevant historic discoursing on war in
the West to one particular, radically individualist,
contribution from philosophy, the critique of
Hobbesianism eclipses the need for such recogni-
tion. By demonstrating that ethnographic writings
are dialogically interanimated creations, rather than
products of such isolated individuals as the reflec-
tive New Guineast of the 1980s and 1990s attributed
to the West, and by underscoring that ethnographic
representation relates to distinct historic situations,
this chapter should, in contrast, reveal that need.
At the same time, this chapter should be a warn-
ing not to follow the lead of Keeley and Otterbein,
who, just as the critics of Hobbesianism, had a dis-
tinct future in mind when they presented their view
of anthropology’s past. Whereas people like
Harrison urged for a reconstruction of notions of
personhood impacting the understanding of war,
and thus the practice of warfare, the historical nar-
rative about Rousseauian myth-making and mysti-
fying the true character of warfare among tribal peo-
ples was presented to arouse a desire for a ‘realistic
view of all warfare’ (Keeley 1996: 24). On this
account, the anthropology of war is to be brought in
line with the discipline’s ‘painfully accumulated
facts’, which, according to Keeley, ‘indicate unequiv-
ocally that primitive and prehistoric warfare was
just as terrible and effective as the historic and civi-
lized version’ (ibid.: 174). It is suggested that any
future anthropology should recognise that ‘[p]rimi-
tive warfare is simply total war conducted with very
limited means’ (ibid.: 175). Writing so, Keeley sug-
gested that anthropology would make a distinct
contribution to military history when it would start
constructing the warfare of tribesmen as total war:
The discovery that war is total – that is, between peoples or
whole societies, not just the armed forces who represent them
– is credited by historians to recent times. … [T]his ‘discovery’
is comparable to the European discovery of the Far East, Africa,
or the Americans. The East Asians, sub-Saharan Africans, and
Native Americans always knew where they were; it was the
Europeans who were so confused or ignorant. So it is with
total war. (ibid.: 175-76)
What Keeley wants anthropologists to do, producing
ethnographic reports on non-western ‘total war’,
they have already been doing, however, for decades.
Historically, by doing so they made a distinct con-
tribution to the formulation of American culture
and identity. The anthropology of New Guinea paid
a high price, however, for the anthropology of ‘total
war’ burdened regionalist discourse with an image
of war that, while certainly belonging to a specific
culture, was foreign to the setting studied in field-
work. As I have demonstrated, it took New Guineasts
many decades to pass beyond the resulting con-
fusion.
Moreover, even if ‘an anthropology of total war’
could ever have made a distinct contribution to mil-
itary history, the time for making such a contribu-
tion seems over now. While Keeley urged anthro-
pologists to recognise the reality of total war, by
now an increasing number of military historians
treat ‘total war’ as a mythologising interpretation of
war; not a ‘discovery’ of the nature of (modern)
warfare to be celebrated, but one of those master
narratives that, put to use by modern actors, have
shaped the structure and texture of social action in
the twentieth century. Such a master narrative
needs to be ethnographically studied, rather than
reproduced. Ethnographers of New Guinea may see
a task here, as they move on from the critique of
Hobbesianism and the thick description of New
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Guinean evaluations of war, to the analysis of the
practice of warfare in a historical setting that even-
tually came to include also western agents. Given
that New Guinea was frequently rendered as a place
of total war in ethnography, this modern myth to
all likelihood also affected the action and speech of
such agents of change as Malinowski addressed in
1922 with a claim about warfare in New Guinea
being different.
N O T E S
1 For a discussion of relevant historiography, see Chikering
(1999).
2 Brandt (2000) offers more detail on Rivers, Wedgwood,
Malinowski, and the anthropology that Westermarck pro-
moted at the London School of Economics. On the analy-
sis of World War I, in terms of ‘international anarchy’ and
the discourse on International Law, see Wallace (1988).
3 Brandt (2002: esp. 61-64, 71-77) provides further detail on
the discourse on exchange to which A. Strathern’s writing
of around 1970 belongs.
4 For a detailed discussion of the literature about exchange
as a pacifying social practice of the 1970s, see Brandt
(2002: 97-106).
5 For further detail, see Brandt (2002: esp. 121-131).
6 Of course, rendering Hobbes simply as a modern Western
philosopher also eclipses the historic warfare that he was
responding to when writing Leviathan, which, as Barker
(1993: 135) observes, was the work of a ‘philosopher in
terror’ hoping to safe his country from further bloodshed
by the creation of a Cartesian science of politics.
7 I formed my ideas on Americanism in anthropology after
reading Stocking (1992: esp. 284-290) and Michaels
(1995).
8 The work of Read and Langness, as well as others offering
related representations, is discussed in more detail in
Brandt (2002: esp. 50-56, 64-71).
9 Preparing for fieldwork in New Guinea in the early 1960s,
Strathern spent time also at the Australian National
University where he worked together with Paula Brown,
who strongly supported the search for social order in New
Guinea (see Brandt 2002: 63-64, 72-73). 
10 It is to be noted that ‘after the fact’, Stocking (1992) has
recognised the epistemological limitations of his original
position on ‘historicism’ and ‘presentism’. 
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Introduction
This is an inquiry into the relation between war and
social change and an attempt at constructing a
framework for analysing this relation. On the most
general level, it is based on a simple question: How
do war and military organisation contribute to
social structural change? I use the term ‘structural’
in order to stress that I do not aim to consider how
wars or military organisations enabled an actor or a
group of actors topple and replace one power-holder
and become the new person(s) in power. Nor do I
aim to examine how, for example, conquest enabled
the incorporation of new or re-incorporation of old
territory, or how war and conquest led to famine
and devastation for one group and conspicuous liv-
ing for another. These are matters of life and death
to the people involved, but in the perspective taken
here they will only feed into the discussion if the
new power-holder, conquest or acquisition of new
resources, for instance, led to new social structures.
Whilst there is no doubt that wars have been
fought throughout human history (Keeley 1996;
Martin and Frayer 1997; O’Connell 1995), and that
their consequences for people and their societies
can be vast and devastating, it is a matter of dispute
whether war should be seen as a having a role or
being a factor in the development of human history.
The old evolutionist Herbert Spencer (1967) and
his more contemporary heir Robert Carneiro (1970)
argue that war is the driving force in human evolu-
tion, and the renown historian John Keegan asserts
that ‘... all civilizations owe their origin to warriors…’
(Keegan 1993: vi), even though he also emphasises
how warfare is embedded in the societies of which it
is part. On the other hand, the anthropologist Henri
Claessen (2000) argues, very much like the sociolo-
gist Bruce Porter (1994), that war is a derived phe-
nomenon and thus cannot be a ‘factor’ in human
history, though both acknowledge that the conse-
quences of war for humans and societies are
immense. I will sidestep this discussion first of all
by rejecting any evolutionary schemata in human
history. While I think that it does make sense to
establish categories for different kinds of society –
such as ‘tribe’, ‘chiefdom’ or ‘state’ – and ask how
one kind of society could develop into another, I do
not presuppose any historical or systemic logic in
these processes. Secondly, I do not think it is con-
structive to discuss war as a unitary phenomenon;
instead, I propose to subdivide war into different
elements – e.g., physical violence, military organisa-
tion, conquest – and look at war at three different
levels: that of practice, that of society and that of
process.
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War as Practice, Power, and Processor: 
A Framework for the Analysis of War 
and Social Structural Change
C L A U S  B O S S E N /7
The interrelations and feedback between war,
military organisation and other sections of society
are many and complicated, and in this article I take
on the task of constructing a framework for ana-
lysing war in an attempt to provide an overview. In
the existing literature analysis tends to become
bogged down in historical detail or limited to spe-
cific geographical areas. Historians like Timothy
McNeill (1983) and John Keegan (1993) have pro-
duced impressive accounts of the historically chang-
ing relationships between war, military organisa-
tion, technology and society, but they do not offer a
framework for conceptualising these relations in
general. Grand Theory sociologists Anthony Giddens
(1985b) and Charles Tilly (1990) provide such frame-
works, but suffer from their focus on European his-
tory and developments after the rise of the European
state: while they analyse the concurrent develop-
ments of war, military organisation and the European
state, they pay little attention to the transition from
pre-state to state societies. On the other hand, the
analysis of Michael Mann (1993), another Grand
Theory sociologist, conceptualises military organisa-
tion as one of four sources of social power (the other
three being politics, economy and ideology), which
seems to me to be one of the best approaches to a
historical and theoretically informed understanding
of the role of war in the development of societies.
My debt to his work will be clear in the following.
However, war has more aspects than military organ-
isation and the historical contingent interactions
with politics, economy and ideology that Michael
Mann outlines. I will add to his theoretical frame-
work the dimensions of practice and process.
Building a framework for the analysis of war in the
perspective of social change would be an immense
task if it had to take into consideration all the exist-
ing literature on war (for overviews, see Modell and
Haggerty 1991; Nagengast 1994; Simons 1999), and
this particular attempt must be regarded as but an
initial contribution. I start from the premise that
change takes place gradually or suddenly (Friedman
1982) as intended or unintended results of actions
by humans acting within given contexts. It is neces-
sary to combine social structure with human action,
as argued by Sherry Ortner (1984) and elaborated by
anthropologists and sociologists (e.g. Bourdieu 1993;
Giddens 1985a; Mann 1986). For an analysis of the
relation between war and social structural change,
the practice of war has to be included. In addition to
practice and structure, there is change. At this proces-
sual level it is possible, I will argue, to delineate the
particular kinds of roles that war can have. Thus, the
framework proposed has three levels (figs. 1-3). At
one level, I argue, war is seen as a form of social
practice based on violent acts, which are embedded
in webs of significance and organised socially and in
which technology is usually applied. At the second,
societal, level, war is conceived as one of four forms
of social power: military, political, economic and ide-
ological (following Michael Mann [1986]). Finally,
at the third, processual, level war may have three
different roles in processes of social change and these
are linked to the manifestations of war as military
organisation, conquest, or a general context for the
reproduction of society. While each level by itself is
rather simple, the overall model becomes more com-
plicated (as can be seen in the final figure, Fig. 4).
A framework for the analysis 
of war and social change
War as social practice
What is war? A minimalist definition views war as
‘…organised inter-group homicide involving combat
teams of two or more persons’ (Divale and Harris
1976: 521). This definition includes battles, sieges
and campaigns, which in the era of the modern
nation-state are associated with war, but also small-
scale war acts like skirmishes, raids or feuds.
However, most people would probably add further
qualifications to the minimalist definition: the single
event of the murder of two persons from one group
by two members of another group for idiosyn-
cratic reasons and not implicating their respective
groups in general would usually not qualify as war.
Somehow, war implies some kind of scale and that
the acts carried out are interpreted not merely as
violence, but as part of inter-group relations. The
problem of scale is sometimes solved by incorporat-
ing some kind of size and extent into a definition of
war. Quincy Wright, for example, in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), writes that
‘War in the ordinary sense is a conflict among polit-
ical groups, especially sovereign states, carried on by
armed forces of considerable magnitude for a con-
siderable period of time’ (Wright 1968: 453). I would
argue, however, that it is crucial to distinguish
between the analyst’s and the actors’ perception of
the acts of homicide. While we normally would not
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interpret a single homicide as war even if the victim
and the perpetrators were from different groups, and
would demand evidence of more incidents before
applying that kind of label, two groups may on the
other hand have such strained relations that even a
single incident would lead to a declaration of war. It
is the interpretation and the meaning given to the
incident of homicide that is crucial and not the
scale of violence itself. War is thus based on acts of
homicide that are seen as part of the inter-group
relations and hence as part of the political relations
between groups. However, while homicide is most
often involved in war, this is not always the case,
since wars may be declared, warriors or soldiers
raised, and weapons used without anyone being
killed. Here it is the threat of homicide that qualifies
these incidents to be labelled as war. This is reflect-
ed in the definition of war by Simon Harrison in the
Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology
(Barnard and Spencer 1996):
… anthropologists usually envision war as a particular type of
political relationship between groups, in which the groups use,
or threaten to use, lethal force against each other in pursuit of
their aims. (Harrison 1996: 561)
For the present purposes I will therefore define war
as the organised use or threat of use of lethal force by a
minimum of two or more actors from one group against
members of another group, which is interpreted by the
actors and/or the analyst as part of the relations between
the two groups.
Such a definition, however, looks at war at the
level of society; and while it points to central ele-
ments such as organisation, lethal force and inter-
pretation, it does not yet perceive war as a practice.
At a basic level war is about causing physical harm
to other peoples’ bodies and acts of war are thus a
subcategory of acts of physical violence. While vio-
lence may take on ‘symbolic’, ‘mental’, ‘emotional’
and ‘structural’ forms, in the case of war it is ulti-
mately the physical aspect that must be at the core.
David Riches’ discussion of violence is of special
interest here, since he defines the universal core
meaning of violence as ‘the intentional rendering
of physical hurt to another human being’ (Riches
1986b: 4). Violence, Riches furthermore argues, is
always embedded in strategy and meaning. It is used
as a means to achieve goals, practical or symbolic,
and will always imply a need to legitimise the violent
act. Aiming at a cross-cultural theory of violence,
Riches argues that while performers, victims and
witnesses (including analysts) may disagree as to the
legitimacy of violence, they will nevertheless uni-
versally recognise violence in the sense of rendering
physical hurt to another person. We may disagree as
to whether the beating of pupils and children
should be labelled as ‘education’, the police disper-
sion of demonstrators as ‘restoring peace and order’,
and the incision of patterns upon the skins of young
girls and boys should be seen as ‘ritual’. We may dis-
cuss whether these are all examples of illegitimate
violence or not, but we recognise the element of
‘rendering physical hurt’ in all of the examples and
thus recognise violence in its core meaning.
Violence is a highly potent act, according to
Riches, because of four key characteristics: firstly,
violence always implies contestations of legitimacy
and is especially suited for making statements of
significance and meaning; secondly, it is a recognis-
able act in its key sense of ‘rendering physical hurt’;
thirdly, violence is highly visible to the senses; and
fourthly, violence requires little specialised equip-
ment or knowledge (see also Nagengast 1994: 111-
16; Riches 1986a; Riches 1986b: 11):
…as a means of transforming the social environment (instru-
mental purpose), and dramatizing the importance of key
social ideas (expressive purpose), violence can be highly effi-
cacious. So it is that the desire to achieve a very wide variety
of goals and ambitions is a sufficient condition for acts of vio-
lence to be performed. (Riches 1986b:11)
In sum, war as social practice can be seen as having
at its core the use of physical violence, which has
three aspects. Firstly, it is always embedded in webs
of meaning and interpretation. Secondly, while one
of the reasons for the ubiquity of violence may, as
David Riches argues, be found in the small amount
of specialised knowledge, training, and technology
required to carry it out, war almost everywhere entails
some kind of technology and specialised knowledge
such as arms, their use, cooperation and tactics. This
logically derives from the fact that the expansion of
these elements highly increases the scope and inten-
sity of the possible impact. Thirdly, while war is a
subcategory of violence it always involves two or
more actors who coordinate their actions, and acts
of war therefore always imply organisation. War as
practice can be represented graphically as in figure 1.
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F I G .  1 : War at the level of social practice.
The ‘meaning’ aspect of war as social practice under-
scores the point that violence is not in the arbitrary
outcome of biological or psychological drives, but as
always embedded in webs of significance. According
to Jonathan Spencer,
Anthropology’s most useful contribution [to the study of vio-
lence] has probably been its documentation of the fact that
violence is pre-eminently collective rather than individual,
social rather than asocial or anti-social, usually culturally con-
structed and always culturally interpreted. (Spencer 1996:
559, my insertion)
This applies to the subcategory of violence as well:
‘war … is always an expression of culture’ (Keegan
1993: 12), and acts of war dramatise key social ideas,
create categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as points of iden-
tification, and are embedded in stipulations of legit-
imate kinds of acts of war. The Nuer restrict intra-
village fighting to clubs while spears may be used in
inter-village fights; and while the molestation of
women and children, the destruction of huts and
taking of captives is prohibited in intra-Nuer fights, it
is not when the enemy is non-Nuer (Evans-Pritchard
1969: 121, 155). Pre-contact Fijian chiefs led their
armies into war, but attacks on the chief himself were
strictly prohibited and would lead to cruel revenge
upon the transgressor and his family (Clunie 1977).
The stipulation of legitimate acts of war varies from
group to group and Western observers have often
explained these differences by referring to ‘ritual-
ised’ or ‘conventionalised’ warfare. However, all
societies have stipulations of legitimacy and ritual
kinds of skirmishes or fights as precursors to the
total annihilation of the opposing society. This of
course does not mean that actors always respect the
stipulations of legitimate violence, and often it is
not the violence itself but its undue application in a
certain context that is criticised in public debate.
Nonetheless, history abounds with actors who did
not comply with existing limits to violence and who
successfully achieved their goals and transformed
society. In Vengeance is their Reply by Rolf Kuschel
(1988), a young warrior on Bellona Island in the
Pacific dreams of killing a prominent chief because
of the lasting renown he would achieve and the like-
ly incorporation of his name in local mythology,
despite the fact that chiefs were absolutely beyond
the range of possible legitimate victims.
The ‘organisation’ aspect of war as social practice
emphasises the coordination problems posed by
actors engaged in war. More coordination means
more efficient attack and defence, whether efforts are
invested in large armies, guerrilla warfare, fortresses
or evasive resistance. However, the coordination and
cohesion of warriors is not always easy. In The Mask
of War, Simon Harrison (1993) describes the prob-
lems of assembling a raid party: recruiters always
have to consider whom to include from their own
village group, since some of their fellow male vil-
lagers are members of different kinship groups and
closely related and obliged to people from villages
other than their own. In ancient Fiji, village men
would readily fight on behalf of the village to which
they were related through kinship. However, the
large armies of state raised for larger campaigns, valu
ni tu and valu rabaraba, consisted of bands of warriors
from different villages and were plagued by mistrust
since village chiefs often betrayed their allies. On
hearing a rumour of betrayal, the army might dis-
solve into its different bands (Clunie 1977). The
European city states of the 14th and 15th centuries
often used hired armies whose cohesion was based
on their mutual interest in financial remuneration
because their rulers could not count on the loyalty
of their subjects, and these hired armies were used to
suppress internal rebellion as much as to fight other
rulers. When France was attacked after the revolu-
tion in 1794, common conscription was invented
and the strength of an army of soldiers dedicated to
their force was demonstrated by the defeat of the
European powers that moved against revolutionary
France. An alternative way of achieving cohesion
within the military organisation was daily drilling,
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which in addition to increased efficiency and coor-
dination also created strong psychological bonds
between individual soldiers (McNeill 1983: 131-33).
Finally, the ‘technology’ aspect of war as social
practice has significance for the scope and intensity
of war. This also has important corollaries for which
kinds of war armies can engage in and what kind of
coercive rule they can sustain. According to Michael
Mann, the logistical limitations upon Mesopotamian
armies (they could only march for seven days with
a maximum distance of 90 km) had repercussions
for rulers who could rule but not govern: they could
exact tribute and demand allegiance from people
marginal to the centre of power with the threat of
military retaliation, which however was costly and
took time, so they could not control their subjects on
a day-to-day basis (Mann 1986). It is often assumed
that the history of war is the history of technological
development. The development of ever more effi-
cient technologies and of war in Europe in the 19th
and 20th centuries and the concurrent developments
in state bureaucracy and taxation can be taken as evi-
dence of this point and indeed make the question of
war a central dynamic in social change (see for exam-
ple McNeill 1983; O’Connell 1995). However, such a
perspective is challenged by those who emphasise
the importance of local politics, succession struggles
and legitimating principles (see Simons 1999). The
historian John Keegan (1993) argues that war is
always embedded in culture, offering the example of
16th century Japan where rulers first used fire
weapons to secure their basis of power. However,
after having monopolised fire weapons, they phased
them out and military power was subsequently based
on the samurai and his sword for the next two cen-
turies. Efficiency is but one concern in war.
The social practice of war should be taken serious-
ly, not only because it approaches war from the per-
spective of actors, but also because war at this level
may constitute social groups and their organisation.
Internal cooperation and the division of work, and
the experience and interpretation of acts of war can,
as is well-known, create a strong sense of ‘us’ within
a group of fighting (wo)men and/or within another
group on whose behalf the group fights. In one of the
most inspiring books on war in non-state societies,
The Mask of War, Simon Harrison (1993) argues that
the social entity of the ‘group’ may in a very fun-
damental way be constituted by war. In Western
theories it is often assumed that war is the result of
a lack or weakening of social order. This assumption
can be traced back to Thomas Hobbes (1991[1651]),
who argued that humans in their natural state – i.e.,
without society – will inevitably become entangled
in war against each other. Society, Hobbes argued,
arose as a way of establishing an order above indi-
vidual interests. Harrison, however, argues that to
the Avatip of Papua New Guinea acts of war are fun-
damental acts in the building of society. Their onto-
logical premise is not like that of Hobbes, of man
living individually in nature, but instead that of per-
sons inescapably interrelated in networks of kinship
to everyone else. Without the social group, the Avatip
person would be ontologically dissolved into an
indefinitely extendable web of kinship relations and
the rights and obligations they entail. War serves to
establish non-kinship relations and thus to establish
separate identities for individuals and groups. An
analysis of war thus cannot assume that social order
and groups precede war.
This is nevertheless what we often do in the era
of the nation-state, each of which has its own army
to the exclusion of all other fighting military organ-
isations. Social order internally and externally is the
premise from which exchange-relations are seen as
establishing peaceful relations between groups; con-
sequently, war is viewed as the result of a breakdown
of these relations. In continuation of this premise, it
is discussed whether trade inhibits war (e.g. Mansfield
1994). This is however a normative and culturally
biased perception. Based on a review of the literature
on war in Melanesia, Bruce Knauft (1990) concludes
that while in one instance a group seemed to fight
because of a lack of society – i.e. a lack of exchange
and kinship relations – other groups fought because
of too much society. Marilyn Strathern (1985) argues
that the giving of compensation payments and the
shaking of hands in Papua New Guinea is not, as a
Western approach would assume, an example of the
regulatory power of social conflict management.
Offensive acts also give the perpetrator esteem and
subsequent conciliation, and the giving of compen-
sation and shaking of hands testify to the perpetra-
tors’ ability to produce wealth and power to start a
violent conflict and end it again. To the Hageners of
Papua New Guinea, exchange relations and rela-
tions of violent conflict are not normatively differ-
ent but are rather equally attractive opportunities in
the pursuit of male power, exemplified, among other
things in the ability to use and control these.
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Consequently, we cannot assume that the practice
of war takes place in a context of disorder and moral
condemnation, just as we cannot assume groups to
precede the practices of war. Whether this is the case
has to be ascertained on an individual basis.
War at the level society: 
the four forms of social power
While the literature on war is extensive, only few
sociological theories have been proposed in which
war is not a derived but a factor by itself. Among
these, the work of Anthony Giddens, (1985b) Michael
Mann (1986) and Charles Tilly (1990) stands out.
Giddens pays a great deal of attention to military
organisation and how it institutionalises domina-
tion, but also cautions that
Power may be at its most alarming, and quite often its most
horrifying, when applied as a sanction of force. But it is typi-
cally at its most intense and durable when running silently
through the repetition of institutionalized practices. (Giddens
1985b: 9)
The foci of Giddens’ and Tilly’s work are neverthe-
less primarily directed at explaining the emergence
of the nation-state in Europe. Michael Mann, on the
other hand, has a broader historical and geographi-
cal scope, making him theoretically suited for the
general perspective of this article. I will therefore
rely heavily upon him in the following.
Michael Mann’s theory perceives of society as
constituted by ‘multiple overlapping and intersect-
ing sociospatial networks of power’ (Mann 1986: 1).
‘Societies’, ‘groups’ and ‘states’ are not viewed as
natural entities but emerge where there is a socio-
spatial condensation of different kinds networks.
The theory therefore does not assume that society
precedes war and military organisation and that war
is a deviation from social order, but instead views
war as one kind of network of power. Power, accord-
ing to Michael Mann, ‘…is the ability to pursue and
attain goals through mastery of one's environment’
(1986: 6). In a Weberian perspective power refers to
the ability of one actor to carry through his will
despite the resistance of other actors and is seen as
something distributed between a number of actors in
a zero-sum game. However, power also has, accord-
ing to Mann, a Parsonian aspect, since a number of
actors may cooperate and thus collectively enhance
their power over third parties or nature (Mann 1986:
6). Cooperation means social organisation and divi-
sion of labour and there is, Mann writes, an inherent
tendency in collective power also to entail distribu-
tive power. Those at the top of a social organisation
tend to be more likely able to carry through their
will, while those at the bottom are hindered in their
resistance by the fact that they can only achieve
similar collective benefits if they can establish an
alternative division of labour: people with a low
position in a social hierarchy are, in Mann’s word-
ing, often organisationally outflanked. To Mann,
stratification is the central aspect of societies since
its dual aspect of distributive and collective power
is the means by which humans try to achieve their
goals. Both Marxists and neo-Weberians argue,
according to Mann, on the premise that stratification
is the central aspect of social organisation and that
politics, ideology and economy are the main organ-
isations in any society. Mann accepts this but sepa-
rates military organisation from political organisa-
tion. His argument for doing so is historical: unlike
the modern nation-state, most states have not had
or even claimed a monopoly on organised military
force and, furthermore, military groups constitute an
independent factor that may act without the con-
sent of the society from which they come (Mann
1986: 11). Mann distinguishes between two dimen-
sions of power which result in four ideal-typical
organisations of power. Firstly, power may be assessed
according to its extensity and intensity – i.e., its
‘ability to organize large numbers of people over far-
flung territories in order to engage in minimally sta-
ble cooperation’, and its ‘ability to organize tightly
and command a high level of mobilization or com-
mitment from the participants’ (Mann 1986: 7).
Secondly, power can be assessed according to its
authoritative and diffused types, which refers to
whether power is ‘actually willed by groups and
institutions [and]... comprises definite commands
and conscious obedience’ or whether it is spread in
a more ‘spontaneous, unconscious, decentred way
throughout a population’ (Mann 1986: 8, my
insertion) (These ideas are, incidentally, very simi-
lar to those of Anthony Giddens’ [1985b: intro-
duction]).
Putting these four polarities of power together
results in four ideal-typical forms of organisational
reach:
94 . C O N C E P T I O N S  O F  W A R F A R E  I N  W E S T E R N  T H O U G H T  
W A R  A S  P R A C T I C E ,  P O W E R ,  A N D  P R O C E S S O R . 95
Authoritative Diffused
Intensive Army command structure A general strike
Extensive Militaristic empire Market exchange
(Mann 1986: 9)
The army is an example of concentrated and coer-
cive organisation of power which is intensive, in
contrast to the militaristic empire where power is
also ‘willed’ and based on ‘definite commands and
conscious obedience’, but which is likely to get only
a low degree of commitment from its subjects. The
general strike is Mann’s example of a diffuse, inten-
sive organisation of power showing a high degree of
commitment and happening more or less sponta-
neously. Finally, market exchange, which is volun-
tary and involves transactions that may extend over
vast areas, is an example of a diffuse, extensive
organisation of power.
Power in its distributive and collective aspects
thus has four ideal typical forms of organisation:
economic (production and exchange of subsistence
needs), ideological (giving meaning, morale and
aesthetics to actors), military (providing means of
defence and aggression) and political (centralised,
institutionalised and territorialised aspects of social
relations). Below is a graphic representation of my
perception of society as constituted by four networks
of power. The broken circle indicates that only the
socio-spatial overlap and condensation of these net-
works lead to what we normally characterise as
‘society’:
F I G .  2 : War at the level of society.
All of the four main organisations of power entail a
mixture of the above-mentioned aspects of power.
Military organisation ‘mobilizes violence, the most
concentrated, if bluntest, instrument of human
power’ (Mann 1986: 26). The concentration and tac-
tical use of this form of power is crucial in battles,
sieges and skirmishes, so violence that is organised
authoritatively, distributively and intensively provides
decisive advantages in such situations. However,
military organisation also has a more extensive aspect
in that raids and punitive actions may be launched
over extensive areas:
Thus military power is sociospatially dual: a concentrated core
in which positive, coerced controls can be exercised, sur-
rounded by an extensive penumbra in which terrorized popu-
lation swill not normally step beyond certain niceties of com-
pliance but whose behavior cannot be positively controlled.
(Mann 1986: 26)
Likewise, the economic organisation of production,
distribution, exchange and consumption has an
extensive reach, since distribution and exchange may
imply networks crossing vast distances, but it also
has an intensive side since, for example, production
involves intensive practical, everyday labour.
These four ideal types of social power broadly
have the function they indicate, according to Mann,
there is no one-to-one relationship between form
and function. Economic functions can be handled
by states, armies and churches as well as specialised
circuits of exchange, just as ideologies can be bran-
dished by economic classes, states and armies. On
the one hand, there are obviously important inter-
dependencies between the different kinds of power.
Military organisations may, for example, rely on or
lean to hierarchies of authority in political networks,
be dependent on ideological networks for the cre-
ation of solidarity between warrior-soldiers and the
endowment of meaning and legitimacy to their
task, and be dependent on access to economic net-
works for campaigns of any size and duration. Such
interdependencies are evident in ancient Polynesian
chiefdoms like ancient Fiji and Hawaii, where the
political status of chief was not only linked closely
to divinity but also to the chief’s capabilities as a
warrior (Kirch 1981; Valeri 1985), and in the case
of European state-building in the 18th and 19th
centuries (Giddens 1985b; Tilly 1990). On the
other hand, military power may be extended into
Military Economics
Political Ideological
Networks
of Power
economic, political and ideological networks. The
distributed power of military organisation is, accord-
ing to Mann, amendable to other situations of social
cooperation where coercion can be used, such as
coerced labour in mines, in plantations and in the
building of monuments, fortification or roads. It is,
however, less suitable for normal dispersed agricul-
ture, for industry where special skills are required, or
for trade, where the costs of coercion exhaust the
resources of the military regime (Mann 1986: 26).
The ideal-typical forms of power attain intermit-
tent existence in specific historical situations where
they interrelate and give rise to a particular configu-
ration of networks of interaction. In their specific
forms, they are interdependent on the development
of the other forms of power organisation in their
distributive, collective, authoritative, diffuse, exten-
sive and intensive aspects. They are furthermore
also dependent in extensity and intensity on the
development of technologies of transportation and
communication (though Mann argues against tech-
nological determinism [1986: 524-26]). As already
mentioned, Mann argues that the logistics of pre-
industrial societies inhibited unsupported marches
of more than 90 kilometres and that military power
could thus be exercised at longer distances at high
costs. A similar argument is made by Anthony
Giddens, who makes the limitations upon European
cavalry in the 15th and 16th centuries a pivotal
point in the change from the Absolutist to the mod-
ern nation-state: in the former, coercion could only
be applied temporarily and at costs increasing with
the distance from the centre of power, whereas
modern technology has enabled the rapid deploy-
ment of armies to all of the geographical areas
enclosed by the borders of the nation-state. In the
former, power diminished with distance; in the latter,
power is homogenously present all over (Giddens
1985b, see also Anderson 1991 for a similar point).
What we get from this perception of war at the
societal level is the possibility of analysing war as
organised physical violence, as defined above, in
relation to other kinds of social power. It is often
assumed that military organisation is derived from
social organisation as such. For example, the ‘old’
evolutionists such as Morton Fried (1967) and Elman
Service (1978) argue that war cannot be a factor in
social evolution because it will always rely on politi-
cal organisation. What they do not take into account
is that military organisations might develop inde-
pendently of other networks of power and/or across
established social groups. Obvious examples are the
rebel movements in, for instance, Sierra Leone
(Richards 1996) and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.
In neither of these cases do we have a military organ-
isation that is part of a ‘society’ on whose behalf it
acts; instead, military organisations fight across such
entities. Paul Richards (1996) thus argues that the
rebel movement in Sierra Leone takes advantage of
young people who drop out of established social
networks, forcefully integrates them in a movement
that is informed by practices connected with the
forest (as opposed to the ‘city’, both metaphorically
and concretely) and makes use of specific kinds of
violence (the cutting off of limbs at the wrist or at
the elbow) to reach an international audience in
order to circumvent the enemy ‘group’ (the state).
War at the processual level
Since societies are conceived of as overlapping net-
works of social power, social structural change takes
place when the configuration of these networks
changes and a more extended and tightly overlap-
ping concentration of networks emerges or more
fragmented and loose overlayings result. Michael
Mann posits that whereas the four forms of power
are ‘track-layers’ in the world-historical process ‘...
there is no obvious, formulaic, general patterning
of the interrelations of power sources.’ (Mann 1986:
523). He does point out two different ways in which
military power may have a reorganising role in his-
tory: in battles military power may decide which kind
of society will predominate; and in peace, military
organisation may dominate other networks of power
and organise societies as such (Mann 1986: 521). I
would, however, like to reformulate these two reor-
ganising roles of war in history and add a third.
If we conceive of societies as configurations of
overlapping networks of power, war may have a role
in changing these configurations in three different
ways: firstly, war may as military organisation expand
onto the other networks of power of which it is part
and from which it feeds; secondly, war may be a
means for the forceful integration and subjugation
of other configurations of networks of power such as
when one group conquers or subjugates another;
and, thirdly, as a frequent and recurrent phenomenon
war may form a context within which groups devel-
op. War may thus, from the perspective of a single
society, have an internal, external or contextual role
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in social structural change. Graphically, this can be
represented as below: 
F I G .  3 :  War at the level of process.
These three roles correspond to three basic ways in
which war in the literature on the subject is said to
change society: war leads to subjugation, the devel-
opment of a military organisation based on central
command and hierarchy which spreads to the rest
of society, or provides a context in which political
organisation under the threat of annihilation devel-
ops into more complex forms.
All three roles are represented in the theory of one
of the first scholars to link war and social structural
change, Herbert Spencer, who discusses his ideas in
his three-volume work Principles in Sociology, pub-
lished between 1876 and 1896:
Wars originate governmental structures, and strong leadership
does not evolve where people live in peace with each other or
are scattered and cooperation thus not possible. War between
groups, however, furthers the development of leadership by a
warrior-chief and, later on through the process of differentia-
tion, by developing the political and the military arms of gov-
ernment as separate organs. Means of communication are
eventually developed when the coordination between the dif-
ferent parts of society requires it…. In the process of growth,
one group may compound the other, but such incorporation
through conquest and subsequent tributary relationship
remains unstable until it is ‘habituated to combined action
against external enemies’. (Spencer 1967: 37)
Wars between groups thus spur the internal devel-
opment of a society’s leadership, and wars lead
through conquest to the formation of larger entities,
whose leadership is stabilised through wars with
external enemies:
... men who are local rulers while at home and leaders of their
respective hands of dependents when fighting a common foe
under direction of a general leader, become minor heads dis-
ciplined in subordination to the major head and as they carry
more or less of this subordination home with them, the mili-
tary organization developed during war survives as the politi-
cal organization during peace. (Spencer 1967: 37)
Wars lead, according to Spencer, to the development
of centralised government because of the need to
coordinate action in order to survive. Subordination
in the military is replicated in the political organisa-
tion, and gradually more complex forms of society
develop. While on the one hand war provided a con-
text in which a society developed internally because
of the premium on better management through
better integration of a society’s various parts, on the
other hand war as conquest was a means through
which societies grew in size and from which institu-
tionalised inequality arose.
Since Spencer, the linkage between war and evo-
lution has been continued by Franz Oppenheimer
(1999, originally 1914) and others who argued that
conquest was behind early state formation (see Haas
1982: 63-66; Service 1978: 23-25). A contemporary
heir of Spencer is found in Robert Carneiro, who in
a number of articles (1970; 1981) argues that 
… war has been the principal agent by which human societies,
starting as small and simple autonomous communities, have
surmounted petty sovereignties and transformed themselves,
step by step, into vast and complex states. (Carneiro 1990: 191)
Since people do not voluntarily relinquish their sov-
ereignty, social organisations like the state can only
develop through forced subjugation – i.e. conquest
– Carneiro argues (1970). Michael Mann’s discussion
of the emergence of the early state takes the same
point of departure, but like many others who discuss
the role of war in the formation of early states
(Claessen 2000; Claessen and Skalník 1978a; Cohen
1985; Haas 1981; 1982), he argues that war is neither
a sufficient nor a necessary factor in state formation.
On the other hand, even those who oppose war as a
prime mover or as a factor at all because war is
derived from other factors acknowledge that the
consequences of war can be vast and of immense
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significance (e.g., Claessen 2000: 110; Claessen and
Skalník 1978b: 626; Cohen 1985; Porter 1994: 3).
The interrelations and feedback mechanisms that
can occur are, judging from the literature, many and
complex, but the three roles mentioned above pro-
vide the forms.
The first way in which war can lead to change in
a society’s configuration of power is through the
spread of military organisation onto other networks
of power. Mann indicated this possibility with the
concept of ‘compulsory cooperation’. Here the
intense, authoritative power of the military is used
to intensify the exploitation of concentrated pock-
ets of labour, stabilise systems of value, and protect
production and trade, leading to the compulsory
diffusion of ideologies (Mann 1986: ch. 5). In Mann’s
case the assumption is that military organisation is
a specific kind of social power that may force itself
onto other forms of power. Other authors (e.g.,
Spencer 1967) argue, however, that because military
power is most effective when organised on the basis
of a centralised command and a clear-cut hierarchy,
frequent war will lead to a higher level of subjuga-
tion, centralisation and hierarchy in military organ-
isation than in the rest of the social organisation.
If this military organisation spreads to the rest of
society in times of peace, the social structure will
change towards more hierarchical structures with
more centralised control. The crucial task in both
cases is to delineate under which circumstances mil-
itary power would be allowed to spread into other
social organisations. Not all economic, political or
ideological networks are amendable to the authori-
tative, intense power of military organisation, and
while military leaders may be cherished by their sol-
diers and the people they defend in times of war,
they may not have any power in times of peace. The
successful war leaders Geronimo, of the Apache in
North America, and Fousive, of the Yanomami in
South America, could not transform their military
success into civil authority (Chagnon 1974: 177-80).
Elman Service (1978) argued that a centralised lead-
ership would be agreed upon by consensus because
of the benefits for societal survival that it offers.
While this may apply in times of war and explain
the emergence of a sophisticated military organisa-
tion, it does not explain why such forms of organisa-
tion would spread to the rest of society in times of
peace. People may relinquish their sovereignty to
military command in order to survive, but under
which circumstances would they not revoke that deci-
sion in times of peace? The process is therefore most
likely to take place in circumstances where a society is
under constant threat of being annihilated and where
military organisation can organise the economic
activities, its leadership can achieve political status,
or its ideology can tie into the ideology of the group.
The second role of war in processual change is as
a means for the coerced integration of other soci-
eties into a society’s own networks of power – i.e.,
through conquest or subjugation. The conquest of
other groups provides a means by which to acquire
access to additional basic resources. The conquest
theories have the strength of explaining not only
how centralised command and hierarchy emerges,
but also how stratification – i.e. privileged access to
basic resources in the sense of Morton Fried (1967)
– comes about. The conquest theories posit that the
subjugation of one group by another, followed up
by the extraction of tribute or tax from the con-
quered group, leads to stratification where previous-
ly only egalitarian or ranked political relations pre-
vailed. Over time, military rule is transformed into
institutionalised government, laws, and the assimi-
lation of the two groups into one people. Herbert
Spencer (1967) argued in this way, and more recently
the line of argument has, as mentioned, been taken
up by Robert Carneiro (1970), whose theory has
become one of the most cited and central contribu-
tions to discussions on the relation between war and
state formation. Carneiro argues that in a situation
where a group’s access to land is limited by circum-
scription (because of ecological conditions, the pres-
ence of other groups, or the concentration of scarce
resources) a point will arise when it is more feasible
to conquer the land of another group than to inten-
sify production by working harder or inventing new
technologies of cultivation. Because this point arises
before production is maximised, Carneiro argues, the
conquering group can achieve higher levels of pro-
duction by coercing the conquered group. Through
such a process, chiefdoms arise by incorporating
several villages into one polity. The replication of the
process on a larger scale accounts for the rise of states
through the incorporation of several regions into
one polity. Through a process of ‘internal evolution’,
previous reciprocal or redistributional exchange
relations have been transformed, and a society where
one powerful stratum taxes a subjugated stratum
has appeared.
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While neat and elegant, the theory actually only
explains why and how entities grow larger through
conquest, but not how political organisation changes.
Carneiro does not elaborate upon the ‘internal evo-
lution’ through which political transformation is
achieved and instead takes the state for granted at
this point (Carneiro 1970: 736). His theory does not
actually explain what it intends to do and thus
shares the general weakness of the conquest theories.
They assumed that the relationship between the
conquering and the conquered groups acquires a
new quality after conquest. For the theory to work
the conquered cannot merely become incorporated
into existing exchange relations. A group conquered
by a chief and paying their yearly tribute like other
groups of the chiefdom would not be part of a state
but of a chiefdom. While conquest may explain the
subjugation of another group of people, it does not
explain the transformation of political power or the
social structure as such. The theories offer plausible
contexts in which higher levels of social complexi-
ty, subjugation and stratification should develop,
but not how this would transgress the existing social
structure. One possibility is that the war leaders
appropriate pieces of land (Webster 1975) or tribute
that can provide the initial basis for economic power.
War may, thirdly and finally, provide a context in
which societies develop. The argument is that since
military effectiveness is enhanced the more its dis-
tributive aspects are developed, and that more com-
plex societies enable better organisation of defence
and attack, stratification and division of work will
develop within societies frequently engaged in war.
The evolutionist Herbert Spencer (1967) offers one
example of this approach, and Elman Service (1978)
similarly argued that war would make people accept
the power monopoly of an emerging state since
‘good government’ would enhance their chances of
survival by offering a more powerful organisation
for their protection (Service 1978: 270). Michael
Mann basically says the same when he states that
‘[t]hrough battles the logic of destructive military
power may decide which form of society will pre-
dominate. This is an obvious reorganising role of
military power throughout much of history.’ (Mann
1986: 521). The crucial task here is to explain when
such developments would take place. Herbert
Spencer argued that such a development would not
occur in the case of extensively dispersed groups,
and Carneiro had to invoke a scenario with a resource
shortage and circumscription. Furthermore, just as
war and development cannot be equated, neither can
peace and stagnation: some societies are continuous-
ly at war with each other but do not develop higher
complexity. Here war is instead part of the repro-
duction of social structures (Harrison 1993; Gardner
and Heider 1969). The context approach works best
as a long-term, survival-of-the-fittest explanation of
state formation or to explain development through
the threat of annihilation, but we still need to
explain when a reconfiguration of the networks of
power will be the result.
The three different ways in which war may part of
a process of social structural change can of course
be closely interlinked. The advantage of separating
them is that their distinct ways of operating become
clear and that the preconditions that have to be ful-
filled also become apparent. In evolutionist scenarios
like those of Herbert Spencer and Robert Carneiro
war is seen as a unitary phenomenon. They suggest
that war may entail a number of developments:
better military organisation; better social organisa-
tion as such, to the conquest of other group and the
development of inequality, to the emergence of the
early state; and to the psychological adaptation to
submission. They do not, however, specify how these
different political changes may occur. War may be a
factor in social structural change, but is obviously
not always so: while wars proliferate, they mostly
only bring about the substitution of one chief with
another, but not with a king. One group may defeat
another, but still be a chiefdom demanding tribute
instead of becoming a state that receives taxes. In
the terms of the above framework, social structural
change only occurs when the networks of social
power are rearranged, and the task for an analysis of
the role of war in such a process is to specify the
constraints and opportunities available to actors
in such processes. When is it possible for a warrior-
soldier to transform his status achieved in war into
political status, or apply his command of military
organisation to other areas of his group? When does
conquest and subjugation lead to new forms of
political organisation? Under which circumstances
does frequent war lead to a process in which social
organisation or technologies of violence enter a spiral
of refinement and development instead of the
reproduction of the status quo?
The dominance of long-distance trade may be an
opportunity for leaders to build their own military
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organisation which is not dependent upon the con-
sent of their own group (Webb 1975), and war may be
an opportunity for leaders to acquire small pieces of
land from which they can build an economic base and
transform the political organisation (Webster 1975).
While chiefs, traders, priests and great warriors can be
seen as representatives of one kind of social power
(i.e. political, economic, ideological and war respec-
tively), most leaders have to use the multiple sources
of power in order to uphold their position (Earle
1997). To analyse such processes and discuss the role
of war in social change, it is necessary to consider war
at both the level of practice and the level of society.
Conclusion
What I have argued above is that war may be con-
sidered at three different levels. At the level of prac-
tice, war is conceived as acts of physical violence
organised by two or more actors that may employ
technology to enhance the scope and intensity of
violence. The acts are directed at members of another
group and are always embedded in a context of
meaning which gives significance to the acts and
delineates which kinds of violence are deemed legiti-
mate in the actual context and which are not, yet this
does not imply that these delineations are always
respected. At the level of society, practices of war
are manifestations of one of four social sources of
power – economic, political, ideological and military
– which are ideal-typically organised in military
organisations. All societies consist of overlapping
networks of social interaction that are based upon
one of these four kinds of social power and which in
their specific combination characterise a specific
kind of society. At the level of process, war can have
three different roles according to whether military
organisation spreads into and dominates other net-
works of power, whether other societies by conquest
or subjugation are forcefully integrated in the net-
works of which the military organisation is also part,
or, finally, whether frequent and reoccurring wars
provide the context for an ongoing process of devel-
opment of technology and forms of power, especially
social organisation. Processes of change are always
induced by actors pursuing interests in a specific
context and while some processes of change are the
result of conscious choice others result from unin-
tended consequences. Change is spurred by practice
and its intended or unintended consequences for
the overall configuration of networks of social power.
Combined, the three levels of analysis of war at the
level of practice, of society and of process can
graphically be represented as below:
F I G .  4 : The framework for the analysis of war.
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The advantage of this model is its combination of
three levels of analysis. War is most often looked
upon at the societal level in discussions of war and
historical development or social structural change.
As I have argued, this is not acceptable for any social
theory that aims to take practice seriously, nor is it
feasible as an exclusive focus in connection with
war. War may change the overall configuration of the
social networks of power, but not always. Its ability
to do so is dependent on other circumstances. First,
the internal spread of military organisation is
dependent on the compatibility of military organi-
sation to political organisation, on the linkage of
meanings of organised physical violence to ideology
and on the possibilities of converting military status
into political status. Second, the external application
of war leads only to qualitative change to the extent
that new forms of subjugation and payments are the
result of conquest; and third, for societies that repro-
duce themselves in a context of frequent war there
is the need to specify the dynamic of change that
results in a reconfiguration of the networks of power.
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This section concerns warfare in non-state or pre-state societies. In our own part
of the world social entities without central power no longer exist. To find them
we have to reach far back into the prehistory of Europe or to consult ethnographic
descriptions of tribal populations outside Europe even today not entirely subordi-
nated to a state power. European prehistory represents excellent research ground
for the study of warfare in non-centralised societies outside the sphere of influence
of states and, later still, under various forms of impact from such centralised units.
For thousands of years de-centrality was a dominant social principle in Europe
and remained so even after the formation of states in certain core regions:
around 2000 BC the first state societies emerged in the eastern Mediterranean.
Further north, in central Europe and the Balkans, there were attempts to monop-
olise power early on, but it is not until the 7th and 6th centuries BC – under the
influence from Mediterranean city-states – that these efforts turned out more
successful. In northern Europe, by comparison, state formation is a late phe-
nomenon; a prolonged process of emulation connected to the expansion and
politics of the Roman Empire. Turning to the ethnohistorical and ethnographic
record, few, if any of the tribal societies we know of, have maintained them-
selves independently of the modern world system, and this particular context
should be taken into account when assessing their relationship to war. 
Research and stereotypic pre-understandings
To venture into the subject of warfare among tribes is intriguing, not least, due
to the mythical constructions associated over the years with these societies. The
difficulties scholars are facing in avoiding these stereotypic pre-understandings
are obvious when looking at the history of archaeological and anthropological
research into the subject of warfare and society: we have tended to classify tribal
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societies as either inherently bellicose or innately peaceful with periodic ups
and downs for either view (Otterbein 1999, Vandkilde 2003 and this volume
chapter 5). Lately, the former, Hobbesian, view has prevailed in both disciplines. 
In prehistoric archaeology, studies devoted specifically to war and violence were
few until the mid 1990s, when Lawrence Keeley’s book War before Civilisation
(1996) turned the tide and pushed the opinion from a dove’s view on prehistory
towards a hawk’s view. In the more recent anthropology non-centralised societies
are quite often described as being in a constant state of war. This perception of
a bellicose other with deep roots in Western thought was in the 1970s reiterated
by Pierre Clastres, who argued that warfare should simply be understood as
the dominant structure, the essence, of tribal society: warfare, says Clastres, is
ubiquitous among tribes, and the very factor that prevents their transformation
to state. What Clastres did was to reverse Thomas Hobbes (1958[1651]) famous
dictum about the primitive being ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ by arguing that
if the state is categorised as the pacifier of that being, then war in primitive
society is war against the state; hence the phrase society against the state (Clastres
1977; 1994; Bestard and Bidon-Chanal 1979: 225). 
There can be no doubt that warfare was a frequent activity among tribal popu-
lations in the Americas: Tupi-Guarani, Yanomami, Blackfoot, Apache, Algonquin,
Iroquois, and so forth, but also in many other parts of the world, for example
in Melanesia and east Africa. Tribes without warfare are definitely few, but Jürg
Helbling rightly points out that it is nevertheless significant that they exist
(chapter 9). Likewise, one may wonder if omnipresence of war and martial cul-
ture really is a fair description of European prehistory – before and after the first
states and empires were formed in the east Mediterranean region?
Questions and recent approaches
The more recent debates in anthropology and archaeology bring forth a series
of connected questions. Can we really, irrespective of context, talk about a per-
manent situation of war among tribes and is the often quoted prerogative
‘endemic war’ really appropriate? Are the use of violence and the waging of war
against the other, then, deeply rooted in human biology? Here follows, logically,
the question whether the state is a pacifier or creator of that bellicose being?
Pacification is one possibility and at the other end of the scale warfare among
tribes is considered as a result of state expansion and influence (Ferguson and
Whitehead 1992). We may likewise ask whether warfare could possibly be a fac-
tor in generating social complexity and hierarchy among tribal societies thus
undermining the basic principle of decentralisation? Or is it rather the opposite
way around, namely that war merely has a homeostatic function in reproducing
these societies as themselves? If the latter is the case, this would support
Clastres’ view that tribal societies are inevitably structured against change pre-
cisely due to the permanency of war (1977; 1994). 
The five articles of this section all work towards solving these problems, and
all authors share the view of warfare as a violent kind of social action. Jürg
Helbling’s (chapter 9) contribution is the most general of them, offering impor-
tant new insights into the theme of warfare in societies without centralised
political control – in Polly Wiessner’s phrasing acephalous societies (chapter 11).
It also assesses critically the prevalent theories of warfare and ventures into the
difficult question of the cause, purpose and effects of war in these societies. The
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remaining four articles are case studies examining warfare in specific non-state
societies or regions: Nick Thorpe (chapter 10) examines patterns of warfare in
prehistoric Britain and Ireland, whereas Polly Wiessner (chapter 11), Ton Otto
(chapter 12) and Chris Gosden (chapter 13) all operate within historical Papua
New Guinea, although the actual contexts of Highland and Island New Guinea
differ in many aspects. 
War was never permanent
What is especially striking – when reading these different accounts from anthro-
pology and archaeology – is the actual variable presence of war, hence strongly
implying that war-related violence is culturally and socially constructed rather
than rooted in psychology and biology. 
Thorpe’s examination (chapter 10) demonstrates with clarity that the British
evidence of the Neolithic and the Bronze Age cannot support the evolutionary
hypothesis of increasing warfare through time. The surprisingly rich record of
traumata, weaponry and fortified settlements rather points towards specific hori-
zons of fighting and feuding, especially connected to periods with radical social
and economic change. This is much in tune with Wiessner’s findings among the
notoriously warlike Enga in the Highlands of New Guinea: not even here is war
always of the same magnitude and different kinds of war can be distinguished,
not all of them equally lethal (chapter 11). 
The temporal and regional variation in the presence of war is also very much
the focus of Helbling’s discussion. He puts emphasis both on the fact that warfare
is frequent among tribes and that peaceful tribes exist. He argues further that
not all conflicts lead to war and some conflicts are solved peacefully. He shows
that hunter-gatherer societies typically have no war, and this argues against bio-
logical and psychological explanations of tribal warfare. War is nevertheless a
widespread form of social action, which constitutes a particular social environ-
ment to which actors and local groups have to adapt for the sake of survival.
War does not break out because people are devoted to warfare and killings; it
breaks out because it is simply too risky to engage in a strategy of peace: war is
the necessary, even though unintentional and damaging result of the strategic interac-
tion of groups under specific structural conditions (chapter 9). 
The distinct variability in the presence and scale of warfare in time and space
points to the conclusion that the predominant understanding of tribal societies
as being in an eternal state of war has to be nuanced and contextualised. It is
equally thought-provoking that some periods in European prehistory with exces-
sive amounts of prestigious weaponry have surprisingly little evidence of war-
inflicted skeletal traumata (cp. Thorpe chapter 10; Robb 1997), and this may
suggest that the concepts of cold war and arms race could possibly apply to
decentralised societies. This is completely in accordance with Helbling’s obser-
vation (chapter 9) that among ethnographically described tribes war rarely
breaks out when two parties are of equal strength and in a stalemate situation. 
War and social change
People caught in the middle of a war certainly experience that conditions for
action have changed, but we need to approach the relationship between war
and social change in a more sociological manner. Does war produce social
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change, either smoothly or radically? The answer to the first part of the question
is a fairly clear yes. Theories of human practice and interaction have in recent
years helped to bring more focus upon the human actor as the instigator of
social change, irrespective of whether that action is peaceful or warlike. All kinds
of social action produce small-scale change, which we may term ‘social repro-
duction’. Hence, warfare can be said always – whenever it occurs – to contribute
to the hardly noticeable change that continuously takes place in all societies. 
The answer to the second part of the question is a more hesitant yes, or per-
haps. From the point of view of archaeology war seems to occur most frequently
in certain periods with radical shifts in the systems of domination in Europe, for
example when agriculture and a domesticated way of living were first imple-
mented from the 7th millennium BC onwards, or much later, at the transition
to the Middle Bronze Age around 1600 BC when a series of new geo-political
figurations formed. Warfare can certainly be attributed some kind of role in the
web of causes and effects contained by major macro-regional horizons of social
transformation in European prehistory, but at present this role is hard to pin-
point more precisely. Acts of war have often enough been used strategically by
groups or individuals to centralise and enhance social power, but how effective
is war in this respect? Along side economic power, ideological power and polit-
ical power, the military source of power is among Michael Mann’s four key
power sources. It mostly functions as a back-up of one or more of the other three
power sources (Mann 1986). Then, in Mann’s perception of history, war and
military organisation often play roles in the games of power, even if they rarely
stand alone. 
The articles of this volume allow us to carry the debate about the role of
warfare in social transformation further, especially as regards the emergence of
strong leadership. Thorpe is critical to the often assumed connection between
the enhancement of male status and warfare; at least it is clear from the British
evidence that warfare was not only conducted by young males striving for
prestige; senior males, and even women, can be seen to have been involved in
violent encounters presumably related to war (chapter 10). Outside Britain the
prehistoric age-gender pattern is also variable, which should evoke some caution
in connecting emphasised masculinity directly with (war-imposed) hierarchy.
The (male) warrior companies inhabiting many past and present societies do not
inevitably lead to a central leadership even if the potential is present owing to
their high standards of internal order and organisation. Rather it seems to me
that warrior clubs are quite often placed on the margins of society where they
are far from being power fields in themselves. Only grave forms of external
pressure seem to be able to change this state of affairs (Vandkilde chapter 5; cp.
also Steuer chapter 16). 
In the context of historical Papua New Guinea Wiessner points out that
egalitarian institutions typically pulled in the opposite direction when ambi-
tious individuals tried to establish themselves as leaders with a following of sup-
porters (chapter 11; also Wiessner 2002). She is also reluctant to accept a direct
connection between the rise of hierarchy and the waging of war. True enough,
strong leaders eventually rose in Melanesia, but not from conventional warfare,
she argues. Among the Highland Enga it was first and foremost war-games and
exchange transactions of the so-called Great Ceremonial Wars that played a vital
role in this respect, and leadership sometimes passed on from father to son. In
the eastern Highlands weak hierarchies developed connected to warfare and male
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cults, but had little effect on the routines of daily life. It seems likely, according
to Wiessner, that it was activities within institutions with a predominantly
peaceful purpose which – in her phrasing – paved the road towards changing
the role of warfare from a conservative to a progressive force (chapter 11). 
This is fairly parallel to the outcome of the debates in the War and Society
project group, reported on in the introduction to this book: war is for the most
part involved in the formation of hierarchies, but other factors enter into inter-
action with war. Claus Bossen (cp. chapters 7 and 17) has in particular studied
war as a possible processor in state formation. His conclusion is that war can
rarely be singled out as the very factor that leads to the emergence of the state:
war is almost always present when states are in the making, but a series of con-
tributing factors can be added. 
In sum, regularities are difficult to pinpoint apart from the fact that war very
often creates more war; most likely as an unintended effect of power-strategic
actions. For the moment we can then safely say that warfare is almost always
present when societies make the change towards strong leadership and hierarchy,
but the role as processor needs more study.
War, tribes and states
It is probably in the nature of states to reproduce themselves by expanding their
interests into new territories, such as those inhabited by decentralised societies.
Doubtless the latter will be influenced one way or the other, even when the state
resides, not in the vicinity, but farther away. Our present knowledge hardly
allows us to model the effect of state expansion on decentralised peripheries,
with respect to war and peace, in any great detail, and until recently two quite
opposite scenarios have quite dominated the research. They originate in the
Hobbesian and Rousseaunian worldviews briefly referred to above. 
The first standpoint assumes that tribes are by nature peaceful and that warfare
amongst them is not an original mode of action, but a result of state contact.
Especially Brian Ferguson has advanced this view with primary reference to
interaction between colonial authorities and indigenous societies in 19th and
20th century Americas, the so-called ‘war-in-the-tribal-zone-theory’ (Ferguson
1990; Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). The underlying idea is that a delicate,
and predominantly peaceful balance between local tribes was shattered by the
state intrusion and as a result widespread acts of war broke out. A similarity may
here be noted to Clastres’ conceptualisation of tribal warfare as a defence mech-
anism against the state. New archaeological evidence and analyses, however,
seriously undermine this argumentation: war has existed among decentralised
societies long before any state was ever present and for that matter continued to
exist long after this major watershed (e.g. Thorpe chapter 10; Vandkilde chapter
5; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998; Keeley 1996). This does not necessarily
mean that ‘the tribal zone’ was unaffected, and it is quite likely that the actual
level of warfare increased or decreased due to state meddling. 
The second standpoint advances the contrasting opinion that state interfer-
ence has the positive effect of pacifying inherently warlike tribes, but, as argued
above, the level of war in decentralised societies has varied across time and
space, and cases of peaceful societies can even be cited. This actual variability
suggests that state intervention in tribal affairs has effects that logically also
must vary from case to case. The configuration of power in itself makes possible
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different strategic avenues for both parties: state dominance can notably be
achieved through coercion and/or persuasion. Likewise, tribal subordination
may imply strategies of collaboration and/or resistance that may again have
effects on the modes of interaction internally between local groups – whether in
a more peaceful or warlike direction (cp. Guha 1997: 20ff).
Monopolising the violence will surely be amongst the primary aims of
expanding states, but will they necessarily succeed in pacifying the people they
are trying to convert into subjects and by what means? In spite of the ideologi-
cal construction of Pax Romana, the reactions of Germanic and Gallic tribes to
the military and political expansion of the Rome were manifold, varying in a
very complex manner between radical militarisation and intimate cooperation,
and even emulation of the Roman state organisation. In more recent times there
are several examples of immediate or ultimate success at pacification, but this
was a two-sided process in which the colonised people acted strategically in
their world. 
In the Bismarck Archipelago of Papua New Guinea, Gosden points out that
pacification was not only the result of colonial efforts to impose a monopoly,
but also due to local desires to stop fighting (chapter 13). Otto has in Manus
region of Papua New Guinea observed a slightly deviating pattern (chapter 12).
He points out that exchange was the crucial glue that ensured the functioning
of the social structure and that warfare was traditionally utilised as an alterna-
tive resource that contributed to the maintenance of the exchange network and
hence in an essential manner to the reproduction of society. In this part of PNG
the continued smooth functioning of the traditional exchange systems – rather
than peace – was a key issue: a destabilisation of the existing exchange systems
occurred first, probably due to impact of the state apparatus, and then as a result
an acceptance of colonial authority and its efforts to monopolise violence.
Importantly, prior to the decisions to engage in strategies of peace in the Manus
province and other regions of Papua New Guinea – the actual level of internal
warring was raised – apparently accentuated by the introduction of firearms.
The chain of events can be roughly reconstructed as follows: First, in order to
obtain firearms attacks were organised on Westerners, who then committed
severe retaliations in which villages were destroyed and people killed or driven
away. The Western punitive raids and the use of firearms in local warfare dis-
rupted existing exchange relations and the ensuing malaise – probably ampli-
fied by epidemic diseases – caused villagers to give up weapons and fighting, and
as a consequence the whole social system underwent transformation ending
with the firm establishment of colonial authority. A similar pattern of response
also involving firearms has been noted among the Yanomami (Clastres 1994),
and the adoption of horses among the Abipón of the Grand Chaco, likewise in
South America, is known to have increased the level of internal warfare as well
as the level of resistance against the Spanish colonisation (Lacroix 1990). In
sum, this suggests a varied response to conquest and colonial hegemony and
underlines that innovation in fighting technology is a variable that should also
be accounted for. 
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Concluding remarks
It seems to me that the topic of warfare in non-state societies – with or without
states in their spheres of interaction – has made some recent advances. The arti-
cles of this section testify to this conclusion. To achieve clearer answers about
the relationship of non-state societies to violence and warfare archaeological
prehistoric sources have to be consulted and compared to anthropological evi-
dence. We could probably learn a lot more by engaging into systematic and con-
text-based comparisons of cases distributed research-strategically across time
and space. Attention should be paid to the intricate interplay between action
and structure since it is in this configuration that regularity and variability in
history are formed.
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Since the late 1960s – that is, after the decline of
structural functionalism and under the impact of the
various wars of independence and postcolonial wars
in the Third World – anthropology has again become
more interested in conflicts and wars (Bohannan
1967; Fried, Harris and Murphy 1968). Various the-
ories of war in societies without a central power have
been fiercely debated in the last few decades.1 In the
following article I will examine some aspects of war
and peace and discuss those theories of war, which
are in the centre of current discussions. I will not deal
with civil wars and ethno-political wars, which have
also occupied anthropological thinking in recent
decades, nor will I discuss the contribution of war to
the formation of states. Instead I shall concentrate
on war and peace among tribal populations, which
are not (no longer, or not yet) completely subordi-
nated to a state power (Ensminger 1992: 143).2 These
so-called tribal wars – as can be observed still today
in Amazonia, in the Highlands of New Guinea, in
East Africa and elsewhere – are of course not ‘modern
wars’ (i.e. in the sense of wars for secession from a
state or for the control of the state apparatus). But
they are, nevertheless, wars occurring in the present
world of states and in the context of an economic
world system – contexts, which have manifold
impacts on these wars and modify their character.3
Besides discussing some concepts (such as war,
conflict, feud and violence) as well as five important
theories on war, I will deal with four issues which
may be considered important for future research
on war in anthropology. First, we should take into
account theories of international relations, which
may considerably inspire the anthropology of war.
These theories are relevant for anthropology because
states are political units waging war, as local groups
in societies without a state are, and the logic and
dynamics of war between states are, despite all the
differences between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ war
(Keeley 1996), comparable to those in war between
local groups. Second, the phenomenon of alliance
has been neglected by anthropology so far, but this
must be taken into consideration because whoever
has to wage war also needs allies. Alliance formation
influences the regional relation of force between
warring local groups, and both victory and defeat
may depend on the support of allies. Third, any
theory of war also has to explain why in some (but
few) tribal societies conflicts between local groups are
never carried out by warlike means. Hence, we have
to tackle the problem of explaining tribal societies
without war. Fourth, the anthropology of war also has
to consider the question of pacification. Pacification
of warlike tribal groups is not only an interesting
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historical process as such, but also represents a test
field for theories of war in tribal societies. Before
addressing these aspects, I will give a brief overview
of anthropological theories of war and discuss some
conceptual problems.
1. Tribal warfare and theories of war
According to one widely accepted definition, war is
a planned and organised armed dispute between
political units (Otterbein 1968: 278; 1973: 923ff;
1985: 3; Ember and Ember 1994: 190), or as Ferguson
(1984a: 5) puts it: ‘an organized, purposeful group
action, directed against another group ... involving
the actual or potential application of lethal force’.4
Tribal warfare can take different forms: from ambush-
es and surprise attacks to open armed clashes on dif-
ferent levels of escalation, ranging from an exchange
of insults and the use of long-range weapons, which
only cause minor losses, to pitched battles and close
combat with spears and axes that cause far more
casualties (Turney-High 1949; Hanser 1985). Battles
such as these are not common in all societies. For
instance, they occur in New Guinea, but not in
Amazonia (Hanser 1985). Surprise attacks are by far
the most frequent form of tribal warfare and cause
the highest proportion of war related casualties.
Head-hunting and other forms of conspicuous cruel-
ty are tactics of warfare often used in areas with low
population density. By means of such instrumental
brutality enemy groups can be terrorised and
expelled from an area, which could not be achieved
as easily using military force (see Morren 1984 on
the Miyanmin; Vayda 1976 on the Iban). Coalitions
may be of different size and may differ in stability.
In the Highlands of New Guinea, the coalitions
described amounted to anything up to 800 or 1000
warriors on each side (see Meggitt 1977 on the Mae
Enga; Larson 1987 on the Ilaga Dani), but mostly
did not comprise more than about 200 warriors
(Hanser 1985: 158ff). In these societies, alliances may
be strengthened by gift exchange, alliance feasts
and by marriage relationships, all of which are quite
costly but render alliances more reliable and long
lasting (see Meggitt 1977 and Wiessner and Tumu
1998a; 1998b on the Mae Enga). In other societies,
alliances are purely ad-hoc pacts without gift
exchange and marriage relations of any importance
and are, therefore, far more unstable (see Chagnon
1983 on the Yanomami).
Turney-High (1949), Keegan (1993) and others
maintained that the difference between ‘primitive’
and ‘civilised’ war is absolute and essential (see
Otterbein 1999). According to them, ‘primitive war-
fare’ is determined by religious-cultural factors and
is mainly a harmless, playful form of fight, causing
only minor casualties. In contrast, states rationally
calculate the advantages and disadvantages of a
war; ‘civilised (real) wars’ aim at territorial gains or
political advantages and cause far more losses than
‘primitive wars’. However, this distinction does not
make sense against the background of empirical
evidence: local groups in tribal societies compare
possible gains and losses of a war as well, and they
behave strategically and use certain tactics to beat
their enemies – as states do. Furthermore, war-related
mortality seems to be even higher in ‘primitive wars’
than in ‘civilised wars’: war-related mortality as a
percentage of total mortality averages between 20%
and 30% in tribal societies, whereas it lies below 5%
in most state societies (see Keeley 1996: 88ff, 196f).
Thus, it is tribal warfare which deserves the descrip-
tion ‘total’ (in the sense of involving the whole pop-
ulation) rather than wars between states, even
though ‘unrestricted’ and ‘restricted’ warfare can also
be distinguished in tribal societies (Feil 1987: 67f).
Several anthropological theories of war in tribal
societies are distinguishable. I will discuss five theo-
ries, which take centre stage in current debates on
tribal warfare (for a more comprehensive list of
theories, see Otterbein 1973 and 1990). But before
examining these theories more extensively and pre-
senting yet another new theory of tribal war, we first
have to discuss some of the concepts involved, such
as war, violence, feud and conflict.
2. War, conflict, feud and violence
War is a planned and organised armed dispute
between political units (Otterbein 1973: 923ff;
Ferguson 1984a: 5). The political units in a society
without a state are local groups (i.e. villages) or coali-
tions of local groups. Local groups display an inter-
nal hierarchy and a leadership structure (elders and
juniors, men and women, village headmen, councils
of elders etc.), as well as a specific kin composition
(such as local kin groups which possibly form polit-
ical factions). Internal conflicts are usually settled in
a peaceful way within the group or – if they cannot
be resolved (i.e. if violent self-help prevails) – they
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may escalate, leading to a splitting of the group.
Decisions on war, alliance or truce are usually made
through meetings comprising all the adult men in a
local group, although group members may differ as
to political position (‘hawks’ and ‘doves’), bargaining
power and, hence, as to their interests (elders and
juniors, competing local kin groups). As a collective
decision is finally taken and implemented, local
groups can be interpreted as politically autonomous,
collective actors with regard to ‘foreign policy’. 
Furthermore, the analytical difference between
‘conflict’ and ‘war’ must be emphasised. In societies
without a state conflicts are fundamental features
characterising the social interaction within as well
as between the groups (Koch 1974a: 16). However,
not all conflicts lead to wars, but some are resolved
peacefully by means of compensation payments or
negotiations, or alternatively violence is contained
by limiting it to the direct adversaries and norma-
tively regulated as in a feud (see Greuel 1971 on the
Nuer). As serious conflicts may peter out and trivial
conflicts escalate into wars, there is no necessary
relationship between conflict and war, i.e. between
the seriousness of a conflict and the intensity of a
war. Thus, war is only one mode of conflict resolu-
tion, namely a planned and organised armed con-
flict between political units.
As for ‘violence’, this embraces a large number of
phenomena ranging from war to hooliganism, from
torture to terrorism, from a bull fight to suicide (see
Riches 1991: 293f; Aijmer 2000: 1) and it is doubtful
whether violence in general is an appropriate object
for a theory at all. Violence is defined as intention-
ally inflicting physical harm on somebody (Riches
1991: 292ff). If we define war as an armed conflict
between local groups, violence between individuals
(or families) belonging to the same or to different
local groups is not war. Violence between individuals
often breaks out spontaneously (Knauft 1987) or in
a ritualised form, as in the form of fist pounding or
stick duels among the Yanomami (see Chagnon
1983). Conflicts within a local group are usually
settled peacefully, but they can escalate, leading to a
splitting of the group. This is often prevented, how-
ever, since a split would weaken the group militarily
at a time when it is facing a threat from hostile neigh-
bouring groups. Furthermore, ‘war’ must be distin-
guished from ‘feud’, since a feud consists of violence
and counter-violence between individuals and/or
families of different local groups. Whereas feud
consists of taking revenge for wife stealing, abuse,
manslaughter, or sorcery etc. in order to achieve an
even score, war usually aims at defeating the enemy
by decimating and expelling him (Carneiro 1994:
6).5 However, the difference between war and feud
is often blurred, since feuds may escalate into war
between local groups under certain conditions. Some
wars – often called ‘ritualised warfare’ – have much
in common with feuds as they are waged with the
intention of ‘making peace’ after a show of force, and
end with an exchange of compensation payments.
The difference between violence and war is not
merely a terminological exercise, as can be seen in
the case of hunter-and-gatherer societies (such as the
!Kung San, BaMbuti, Yaghan and the Inuit). In these
societies wars usually do not take place, but a high
level of inter-personal violence may be observed,
with homicide rates even higher than in tribal soci-
eties.6 In contrast to that, the social relations within
the groups are largely peaceful in many warlike
tribal societies, as among the Dani, the Cheyenne
and the Iban (see Kelly 2000: 21). Because war, as
an armed conflict between groups, must be distin-
guished from violence between individuals and
families, biological or psychological explanations of
tribal war can also be refuted. These theories see war
as an extension and accumulation of individual vio-
lence and do not distinguish between individual
and collective violence, which is a planned and
organised endeavour of a local group achieved by a
bargaining process within the group. Furthermore,
such theories explain violence by some biological
potential or psychological mechanism (such as frus-
tration leading to aggression). While nobody has ever
contested the proposition of a (biological) capability
for aggression, the same also holds true for the abil-
ity to behave peacefully, which may also be rooted
in our biologically determined behavioural reper-
toire. The main problem of all theories referring to
human universals is that they can explain neither
the regional and temporal variation of war within a
society, nor its variation between different tribal
societies or between different types of societies. 
3. Five theories of tribal warfare
In the following, I will discuss the five main theories
of tribal war: 1) the biological, 2) the cultural, 3) the
ecological and economic, 4) the historical and 5) the
political theories of war. 
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1) Biology
According to sociobiology (see Chagnon 1988;
1990a; 1990b on the Yanomami; Durham 1991 on
the Mundurucù; Barash 1981; Gat 2000), tribal wars
may ultimately be explained by the competition
between men for the scarce resource of women7. The
theoretical background of this proposition is the
assumption that more aggressive men are not only
more attractive to women (because they improve
their children’s chance of survival) but are also able
to outdo less aggressive men. Aggressive men are
assumed to have a reproductive advantage, because
they can control more women and transmit their
genes to more (surviving) descendants than their less
aggressive competitors. The aggressiveness of men
is therefore favoured by sexual selection and ulti-
mately leads to warlike competition between local
groups including the abduction of women from
enemy groups and allies alike, as Chagnon (1983)
has maintained for the Yanomami.8 Currently two
variants of socio-biological theories are discussed
(see van der Dennen 1995; 2002). Alexander (1977)
has proposed a theory of ‘imbalance of power’,
according to which a group attacks if it is superior
in power, and will be rewarded with women and
resources (see also Wrangham 1999). This argument,
however, already presupposes the existence of inter-
group hostility. Hence, an imbalance of power may
be a plausible reason for a specific war to break out,
but it is neither an explanation for tribal war nor is
it a biological theory. The theory of ‘male coalitional
warfare’ (Tooby and Cosmides 1988; van der Dennen
1995; Wrangham 1999) maintains that men in war
pursue a high risk, high gain reproductive strategy:
the surviving men will gain more women (on aver-
age) after a war because war-related female mortality
is much lower than male mortality. This theory may
explain the (reproductive) interest of men in partici-
pating in wars, but it does not explain why war is
the dominant mode of interaction between local
groups in tribal societies.
To explore the impact of individual and group
strategies in a warlike environment on the relative
reproductive success (on mortality and fertility) is
one matter. To maintain, however, that war is adap-
tive (in this biological sense) – ‘a master adaptation’,
as Barash (1981: 188) puts it – is not very plausible
considering the high costs of war (including the loss
of life, the practice of infanticide and the destruc-
tion of resources), as even Barash (1981: 181ff) has
to concede. Rather, war constitutes a specific social
environment, to which local groups have to adapt
in order to survive. Such a warlike environment may
have emerged for the first time in world history as
an unintended result of becoming sedentary (first
among Mesolithic fishers and then among Neolithic
farmers), as archaeological data suggest (see Ferrill
1985: 26ff; Gabriel 1990: 31ff; Keeley 1996: 31, 39;
Thorpe http://www.hum.au.dk/fark/warfare/thorpe
_paper_1.htm; Haas http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/
publications/Working-Papers/ 98-10-088.ps: 6, 8, 10,
13, 18).
The sociobiological explanation of war is also
implausible for empirical reasons, as even the example
of the Yanomami shows. Although conflicts between
men of different villages may emerge because of
women (wife stealing and adultery), most of these
conflicts are settled in a peaceful way. They may
provoke duels, but this only leads to war if the rela-
tionships between the villages were already, for other
reasons, in a bad state (Lizot 1989: 105f; Alès 1984:
92). Although wife stealing is a welcome side-effect
of a successful war campaign (more fertile women,
more children and, thus, more influence within a
group for a man and more future warriors for the
group), it is neither the cause nor the purpose of
wars (Alès 1984: 97; Lizot 1989: 106; even Chagnon
1983: 175f).9 According to Lizot (1989: 104f) aggres-
sive men do not enjoy higher status within their
local group, but they do earn greater respect from
their enemies: to kill a successful warrior improves
one’s reputation. Therefore, they become preferred
targets in warlike clashes, and their life expectancy
is lower than the male average. Excessively aggres-
sive men, who involve their group in unnecessary
and unwanted wars, are often killed by their own
people, even by close kinsmen (Biocca 1972). Besides
that – and this is the crucial point – successful war-
riors do not have more wives or more children than
other men (Lizot 1989: 104f; Albert 1989; 1990;
Ferguson 1989b). The proposition of a relative
reproductive success of aggressive men is, thus, not
confirmed (see also Robarchek and Robarchek 1998:
133ff on the Waorani and Moore 1990 on the
Cheyenne). It seems that wife stealing can only be
understood against the background of an already
existing warlike environment. Men or local groups
try to acquire more women and to have more chil-
dren, in order to improve their political position
within the group or to enhance their military
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strength. Competition for scarce women (an unlim-
ited demand for fertile women) is not a natural
phenomenon, but a consequence of warlike compe-
tition between local groups (see Harner 1975 on
women as the labour force). Therefore, war is the
cause, not a consequence, of the scarcity of women.
2) Culture
Cultural theories explain wars by moral ideals and
norms, which sanction and value violent behaviour
and are reproduced by corresponding modes of
socialisation, such as male initiation (Whiting 1965).
These motivational dispositions and expectations
cause violence and its escalation to war (Robarchek
1989; Robarchek and Robarchek 1992; 1998; Ross
1981; 1986; 1993a; Orywal 1996a; 1998).
It is true that (male) violence (or rather courage
and the readiness to be violent) is highly valued in
warlike societies, whereas peaceful behaviour and
harmonic interaction are the cultural ideals in soci-
eties without war. However, these are not causal rela-
tions, but correlations, which need to be explained.
Norms and ideals which reward violent behaviour
only have a selective value (as compared to alterna-
tive norms of peacefulness) in an already warlike
society. If, among other things, the military success
of a group depends on the courage and determina-
tion of its warriors, local groups with a higher share
of such men will have military advantages in a war-
like environment (Peoples 1982). The cultural theory
does not, however, explain how and why such a
warlike environment comes into existence.
Furthermore, the cultural norms and ideals are one
thing, the real attitudes and preferences of actors,
however, quite another. It seems astonishing that the
proponents of a cultural theory of war have seldom
tried to find out the real attitudes of their inform-
ants towards war and violence. If they had done so,
they would have learned that the facts contradict
their proposition that cultural norms and ideals
determine human thinking and action. Ethnographic
evidence shows that even the most valiant and
courageous warriors consider war a bad thing and
are afraid of being wounded or killed during fights;
many even suffer from war trauma (see Keeley 1996:
395; Knauft 1999: 143ff). Hence, fear seems to be a
more important emotion than aggressiveness in the
context of war (Gordon and Meggitt 1985: 28, 146;
Goldschmidt 1997: 50f). Taking this meta-preference
for peace even in warlike societies into account, it is
not surprising that men first have to be motivated
to engage in an unavoidable war.
In a society with local groups, entangled in a
permanent state of war, there is a high demand for
men willing to overcome their fear when time for
war has come. Actors will choose that mode of
action which is best rewarded and provides the most
advantages for men who courageously participate
in war. Reputation and prestige, power and booty,
slaves and women are the most important advan-
tages a man can get by successfully participating in
war. War rituals, prophesying and protective amulets
also contribute to overcome fear. And a correspon-
ding mode of socialisation emphasises courage and
strength, fearlessness and perseverance (Goldschmidt
1997: 51–56). Since every mode of socialisation pro-
duces the kind of individuals which ‘society needs’,
it is not astonishing that the mode of socialisation
in these societies produces individuals – through a
system of reward and punishment, disapproval and
indoctrination – who are prepared to be violent,
courageous and aggressive. Such a mode of (male)
socialisation is a consequence of war and not the
reverse, because it disappears with progressing paci-
fication (Ember and Ember 1994: 192; Goldschmidt
1997: 55, 58f). Aggressiveness must be mobilised and
instrumentalised. Aggressiveness is, however, not the
dominant feeling in wars, but the quality needed to
gain the rewards and advantages which are con-
nected with a successful performance as a warrior
(Goldschmidt 1997: 58f). But these rewards and
advantages are always weighed against the costs and
risks of a war.
Furthermore, cultural norms and values (such as
the obligation to take revenge in the case of black
magic and manslaughter) never completely deter-
mine the actors’ behaviour or even their thinking.
While the principle of taking revenge is never con-
tested, its application has always to be negotiated
and interpreted in each individual case. Whether
revenge is taken in a specific case depends on the
relations of force between the groups as well as on
the bargaining process between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’
within each of the involved groups (see Greuel 1971
on the Nuer; Ferguson 1995 on the Yanomami).
Ethnographic evidence shows that a group will only
remember an unpaid blood-debt and take revenge
if it is stronger than the other group and if there is
a good chance of defeating the enemy. The number
of conflicts, accusations and grievances will only
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increase if a group is determined and ready to start
a war (see Vayda 1976: 13 on the Maring). Sometimes,
a reason for revenge is even intentionally created
through a well-calculated provocation in order to
have a legitimate reason to attack a weaker group
(see Godelier 1982: 155 on the Baruya). If in turn a
group is too weak, or interested in an alliance, the
accusations of a perpetration are simply ‘forgotten’
or the death of a group member is attributed to ‘nat-
ural causes’ (see Lizot 1989 on the Yanomami).
Therefore, warlike behavioural ideals and norms,
as well as the obligation to take revenge, are not
causes of war, but can only be understood against
the background of an already existing warlike envi-
ronment, in which each local group fights for its
survival (Helbling 1996a). Even though norms and
values rewarding violent behaviour do not explain
wars, the description of the cultural dimensions of
war remains nevertheless important.10
3) Ecology and economy
According to the ecological-economic theory, war
is the result of competition due to scarce resources
and population pressure (Vayda 1961; 1976; Harris
1977; 1984; Rappaport 1968). The shortage of agri-
cultural land and/or of game, on which local groups
are dependent as resources, leads to stress (frustra-
tion and aggression) within the groups, as well as to
competition between adjacent local groups. These
conflicts easily escalate into wars, aiming at appro-
priating more land from neighbouring enemy groups
or at expelling them from their hunting grounds.
Rappaport (1968) on the Maring, as well as Harris
(1974; 1977) on the Yanomami, reformulated this
theory using a functionalist model. According to
them, war has the function of lowering population
growth (through a reduction of local population
by war or, indirectly, through female infanticide)
and of preventing the overuse of local resources (by
reducing pig population for alliance feasts or by
spacing out enemy groups and creating buffer zones
where depleted game may recover). But even if war
had such ecological functions – which is highly
questionable (see Helbling 1991; 1992; 1996a) – it
would still have to be explained why local groups –
acting according to their interests, not in order to
meet the requirements of their ecosystems – decide
to wage war. This is even more questionable if one
considers the fact that war always entails consider-
able risks (such as loss of life and the destruction of
resources) and high costs (such as war preparations
and recruitment of allies through gifts).
There are examples of warlike tribal societies (espe-
cially in the Highlands of New Guinea) with high
population densities, where land resources represent
a frequent reason for conflicts between adjacent
groups, as Meggitt (1977: 14) has argued for the Mae
Enga. However, there are several arguments against
such a theoretical position. First, conflicts over scarce
resources – as other conflicts – do not necessarily
lead to war. There are alternatives to a warlike zero-
sum struggle over scarce resources, such as reloca-
tion of a village or migration of a faction into a thin-
ly populated area, a peaceful exchange of land and
trade between local groups, as well as the intensifi-
cation of agriculture (Ferguson 1989a: 196; Hallpike
1977: 231).11 Land scarcity may increase conflicts,
but conflicts do not have to lead to wars. The same
is also true for the Yanomami, who according to
Harris (1977) wage war because of scarce game. Lizot
(1971: 149-68; 1977: 190-202) and Chagnon (1983:
57, 85f) have shown that the Yanomami consume
vegetable and animal protein in sufficient quanti-
ties. Many species of wild animals are locally avail-
able in high densities and not all species are hunted;
the high resource selectivity also weighs against the
proposition concerning a general scarcity of hunt-
ing game. The hunting territories are sufficiently
large and exclusively defined; they are, therefore,
never the object of conflicts between local groups
(Lizot 1977: 195). Second, there are numerous war-
like tribal societies in which population densities
are low and resources cannot be said to be scarce at
all (Hanser 1985: 269, 285 on the Eastern Highland
of New Guinea; for Amazonia see the examples of
the Jivaro, Mekranoti, Waorani and the Yanomami).
And there are societies with very high population
densities, in which hardly any conflicts break out
over land or other resources, as among the Ilaga
Dani (Larson 1987: 405). Hence, population density
is neither a relevant indicator of resource scarcity
nor of frequency of conflict or war (Knauft 1999:
124). Third, in many warlike societies with resource
scarcity, it is the necessity to prepare for war and to
recruit war allies, which forces local groups to pursue
an expansive reproductive policy (high birth rates,
wife stealing) and to increase production for alliance
feasts and gift exchange. As local groups have to
compete for allies with multiple alliance options, an
inflationary increase in the production of political
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goods is often the result, as evidenced by the cere-
monial exchange of pigs in the Western Highlands
of New Guinea (see Meggitt 1974: 198ff and
Wiessner and Tumu 1998a; 1998b on the Mae Enga;
Helbling 1991 on the Maring). But even in societies
where gift exchange and marriage relations only
play a minor role (as in Amazonia and the Eastern
Highlands), allies must be won by holding feasts and
therefore crop production and hunting have to be
intensified. Thus the shortage of resources (of land
or game) is a consequence rather than a cause of war
(Helbling 1991; 1996a; Ferguson 1989a: 185f).12
4) History
According to Ferguson and Whitehead (1992: 27f)
tribal war is not rooted in the structure of indige-
nous societies, but first occurred in the course of the
expansion of (colonial) states – and the formation of
the world economic system. Tribal wars are thus not
explained by reference to the internal logic of tribal
societies, but as a consequence of the expansion of
the state into the ‘tribal zone’, in which the state
interacts with tribal populations. Ferguson and
Whitehead maintain that tribal wars break out when
local groups start to compete for scarce trading
goods (such as iron tools and weapons), for the con-
trol of export products (such as slaves) and for a
favourable position in regional trading networks
(cp. Ferguson 1992 on the Yanomami). Furthermore,
the expansion of the colonial state triggered rebel-
lions and wars of resistance in indigenous popula-
tions. And the states often supported and supplied
groups with arms in order to attack other tribal
groups, to punish them for rebellions, or to capture
slaves (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992: 19). All these
factors have contributed – according to Ferguson and
Whitehead – to the emergence of tribal warfare.
It is true that the expansion of colonial states cre-
ated new constellations of conflict as well as new
forms of war, as Ferguson and Whitehead have
shown. However, numerous archaeological findings
(see extensively Roper 1975; Vencl 1984; 1991;
Keeley 1996; Haas http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publi-
cations/Working-Papers/98-10-088.ps, LeBlanc 2003)
and ethno-historical data (Knauft 1999: 99ff) indi-
cate that this proposition, according to which tribal
wars are caused by the expansion of states into the
tribal zone, is wrong.13 Even the less radical version
of this theory – claiming that wars did not emerge
for the first time but intensified in the tribal zone
– seems to be one-sided. The interaction of tribal
groups with expanding states had different effects.
As well as intensifying warfare it also reduced war-
ring in many regions, or even stopped it altogether.
As Service (1968) has already shown, defeated pop-
ulations were forced to retreat into inhospitable areas
and to transform themselves into peaceful hunter-
and-gatherer societies (see also Dentan 1992; 1994).
Even Ferguson (1990a: 242) argued in an earlier article
that epidemics decimated indigenous populations
(such as the Pemon and the Piaroa) and reduced
regional settlement densities to such an extent that
local groups were henceforth too far removed from
each other to wage war. Furthermore, it should not
be forgotten that the politics of all colonial states
ultimately aimed at pacifying warlike tribes and at
establishing a monopoly of power, which they always
achieved sooner or later (see Bodley 1983).
The fact, however, remains uncontested that the
states and the world economic system constitute
contexts for tribal wars which must be considered
in their historical dimensions much more than has
been the case up to now, as has been shown by
Ferguson (1995) on the Yanomami, Sandin (1967),
Pringle (1970) and Wagner (1972) on the Iban,
Renato Rosaldo (1980) on the Ilongot, Keesing (1992)
on the Kwaio on Malaita, Meggitt (1977), Gordon
and Meggitt (1985) and Wiessner and Tumu (1998a;
1998b) on the Mae Enga and others (see also Wolf
1982; 1987).14 But it is important to analyse not only
the wider regional and historical contexts but also
the internal logic of indigenous warfare.
5) Politics
According to Koch (1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1976),
Spittler (1980a) and Sahlins (1968: 5), war in tribal
societies must be explained by the absence of a triadic
mode of conflict management (adjudication), i.e. of
a superordinate power (such as a state), which can
enforce peaceful settlement of conflicts between
groups and prevent the escalation of conflicts into
wars. If no (efficient) state is present, a ‘permanent
state of war’ will prevail, in which wars may break out
at any time. This Hobbesian proposition, however,
may hold for tribal societies, but not for hunting-
and-gathering societies, which also lack a state, but
usually do not wage war.
Marcel Mauss (1926) saw the solution for this
Hobbesian problem in gift exchange, presenting
an overall alternative to the general state of war.
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According to Lévi-Strauss (1967: 78; Clastres 1977:
183ff), every successful exchange prevents war and
every war is the result of a failed exchange. It is,
however, highly questionable whether gift exchange
is an alternative to war. It is true that gift exchange
may strengthen an alliance, as Meggitt (1974) has
shown for the Mae Enga and Pospisil (1994) for the
Ekagi-me. But, as the Mae Enga state, ”we first
exchange, then we fight”, which means that either
gifts are exchanged with one group in order to wage
war against another, or gift exchange itself creates
conflicts, and allied groups become enemies (Gordon
and Meggitt 1985: 149). Gift exchange is a means
to recruit allies in order to fight and defeat common
enemies, but it is neither an alternative to war in
general nor a goal in itself (Clastres 1977: 196ff;
Meggitt 1974: 170f, 198ff). Gift exchange (and mar-
riage) may even in itself create conflicts between
exchange partners, so that allies may turn into
enemies (see Tefft and Reinhardt 1974; Tefft 1975;
Knauft 1999; Pospisil 1994).
Sillitoe (1978) proposed another political theory
of war by referring to the internal power structure of
local groups. According to him, political leaders are
motivated to instigate wars because ultimately they
owe their status to their merits as valiant warriors and
organisers of war campaigns. For Godelier (1991) this
is especially true for Great Men, but much less for Big
Men, who owe their status to their skills as organisers
of gift transactions (see also Feil 1987 on the Highlands
of New Guinea). However, even an aggressive Great
Man must conform to public opinion and cannot
permanently act against the interests of the majori-
ty of his group. Great Men are often killed by their
own people, especially if they have infringed on
other group members' interests and have turned
into local despots (see Godelier 1982 for the Baruya;
Biocca 1972 for the Yanomami; Watson 1971 for the
Tairora; Pospisil 1978 for the Ekagi-me).15
Otterbein (1985; 1990) put forward yet another
political explanation of tribal war, which refers to
kinship relations within and between groups.
According to him, it is highly probable that wars
break out in societies with patrilocal and patrilineal
groups (fraternal interest groups), because no rela-
tions of kinship amity and loyalty exist between the
local groups (see also Murphy 1957, Thoden van
Velzen and van Wetering 1960). However, Ember
and Ember (1971) and Lang (1977) argued that – if
such fraternal interest groups occur – they are the
consequences rather than the causes of war. Moreover,
rules of descent and locality are cultural norms,
which do not even allow us to predict the actual kin
composition of local groups (Sahlins 1965). Local
groups in a warlike environment most often display
a heterogeneous kin composition, comprising defeat-
ed allies and immigrants from weaker groups who
joined the stronger group in order to enhance their
military strength (Hanser 1985: 297ff). Nevertheless,
patrilineal kinship rules may form the core of an
ideology, which is the normative result of adapta-
tion to a warlike environment, and may enhance
the solidarity of co-resident men (Lang 1977; Ember
and Ember 1971).
The propositions regarding ‘fraternal interest
groups’ and the lack of an adjudicative power (put
forward by Koch 1974a; 1974b), however, converge
in the more general approach suggesting that polit-
ically autonomous local groups in a multi-centric,
anarchic system are an important element for the
explanation of tribal warfare. But the emergence of
conflicts is still not explained in this way, and social-
isation inducing aggressive behaviour (Koch 1974a)
or biological dispositions like ‘the primate past of
man’ (Otterbein 1985: 168f) are not convincing
either. In contrast, the absence of a superordinate
power (such as a state) is able to explain both the
conflict ridden relationships between local groups,
as well as the high probability that these conflicts
will escalate into wars. I have tried to develop such
an explanation, which I will sketch in the following
(see Helbling 1999).
4. War as a strategic interaction between
groups in an anarchic environment
I shall focus on tribal societies in which the state –
before pacification – did not play a role, or at least
not a decisive one. I will first address the precondi-
tions for the likelihood of war in these societies by
referring to both structural conditions and interac-
tion in the form of conflict between local groups.
However, those theories which have been refuted as
causes of war in the preceding part must also be
accounted for in an alternative theory of war. My
main proposition is that the cultural, economic,
socio-structural and political factors, which these
theories hold responsible for tribal war, are merely
dependent variables, i.e. the consequences of war. 
Let us start with the fact that war – as a purposeful
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and planned group action, directed against another
group and involving the application of lethal force
– was quite frequent in societies without centralised
power. Whereas war was hardly fought by nomadic
bands, there was a state of permanent war in tribal
groups of shifting cultivators, sedentary fishermen
and pastoral nomads; war could break out at any
time, though without effectively being waged all the
time. War has severe consequences: war-related male
mortality is as high as 35% on average (N=13) and
overall war-related mortality is at 25% on average
(N=16).16 A huge volume of resources is destroyed or
misallocated, and a considerable number of the labour
force as well. The question then, is how this state of
permanent war can be explained. My proposition is
that tribal war can be explained by two structural
conditions: 1) the anarchic structure of the political
system consisting of politically autonomous local
groups, and 2) the relative immobility of local groups,
i.e. their dependence on locally concentrated
resources.
These structural conditions render strategic inter-
action between local groups warlike, which may be
described in terms of game theory.17 I should add
that game theory neither refers to games nor is it a
theory. Rather, it is a parsimonious description of dif-
ferent constellations of strategic interaction between
social actors, and its logic may be described in purely
colloquial terms without any mathematical techni-
calities. These simplified descriptions should make
sense of what we observe, i.e. they are not a priori
models into which reality has to fit. Game theory is
also a decision theory assuming that actors behave
according to their interests and to their evaluation
of the advantages and disadvantages of different
strategic options. Ultimately this boils down to the
assumption that actors always have good reasons for
behaving in the way they do. Without this assump-
tion hardly any behaviour could be explained. The
analytical aim is to understand the structural prop-
erty of the environment which may explain why
local groups interact the way they do.
Let me first elaborate on the structural conditions
of war in tribal societies.
4.1 Structural conditions
The first structural precondition in the explanation
of warfare is the anarchic system in which local
groups interact, as Thomas Hobbes (1994[1651]), but
also Sahlins (1968), Hallpike (1973), Koch (1974a),
Colson (1975), Spittler (1980a; 1980b), Keeley (1996)
and others have argued. Conflicts between local
groups can be settled either by peaceful or by war-
like means. The reason why conflicts between local
groups lead to war is that there is no superordinate,
centralised power (adjudication) such as a state that
could prevent violent settlement of conflicts between
local groups and punish those who break agree-
ments for peaceful conflict resolution. This impossi-
bility of precluding violence through bilateral agree-
ments ultimately forces each group to use violence
in the first place, in order not to fall victim to the
violence of others. However, war – though not inter-
personal violence – is extremely rare among nomadic
bands of hunters-and-gatherers (see Helbling n.d.b
and footnote 6), in spite of the fact that these soci-
eties also lack a superordinate power. Hence, the lack
of an overarching power or, to put it differently, the
political autonomy of local groups is only one struc-
tural condition, but not the only one. 
The second structural condition responsible for
the prevalence of warfare in tribal societies is their
dependence on locally concentrated resources, such
as fields, herds, pasture or fishing grounds. If local
groups depend on locally concentrated resources, they
cannot afford to move away and thus avoid armed
confrontation with adjacent groups, without incur-
ring high opportunity costs: this would entail losing
property, forgoing harvests and risking starvation. In
contrast, resources in hunting-and-gathering-soci-
eties are usually widely scattered. Hence, mobility is
not only a successful production strategy, but also a
precondition for evading conflicts and avoiding war
(Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978; Carneiro 1994: 12;
Keeley 1996: 31; Haas http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/
publications/Working-Papers/ 98-10-088.ps: 8, 10, 18).
Where these two structural conditions exist, wars
can break out at any time. They therefore explain the
permanent state of war, i.e. constitute the precondi-
tions for the likelihood of war in tribal societies. 
4.2 Strategic interaction
A tribal society thus constitutes an anarchic system
of autonomous local groups dependent on locally
concentrated resources. This structural framework
also represents an incentive system in which each
local group pursues its own interests in interacting
with others, i.e. it causes a specific form of strategic
interaction between local groups. The logic of the
warlike strategic interaction, resulting from the two
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structural conditions, may be described as a prisoners’
dilemma or a security dilemma.18
It may be assumed that politically autonomous
local groups would prefer to (co-operate and to) settle
their disputes in a peaceful, non-violent way, because
they could avoid high losses of human life and
resources. (According to the logic of the prisoners’
dilemma, co-operation between the groups would
provide the highest collective gains for them.)
However, because bilateral agreements between local
groups aiming at settling conflicts peacefully are
neither sanctioned nor enforced by a superordinate
power, none of the groups involved can be sure that
the other groups will keep such agreements. Hence,
it is too risky to pursue a peaceful strategy unilater-
ally, because a one-sided peace strategy would be
interpreted by the other groups as a sign of weak-
ness and this would encourage them to attack. This
is because a bellicose strategy not only brings higher
gains (by decimating the other groups or expelling
them from their territory, and by capturing booty),
but it also helps to reduce the highest possible risks,
by being prepared for surprise attacks, and so deter-
ring enemies. The adoption of a bellicose strategy is
all the more necessary as local groups are dependent
on locally concentrated resources and therefore can-
not opt for withdrawal, as an alternative to war. The
aim of war is thus to deter enemies, to decimate
them and weaken them by stealing their women,
their animals and their land, in order at the same
time to gain strength. To get rid of them – by anni-
hilating them or driving them out into unfertile,
disease-stricken areas – is even better.
Thus the two structural conditions create a warlike
environment in which local groups have to survive.
The mutual mistrust and reciprocal threat of force
ultimately compel each group to take steps to ensure
its survival. The conflicts, leading to war in an anar-
chic ‘state of warre’, are themselves a result of this
anarchic system. It is thus not an innate human
propensity for aggressiveness (the Hobbesian posi-
tion has sometimes been misrepresented in that
sense) which propels collective violence, but fear.
But what about the cultural factors explaining war?
Culture
Although I consider the practical reason of social
actors to be the most important aspect, I am not
denying the importance of the cultural dimension.
It should be stressed that game theory already takes
into account and explains the perceptions and expec-
tations of social actors. It does not ignore them – as
some have criticised – but considers them as a part of
the game, i.e. controlled aggressiveness is supported
by cultural norms and rewarded with prestige, but
mistrust and fear are also culturally expressed. The
adequacy of cognitive systems and the effectiveness of
norms and values may vary. However, if local groups
do not realistically perceive their warlike environ-
ment and male actors are not motivated to overcome
their fear of participating in a war, they will be pun-
ished militarily in a selective social environment.19 
It is thus not astonishing that warlike behavioural
ideals, norms and values, as well as corresponding
modes of socialisation, aiming at rewarding coura-
geous behaviour and punishing cowardice, correlate
with the occurrence of war as we have already seen.
However, they only make sense in a social environ-
ment which is already warlike; they must therefore
– contrary to what a cultural theory of war main-
tains – be treated as dependent variables, as cultural
and behavioral adaptations in a warlike environment.
It does not come as a surprise that values rewarding
readiness for violence make sense in a warlike envi-
ronment, because the military success of a local
group also depends on the motivation and skill of
its adult men in war. It is only by such norms and
values, as well as war rituals and protective amulets,
that reluctant men are motivated to overcome fear,
to participate in a war and to muster the courage
and determination to fight, as Harrison (1993) shows
for the Manambu (see also Goldschmidt 1997). But
despite all these cultural incentives there are still
many reasons for a man not to participate in war:
bad omens, such as certain birds’ song, bad dreams
and so on, that allow warriors to stay at home
(Goldschmidt 1989). Even staunch tribal warriors
dislike war: they fear war-related risks and suffer
from war trauma (Knauft 1999; Keeley 1996). They
seem to have a meta-preference for peace but see
themselves compelled to wage war for reasons of
defence. Meggitt (1977: 33) mentions this ‘Hobbesian
view of war’ among the Mae Enga:
Fear is probably a more potent force in shaping human and
social destiny than bravery or entrepreneurial skill. ... A climate
of suspicion and distrust appears to be a common characteristic
of loosely structured or acephalous societies, which like the
Enga espouse a fiercely egalitarian ideology. (Gordon and
Meggitt 1985: 147)
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And one Yanomami is quoted accordingly: ‘We are
fed up with fighting. We don't want to kill any more.
But the others are treacherous, and one cannot trust
them’ (see also Chagnon 1977: 35f, 129f). This is
exactly what the prisoners’ dilemma is all about.
Under conditions of mutual mistrust and the
reciprocal threat of force, the survival of each group
depends on its ability to become larger and stronger
and to recruit more allies than its potential adver-
saries. But as the military superiority of one group
inevitably entails the corresponding inferiority of the
other groups, these other groups strive to become
larger and to win more allies in turn. Local groups
are thus trapped in a security dilemma (Jervis 1978;
Otterbein 1988), where security for one group leads
to insecurity for the others. The logic of this security
dilemma causes an ‘arms race’ between groups, and
mandates that each group attacks pre-emptively and
tries to decimate, weaken or rout its enemies, because
if a group does not attack at a favourable moment it
risks being attacked at an unfavourable moment
(Waltz 1960: 5).20 There is no way out of this security
dilemma, and groups that behave differently risk
being defeated, routed or even annihilated.21
4.3 Military strength, group size and alliances
Under the conditions of a security dilemma, the sur-
vival of every local group depends on their ability to
become stronger, i.e. to become larger and to recruit
more allies than their enemies.
Group size
The security dilemma forces each group to enhance
its military strength, which basically depends on the
number and determination of its warriors. Hence,
local groups have – as a consequence – to adopt an
‘expansive population policy’ (high fertility, posi-
tive balance of marriage exchange, wife-stealing)
and to encourage immigration. This also explains
the relatively high population growth in tribal soci-
eties. Each group thus tries to become at least larger
in size than its neighbouring rivals. 
What about the social organisation of local groups
and its relation to war?22
Social organisation
The incorporation of refugees (from defeated, allied
groups) or regrouping (after a defeat) – as they often
occur in warlike tribal societies (see Colson 1975:
29f on the Iroquois; Watson 1983: 231ff on the
Tairora) – may explain why patrilocal, patrilineal
male groups are neither common nor necessary in
warlike tribal societies. They certainly do not explain
war, as the theory of fraternal interest groups main-
tains (Otterbein 1994). However, an ideology of male
solidarity, irrespective of the actual kin composition
of a local group, may enhance the unity and soli-
darity of a group’s fighting force, as do rituals and
co-residence in a men’s house. Such an ideology may
well be expressed using (fictive) kinship terms. The
crucial elements enhancing the unity of a local group
are co-residence and the common threat posed by
neighbouring local groups. Adoption and incorpo-
ration of refugees into local kin groups does not
mean that kinship is a determining factor, but that
it is used as a metaphor for amity and co-operation. 
Political leaders 
As for political organisation, local groups with more
efficient leaders will have military advantages
(Otterbein 1985: 95; Hallpike 1977: 122-26, 129,
135f). But people will be loyal to a local leader only
as long as he is a shrewd organiser of war campaigns,
an able mediator in internal disputes and a success-
ful recruiter of allies for his group. The support for
leaders within a group is usually stronger in times of
war than in peacetime (see Meggitt 1971 on the Mae
Enga; Godelier 1982 on the Baruya). This is because
unsettled disputes within a local group, or even open
violence between group members, may seriously
degrade the military strength of a group. The local
group is an organisation with a system of sanc-
tioned norms, and it should be a realm of co-opera-
tion. A political leader delivers collective goods by
organising and co-ordinating war campaigns and
alliances, as well as by contributing more than other
group members to alliance feasts and compensation
payments. For his superior contribution to the mili-
tary success of the group, he is awarded high status
and a good reputation, as long as he delivers. A local
leader who turns into a despot, bullying the other
group members, is either killed by his own people,
or his group masterminds a secret pact with their
enemies to have him killed, as among the Tairora
(Watson 1971; 1983), the Yanomami (Biocca 1972)
or the Baruya (Godelier 1982).
Men and women, seniors and juniors
The most war-prone individuals in a local group are
usually young, unmarried men. They stand to gain
W A R  A N D  P E A C E  I N  S O C I E T I E S  W I T H O U T  C E N T R A L  P O W E R . 123
the most from war by enhancing their status and
acquiring women and political goods. This has been
reported for the Highlands of New Guinea (Meggitt
1977: 79, 110, 116 on the Mae Enga) and of East
African herders (Baxter 1979: 83f; Almagor 1979:
132-41). Elder men, on the other hand, have already
gained maximum status and hence stand to lose
from war. In many instances, they try to cool down
young hotheads and to avoid ‘unnecessary wars’,
although not always successfully. 
As for gender relations, it may be said that they
also depend – at least partially – on war, but the
general picture is not very clear.23 Almost exclusively,
it is men who wage war, and most warlike societies
are characterised by a marked asymmetry between
men and women which, however, varies widely in
tribal societies. This can be shown by examining
some examples of warlike tribal societies, although
the terms used here are rather vague, such as higher
/lower or better/worse to characterise the relative
position of (fertile, married) women.24 The relative
position of women among the Yanomami is low
(Chagnon 1983; Biocca 1972), perhaps because gift
and marriage exchange between groups are not
important. Female infanticide and abduction of
women are practised, and women appear to have
little say in political matters. Nevertheless women
often press their men to go to war, because they fear
rape or abduction by enemies (Biocca 1972). A simi-
lar constellation concerning gift exchange, marriage
relationships and the position of women prevails in
the Eastern Highlands of New Guinea (see Langness
1967 on the Bena Bena), in contrast to the Western
Highland groups. In the latter societies the position
of women seems to be better, because women are
the objects of marriage exchange controlled by men
and they are responsible for raising pigs, which are
used in gift exchange between allies. Hence they are
highly valued as labour. But women have only
minor political influence; in-married women are
mistrusted, because quite often they originate from
hostile groups (Meggitt 1977). However, women
play an important role in opening peace negotia-
tions (Wiessner and Tumu 1998b: 262). Among the
Waorani, however, who resemble the Yanomami in
many respects, women seem to be in a better posi-
tion. Their war-related mortality of about 55% is
one of the highest in all warlike societies; this is
due to the fact that women also participate in raids,
and war-related female mortality was at 46% (male
mortality at 63%; Larrick et al. 1979). Maybe this is
the reason why the relationship between men and
women is described as more equal, in contrast to
most of the other warlike societies (Robarchek and
Robarchek 1998). Kinship and residence may also
play a certain role: among the bilaterally organised
Iban, the position of women seems to be better and
they have more say in choosing their spouse than in
other tribal societies (Komanyi 1971; 1990). Among
the matrilineal, matrilocal Iroquois – famous for
their external warfare – the position of women is
high (Colson 1975; Schumacher 1972); however,
this is not so among the matrilocal, patrilineal
Mundurucu who also wage external wars, but where
the in-marrying, unrelated men reside in a men's
house (Murphy and Murphy 1974). As this brief
overview illustrates, a clear connection between war
and gender relations cannot be demonstrated. A lot
of systematic and comparative study has still to be
done on this topic; but let us now turn to alliance.
Alliance
An expansive population policy will enhance group
strength only in the long term. In the short term,
the military strength of a local group basically
increases with the number and reliability of its allies.
Local groups have to form alliances against com-
mon enemies, and it is the common enmity against
third parties that makes (conditional) co-operation
between allies both necessary and possible. Alliance
partners can expect more from forging an alliance
against third parties than from waging war against
each other; however, the modalities of the alliance
have to be negotiated (Schelling 1960; Elster 1989). 
Anthropological theories of war mostly concen-
trate on war and its causes, but neglect the forma-
tion of alliances. Of course there are ethnographical
accounts of alliance formation by kinship, marriage
and gift exchange, but hardly any theoretical reflec-
tion on this significant phenomenon. However,
alliances are a crucial phenomenon in the context of
war, as victory or defeat of a group often depends on
the number of its allies: whoever has to wage war
needs allies. The military strength of a local group
depends not only on its size and the number of its
warriors, but also on the number and reliability of its
allies. And whether a local group will attack or not,
will also depend on the number of its own allies, as
well as on those of its enemy. Again, anthropology can
learn a lot from models, which have been developed
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by political science (see Riker 1962; Rothstein 1968;
Wagner 1986; Walt 1987; Nicholson 1992). 
The logic of alliance formation
Alliances are forms of pragmatic co-operation based
on (short term) common interests: two groups will
do better against an enemy group by forming an
alliance. With the help of allies an enemy coalition
can be defeated; but allies may also be unreliable,
they may withdraw their support at a decisive
moment (Vayda 1976 on the Maring) or even com-
mit treason by secretly forming an alliance with a
former enemy (see Chagnon 1983 on treacherous
feasts among the Yanomami). Hence, the loyalty of
allies is always uncertain. They have to be compen-
sated for their losses and be considered in the distri-
bution of booty after a successful war. The mode
of co-operation and distribution of gains between
allies has to be negotiated accordingly, whereby
neither of the allied groups will accept a solution,
which is worse than it would be without the
alliance. A group looking for allies will try to con-
cede as little as possible, but still enough to avoid
losing its ally. Each group will try to profit from its
alliance partners’ weakness and to get a higher share
of the booty. Alliances can thus be seen as games of
negotiation: what one group wins, the other one
loses, but in contrast to a zero-sum game, both will
lose if they do not co-operate (see Schelling 1960;
Rapoport 1976). A zero-sum game prevails between
warring groups or coalitions (the one wins, what the
other loses), but within a coalition the modality of
the relations must be negotiated, a game which
displays both conflictive and co-operative aspects.
The formation of alliances follows the logic of a N-
actors-zero-sum game: a zero-sum game between
warring coalitions, a bargaining game characterised
by both conflictive and co-operative aspects, how-
ever, within a coalition (Barth 1959; Riker 1962).
Alliances may be reinforced by an exchange of gifts
and by marriage relations. But even allied groups
may mistrust each other, and often conflicts over the
modalities of gift transactions break out between
them. A gift may be interpreted as a sign of the sin-
cerity of one’s intentions and a means of overcom-
ing mistrust. But the incentive not to deviate from
this mode of co-operation is the common interest in
an alliance. Exchange will be successful as long as
both groups are sufficiently interested in an alliance
against common enemies.
Barth (1959) has described the coalition strategies
among the Swat Pathan as a zero-sum game with
five groups, which either wage war against each
other or are allied to each other. The strategy of each
local group consists of belonging not only to the
stronger coalition (which is large enough to defeat
a common enemy) but also to maximise its gains
within the coalition (land and cattle, as well as
women and an improvement in its strategic posi-
tion; see Riker 1962). In this way weak groups may
become stronger than the strongest group by form-
ing an alliance. But there may be cases where the
weaker groups are too weak to form a winning or
even a blocking alliance against the strongest group.
In this case it makes more sense for a weak group to
join the dominant group in order not to be defeated,
although it may be exploited by its stronger ally
(Nicholson 1992: ch. 11). At any rate, the logic of
alliance formation depends on the specific relation
of force between the local groups in a region. The
relative strength of the groups, the different threats
to which they are exposed from other groups, as well
as their alternative alliance options, ultimately deter-
mine the bargaining power of each group within a
coalition (Helbling 1996a; 1999).
Taking the formation of alliances into considera-
tion is a precondition for a more realistic theory of
war and of the interface between tribal wars and
their regional and national contexts. But what are
the economic consequences of alliance formation?
What are the consequences of war on the relations
between local groups related by kinship and mar-
riage? And to what extent do these relations influ-
ence or determine the formation of alliances? 
Economy
Expanding group size to enhance military strength
and increasing the production of political goods
(such as pigs, shells and axes) for allies are military
advantages in a warlike environment, but may put
considerable stress on local resources. Economically
optimal local groups would be much smaller than
they are (100-300 persons on average) so that the
pressure on local resources would also be smaller
(Helbling 1991). Gift exchange, alliance feasts and
marriage relationships strengthen alliances, but are
quite costly. Production has to be massively intensi-
fied: in the Highlands of New Guinea, for instance,
this involves the production of pigs and sweet
potatoes (Meggitt 1974: 198ff). As a consequence,
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resources may become scarce. However, these
resources are not goods for consumption and their
scarcity is not due to population growth. Rather,
they are political goods and their inflationary pro-
duction is due to the requirements of war, i.e. of
recruiting allies. Thus, if resources are scarce this is a
consequence rather than a cause of war. Besides the
inflationary expansion in the production of political
goods causing widespread overuse of local resources,
war also entails the destruction of property, such as
gardens, animals and trees, the killing and misallo-
cation of the labour force, the underuse of land at
the border and its overuse in secure areas, and
investment in defence works such as palisades. The
fact that sometimes an enemy’s land is occupied,
wealth is stolen or women are abducted does not
indicate that these resources are scarce. Rather, it is
a means of weakening the enemies (or allies) and of
strengthening one’s own group at the same time.
Alliance, kinship and marriage
Alliance formation usually follows the criteria of
Realpolitik, which depends on group interests in a
given regional constellation of force (Meggitt 1977:
37). When groups choose allies, kinship relations
play only a subordinate role. The Mae Enga wage war
as often against related clans as against unrelated
ones, but always against neighbouring clans; their
allies often – but not always – belong to the same
phratry. However, belonging to the same phratry is
never reason enough to support a fraternal clan in
a war (Meggitt 1977; see also Colson 1975: 12f, 22ff,
29f on the Iroquois). Furthermore, the Mae Enga say
that ‘we marry the people we fight’ (Meggitt 1977:
42). The Yanomami fight against former allies, groups
led by close cousins as well as against unrelated
groups; often groups of brothers-in-law are allied,
but alliances are always brittle and imbued with
mistrust and fear of treason. Among the Nuer most
of the fighting takes place between neighbouring,
closely related local groups belonging to different
tertiary sections. Local groups of the same section
do not automatically support each other in a fight
against a group belonging to the next higher section.
And there have been wars where Nuer groups allied
to the Dinka fought against other Nuer groups. A
careful study of war histories reveals quite a differ-
ent picture of war and alliance to the one given by
the model of the segmentary lineage system (Evans-
Pritchard 1940; Kelly 1985). Conflicting loyalities and
cross-cutting ties do not seem to affect the policy
of entire groups and will not prevent war between
them, but only affect individuals, who may not par-
ticipate in a war in order to avoid clashing with rel-
atives on the opposite side. So we may conclude that
kinship relations between local groups will only help
to settle conflicts peacefully between allied groups
interested in co-operation against common enemies,
as Greuel (1971) and Evens (1985) demonstrated for
the Nuer. Kinship and marriage, though, are not
irrelevant. They are relevant as resources of mobili-
sation, of which, however, advantage is taken only
if Realpolitik so requires. 
The theory of tribal war which I propose has the
advantage of combining the structural with a strategic
perspective. Structural elements – such as the politi-
cal autonomy of local groups in an anarchic system
and the dependence of local groups on locally con-
centrated resources – form the basic conditions for
the strategic bellicose of local groups. This strategic
interaction includes mutual threat and the adoption
of a confrontational strategy, in order to avoid sur-
vival risks (as a consequence of a prisoners’ dilemma),
or striving for military superiority and attacking pre-
emptively (as a consequence of a security dilemma).
4.4 Reasons for specific wars
The two structural conditions of war, the absence of
an overarching centralised power and high opportu-
nity costs of moving away, account for the warlike
interaction between local groups. Where these con-
ditions exist, wars can break out at any time. They
explain the permanent state of war, i.e. constitute
the preconditions for the likelihood of war in tribal
societies. However, a permanent state of war does
not imply that war is constantly waged. Whether
specific wars break out or not, and whether certain
alliances are formed or not, depend on many factors
which cannot be fully examined here.25 One impor-
tant factor is the regional relations of force between
local groups. The relative strength of a local group is
– as we have seen – a function of its relative size and
solidarity, as well as of the number and reliability
of its allies. A local group will only start a war if it
thereby expects to improve its present position or to
prevent a future deterioration of its situation. Thus
the starting point for any analysis is the local groups
in a region and the individual factions within these
local groups that evaluate the advantages and disad-
vantages of the different options: waging a war,
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forming an alliance, concluding a truce or solving a
conflict peacefully. Whether war breaks out or not
basically depends on the relative regional strength
between the local groups and on the decision process
within the local groups (between ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’).
The relative strength of a local group depends on its
relative size and the number of reliable allies, but
internal unity and determination are also impor-
tant, as well as the extent to which it is threatened
by other groups. However, we still need more com-
parative studies in order to explain the variation of
wars in different tribal societies.
As Clausewitz (1980[1832-34]: I.1.2–17) has
already shown, escalating and de-escalating aspects
of war activities can be distinguished. The prisoners’
dilemma and, above all, the highly conflictive secu-
rity dilemma form the background against which
local groups decide for or against specific wars and
must be considered as escalating forces. Hawkish
positions will prevail in every group in a situation of
heightened mistrust and conflict. Each group wants
to attack at a favourable moment, in order to deci-
mate, expel or at least weaken their enemies (by
occupying some of their land, and by stealing prop-
erty or women), as this is the only means to elimi-
nate the threat from enemy groups and to avoid
being attacked by them at an unfavourable moment
(i.e. when the enemies are stronger). The relation of
force can quickly change, through a variation of
group size (by group splitting or immigration) or a
shift in alliance politics (loss of allies or recruitment
of new ones). Furthermore, the mutual threat
between local groups increases with decreasing dis-
tance. But there are also times of relative peace, in
which no wars break out and conflicts do not esca-
late to wars. No serious wars will break out as long
as two adversaries are of about even strength and in
a stalemate situation. In this case only limited fights
will occur, in which the adversaries mutually test
and demonstrate their strength and their determi-
nation, as well as the reliability of their allies. These
forms of ‘regulated warfare’ may be interpreted as an
attempt to limit violence between groups and thus
to avoid its detrimental consequences for both par-
ties. But if one of the groups has become weaker
(because it has lost its allies), the stronger group will
immediately escalate the fight and try to rout the
other (Vayda 1976 on the Maring). Coalitions may
also be so exhausted after a war of attrition with
high losses that no further gains can be expected
from continuation of the war. In this case negotia-
tions are started in order to achieve a truce and (in
some societies) compensation payments are made,
or one of the groups involved will move away and
the hostilities ended in that way.
Even war activities can be regulated and are limit-
ed by mutual interest. Here we find again the meta-
preference of local groups for peace. Agreements as
to place and time of a fight, limitations on the kind
of weapons used, treatment of the wounded, the
protection of women and children, as well as the
possibility of truce agreements and compensation
payments, are forms of such de-escalating limitations
(restricted warfare). However, all such limitations
continue to be subject to the logic of the prisoners’
dilemma. If it is profitable for one of the coalitions
to deviate from the path of de-escalation (if it has
gained strength or the enemy has become weaker),
it will intensify the fight again and there will be
hardly any limitations (unrestricted warfare). The
balance of power can change quickly, even in the
short term; for instance, if the allies do not show up
at a battle or arrive too late. As soon as one of the
groups proves to be weaker, the superior group will
try to rout or even annihilate it.
To summarise, we have seen that war has highly
detrimental consequences for people, property and
resources. Nevertheless, local groups in tribal soci-
eties cannot avoid waging war under the prevalent
structural conditions. There is no centralised power
to prevent war between politically autonomous local
groups dependent on locally concentrated resources,
and pursuing a unilateral peaceful strategy is too risky
and may lead to annihilation of the group. These
structural factors can change (as with the emergence
of a state), with corresponding consequences for the
strategic interaction between the local groups (such
as, for instance, pacification or an alliance of former
enemies against the state). Strategies may also have
unintended consequences in the aggregate and may
change the structural conditions of interaction
between the groups. 
5. Pacification
The pacification of warlike groups is not only an
interesting historical process as such, but also forms
an important field test for theories of war and peace.
The factors which were responsible for a successful
pacification of formerly warlike societies could also
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be the causes responsible for the endemic state of
war prevailing before their pacification. The ethno-
graphical and historical data on pacification in
New Guinea, in Amazonia and in other areas are
very detailed (see Rodman and Cooper 1983 on
Melanesia; Gordon and Meggitt 1985 on the Mae
Enga; Robarchek and Robarchek 1996 on the
Waorani; Pringle 1970 and Wagner 1972 on the
Iban). But despite this wealth of empirical informa-
tion, pacification has hardly ever been the object of
systematic, theoretical reflection (exceptions are
Bodley 1983 and Koch 1983).
Pacification is a process, in the course of which
the state enforces its legitimate monopoly of power
and brings wars between politically autonomous
local groups to an end. Without any doubt, the paci-
fying states did not pursue philanthropic purposes;
the pacification of the ‘savages’ has never been an
end in itself but a precondition for colonial con-
quest, domination and exploitation and sometimes
even elimination of indigenous peoples (see Wolf
1982; Bodley 1983). However, we shall focus on the
complex circumstances and conditions of the
processes of pacification: the interests and strategies
of state actors who try to establish state control, but
also the reactions of the politically autonomous
local groups, which are entangled in warlike inter-
action and are put under pressure to stop fighting
and to solve their conflicts peacefully. The state
monopoly of power is not a constant factor, but the
presence and effectiveness of a state varies consider-
ably according to the contexts and phases of colo-
nial expansion (see Bodley 1983). Furthermore, the
state is not a homogeneous apparatus, but consists
of different actors (such as colonial officials, police
and army, local allies but also missionaries) who –
together with private actors (such as settlers, traders
and entrepreneurs of all kinds) – interact with the
different tribal groups. These various actors differ
with regard to their interests, capacities of repression
and possibilities of reward, and they have influenced
(furthered or hindered) pacification in different ways
and by different means (Ferguson and Whitehead
1992: 6f, 11). But tribal populations vary in number,
military strength and unity as well, and not all local
groups in a region may have the same strength and
the same interest in stopping warfare.
Many ethnographies report on the relief of mem-
bers of once warlike societies at the successful cessa-
tion of the permanent state of war and the inter-
ruption of the vicious circle of violence and counter-
violence (see Colson 1975: 40ff; Knauft 1999: 143ff).
This fact shows that local groups are interested in
preventing violent clashes with each other. But as
we have seen, a unilateral peaceful strategy would
be too risky, because a unilateral confrontational
strategy provides both higher gains and prevents the
utmost losses. A peaceful strategy for groups entan-
gled in a prisoners’ dilemma only becomes possible
under the influence of a third, superordinate power,
which punishes a unilateral confrontational strategy
to such an extent that a peaceful strategy becomes
the best strategy for each group.
One decisive condition of successful pacification
is the enforcement of state power that can force
local groups to stop fighting and to enforce peace.
The intervention of state actors will be more success-
ful if it is systematic and impartial (as it was in the
Highlands of New Guinea, see Gordon and Meggitt
1985) than in cases where the state intervenes
unsystematically and partially, as in the case of the
Upriver Iban in Borneo (Pringle 1970). However, the
effectiveness of a state not only depends on its
repressive power, but also on its ability to protect
groups who renounce war and reward them selec-
tively with desirable goods (such as iron tools and
prestige goods) and the co-option of their leaders.
This may explain why, in some cases, even less
repressive forms of triadic conflict solution (such as
mediation and arbitration) in combination with
selective incentives have led to the pacification of
warlike groups, such as the Waorani (Robarchek and
Robarchek 1998). The example of the Waorani also
shows that the higher the costs and risks of war were
before, the more the groups are ready to accept
peace. A third precondition for enduring pacification
– besides selective punishment of warlike groups,
selective rewards and protection of groups renounc-
ing war – is the establishment of institutions for the
peaceful settlement of conflicts, such as courts, or
the acceptance of indigenous forms of mediation in
the ‘shadow of the Leviathan’ (Gordon and Meggitt
1985). However, as long as the state does not punish
violent groups systematically (e.g. because police
troops are not, or only partially, present), and as long
as the state is not able to protect groups willing to
stop fighting and fails to establish or support legiti-
mate institutions for the peaceful settlement of con-
flicts, a confrontational strategy is still the best choice
for every local group and the security problem still
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exists. Local groups will only renounce war if they
can be sure of not being attacked by other groups. A
general peace can be achieved in a region if the state
(or another superordinate instance) systematically
punishes a unilateral confrontational strategy (selec-
tive repression), efficiently rewards a peaceful strategy
(selective reward) and establishes alternative institu-
tions for the peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Future research on the processes of pacification
should not only systematise the relevant ethno-
graphical information, but also develop models and
concepts reflecting these processes in connection
with theories of war and peace in tribal societies.
6. Peace
There are tribal populations, which are not (effi-
ciently) controlled by a state, but where local groups
nevertheless do not wage war against each. Every
theory of war should also be able to address the
problem of peaceful societies. But let us discuss some
conceptual problems first.
While war is a collectively planned and organised
armed conflict between political units, the definition
of peace remains somewhat unclear. Often peace is
presented as the normal condition of society and
therefore does not need any further explanation. In
contrast, war is seen as a deviation from this natural
condition, which needs to be explained and, indeed,
it has received far more attention in anthropological
discussion. However, any theory of tribal war must
also address the problem of explaining tribal societies
without war and put forward a consistent explana-
tion for both tribal societies with and without war.
In the last decades anthropology has become more
interested in the causes of peaceful relations between
local groups in societies without a state.26 But not
only are there more studies and theories relating to
war than to peace, but warlike tribal societies are
also far more numerous than peaceful ones.
According to Sipes (1973) only five of the 130 soci-
eties he investigated are peaceful, and Otterbein
(1973) found only four peaceful societies in a sample
of 50 (cited in Gregor 1990: 106; Bonta 1993). Most
of these peaceful societies are hunters-and-gather-
ers, hardly any tribal shifting cultivators, pastoral
nomads or sedentary fishermen (Sponsel 1996:
103ff; see footnote 2). This points to the fact that
tribal societies are warlike, in contrast to hunters-
and-gatherers, who usually do not wage war.
Basically, two different conceptions of peace
require discussion: positive and negative peace
(Dentan 1992: 253f). The first definition – positive
peace – not only includes non-violence between
local groups but also political and economic equality
as well as harmonious interaction within groups
(Fabbro 1978).27 This conception of peace, also
implying non-violence between individuals, is far
too restrictive, for very few societies would fit into
this category: even in societies without war, vio-
lence between individuals within a group is not rare
(for the BaMbuti, !Kung, Inuit and Yaghan, see Kelly
2000). Therefore this first conception hardly suits
the analysis of tribal societies without war. The sec-
ond conception – negative peace – only entails the
absence of collective violence between local groups,
whether or not the interaction between individuals
is violent. Hence peace is the absence of war, but
not of violence between individuals. According to
this conception, war and peace may represent two
modalities of relationships between groups in a tribal
society: peace between allies and simultaneously
war against hostile groups. There may be even peri-
ods of peace (truce) between hostile groups. In these
cases, we may speak of a relative peace in a warlike
environment. But there are also societies in which
local groups do not wage war against each other (see
Dentan 1968 and Gregor and Robarchek 1996 on
the Semai; Helbling 1996b; 1998 on the Mangyan).
In these societies conflicts are solved through avoid-
ance and retreat, never by means of war, although
violence between individuals may occur, as already
mentioned. Hence negative peace as an antonym of
war refers both to an occasional alternative to war in
warlike societies as well as to the general absence of
war (but not of violence between individuals).
If peace were the opposite of war, then the expla-
nation for tribal societies without war would just be
the reverse of theories of war in warlike tribal soci-
eties: that is, the absence of those elements which
cause wars, would then also explain the lack of war.
However, not all the theories of war listed above are
relevant for the explanation of peace, for the same
reasons that they are not convincing in explaining
war. Thus, Robarchek and Robarchek (1992; 1996;
1998) and Gregor (1990) explained the peacefulness
of tribal societies (such as the Mehinaku and the
Semai) by cultural values and norms that reward
peaceful behaviour and disapprove of violence. But
as I have already shown, the peacefulness of tribal
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societies cannot be explained by such values and
norms, because these only make sense in an already
peaceful environment. The opposite of the fraternal
interest theory is the proposition of conflicting loy-
alities of men between their local group and kinship
group, as for instance in patrilineal and matrilocal
societies. But as Hallpike (1973: 463) pointed out,
such a constellation does not prevent wars between
local groups, but only stops certain individuals from
participating in a specific war, as these want to avoid a
clash with relatives on the opposite side. Conflicting
loyalties may even spread violence by dragging neu-
tral groups into the armed conflict if they offer refuge
to a member of one of the main opponents.
A better way of explaining the phenomenon of
peaceful societies without central power is to divide
them into categories and to explore each of them
separately. There are three categories of peaceful
societies beyond state control, i.e. indigenous popu-
lations not (not yet or no longer) subject to (an
effective) power monopoly of a state:
1) Hunter-and-gatherer societies consisting of
small and mobile groups of about 25 persons, who
live from hunting and gathering (Lee and DeVore
1968: 11). The population density is usually very
low, with only very slight population growth, so
that contacts between groups are not frequent and,
therefore, the conflict potential does remain low.
The nomadic economy also allows each group to
avoid conflicts with other groups and to prevent
violent disputes (Reyna 1994: 37; Sponsel 1996:
103ff). Therefore, hunters-and-gatherers – with few
exceptions – hardly ever wage war, and never do so
against each other (Helbling n.d.b).28 In this they
differ from tribal societies, which – as can be seen
from archaeological findings (Gabriel 1990: 31ff;
Kelly 2000: ch. 4) – were predominantly warlike
before their pacification. Hence, we have not yet
explained the phenomenon of tribal societies with-
out war.
2) Tribal groups, which seem to be peaceful, such
as those in the Upper Xingu Basin (Gregor and
Robarchek 1996). However, if the wider regional and
historical context is taken into consideration, we
can discern that the Xingu groups were militarily
weakened by wars against powerful adversaries, as
well as by epidemics, and had to retreat into inac-
cessible areas. They found refuge and recovered in a
protectorate where they had access to medical care
and Western goods. And it was in this ‘sanctuary’
(Dentan 1992: 221ff) that the Xingu groups formed
a kind of permanent alliance against warlike neigh-
bouring groups outside the protectorate, against
which they successfully waged defensive, but also
offensive wars (Menget 1993). The alleged peaceful-
ness of the Xinguanos, thus, turns out to be an opti-
cal illusion: they do not form a peaceful tribal soci-
ety, as Gregor and Robarchek maintained, but a per-
manent alliance between local groups of different
ethnic origins in a sanctuary.
3) Nevertheless, there are tribal societies beyond
state control in which conflicts between local
groups are not settled by means of warfare. These
are tribal groups which were forced by militarily
superior populations from the lowland to retreat
into inaccessible forest and mountain areas, but
continue to depend economically on the adjacent
dominant population for the provision of goods
they cannot manufacture themselves. This situation
– described as an ‘enclave’ by Dentan (1992: 211ff)
– can be found among the Semai (Dentan 1968) and
the Mangyan (Helbling 1998), who face a lowland
population – far superior in numbers and power
and far more aggressive – in a tribal zone that is not
completely controlled by the state. At the same time
they have to work for settlers and to exchange forest
products with traders in order to get desired goods
such as bush knives, cloth and iron pots. Under
such circumstances avoidance of conflicts by retreat
and withdrawal or by a peaceful, submissive behav-
iour are far better survival strategies than armed
resistance and sporadic attacks. These local groups
must, therefore, adapt to their structural inferiority
and factual powerlessness and to their simultaneous
economic dependence on their superior neighbours
on the social, economical and political levels. Small,
mobile groups, a wide network of bilateral kinship
and extensive agriculture, combined with hunting
and gathering, allow a quick withdrawal and disper-
sion of the groups, with the possibility of taking
refuge in other groups in the case of emergency. It
does not come as a surprise that these marginal groups
see themselves as timorous and the neighbouring
populations in the lowland as violent (McCauley
1990: 14f), for this corresponds to their historic
experiences as losers, who always had to withdraw
and to retreat. The fear of violence in all its forms
(physical and spiritual) is an important regulator of
behaviour. This fear makes plausible the norms and
behavioural ideals that reward peacefulness and
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disapprove of aggressiveness, and, thus, legitimates
peaceful behaviour, which matches their actual power-
lessness. The emergence of such peaceful norms and
ethnic stereotypes, contrasted with the ‘violent others’,
produces the reciprocal expectation that the other
local groups also prefer peaceful interaction and, thus,
none of the groups has to fear violent conflicts.
Peaceful relations between local groups in a tribal
society, only marginally integrated into a state socie-
ty and not subjected to effective control by the state,
can, thus, not be explained by the internal logic of
this type of society, but rather by specific circum-
stances in a tribal zone (i.e. a tribal group facing a far
superior population). One important factor explain-
ing the peacefulness of tribal groups is the kind of
refuge to which these groups are forced to withdraw.
Local groups either sporadically attack neighbour-
ing groups from a secure sanctuary (as the Xingu) or
have permanently become peaceful in an enclave
(as the Semai and the Mangyan). Both, structural
inferiority vis-à-vis a powerful neighbour, which
precludes violent resistance and forces retreat, and
at the same time economic dependence on settlers
and traders (hence an enclave), cause economic,
organisational, political and cultural adaptations on
the part of the indigenous groups, which make
wars between local groups highly improbable (see
Helbling 1998). The explanation of peaceful rela-
tions between tribal groups emphasises the necessity
to explore not only the internal logic of the inter-
action between tribal groups but also the regional
and national context as well the history of tribal
societies.
7. Summary and outlook
Although tribal wars always take place in a wider
context of expanding or weakening states in a world
economic system that influences the course and
intensity of wars, it is nevertheless imperative to
analyse the internal logic of indigenous war. I have
argued that war can be explained by two structural
conditions: the political autonomy of local groups
in an anarchic system and the dependence of local
groups on locally concentrated resources. This polit-
ical and economic constellation causes a warlike
type of strategic interaction between local groups,
which may be described in terms of game theory.
Despite the high costs and disadvantages of war and
despite the fact that a peaceful interaction (co-oper-
ation) yields the highest gain for all groups collec-
tively, each group is compelled to adopt a bellicose
strategy. This is because a one-sided peaceful strategy
is too risky, since a one-sided bellicose strategy brings
the highest gains and a one-sided peaceful one the
highest losses. Under these conditions of mutual
threat and fear of violence, the survival of each
group depends on its ability to become larger and
stronger and to recruit more allies than its potential
adversaries. The military superiority of one group,
however, inevitably constitutes a threat to the others,
forcing them to achieve military superiority in turn.
And each group tries to attack pre-emptively and to
defeat, to weaken or expel its enemy, because if it
does not attack at a favourable moment it risks
being attacked at an unfavourable moment. Thus,
the prisoners’ dilemma evolves into an even more
conflictive security dilemma. It is against this back-
ground that local groups interact strategically and
pursue their interests. War is the necessary, even
though unintentional and damaging, result of the
strategic interaction of groups under specific struc-
tural conditions. I have also examined alternative
theories of tribal warfare. These theories explain
tribal warfare with human aggressiveness rewarded
by reproductive success or by cultural norms and
values, with a struggle over scarce resources, con-
flicts between groups of men related by kinship or as
caused by politically ambitious group leaders. My
conclusion was that these factors are consequences,
not causes, of tribal warfare.
The study of tribal wars remains one of the cen-
tral topics of anthropology. Numerous theories have
been put forward in order to explain tribal warfare,
and many ethnographic accounts have been pub-
lished which describe tribal warfare in all its modal-
ities. Archaeology, too, has tackled the problem of
warfare, especially since the 1980s and the 1990s
(see among others Vencl 1984; 1991; Keeley 1996;
Haas and Creamer 1993; 1997; Haas http://www.
santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/98-10-
088.ps; Martin and Frayer 1997; Thorpe http://
www.hum.au.dk/fark/warfare/thorpe_paper_1.htm
LeBlanc 2003 and contributors to this volume). But
still, The Oxford Companion to Archaeology (of 844
pages), edited by Brian Fagan (1996), has no entry
on war and war is not even listed in the index (of 24
pages). Our aim should be not only to provide
ethnographic and archaeological data on warlike
societies but also to explain tribal warfare based on
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controlled comparison and – where possible – on
statistical analysis. Tribal wars are too interesting
and too important a theme for anthropology and
archaeology to leave their study to sociobiologists,
political scientists and military historians. War
should again be moved into the centre of anthropo-
logical and archaeological research in close co-oper-
ation with neighbouring disciplines such as history,
political science and sociology.
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N O T E S
1 For an overview of different theories see Otterbein 
(1973; 1985; 1990; 1999), Hallpike (1973), Koch (1974a),
Nettleship et al. (1975), Clastres (1977), Harris (1977),
Hanser (1985), Foster and Rubinstein (1986), Wolf (1987),
Rubinstein and Foster (1988), Ferguson (1984b; 1990b),
Knauft (1990; 1999), McCauley (1990), Haas (1990), Ross
(1993a; 1993b), Carneiro (1994), Reyna and Downs
(1994), Keeley (1996), Orywal (1996b; 1998), Elwert,
Neubert and Feuchtwang (1999) and Simons (1999).
2 I am fully aware of the fact that the term ‘tribal’ is a 
contested one (Fried 1975). I use the term ‘tribal society’
neither in the sense of an developmental stage of human
society, as the evolutionists do, nor in the sense of a
political organisation of a whole regional population, 
but in a purely descriptive sense or as an ‘ideal type’
(Max Weber). The term denotes a regional population of
extensive farmers, pastoral nomads or settled fishermen,
who live in politically autonomous local groups and
entertain relationships of kinship, marriage and gift
exchange and who are allied or wage war against each
other (Sahlins 1968; Bodley 1997). Tribal societies thus
differ from hunters-and-gatherers, who live in small
nomadic groups. I do, however, not consider sedentary
fishermen such as the Kwakiutl and incipient farmers
such as those at the north, east and south-east coast of
Australia as hunters-and-gatherers since they – as tribal
groups – also depend on locally concentrated resources
(Murdock 1968; Lourandos 1997: 44–52, 57–59, 60–69;
Helbling n.d.b). Tribal societies also differ from local
communities integrated into a state society, controlled
by a state with a legitimate monopoly of force, and 
having to pay tribute and rents.
3 According to a statistical evaluation by Scherrer (2000: 24,
31-35) about 19.6% of all wars between 1985 and 1995
were anti-regime wars and 11.8% were waged between
states. In the same period tribal wars represented 15.7%
of cases, whereas ethno-national wars amounted to
44.1% of all wars.
4 It does not make sense to define war as organised, collec-
tive violence only between states because in that case the
proposition of war contributing to the formation of the
state would not even be considered. 
5 Feud is the legal obligation and right to take revenge for
an injustice committed against the perpetrator (or one 
of his kin). In some cases revenge can be replaced by a
compensation payment, which, however, does not always
annul the desire to take revenge, but only postpones it
(on the Nuer, see Evans-Pritchard 1940 and Greuel 1971;
on the Mae Enga see Wiessner and Tumu 1998b).
6 On the absence of war in hunting-and-gathering societies
see Johnson and Earle (1987: 19), Steward (1968: 334),
Service (1966: 60), Fried (1967: 99-106), Lee and DeVore
(1968: 339-40), Wolf (1987: 132, 136), Carneiro (1994: 12ff),
Coon (1976: 275), Harris (1977: 42ff), Sponsel (1996: 107),
Kelly (2000: 125) and Konner (1982: 204), for archaeologi-
cal evidence see Sponsel (1996: 103ff), Roper (1969: 330f),
Leakey and Lewin (1977: 245), Vencl (1984: 120f), Ferrill
(1985: 17), Gabriel (1990: 23), Thorpe (http://www.hum.
au.dk/fark/warfare/thorpe_paper_1.htm), Haas (http://www.
santafe.edu/sfi/publications/Working-Papers/ 98-10-088.ps)
and Keeley (1996: 39). LeBlanc (2003) maintains a con-
trary view, although he only presents cases of individual
violence rather than of war and cases of ’Mesolithic 
peoples’ (such as those at the American Northwest Coast)
rather than real hunters-and-gatherers.
7 For older biological theories, focussing on territoriality,
cp. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984).
8 Durham (1991), Chagnon (1990b) and Gat (2000) also
take the competition over scarce food into consideration.
The military success in competition over scarce food also
leads to (relative) reproductive success. I will address this
economic explanation of tribal war, also shared by
anthropologists not favouring a biological theory, below.
9 Even in hunting-and-gathering societies, which display a
high level of violence between individuals, violence is not
predominantly between men and not because of women
and sexual rivalry. Adultery and jealousy are only rarely
recorded as reasons for violence (Kelly 2000: 31ff). 
10 Examples of such descriptions are provided by Harrison
(1993) on war rituals among the Manambu (Avatip) of
the Sepik, as well as by Michelle Rosaldo (1980) on the
Ilongot in the Northern Philippines.
11 Moreover, as Wiessner and Tumu (1998b: 148f) and oth-
ers have pointed out, not land but rather labour seems to
be scarce among the Mae Enga.
12 Ferguson (1990b) made differentiations in the ecological-
economic theory of tribal wars, by also taking into
account socio-structural and ideological elements. He
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claims that infrastructural elements explain why wars are
waged; structural elements determine the social patterns
of war and why a specific war will break out at a given
time; superstructural elements ultimately determine the
cognitive conditions of decision processes about war and
peace. But even this more sophisticated model continues
to uphold the (implausible and empirically not substan-
tiated) premise that economic-ecological elements ulti-
mately cause wars. 
13 Even Ferguson (1984b: 271ff) concedes that wars were waged
among the Indians of the Northwest coast long before
their first contact with representatives of a state; accord-
ing to Yesner (1994: 161f) a period of about 4000 years.
14 Turton (1979; 1994 on the Mursi) and others focussed
especially on the impact that the introduction of
firearms had on the frequency and mode of warfare.
15 Clastres (1976) and Harrison (1993) maintained that war
is the result of the local groups’ endeavour to preserve their
sovereignty and autonomy. This is highly implausible, not
only because of the functionalist logic of the argument but
also because the sovereignty of local groups is only endan-
gered in an already warlike environment. Furthermore,
one can ask why warfare, and not more peaceful, less
risky and less costly, but nevertheless equivalent forms
(ritual, classification, peaceful contest etc.), is used by
local groups to mark their identities in the first place. 
16 The sample includes the Tauna-Awa, Usurufa, Mae Enga,
Kamano, Auyana, Huli, Eipo, Baktaman (Faiwolmin),
Dani, Anggor, Abelam, Jivaro, Yanomami, Waorani,
Mekranoti and the Blackfoot (see Helbling n.d.a). 
17 It is astonishing that, with a few exceptions, anthropolog-
ical theories of war hardly ever took notice of the relevant
theoretical discussions in political science. Anthropology
could learn a lot from models of war and alliance between
states provided by the theory of international relations,
as states are political units of war as are the local groups
in tribal societies. Neo-realist theories (see Waltz 1979;
Levy 1989; van Evera 1998; 1999) and decision theories,
above all game theory (see Rapoport 1974; Brams 1975;
Nicholson 1992), are of special interest in understanding
the logic of tribal warfare. Levy (1989) gives an overview
of the discussions on the causes of war, see also Waltz
(1960), Brown (1994), Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
(2001[1990]), Vasquez (1993; 2000), Bueno de Mesquita
(1980), Nicholson (1992), Burchill and Linklater (1996).
18 In a prisoners’ dilemma co-operation would yield the
highest gains collectively for all actors but is too risky for
each actor because a one-sided defection brings the high-
est gains and a one-sided co-operation the highest losses.
19 To be clear I do not adopt a Social Darwinist position 
but rather follow evolutionary economics (Nelson and
Winter 1982; Hodgson 1993; Nelson 1995; for anthropol-
ogy see Peoples 1982 and Ensminger and Knight 1997).
Local groups in a tribal society interact in a warlike envi-
ronment as firms interact in a capitalist market environ-
ment. Those firms pursuing strategies which entail lower
costs and higher profits will be more successful and expand,
whereas firms with higher costs and lower profits will
lose market share and may even become bankrupt.
20 The ‘arms race’ in tribal societies mainly consists of the
enlargement of groups (more warriors) as well as the
recruitment of more allies.
21 Under these conditions the adoption of a peaceful strategy
by all groups is only possible if a superordinate power
effectively punishes those who pursue a unilateral con-
frontational strategy and rewards those who adopt a
peaceful one.
22 It should be stressed that war does not endanger the
‘social order’, as the structure-functionalists assumed.
While there is social order – sanctioned norms, a struc-
ture of authority, procedures to settle conflicts peacefully
– within a local group as the relevant political unit in
tribal societies, the relation between the local groups in a
region is a spontaneous order. As I have shown, this
order emerges under certain structural conditions as an
unintentional result of interaction between local groups.
23 Theoretical attempts to explain war by the higher
aggressiveness of men, gender-specific modes of psycho-
socialisation (Chodorow 1978) or patriarchal structures
(Schmölzer 1996) have failed - why should men be more
aggressive in tribal societies than in societies of hunters-
and-gatherers? It seems to be more meaningful to study
the consequences of a warlike environment on the rela-
tions between men and women in local groups (see Harris
1977: ch. 6).
24 For convenience I will use the ethnographic present in
the following by thus referring to the date when the
field-research had been conducted or the monograph
been published.
25 Put in terms of ultimate and proximate causes, it may be
said that the structural conditions and the ensuing logic
of warlike interaction – and not the maximisation of
inclusive fitness, as sociobiology states – are the ultimate
causes of tribal warfare. Other causes put forward by
alternative theories of tribal warfare may be interpreted
as proximate causes.
26 On peaceful societies see Fabbro (1978), Wiberg (1981),
Howell and Willis (1989), McCauley (1990), Dentan
(1992; 1994), Sponsel and Gregor (1994) and Gregor (1996).
27 According to Fabbro (1978) local groups in peaceful 
societies display five characteristics: 1) small group size
with face-to-face-communication, 2) an egalitarian social
organisation, 3) general reciprocity, 4) social control and
decision making by consent and 5) non-violent values
and socialisation (see also McCauley [1990: 14f]).
28 This is also true for tribal groups which were forced by
powerful neighbouring groups to withdraw into inhos-
pitable regions, where they could live in relative security,
but – as cultivation was not possible in these areas – had
to become hunters-and-gatherers (Service 1968).
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Although this paper concentrates on evidence from
Britain and Ireland, it is inevitably situated within a
far wider theoretical debate, which mostly sets the
British and Irish material within a universal or at
least pan-European framework. The specifics of the
data examined here are therefore weighed against
these general models as well as being assessed in
their own terms.
Origins are always attractive subjects, and the
origin of war in early prehistory is no exception,
having been considered recently from the viewpoint
of biological anthropology (e.g. Wrangham 1999),
social anthropology (e.g. Otterbein 1997; Kelly 2000),
military history (e.g. Keegan 1993; O’Connell 1995),
history (e.g. Dawson 1996) and archaeology (e.g.
Keeley 1996).
Of these fields, the most interest in early war has
been shown by anthropologists of varying kinds, as
it is central to that elusive quality, ‘human nature’.
Strangely, archaeology has largely been an onlooker
in this argument, which has almost entirely been
fought out using evidence from contemporary soci-
eties (with Ferguson 1997 an important exception).
The most influential of these general theories have
been various approaches within evolutionary theory
(see Laland and Brown 2002 for a clear guide to the
similarities and differences of the different schools),
the materialist approach (e.g. Ferguson 1990) and
cultural evolution (Dawson 1999; 2001).
Within evolutionary theory the particular strand
which has shown most interest in the origins of
human conflict is evolutionary psychology. This is
because evolutionary psychologists see humans as
shaped by an ancestral environment long past,
dubbed the environment of evolutionary adaptation
(EEA). The EEA broadly equates to the Palaeolithic
and Mesolithic (e.g. Cosmides et al. 1992; Pinker
1998: 42), with the development of agriculture mark-
ing a crucial break. Thus any pattern to be discerned
in Neolithic or Bronze Age warfare has its origins
in earlier times and should clearly fall into line with
one of the three main competing theories for war-
fare situated within evolutionary psychology – terri-
torial, reproductive and status competition.
The territorial model originates in modern times
with E.O. Wilson, who argued from the sociobiologi-
cal perspective that ethnocentricity was a product of
natural selection (1978: 119):
Our brains do appear to be programmed to the following
extent: we are inclined to partition other people into friends
and aliens, in the same sense that birds are inclined to learn
territorial songs and to navigate by the polar constellations.
We tend to fear deeply the actions of strangers and to solve
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conflicts by aggression. These learning rules are most likely to
have evolved during the past hundreds or thousands of years
of human evolution …
More specifically, Wrangham (1999) has argued for
continuity of a territorial instinct from the common
ancestor of chimpanzees and humans. He argues that
a territorial instinct exists in modern chimpanzees,
with young male chimpanzee patrols of territorial
borders leading to conflicts of extermination with
neighbouring groups, improving the victors’ access
to resources. He compares these with the territorial
nature of modern American gang culture, with the
link in his argument provided by comparisons with
the Yanomami of the Amazon as an example of
‘primitive’ culture.
The reproductive theory of warfare is based on
analogies with primate behaviour in which male-
centred competition, over access to females, takes
violent form (e.g. Wrangham and Peterson 1996). In
human societies this is argued to take the form of
successful warriors having more wives and, crucially,
more children. The other approach regards warfare
as the outcome of violent competition by young
males striving for status and prestige (Maschner
and Reedy-Maschner 1998), even when there is no
prospect of territorial gain; reproductive success is
not the primary aim here, even though it may be a
consequence of gaining status.
There are a variety of problematic assumptions
involved in these theories, which struggle to encom-
pass the ethnographic evidence, let alone the archae-
ological record (Thorpe 2003b). They also tend to
blur almost entirely any distinction between indi-
vidual acts of violence directed against those nearest
to them, conflict within and between groups directed
against specific individuals, often in the form of
feuds between kin-groups, and actual warfare (by
which I mean here organised, premeditated, aggres-
sion between autonomous political units, where
the individual identity of the victim is less impor-
tant than their membership of the group being
attacked).
In addition there are some specific issues relating
to prehistoric archaeology. First, while prestige is
clearly a significant factor in the creation of warriors
(Clastres 1994: 169-200), just as with the reproduc-
tive theory, however, dubbing violence the business
of men (e.g. Gilbert 1994; van der Dennen 1995)
avoids the considerable ethnographic, historical and
archaeological evidence, especially from Asia (Rolle
1989) and the Americas, of female warriors and even
female war chiefs (Koehler 1997; Hollimon 2001).
The existence of female warriors in prehistoric
Europe is an area which has received extremely little
attention.
The other fundamental problem for evolutionary
anthropology is that, as various critics have noted
(e.g. Knauft 1991; Foley 1996), almost no archaeol-
ogists believe in an unchanging environment of
evolutionary adaptation until the advent of agricul-
ture. Instead, the pattern of conflict and warfare may
well be expected to vary through time and across
space.
The other main camp within anthropology is the
materialist. Those favouring a universal materialist
interpretation start from the standpoint that warfare
is completely irrational, and therefore one would
only risk one’s life in combat when there was a des-
perate need for land, or more immediately food (e.g.
Ferguson 1990). Ferguson (1990) argues that moti-
vations as stated by the participants to ethnogra-
phers hide the real motives of achieving basic mate-
rial goals. Resource shortages are, of course, a staple
of archaeological explanations, and one can note
some clear difficulties for the materialists here. For
example, many models of the transition to agricul-
ture in the Levant involve a supposed shortage of
resources, either through over-population (Cohen
1989), climatic decline (Henry 1989) or seasonal
shortfalls (Harris 1990), yet the evidence for conflict
within the Natufian gatherer-hunter population here
is negligible, only a single traumatic injury from
some 400 skeletons excavated (Thorpe 2003b). Of
course, the significance of material considerations in
many conflicts is undeniable, and must have played
some part in prehistoric warfare. Material considera-
tions are not, however, convincing as a total or sole
explanation.
A recent reappearance in warfare studies is that
of cultural evolution (Dawson 1996; 1999; 2001),
which harks back to 1960s notions of a simple divi-
sion of prehistoric societies into bands, tribes, chief-
doms and states. For Dawson a key development
was agriculture. In this he follows earlier commen-
tators who see conflict as a consequence of settled
agrarian communities (e.g. Leakey and Lewin 1992);
although he does propose that in prehistory the
pattern of warfare may have been cyclical rather than
linear. In such models the walls of Jericho, one of
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the earliest towns, feature prominently (for an alter-
native interpretation as a flood defence see Bar-Yosef
1986) along with the attack on the Early Neolithic
causewayed enclosure of Hambledon Hill, England
(Mercer 1999), considered below, or Schletz in Austria
(Windl 1994), an enclosure with multiple burials of
individuals who met a violent end in the ditch. The
most dramatic case is that of Talheim in Germany
(Wahl and König 1987), c. 5000 BC, where a mass
grave contained men, women and children, killed
by axe and adze blows to the head.
To assess the validity of this proposal we need to
consider the evidence from the Mesolithic, as what-
ever the level of Neolithic violence may have been,
we can not simply assume this appeared from noth-
ing. Certainly the evidence for both serious injuries
and violent death from Mesolithic skeletons in
Europe is steadily growing (Vencl 1999; Grünberg
2000; Thorpe 2003a; Thorpe 2003b). It is clear that
conflict is not a feature confined to the period after
the development of agriculture. If we look at north-
ern Europe, there is plentiful evidence of individuals
with healed injuries. One of the best known exam-
ples is the Korsør Nor harbour settlement site on
the coast of Zealand, dating to the Ertebølle period,
where three of the seven burials at the site were of
individuals who had suffered traumatic skull injuries
(Bennike 1997).
Skeletal material also points to the existence of
conflicts occurring on a much larger scale, perhaps
actual Mesolithic warfare. At Ofnet cave in Bavaria
two pits contained the skulls and vertebrae of 38
individuals, all stained with red ochre, dating to
around 6500 BC (Frayer 1997). Most were children;
two thirds of the adults were females. Grave goods
of deer teeth and shells were associated only with
adult females and children. Half the individuals
were fatally wounded by blunt mace-like weapons,
with females, males and children (even infants) all
injured, but males suffering the most wounds (Frayer
1997). The scale of this apparent massacre suggests
the destruction of a whole community, followed
by the ceremonial burial of ‘trophy skulls’ (Keeley
1996: 102). Certainly, there are many accounts in the
ethnographic record which demonstrate the very
careful curation of skulls taken in warfare (e.g.
Sterpin 1993). We should also note that none of the
conditions of sedentism, territoriality and status
competition attributed to the Ertebølle (which
therefore fits quite well with the general theories
outlined above) have been claimed for the German
Mesolithic (Jochim 1998).
It is also crucial to note that even within relative-
ly small areas there can be significant differences
in the level of inter-personal violence revealed by
skeletal injuries. In the Iron Gates area of the Balkan
Mesolithic the sites of Vlasac and Schela Cladovei
show clear evidence of conflict (Radovanovic 1996;
Chapman 1999). The level of violence is especially
high at Schela Cladovei – among the fifty-six skele-
tons excavated there are six cases of projectile
injuries (four male, one female, one unsexed, most-
ly from bone points) along with some half a dozen
examples of cranial injuries (mostly not healed
before death), so that about one third of all adults
from the site had traumatic injuries. However, Schela
Cladovei and Vlasac are anomalous within the
region’s Mesolithic cemeteries as a whole – the latest
overall figures are eight projectile injuries out of 400
skeletons, and roughly ten individuals with frac-
tures. These two sites thus provide the vast bulk of
cases of violence from just one fifth of the total
examined burial population. Thus sweeping gener-
alisations arguing for high (or low) levels of conflict
in early prehistory may not hold true even for rela-
tively small regions.
Turning to Britain, we do not have the skeletal
record possessed by our continental colleagues for the
Mesolithic, with the material from the only ceme-
tery of this date (Aveline’s Hole in southwest England)
largely lost or destroyed, and the remainder almost
all single bones, so the existence of conflict can not
be documented in any clear way. There are, however,
a few exceptions. Cheddar Man, near Aveline’s Hole,
dated to c. 8000 BC, is a complete skeleton (Tratman
1975) with a variety of traumatic injuries to the skull
and collar-bone. Most of these have been attributed
to the effects of water (Stringer 1985), but the most
recent examination by pathologists suggests that he
suffered several blows to the head some time before
death, one of these resulting in the formation of an
abscess between the eyes, this probably becoming
infected and bringing about his death (Wilson 2001:
54). The cranium of a probable adult male, dating to
c. 8500 BC, from the Ogof-yr-Ychen cave on Caldey
Island off Wales has a healed depressed fracture
(Schulting 1998: 277). Finally, a skull from Aveline’s
Hole appears from examination of a photograph
(the skull itself has not been located) to have a per-
foration of the skull (Schulting 1998: 273).
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One can either take these scattered examples to
mean that the evidence for larger-scale conflict will
one day emerge, or that things were genuinely dif-
ferent in Britain. If we believe the latter, then this
may have implications for our interpretation of the
Early Neolithic.
Early Neolithic
Beginning with individuals, and perhaps individual
acts of violence, there are clear Early Neolithic
examples of death through arrowhead injury at the
chambered tombs of Ascott-under-Wychwood
(Selkirk 1971) in western England (probably an adult
male) and Tulloch of Assery Tomb B (Corcoran 1964-
6) in Scotland (an adult), in both cases with the
arrowhead being embedded in a vertebra. In Ireland,
the portal tomb of Poulnabrone (Lynch and Ó
Donnabháin 1994), Co. Clare, contained an adult
male with the tip of a chert projectile point embed-
ded in his right hip. An important addition to this
small group is the rib fragment from a young adult
at Penywyrlod in Wales with an embedded arrow-
head tip (Wysocki and Whittle 2000). This only pen-
etrated the bone slightly, and was on a downward
path at the moment of entry, suggesting a shot from
a distance. The wider significance of this discovery
is that the Penywyrlod tomb was fully published
in the relatively recent past (Britnell and Savory
1984) and thus suggests that many more cases may
have been missed where they were not specifically
sought for.
Another adult at Ascott-under-Wychwood in the
Thames Valley had an arrowhead beneath a rib,
which may be the cause of death (Selkirk 1971). This
was also the preferred interpretation of the complete
leaf-shaped arrowhead found in the throat region of
an elderly male burial in the northeast chamber at
West Kennet in Wessex (Piggott 1962: 25). He also
had a fracture of the radius and a large abscess cavity
at the head of the humerus, interpreted as the result
of a wound through the muscle. At Wayland’s Smithy
chambered tomb in the Thames Valley (Whittle
1991) three leaf-shaped arrowheads were found,
each on the pelvis of an adult; all had broken points.
Significantly, the arrowheads were regarded as hav-
ing had their points deliberately broken off and dis-
carded before burial by the original excavator in the
interim report (Atkinson 1965) but interpreted as
either being grave goods or the cause of death in the
final report (Whittle 1991). That these individuals
were buried in such important monuments may
show that this was a method of death which was
approved socially. A similar explanation may be
appropriate in the case of the tip of a leaf-shaped
arrowhead found in the entrance to the northern
passage at the Hazleton chambered tomb in western
England, as the excavator, Alan Saville (1990: 264)
has argued, given that the rest of the piece was not
present. The articulated and disarticulated skeletons
from this area of the passage were all male, although
it might have entered with one of the bodies which
were located in the chamber to which the passage
had originally led. Less well recorded examples have
come from the burial deposits in several other cham-
bered tombs in western England and Wales, includ-
ing Notgrove, West Tump, Rodmarton (two exam-
ples), Sale’s Lot, Adam’s Grave and Ty-Isaf (Saville
1990: 264) and at Harborough Rocks in Derbyshire
in Northern England (Burl 1981: 95-96). These might
be seen as the cause of death rather than as exam-
ples of the deliberate breakage of objects as a funeral
rite (Grinsell 1961).
Outside chambered tombs, the Fengate multiple
burial in eastern England included an adult male
aged 25-30 with an arrowhead with a broken tip
lodged between his ribs (Pryor 1984: 19-27). There
are several examples from Wessex: an adult male
burial in the ditch of the Wor Barrow earthen long
barrow (Pitt-Rivers 1898: 63) was found with an
arrowhead between the ribs; an adult at the Tarrant
Launceston round barrow (Piggott and Piggott 1944:
75) had an arrowhead among the ribs; an arrowhead
with a broken tip comes from Fyfield long barrow
(Thurnam 1869: 194) and the tip of a broken arrow-
head from Chute long barrow (Passmore 1942).
In Yorkshire, at the Wold Newton round barrow
in Yorkshire (Mortimer 1905: 350-52) an arrowhead
was discovered lying on the pelvis of one of the buri-
als, and at Callis Wold 275 round barrow two arrow-
heads with broken tips were recovered near the knees
of an adult (Mortimer 1905: 161-63) and a further
arrowhead at the hip of another adult. Another case
of an arrowhead with a broken tip comes from the
Aldro 88 round barrow (Mortimer 1905: 59).
The causewayed enclosure of Hambledon Hill in
Wessex has also famously produced likely evidence
of death through arrowshot. A young (about nine-
teen years old) adult male was buried in the outwork
ditch surrounding the enclosure complex at the time
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that the timber palisade surrounding the site was
burnt down and pushed back into the ditch along
with chalk rubble (Mercer 1980; 1988). He had been
killed by an arrowhead (missing its tip) shot from
behind into the lungs. Another young adult male
was found nearby in the rubble layer (Mercer 1988),
now known to have an arrowhead in the throat
(Mercer 1999).
Other Neolithic burial sites have produced dozens
of arrowheads (Green 1980), mostly poorly recorded,
and the possibility exists that modern excavations
might have produced evidence for violence from
many of these. The individual examples of death
through arrowhead injury are all adult males, where
the sex has been identified (although Ascott-under-
Wychwood may be an exception if Darvill’s descrip-
tion of the skeleton as that of a woman is correct
[1987: 68]).
In addition to arrowhead injuries, there are a
number of examples of skull and other injuries caused
by short range weapons such as antler tines, clubs
and axes (as recorded in mainland Europe, e.g. at
Talheim, mentioned above). As well as the individuals
killed by arrowshot at Hambledon Hill, two skulls
(one of a male, the other unsexed) had healed injuries
(Roberts and Cox 2003: 73). At the Poulnabrone
portal dolmen in Ireland (Lynch and Ó Donnabháin
1994), in addition to the adult male with an arrow-
head injury there were individuals with healed
fractures to the skull and to a rib, giving a total of
three individuals out of twenty-two with traumatic
injuries. Tulloch of Assery Tomb A (Corcoran 1964-6),
immediately adjacent to Tomb B, with an adult killed
by arrowshot, produced an adolescent, aged approx-
imately fourteen years, who had apparently suffered
a blow to the skull. Other less clear-cut examples
come from the long barrow at Barrow Hills in the
Thames Valley (Barclay and Halpin 1999: 29) – an
adult (probably male) with a healed forearm frac-
ture; from the Fussell’s Lodge long barrow in Wessex
(Ashbee 1966) – an adult with a broken forearm; from
the Wayland’s Smithy, Wessex, chambered tomb
(Whittle 1991) – a young adult with a healed forearm
fracture and a young adult female with a possible
upper arm injury; from the Isbister chambered tomb
on Orkney (Hedges 1983: 118-19) – an adult male
with a broken and healed forearm and adults with
broken ribs; from the Hazleton chambered tomb
(Saville 1990: 191) – ribs with healed fractures from
at least two adults.
There are similar discoveries from other common
locations for burial. Perhaps coming from the very
end of the Early Neolithic, the massive round barrow
at Duggleby Howe in Yorkshire (Mortimer 1905: 23-
42; Loveday 2002), produced a skull part way down
one of the burial shafts with a large hole in it. The
adult male from Painsthorpe barrow 118 (Mortimer
1905: 125-28), also in Yorkshire, found with a jet
slider, who had suffered a heavy blow on the skull
causing fracturing and the formation of a large blood
clot (Brothwell 1960). Of a similar date is the primary
burial of an adult female inside a ring-ditch at Five
Knolls, central England (Dunning and Wheeler
1931), with a polished flint knife, who had a healed
forearm fracture.
The site of Linkardstown, Co. Carlow, which gives
the series of late Early Neolithic Irish round barrows
covering cists their name, produced an adult male
burial with several healed fractures from blows to
the skull, buried with an axe (Raftery 1944). At the
Staines causewayed enclosure in the Thames Valley
the head (skull and mandible) of an adult male aged
twenty-five to thirty years old were found in the pri-
mary fill of the outer ditch (Robertson-Mackay 1987).
He had two healed head wounds on the right side of
the head, and met his death through a series of four
blows to the head from a blunt object and was finally
decapitated. The published evidence is, however,
not entirely convincing (R. Schulting pers. comm.).
Another case which probably belongs in the Early
Neolithic is from the cist burial under a cairn at
Glenquickan in southwest Scotland, discovered
when the site was destroyed in 1809. The adult con-
tained within it had had an arm almost severed
from the shoulder by a blow from a greenstone axe,
a chip of which was found embedded in the bone
(Burl 1987: 112).
Outside the norm of Early Neolithic burial places,
the adult (possibly male) skull from Haywood Cave
in Somerset with a depressed fracture (Everton and
Everton 1972) may well date to the Early Neolithic
given the radiocarbon date on a vertebra from the
same deposit (Hedges et al. 1997: 446). One of the
earliest British wetland burials, from intertidal peats
in Hartlepool Bay on the east coast of northern
England, was an adult male who had two old blows
on the skull and a healed rib fracture (Tooley 1978).
Undoubtedly the most significant development
concerning injuries from short-range weapons is the
programme of re-examination of cranial trauma from
F I G H T I N G  A N D  F E U D I N G . 145
Early Neolithic tombs in southern Britain (with
northern Britain and Ireland to follow) (Schulting
and Wysocki 2002). Of 350 skulls examined, twenty
six (7.4%) are high or medium probability traumatic
cases, with another five possibles. Of the twenty six,
nine are perimortem injuries with no signs of heal-
ing, so the majority are old injuries. This provides an
interesting match with the Danish Mesolithic mate-
rial alluded to above. Mostly there is one healed
injury per skull, e.g. Norton Bavant long barrow in
Wessex, but an adult male from Fussell’s Lodge long
barrow had three (Ashbee 1966). A slight majority of
injuries are on the left side of the cranium, perhaps
suggesting right-handed attackers, as is the case with
the Danish Mesolithic material (Bennike 1985). Some
injuries appear from their size to have been inflicted
with antler tines, or possibly pointed wooden clubs.
Of the perimortem injuries, examples include a prob-
able axe blow on an adult (probably female) from
Coldrum, a chambered tomb in Southeast England
and a possible club blow on an adolescent from
Belas Knap chambered tomb in western England. At
both sites there were also individuals with healed
depressions in the skull: at Coldrum an adult male
and at Belas Knap an adult female (Schulting et al.
n.d.). Overall, both women and men suffered
injuries, but women apparently in slightly higher
numbers (Schulting et al. n.d.).
This re-examination prompts a reconsideration
concerning the many claims in the antiquarian lit-
erature, previously passed over as over-interpreta-
tion (Schulting and Wysocki 2002). According to
Thurnam (1869: 185), ‘In a large proportion of the
long barrows which I have opened, many of the
skulls exhumed have been found to be cleft, appar-
ently by a blunt weapon, such as a club or stone axe.’
Turning to specific cases, the majority of Thurnam’s
observations came from Wessex. At the long barrow
of Boles’ Barrow near Stonehenge, the barrow diggers
Colt Hoare and Cunnington encountered a skull in
a primary burial location which ‘appeared to have
been cut in two with a sword’ (Colt Hoare 1812: 88).
Thurnam reopened the mound in 1864, concluding
from his examination that several of the skulls had
been hacked apart (Thurnam 1869). He also sug-
gested that the apparent level of violent death was
so high that dismemberment of corpses as a funerary
ritual was a more likely explanation. A later genera-
tion of Cunningtons in 1886 re-excavated the burial
deposit once more, noting that ‘with one exception,
the blows were inflicted on the left side of the crani-
um’ (Cunnington 1889: 107). They also argued that
one of the dead had been decapitated. At Tilshead
Lodge long barrow one of two individuals had a
fractured skull (Thurnam 1869: 186). In the northern
chamber at West Kennet chambered tomb the skull
of two adult males were claimed to be fractured
before death (Thurnam 1869: 227). In western
England Thurnam identified one skull as fractured
at the Littleton Drew chambered tomb, and at the
Rodmarton chambered tomb no less than four of
the thirteen skulls, those of men from twenty to
fifty years old, were interpreted as showing signs of
violence (Thurnam 1869: 227-28). From Belas Knap
chambered tomb, Crawford (1925: 67-79) identified
three cases of cranial trauma (an adult male of about
thirty, another adult and a child) from the western
chamber and two cases (both elderly males). At
Lanhill chambered long barrow in Wessex an adult
male seems to have suffered a crippling injury to the
left elbow in childhood, possibly resulting from a
penetrating wound (Keiller and Piggott 1938).
Although some of these antiquarian observations
have not been confirmed by re-examination, for
example Tilshead (R. Schulting pers. comm.), they
do merit serious consideration.
Moving from burials to settlements, the focus of
attention here has been the causewayed enclosures
mostly found in southern England, but with exam-
ples also now known from Wales, the Isle of Man
and Ireland (Oswald et al. 2001). The interpretation
of these has swung between the poles of ceremonial
centres and defended settlements for some seven
decades, as general explanations then as interpreta-
tions of individual sites. The first archaeological
investigation of a causewayed enclosure, by another
of the Wessex Cunningtons, produced some con-
fusion from the observation of the interrupted
nature of the ditches, broken by frequent causeways
(Cunnington 1912: 48):
It is impracticable to regard these breaks in the entrenchment
as due to an unfinished undertaking, or as entrances in any
ordinary sense, and the only other feasible theory seems to be
that they had some distinct purpose in the scheme of defence;
that they were, indeed, a strengthening and not a weakening
factor in this seemingly not very strongly defended place.
The general notion had long existed that with the
adoption of an agricultural economy would come a
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greater attachment to land and a need to protect
people and animals, and these ‘Neolithic camps’
(Curwen 1930) fitted neatly into such a picture
(Oswald et al. 2001).
With the results of a further ninety years of survey
and excavation, what general observations may we
make now? Beginning in southwest Britain, one of
the most intensively investigated causewayed enclo-
sures is that at Hambledon Hill in Dorset (Mercer
1980; 1988; 1990: 38-44; 1999). Within this major
complex there are a number of separate enclosures.
The Stepleton Enclosure has a rather different lithic
and ceramic assemblage to the Main Enclosure,
which seems to be the ritual heart of the site, where
bodies were perhaps exposed and pits filled with
exotic offerings to the dead. Mercer also believes
that a third enclosure existed, below the Iron Age
hillfort. This would have lain in the most naturally
defensible location. All three enclosures were them-
selves enclosed by a series of outworks running for
over 3000 m, less causewayed and more rampart-
like, held together by timber uprights and cross-
beams. This massive undertaking would have
required both the clearance of a significant area of
forest to produce the 10,000 oak beams required
and the mobilisation of a substantial labour force.
Gateways through the outworks were lined with
massive oak posts. The purpose of this remarkable
earthwork system was possibly to be the protection
of herds of cattle on which the wealth of the com-
munity was built (Mercer 1990: 42-43). It is impor-
tant, however, to note that the Earlier Neolithic date
of the outworks has not been established by excava-
tion (R. Mercer pers. comm.).
Then around 3500 BC this high status site was
eventually attacked and destroyed. The two bodies
in the ditch along with destruction debris men-
tioned above seem conclusive evidence of an attack
by a force of archers. (However, Saville [2002] does
note that in one case the arrowhead tip is missing
and that the arrowhead is of unusually fine quality
for the site, so it could have been a personal posses-
sion intended for reworking). In addition to the two
young males in the ditch, another young man was
apparently abandoned on the outer edge of the
ditch, where his body was dismembered by animals;
the partly intact skeleton of an older adult female
was found in the upper fill of the old Stepleton
enclosure ditch where it had been dragged by dogs
or wolves. Of a different character (possibly one of
the attacking force – Mercer 1990: 41) is the burial of
another young adult male in a pit with pottery frag-
ments and a quern-stone which was backfilled with
scorched chalk rubble for which the only known
source is the destroyed rampart. The evidence from
Hambledon Hill for warfare seems as clear as a dry-
land and plough-damaged site could hope to produce.
The only element which one might expect to be
there which is not is a concentration of arrowheads,
but Mercer (1988: 105) suggests that the excavated
evidence represents only ‘a preliminary skirmish in
an altogether more serious encounter’, with the pro-
posed enclosure below the Iron Age hillfort as the
primary target of the attack. Unfortunately, excava-
tion of the Neolithic levels here would necessitate
the removal of the protected Iron Age site, so this
possibility remains tantalisingly out of reach.
A related interpretation of events has been pro-
posed for Crickley Hill in Gloucestershire (Dixon
1988). Here a causewayed enclosure with a double
line of banks and ditches may have been burnt down,
with buildings inside the enclosure destroyed and
burnt material thrown into the ditch. Following this
possible catastrophe, a single line of enclosing bank
and ditch was constructed just beyond the line of
the earlier enclosure. This was a more substantial
rampart, with just two or three entrances and a pal-
isade at the back of the rampart. Then the palisade
was burnt and some 400 arrowheads were found
around the entrances, in and around the stockade
and along the fenced route leading in to the site.
Following this the site was abandoned for settle-
ment. However, some of the arrowheads may well
relate to an attack on the earlier enclosure, so this
figure could be an overestimate.
A similar defensive work may have been present
at the Hembury enclosure (Liddell 1930; 1931; 1932;
1935; Todd 1984), where the inner ditch contains
extensive traces of in-situ burning of the timber pal-
isade and stones. Liddell’s excavations recovered over
120 arrowheads, most of them burnt and broken,
many of them located in the vicinity of a burnt gate-
way in the line of the inner enclosure. Immediately
inside the enclosure behind the gateway was a sub-
stantial building, also burnt down apparently in the
same episode of destruction.
We must also consider here the related class of
monuments known as ‘tor enclosures’ (Silvester
1979). They are defined as sites with irregular stone
banks with narrow entrances at fairly frequent
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intervals surrounding tors (natural granite outcrops);
where they mostly differ from causewayed enclo-
sures is in lacking a ditch, although this would have
been extremely difficult to cut out of the rock. Of the
fourteen certain or possible examples of this group
(Oswald et al. 2001) only two have been excavated
and thus confirmed as Early Neolithic in date – Carn
Brea (Mercer 1981) and Helman Tor (Mercer 1997),
both in Cornwall. At Carn Brea the hilltop enclosure
was surrounded by a massive wall originally well
over two metres high and some two metres wide at
the base, with further walls outside this. For part of
the circuit there was also a causewayed ditch outside
the wall, which was not a quarry for the stone to
construct the wall. There are over 750 arrowheads
from Mercer’s excavations, some found among the
stones of the enclosure wall, a record for any Early
Neolithic British site in both absolute number and
as a proportion of the retouched lithic assemblage
(35.7%). Several hundred more were found in anti-
quarian diggings and as surface finds. There was
widespread burning in the buildings on the eastern
summit of the tor and many of the arrowheads were
broken and burnt. Mercer sees Carn Brea as a high
status settlement, which was eventually attacked and
destroyed, possibly by the inhabitants of the hilltop
enclosure of Helman Tor some 40 kms away.
Helman Tor is a somewhat smaller enclosure, but
again defined by a massive boulder wall. Limited
excavation within this revealed substantial midden
deposits and a possible layer of burning, again with
a high proportion of arrowheads among the lithic
assemblage, but not in such dramatic numbers as at
Carn Brea.
The Maiden Castle causewayed enclosure under-
lying the famous hillfort (Wheeler 1943; Sharples
1991) also produced several broken arrowheads
leading to the recent excavator (Sharples 1991: 255)
entertaining the possibility of violent attack there
too. However, as he himself notes, the area excavated
is too small for such a pattern to emerge, and cer-
tainly the proportion of arrowheads in the
retouched lithic assemblage is nowhere near that
from Carn Brea.
In Southeast England the causewayed enclosures
of Sussex have been divided into two groups – one
of fortified settlement enclosures and another of
exposure burial (Drewett 1977) or unfortified cere-
monial/ritual enclosures (Drewett et al. 1988: 34-44;
Drewett 1994). The fortified enclosures (Whitehawk
and The Trundle) are located on hill tops, have
views in all directions, have multiple ditch circuits
(two at the Trundle, at least four and possibly six at
Whitehawk) have some evidence for internal and
defensive features, have environmental evidence sug-
gesting mixed farming in the locality, and flintwork
suggesting a wide range of tools and craft activities.
However, apart from the location, the evidence is
not especially clear-cut. Whitehawk has one possi-
ble internal structure and a number of pits; and The
Trundle just a single post-hole, which may be part of
an entrance structure. Whitehawk has a possible
gateway and palisades behind the third and fourth
(counting outwards) ditches. Craft activities are not
confined to Whitehawk and The Trundle (Russell
2002: 87), while ritual deposits in the form of human
and animal burials occur at both these sites. Saville
(2002) has also questioned the validity of drawing
such a sharp distinction between the lithic assem-
blages from the various enclosures.
In Essex, in eastern England, the Orsett enclosure
(Hedges and Buckley 1978) has strong similarities to
Whitehawk, with three ditch circuits and a palisade
line within the middle ditch. There may have been
a single bank between the two outer ditches created
from the soil from both ditches, suggesting that they
were contemporary. However, aerial photographs
indicate that the ditch circuits were not complete,
negating the defensive value of the substantial bank
and palisade.
Moving to the Thames Valley, the Abingdon enclo-
sure (Avery 1982) has two ditch circuits, the outer
succeeding the inner. Bradley (1986) has argued that
the outer ditch had an accompanying palisade and
that it is not clear that the ditch was broken by reg-
ular causeways, so that this phase of the ‘whole
earthwork seems to assume defensible proportions’
(1986: 183-84). However, there is little trace of settle-
ment activity in the area newly enclosed by the
larger ditch circuit, so a defended settlement seems
unlikely. Unfortunately, the extent of gravel extrac-
tion here is such that a resolution of the question is
now impossible.
Turning to the north and west, a concentration of
complete arrowheads (some 130, mostly from the
enclosure ditch) indicates the possibility of an attack
on the large D-shaped Billown enclosure on the Isle
of Man (Darvill 2001). Conflict has also been pro-
posed for the only definite causewayed enclosure in
Ireland, at Donegore Hill in Country Antrim (Mallory
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and Hartwell 1984). Located on a hilltop with a dou-
ble line of ditch and palisade circuits surrounding a
ploughed area from which some 45,000 sherds from
1,500 vessels of Early Neolithic pottery have come
(Sheridan 2001), the site certainly has claims for
being a defended settlement. However, plough dam-
age made the recovery of evidence for internal struc-
tures very difficult, the flint assemblage contains
rather few arrowheads, which are mostly scattered
across the site (Nelis 2003), the palisade appears to
be rather slight and lacking traces of burning and
the ditches are wide and flat. All these factors sug-
gest that Donegore was probably not a defended
site, contrary to early thoughts (e.g. Sheridan 1991).
The palisade enclosures at Knowth, C. Meath
(Eogan and Roche 1997), predate the famous Middle
Neolithic passage graves. Inside there are a number
of pits but no clear settlement traces. The lack of evi-
dence for destruction and of associated arrowheads
and the slight nature of the palisade again suggest a
non-defensive enclosure.
From preliminary reports (e.g. Logue 2003) the
Thornhill, Co. Londonderry, site has a palisade line
with evidence of rebuilding after destruction by fire,
with seven burnt and unburnt leaf-shaped arrow-
heads (of a total of 21 from the excavations as a
whole) associated with the destruction phase. Inside
the enclosure, which was rebuilt and seems to have
grown over time, were several rectangular houses
and outbuildings associated with Earlier Neolithic
pottery. Logue (2003) has suggested that the pal-
isade enclosure was located so as to secure a promi-
nent position in exchange networks of flint and
stone.
Also in Ireland, the Ballynagilly, Co. Tyrone, long
house has been argued to be a scene of conflict, with
the house being burnt down and six leaf-shaped
arrowheads in and around the house but only three
discovered elsewhere in the extensive excavations
(ApSimon 1971). This is certainly possible, but the
precise stratigraphic relationship between the arrow-
heads and the house would need to be established.
There appears to be a similar case at Islandmagee,
Co. Antrim (Moore 2003), where the rectangular
House 1 was burnt down c. 3800 BC, an action asso-
ciated with some fifteen projectile points.
From this brief summary it should be clear that
there are plausible defended, and sometimes
attacked, Early Neolithic enclosures from across
south-western Britain and Ireland. However, this does
not mean that I agree with Lawrence Keeley’s recent
criticism of British archaeologists for attempting to
‘pacify the past’ (1996: 18). Ironically, he contrasts
Alasdair Whittle with ‘the archaeologists who have
conducted extensive excavations of some of these
enclosures’, when Whittle has actually carried out a
major excavation at the most famous of all cause-
wayed enclosures – Windmill Hill (Whittle et al.
1999). The ditches at Windmill Hill contain not
only deliberately dumped mounds of feasting debris
and fragments of items which arrived there through
long distance exchange, but also burials, such as
that of a child. In the case of Windmill Hill, a wide
range of activities was carried out at this major site,
but not settlement and not defence. There are also
sites in eastern England which have been intensive-
ly investigated but present no evidence for defence
or attack and little of possible settlement – Briar Hill
(Bamford 1985), Etton (Pryor 1998) and Haddenham
(Evans 1988; Hodder 1992), along with those Sussex
examples identified by Drewett (1994) as non-
defensive. Saville (2002) notes that in terms of num-
bers of arrowheads only Carn Brea, Crickley Hill and
Hembury stand out, with other enclosures having a
consistently minor presence of the type. So on this
specific criterion there is very limited evidence to
suggest a consistent pattern of attacks on enclosures.
Roger Mercer himself, one of the excavators cited
by Keeley, has recently stated clearly that he ‘does
not argue that all Neolithic enclosures were defensive
– many were clearly not, and indeed components of
the site at Hambledon Hill were not’ (1999: 156).
We must not forget that sites such as Hambledon
Hill and Crickley Hill began life as ceremonial enclo-
sures, but only later in their history became defen-
sive enclosures, reducing the number of entrances
and constructing banks and palisades. As Mercer
stresses, the ritual element is central to any under-
standing of causewayed enclosures. At Hambledon
Hill the Main Enclosure, with skulls in the ditch
along with the remains of feasting debris, possibly
funerary feasts, continued in use in tandem with the
Stepleton Enclosure.
The ritual authority residing in such centres may
have been crucial to their transformation into defen-
sive settlements, given that they existed on the edge
of the settled landscape, rather than at its centre,
where one would expect the pressure on resources
to be at its greatest (Thorpe 1996: 177). The other
major factor may have been the potential control
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over exchange processes which permanent occupa-
tion of an enclosure could bring, were exotic items
to become a source of social power. Such develop-
ments involved only a minority of sites, in western
Britain (Oswald et al. 2001: 128-29) in a horizon
around 3500 BC, and where we have dating evidence
for the individual arrowhead deaths, these occur in
the same period. The broader context is the emer-
gence of regional pottery styles, and greater seden-
tism in the form of the first fields and large houses,
perhaps resulting in attempts at political centralisa-
tion, although they did not succeed. It is likely that
this evidence for large scale conflict relates to the
more general pattern of the emergence of the indi-
vidual within society. Towards the end of the Earlier
Neolithic individual burials take place under long
barrows in Wessex and western England (a class of
monument which had previously covered disarticu-
lated and tangled masses of bones [Thorpe 1984]),
in the north earthen round barrows with individual
interments appear, as at Duggleby Howe in Yorkshire
(Loveday 2002), and in Ireland the Linkardstown
cist burials develop (Cooney 2000: 97-99). These
share features of the burial of recognisable individual
skeletons, mostly of single males where the skeletal
material has been studied, sometimes placed in sep-
arate graves, and with the provision of definite grave
goods. However, we must not forget that some of
the individual cases of trauma, especially the skull
injuries, come from the communal monuments dat-
ing to the very beginning of the Neolithic, such as
Fussell’s Lodge. At least small scale conflict was
present, therefore, from the origins of agriculture in
Britain, and probably before, so a simple materialist
model of conflict appearing along with pressure on
land does not work.
Later Neolithic
With this evidence from the latter part of the Early
Neolithic one might expect the Late Neolithic to be
an even more intense period of conflict. Yet the main
successor monument type to causewayed enclosures,
henges, have long been accepted as non-defensive
(Wainwright 1989), because of the existence of an
external bank allowing an attacking force to fire down
on the defenders. (Burl 1987: 129 is an extremely
rare exception to this unanimity, and he does not
address the issue of the external bank.) Indeed, there
is remarkably little evidence for conflict of any kind
from the early part of the Later Neolithic (from c.
3300-2700 BC). There may be two factors contribut-
ing to this: the burial record is generally sparse,
especially in terms of complete bodies in protected
locations such as below the mounds of round bar-
rows, and a change in the form of arrowheads, from
leaf-shaped to the asymmetrical petit-tranchet form
(Edmonds and Thomas 1987). Such arrowheads
would be more suitable as a short-range weapon and
would tend to inflict wide bleeding wounds. However,
Edmonds and Thomas note that such arrowheads
can penetrate bone, so a complete absence of arrow-
head injuries should not be expected.
But after this possible period of peace, the gener-
al assumption has been that a period of conflict
arose in the later part of the Later Neolithic (after
2700 BC) with the appearance of Beakers. Certainly
this was the traditional view of an invading group of
Beaker warriors arriving from the continent. Wessex
archaeologist Charles Warne saw the Beaker invaders
of Britain as wielding ‘the gory battle-axe, reeking
and fresh from deadly strife’ (1866: 63), while for
Lord Abercromby (1912: 64) the Beaker Folk ‘pre-
sented an appearance of great ferocity and brutality’,
and indeed their faces betrayed to his keen eye clear
criminal features. Even trepanned skulls were inter-
preted as gruesome drinking vessels made from vic-
tims – these are now thought to be the result of
medical operations (James and Thorpe 1994: 24-33),
although these may in some cases result from
attempts to relieve problems produced by skull frac-
tures arising from conflicts.
The reasons behind this lie, of course, in the
Beaker-associated set of equipment including metal
daggers and copies in flint, battle-axes, barbed and
tanged arrowheads and stone wristguards plausibly
symbolising archery and warring (Replogle 1980),
and argued to be associated with males (Clarke 1970:
264-65) in warrior graves (Ashbee 1978: ch. 7).
Both the association of archery with males and the
pan-European nature of the Beaker phenomenon
have recently been confirmed by the burial from
Boscombe Down near Stonehenge (Fitzpatrick 2002):
this adult male (aged 35-45) was buried with five
Beakers, gold hair tresses, three copper knives, a slate
wristguard on his left forearm, and another wrist-
guard by his knee, and a cache of flints (possibly in
a bag); in the grave fill were fifteen barbed-and-
tanged arrowheads. Isotopic analysis of his tooth
enamel points to a birthplace in central Europe.
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The invasionist hypothesis has largely been aban-
doned today (although some element of population
movement is plausible [Brodie 1994], as the Boscombe
Down burial suggests), but the impression neverthe-
less remains of the Late Neolithic as a period of con-
flict, due to the warfare symbolism of the artefact
repertoire.
But what is the actual evidence for this? In contrast
to the Early Neolithic, only two plausibly defensible
Late Neolithic enclosures have been claimed. One is
at Mount Pleasant in Wessex, where around 2200 BC
a substantial timber palisade some 800 m long was
constructed to cut off an area of over four hectares
with just two narrow entrances established by exca-
vation. The palisade, which stood up to six metres
high, was partially destroyed by fire, partially disman-
tled and partially left to rot in situ. Wainwright (1979:
ch. 4 and 237-45) felt that the palisade was defensive,
but the only potentially contemporary activities
related to the enclosure are an internal stone setting
(a three-sided cove) and some pottery, flintwork and
animal bone in ditch deposits. Although Wainwright
interpreted the ditch material as ‘domestic refuse’
(1979: 241) which arrived in the ditches after the
demolition but derived from settlement activity
contemporary with the enclosure, reconsideration of
the finds suggests that this is the result of deliberate
deposition not the dumping of rubbish (Thorpe
1989: 322-25; Thomas 1996: 214-22). The siting of
the enclosure on a spur with a steep fall in the ground
on one side shows the natural contours of the site
could be considered to be taken into the account for
defensive purposes. However, the relatively low-lying
setting of the enclosures still makes this an unlikely
location for a defended settlement, with far more
suitable locations such as Maiden Castle (with an
earlier causewayed enclosure) in the vicinity.
In Scotland, at Meldon Bridge there was a rather
earlier palisade enclosure built around 3000 BC. The
palisade here cuts off a large area (c. seven hectares)
between two rivers and is again an impressive con-
struction. This was at first thought to be a defended
settlement (Burgess 1976), but it is now clear that the
settlement debris found inside the enclosure is not
contemporary with the palisade. It is now thought
that although the perimeter palisade had a defensive
potential the site is best seen as one of a group of
enclosures with timber avenues which are believed
to be primarily ceremonial in nature (Speak and
Burgess 1999).
These reinterpretations of the Mount Pleasant
and Meldon Bridge palisade enclosures come against
the background of the later discovery and excava-
tion of other palisade enclosures with little claim to
a defensive purpose (Gibson 2002). These include
Greyhound Yard, Dorchester (Woodward et al. 1993),
only some two kilometres from Mount Pleasant,
Hindwell in Wales (Gibson 1999) and two enclosures
at West Kennet in the river valley below the cham-
bered tomb (Whittle 1997).
Unfortunately for the theory of blood-soaked
‘Beaker Folk’ examination of copper and early bronze
daggers has revealed no traces of violent conflict.
Many battle-axes are elaborate objects, sometimes
decorated, and frequently have blunted edges. This
need not, of course, mean that battle-axes were
never used as weapons, for there are cultures, such
as the Maori, in which famous weapons became
highly decorated, but almost no skeletal evidence
exists in the form of battle-axe wounds from Britain.
Similarly, examination of copper daggers failed to
provide traces of their use in combat (Wall 1987).
Given the background of nineteenth century exag-
geration it is not surprising that some archaeologists
have concluded that the Beaker period was peaceful.
What we do see in the Late Neolithic are individ-
uals who appear to have suffered traumatic injuries.
At Smeeton Westerby, central England, a disturbed
adolescent burial from a Beaker barrow has a possible
injury to a chest vertebra (Clay and Stirland 1981).
At Chilbolton, Wessex (Russell 1990) the forearm of
a young adult male accompanied by a Beaker (radio-
carbon dated to c. 2200 BC) had a parry fracture. The
Liffs Low, northern England, stone cairn contained
a young adult male with a healed fracture of the
upper arm; this burial appears to have been associ-
ated with a Beaker (Barnatt 1996). In Southeast
England, the primary burial in the Pyecombe barrow
(Butler 1991) was a mature adult male with healed
fractures to the forearm and collarbone, associated
with a Beaker, bronze dagger and stone wristguard.
A number of possible traumatic injuries are recorded
for the Barnack barrow, eastern England (Donaldson
1977). These are a probable older adult male with
two depressions on the skull which could result from
blows with a hammer; an adult male with a healed
linear wound on the cranium, and an older adult
male with a healed fracture of the forearm.
More significant are those individuals who seem
to have died violent deaths. At the Oxford University
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Parks Science Area in the Thames Valley a round
barrow ditch enclosed four inhumation burials in
graves (Boston et al. n.d.). The earliest of these buri-
als (radiocarbon dated to c. 2200 BC) was a woman
aged over fifty, who had suffered a blow from an axe
to the back of the head, which had begun to heal
before death. She was accompanied by a late-style
Beaker and a used flint toolkit. Although an unlikely
warrior this woman was buried with respect – being
the primary burial and the only one with a Beaker.
At Stonehenge (Evans 1984) the burial of a young
man, aged twenty five to thirty, was found in the
ditch, accompanied by a stone wristguard and three
barbed and tanged arrowheads; the tip of one of these
was embedded in one of the ribs, while the tip of a
fourth arrowhead was found in the sternum, proba-
bly having passed through the heart, and another
rib has a groove cut in it which was also interpreted
as the result of an arrow injury. All the arrow shots
appear to have been from close range. Does this rep-
resent a ritual killing (as argued by Gibson 1994), the
execution of a criminal, or alternatively a victim of
conflict? Certainly the notion of an execution seems
highly implausible given the setting – someone who
had broken social rules is unlikely to have been seen
as a suitable person to bury in such prestigious sur-
roundings.
Also in Wessex there is the burial at Barrow Hills
(Barclay and Halpin 1999). A young adult male, aged
twenty to thirty, was found with variety of artefacts
including a Beaker, a bronze awl and a set of five fine
barbed and tanged arrowheads. When the skeleton
was lifted another arrowhead was discovered lying
against the spine – this crude example has an impact
fracture at the tip and both barbs are broken and
was probably the cause of death.
In central Wales, excavations at the Sarn-y-Bryn
Caled timber circle (Gibson 1994) produced the cre-
mation of a young adult buried in a pit at the centre
of the circle, which dates to the very end of the Late
Neolithic or the start of the Earlier Bronze Age. (The
radiocarbon date on charcoal is earlier than the
typological associations of the arrowheads). The
burial was accompanied by four fine barbed-and-
tanged arrowheads discovered amongst the mass of
bone. The arrowheads were burnt, but they had not
disintegrated completely, so Gibson concludes that
they must have been protected from the hottest
flames. Moreover, they had clearly been used, and
two had lost their tips as a result of breakage on
impact. Gibson thus argues that the arrowheads were
in the body during the cremation, thus preserving
them. Moreover, he notes the fine quality of the
arrowheads, which contrast with the death-dealing
example at Barrow Hills, and suggests that the Sarn-y-
Bryn Caled death was a sacrifice.
Similar finds are identified by Green (in Gibson
1994) from the cairn of Twr Gwyn Mawr in Wales
(Davies 1857) and Grandtully in Scotland (Simpson
and Coles 1990). At Twr Gwyn Mawr one of the two
barbed-and-tanged arrowheads found with a crema-
tion appears to have an impact fracture at the tip
according to the published illustration – unfortu-
nately the finds are lost. At Grandtully the crema-
tion of an adult, possibly female, was found with five
finely made barbed-and-tanged arrowheads which
were burnt, but had not completely disintegrated.
Again Gibson suggests they may have been in the
body during the cremation. However, if they were in
a body cavity, this would become the hottest part of
the body during the cremation process due to the
body fats (McKinley 1989), so we may instead be
dealing with chance survival as a result of the vari-
ability of wind, consistency of the pyre heat (lower
towards the edges) or material falling down through
the pyre and being collected after the cremation was
over (S. Leach pers. comm.).
A further possible example comes from the
Fordington Farm barrow in Wessex (Bellamy 1991).
A young adult male with a direct radiocarbon date
of c. 2350 BC was found in a grave with a complete
barbed-and-tanged arrowhead in the stomach; the
young man had a healed forearm fracture. However,
the particular form of barbed-and-tanged arrowhead
is found elsewhere in association with Earlier Bronze
Age artefact types, and the grave containing the bur-
ial cut through the mound from the first phase of
burials at the site, covering burials with direct radio-
carbon dates of c. 2100 BC but no grave goods.
Rather than interpreting these discoveries in
terms of sacrifice I would argue instead that we may
see here the remains of those killed in the course of
small scale conflicts, whose bravery was then recog-
nised by a prestigious burial. This interpretation may
be strengthened by a discovery made during the
re-analysis of the Beaker burials from the small flat
grave cemetery at Staxton in Yorkshire, northern
England (Stead 1959; S. Leach pers. comm.). Burial
11, an adult male found with a well-made Beaker,
had a major weapon injury to the left shoulder, a
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(battle-axe?) blade fracturing the clavicle and embed-
ding itself into the scapula (S. Leach pers. comm.).
This is the most likely cause of death. A healed frac-
ture on the side of the left hand may possibly repre-
sent a defensive injury resulting from an earlier
episode of violence.
It is crucial to note that these injuries were not
noted in the original publication and it is therefore
possible that further evidence of traumatic injury
may come to light. In particular, several of the cave
burials of northern England appear to have suffered
sudden deaths. However, direct radiocarbon dates
on a number of these from Yorkshire have produced
Roman period dates (S. Leach pers. comm.), even for
examples apparently associated with Beaker pottery,
so caution is necessary in assigning a date to these
without evidence from radiocarbon dates.
While the Beaker grave-goods of daggers and battle-
axes symbolised warfare, the lack of clear evidence
for conflict, particularly given the substantial num-
ber of surviving skeletons from the period, makes it
more likely that raiding not warfare was typical of
Beaker period Britain. This would perhaps result in
relatively low levels of casualties, but might have
been a vital source of status acquisition. It may be
that the European-scale Beaker network of prestige
goods competition saw a period of suppression of
warfare proper (R. Mercer pers. comm.).
Earlier Bronze Age
Turning to the Earlier Bronze Age, after 2000 BC, it
is important to note the differences between Britain
and continental Europe. Daggers remain the domi-
nant form in burial (Gerloff 1975). Although hal-
berds and spearheads do appear, they are quite rare,
except for halberds in Ireland (Waddell 2000: 129-
31). Although halberds are undoubtedly an unwieldy
looking weapon, frequent use damage to the back
of the hafting plate suggests that they may have
been used in a similar way to medieval pole arms,
that is mostly using the wooden staff and only strik-
ing with the metal head to deliver a coup de grace
(O’Flaherty et al. 2002). Where reliable skeletal
reports exist, daggers are associated with males, and
have thus long been seen as warrior equipment, fol-
lowing Beaker traditions. As with the Later Neolithic
copper daggers, however, there are few traces of
combat on the daggers themselves (Wall 1987),
except for some examples from the River Thames
(York 2002). Some daggers also seem inappropriate
as weapons, as they are too small, have highly pol-
ished and unworn blades, have very wide blades, or
rounded tips (Gerloff 1975: 46 and 55). Swords or
rapiers are rare.
Moreover, we also have a considerable skeletal
record from the period, and this is relatively silent
when it comes to the victims of conflict. In terms of
individual episodes of combat these seem to be rela-
tively few, as other surveys of the evidence have sug-
gested (Osgood 1998: 19).
A similar case of death through arrowhead injury
to those noted from the Later Neolithic may occur
at Ballymacaldrack, Co. Antrim (Tomb and Davies
1938). Here the cremation of an adult, possibly
female, in an Early Bronze Age Collared Urn was
accompanied by a rough barbed-and-tanged arrow-
head with a broken tip.
In western England, the Court Hill round barrow
covered the primary burial of a young adult male
with his left upper arm chopped through, probably
the cause of death (Grinsell 1971: 120; Bristow
1998: Vol. II, 72). The barrow at Withington, north-
west England (Wilson 1981), contained as a primary
burial a cremated young adult female (radiocarbon
dated to c. 1700 BC) who had a head injury in the
process of healing. At Cnip, Isle of Lewis, Scotland
(Dunwell et al. 1995), an older adult male (also
dated to c. 1700 BC) buried with an undecorated pot
had extensive but healed facial trauma.
A prehistoric bog burial which probably dates to
the Earlier Bronze Age was found at Pilling in north-
west England in 1864. A decapitated female skull
was discovered wrapped in cloth, together with two
strings of jet beads, one with a large amber bead at
the centre (Edwards 1969). A probable dryland
decapitation burial directly dated by radiocarbon to
the beginning of the Earlier Bronze Age has been
discovered at the foot of the Gog Magog Hills just
outside Cambridge in eastern England (Hinman
2001). Following a possible decapitation, the remain-
der of an adult male was buried in a pit which was
later reopened to remove further portions of the
body. In neither of these cases, however, is there any
particular reason to suggest that the decapitation
took place as an act of war. We may instead be look-
ing at the result of the execution of socially defined
outcasts such as witches and their subsequent vio-
lent treatment to prevent their return. Certainly, the
large sample of Earlier Bronze Age bog bodies from
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the Wissey Embayment area of eastern England
contains no cases of traumatic injury (Healy 1996),
except for a possible case of an older adult (probably
male) missing some teeth.
A skeleton of an adult male dating to the Earlier
Bronze Age (accompanied by a food vessel and a
battle-axe) from Callis Wold 23 barrow in Yorkshire
(Mortimer 1905: 153-56) had received an extensive
wound to the left wrist, causing the hand bones to
fuse with those of the arm (Brothwell 1959-60).
Another possible case is that of an older adult male
from the Tallington round barrow in eastern England
(Simpson 1976) with a possibly injured upper arm.
From the very limited evidence available, two round
barrows in Amesbury near Stonehenge have pro-
duced cases of Earlier Bronze Age victims of conflict
(Thomas 1956; Ashbee 1960: 79). Under one round
barrow was an unaccompanied skeleton with the
skull and mandible removed, the right arm missing
and the left severed by a cut through the forearm.
A burial below a nearby disc barrow ‘also showed
signs of such treatment’, although whether this is
dismemberment or violence is not made clear. The
dangers of relying on old and incompletely pub-
lished accounts of traumatic injuries are clear from
the case of Stillorgan in Ireland, where a 1955 exca-
vation uncovered a female skeleton in a stone cist
with an oyster shell and a flint flake; a blow to the
head was stated to be the cause of death (noted by
Waddell 1990: 86). However, a recent re-examination
of the skeleton suggests that this is post-mortem
damage (B. Molloy pers. comm.). The recently redis-
covered and extensively injured Sonna Demesne man
(Sikora and Buckley 2003) was also not, as believed,
a Bronze Age victim but a medieval one as revealed
by radiocarbon dating (B. Molloy pers. comm.).
The disputed Sutton Veny bell barrow ‘warrior’
(Johnston 1980; Osgood 1999) from Wessex may
also belong here. The barrow covered a central burial
in a wooden coffin with Earlier Bronze Age pottery
and a bronze dagger. On the edge of the mound,
apparently below the surviving remnants of the
mound, was a grave containing the burial of an adult
aged twenty-four to twenty-eight years, accompa-
nied only by a shark tooth, ‘the victim of a particu-
larly violent head-wound, probably from a sword’
(Johnston 1980: 38). Because of this interpretation
of the traumatic injury, the burial was assumed to date
to the Later Bronze Age, when swords were in use,
and thus the burial had to be a subsequent burial
(after the mound was constructed) in a grave which
was then carefully backfilled and packed down with
chalk. Recently, Osgood (1999) has suggested that
the absence of Later Bronze Age burial in Britain
makes this more likely to be an Anglo-Saxon sec-
ondary burial – a well established type. However, the
illustrations of the wounds (unfortunately the skull
itself has been mislaid) are also consistent with an
interpretation of blunt force trauma (S. Leach pers.
comm.), especially as the fracture does not cross
sutures, so this could indeed be an Earlier Bronze
Age violent death.
Although the relative paucity of the artefactual
and skeletal record for conflict in the Earlier Bronze
Age is clear, one indirect piece of evidence does point
in the direction of warfare. The Irish wooden shield
mould from Kilmahamogue used for making V-
notched leather shields dates (from direct radiocarbon
dating – Hedges et al. 1991) to around 1900-1600
BC. This is the earliest known so far of the group, but
few of the others have been directly dated. As Osgood
notes (1998: 10), this would preclude any idea of
dagger combat. Perhaps the concentration of swords
noted by Harding in Ireland (2000: 279) may have a
beginning in the Early Bronze Age, although shields
do not automatically imply the presence of swords.
Although the beauty of the male warrior (Treherne
1995) seems to be present in the Earlier Bronze Age
of Britain, we can see few archaeological traces of
their actions. Settlements in general are difficult to
locate, so we may be dealing with a fairly mobile
population, therefore static defences such as enclo-
sures may have been inappropriate, and they are
indeed entirely absent.
Overall, the Later Neolithic and Earlier Bronze
Age record of conflict is remarkably thin. This raises
the question of how long the ‘warrior aristocracy’
commonly proposed for Late Neolithic-Early Bronze
Age Britain could have sustained itself without war-
ring. Interestingly, Robb (1997) has noted a similar
pattern for Italy, in which the frequency of cranial
trauma is highest in the Early and Middle Neolithic
but declines in the Late Neolithic even though
weapons made of imported metal appear and
weaponry becomes a central theme in rock art.
Perhaps the pan-European prestige good networks
(the most obvious of which are the movement of
metal and amber) acted to suppress warfare, although
this appears not to be the case elsewhere, e.g. in
Norway (Fyllingen this volume). 
154 . W A R F A R E  A N D  P R E - S T A T E  S O C I E T I E S
Later Bronze Age
Certainly when it comes to the Middle and Late
Bronze Age, after c. 1400 BC, together making up the
Later Bronze Age period, there is far more evidence
of conflict, although most is circumstantial. British
and Irish dirks and rapiers (Burgess and Gerloff
1981) are longer and thus have more serious poten-
tial as weapons than the Earlier Bronze Age daggers
from which they developed, with dirks for stabbing
and rapiers for thrusting. However,
the extreme length, narrowness and general fragility of many
rapier blades, especially of the longer and finer … examples …
combined with the inherent weakness of the butt attachment
method, leaves little doubt that such weapons could not have
been successfully used in combat. (Burgess and Gerloff 1981: 5)
Despite this, York (2002) notes that 86% of the dirks
and rapiers from the River Thames show signs of use
in the form of edge damage, while torn rivet-holes
suggest that rapiers were used as slashing weapons.
At this time we see the appearance in far greater
numbers of shields, swords, and spearheads.
Examination of shields and the far more common
swords and spearheads shows clear traces of damage
– piercings by spearheads in the case of the shields,
edge notching in the case of the swords, and broken
tips in the case of the spearheads.
The damage to shields has been considered by
Osgood (1998: 8-11), who proposes that it may most-
ly be ritual in nature (‘killing’ the now sacred object)
rather than the traces of their use in conflicts. The
shields from Beith in Scotland (stabbed by a blade),
Long Wittenham in the Thames Valley (stabbed by
a spear) and one from Country Antrim in Ireland
(slashed with a sword) could all result from combat
incidents, but the recent discovery from South
Cadbury in Southwest England (Coles et al. 1999)
does not fit this scenario. Three holes were punched
through the shield, probably using a sharpened
stake, after it was placed in the top of an ancient
enclosure ditch. This strongly favours ritual rather
than combat violence, although as Osgood notes
(1998:9) the specific form taken by one may have
been influenced by the other.
Moreover, it seems clear that the most common
British shield type (‘Yetholm type’) is too thin to resist
a determined blow (Coles 1962; Coles et al. 1999).
There are only two examples of the thicker ‘Nipper-
weise’ type known from Britain (Needham 1979).
The edge notching on swords is argued by
Bridgford (1997; 2000) to be the result of direct
impact on their edges and is most likely to have
occurred during the use of swords as weapons. She
distinguishes these edge-damaged from heavily
damaged and hacked swords, which are interpreted
as having been deliberately destroyed. Some clear
regional patterns emerge from her re-examination
of British and Irish swords. Over 90% of the Irish
swords exhibited this edge notching (Bridgford 1997:
106), and about 75% of Scottish examples (Bridgford
2000: Table 4.2.4), while in Southeast England the
figure falls to around a half (Bridgford 2000: Table
4.2.4). However, this is exaggerated by including
small fragments of sword blades from ‘scrap hoards’
in the figures for Southeast England (S. Bridgford
pers. comm.), and York’s specific study of bronzes
from the River Thames (2002) has a figure of 84%
used swords. Combining this with the unusually
large number of swords in Ireland by comparison
with other areas of Europe (Harding 2000: 279) it
might seem that Ireland was the scene of constant
conflict. Against this, the different recording meth-
ods used in Bridgford 1997 and 2000 mean that the
Irish figure given above is an over-estimate and the
true figure may be close to 75% (S. Bridgford pers.
comm.).
However, both Osgood and Harding have ques-
tioned the interpretation of the notching. Osgood
(1998: 13) suggests that misuse of the swords could
have caused notching, and points to the English
Civil War of the seventeenth century when officers
feared that common soldiers would break any swords
issued to them by chopping up firewood. Harding
suggests that Bronze Age swords would have been
ineffective in a slashing role, producing only bruis-
ing, and were much more suited to stabbing (1999a:
166). Both stress that we are not dealing with
medieval-style hand-to-hand combat or modern
fencing, with the sword used as much to parry the
opponent’s blows as to land them oneself, as the
shortness of the Later Bronze Age swords would mean
that warriors were very close to each other (Harding
1999a: 166). Osgood is right to urge a degree of cau-
tion, but the level of edge damage seems excessive
for misuse, while the social importance of swords
seen in later periods (with swords being named and
magical powers attributed to them) makes it likely
that they were highly valued in the Bronze Age too
(Kristiansen 2002). As Bridgford (2002: 127) notes,
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producing the sharp hardened edges of swords
‘required time, knowledge and consummate skill’.
This would be a clear contrast to the utilitarian
swords of the seventeenth century and make misuse
far less plausible. She also argues (S. Bridgford pers.
comm.) that the nature of the notching on Later
Bronze Age swords is unlike known cases of misuse.
Against Harding’s point, Bridgford (1997) notes
that the early Irish Ballintober type swords had a
weakness in the attachment of the hilt to the tang
which would result in breakage if used as a slashing
weapon. Many of the Ballintober type swords have
torn rivet holes suggesting that there was a problem
which was recognised. This was then solved by
redesigning later types. Moreover, Kristiansen (2002)
notes that later swords have a wider blade and a
balance point further down the blade, more suitable
for a slashing weapon.
Spearheads of the Later Bronze Age have gener-
ally been divided into lighter throwing spears and
heavier thrusting spears. The development of hol-
low-cast spearheads may have been to lighten them
so larger examples could be thrown (Bridgford 2000:
203). Both York (2002) and Bridgford (2000) have
identified large numbers of spearheads with damage
to the tip. Bridgford’s more wide-ranging survey
identified both typological and geographical varia-
tions in the frequency of damage, with more elabo-
rate and smaller spearheads and those from Southeast
England being less commonly damaged. There has
as yet been no challenge to the view that tip damage
to spearheads is the result of combat, except that
spearheads are of course known at a later date as
hunting weapons.
The broad-bladed spearhead with pegs in the
socket found at North Ferriby in north east England
could have been used like a harpoon, with the
spearhead breaking off and encumbering the shield-
bearer by becoming stuck in the shield (Bartlett and
Hawkes 1965), in a similar fashion to the Roman
pilum. As Osgood (1998: 15) notes, this is only a
single example and further examples need to be
found to consider this a significant part of Later
Bronze Age warfare.
Despite the general lack of formal burials from
the British Later Bronze Age (Brück 1995) there are a
number of cases which point to the existence of
conflict. Early in the nineteenth century a rare sock-
eted bronze dagger of Later Bronze Age date was dis-
covered in Drumman More Lake, Co. Armagh,
Ireland, embedded in the skull of what was appar-
ently a complete inhumation burial (Waddell 1984).
An equally old account is provided by Colt Hoare
(1812: 181-82) of a cremation in a large apparently
plain urn (which ‘fell to pieces the following day’)
with an unburnt jaw and femur above this. The jaw
‘had evident marks of a contusion’ and Colt Hoare
believed that this was saved from the cremation pyre
to mark the cause of death. Although Burl (1987:
197) regards this as an Earlier Bronze Age burial, the
urn sounds as though it might be Later Bronze Age,
while Grinsell (1957: 167) argues that the unburnt
bones were intrusive and thus unconnected to the
urn. Since the bones have disappeared along with
the urn, this has to remain an open case.
The burial deposits in The Sculptor’s Cave in
Scotland (Benton 1931) may belong here, as several
decapitated individuals (and some evidence that
skulls were suspended from the walls or ceiling of
the cave – Brück 1995: 276) were found at the site, as
well as Bronze Age objects. However, there was also
late Roman (and Viking) material in an upper layer
from which most of the bones were recovered. It is
not clear from the publication whether any of the
decapitated individuals were found in the secure
Bronze Age layer, and it is now clear that many vic-
tims of violent death are found in British caves in
the Roman period (S. Leach pers. comm.). A more
reliable case comes from Antofts Windypit in
Yorkshire, where a possible female of middle to old
age was killed by a sharp blade injury to the head
(S. Leach pers. comm.); there is a direct radiocarbon
date of c. 1350 BC for the skull.
The decapitated skull of an adult male from the
burnt mound on the bank of the River Soar,
Leicestershire (Beamish and Ripper 2000), is better
dated (by radiocarbon to c. 900 BC), but it can not
be determined whether he was a victim of conflict.
At Dorchester-on-Thames (Knight et al. 1972) a
spearhead broke off in the victim’s pelvis as it was
being pulled out, suggesting the use of great force.
The date is around 1100 BC (Osgood 1998: 21). The
most direct evidence of mass violent death comes
from Tormarton in the west of England (Knight et al.
1972), where two young adult males had been killed
from behind in a spear attack. One had fragments of
spearpoints in the vertebrae and the pelvis and had
also suffered a blow to the head. The other had a
spear wound in the pelvis. The radiocarbon date for
this event is around 1400 BC, at the beginning of
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the Later Bronze Age. Recent re-excavation of the site
(Osgood this volume) demonstrated that the bodies
(along with three others without visible wounds)
had been thrown into a ditch which was then swift-
ly backfilled.
These cases not only demonstrate that spearheads
were definitely used to kill people, they also provide
a link with one of the major developments of Later
Bronze Age Britain. The Tormarton ditch was a lin-
ear ditch, one of many dividing up the landscape in
the Later Bronze Age. What may be an analogous
case linking ditches and violence, albeit indirectly,
comes from Middle Farm in Wessex (Smith et al.
1997: 75-79, 157). In the fill of a linear ditch con-
taining Middle Bronze Age pottery were the skele-
tons of four adults (two males, a possible female and
one unsexed). Of these, an adult male, with a direct
radiocarbon date of c. 1400 BC, had a healed frac-
ture of the forearm.
The long-distance boundaries and field systems
which can still be seen in many upland areas (e.g.
Wessex – McOmish et al. 2002, Cunliffe 2004;
Dartmoor – Fleming 1988; North Yorkshire – Spratt
1989; and Wales – Murphy 2001) appear in great
numbers from the beginning of the Later Bronze Age.
Excavations in advance of destruction of sites have
added greatly to this picture in the British lowlands
in areas such as East Anglia (Pryor 1996; Malim
2001) and most spectacularly in the Thames Valley,
where large areas of field systems, probably for stock
management, can now be identified (Yates 2001).
The longer boundaries often seem to be placed to
maximise visibility (e.g. Cunliffe and Poole 2000;
McOmish et al. 2002: 64) and given the considerable
investment of labour involved it is widely agreed
that these make statements about land ownership
(Bradley et al. 1994: 152), with land and its possibil-
ity of surplus production becoming far more impor-
tant at this time.
Among the extensive field systems of the Thames
Valley are a number of enclosed settlements which
have been dubbed ‘ringforts’ (Needham 1992).
Excavated examples include two at Mucking (Bond
1988; Clark 1993), Springfield Lyons (Brown 2001),
South Hornchurch (Guttmann and Last 2000) and
Carshalton (Adkins and Needham 1985).
These ringworks vary in size from only thirty
metres in diameter to a few over two hundred metres
across. They may have one or several entrances with
a main entrance facing East with a gateway. The case
for being the residences of high-status families (e.g.
Needham 1992) is not confirmed by the general lack
of prestige goods (as Needham himself notes), and
as Guttmann and Last (2000) suggest, it may well
be that similarity of form should not be equated
with similarity of function. Deliberate deposits in
the enclosing ditches (including the clay moulds for
swords at Springfield Lyons) do not imply an imper-
ative to maintain defensive structures, while the
number of entrances in some cases implies that mil-
itary considerations were not a priority.
Other examples of ringworks occur in Central
England at Thrapston (Hull 2000-2001) and in
northern England at Thwing (Manby 1980), and the
potentially related stone-built ringforts of the west-
ern coast of Ireland (Cotter 2000), but they appear to
be a rarity outside the Thames Valley and Southeast
England.
The main roles of ringwork enclosures seem to be
in overlooking and overseeing agricultural produc-
tion and in monitoring movement along river valleys
(Bridgford 2000: 207; Guttmann and Last 2000;
Brown 2001; Yates 2001) and changes in the impor-
tance of emphasising the distinction between
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ by creating clear boundaries
between important spaces and the world beyond, a
development which fits clearly with the new empha-
sis on land boundaries (Thomas 1997). A role for
ringworks as the residences of high-status families
may be limited to areas of Britain where they are
rarer. This may be connected with the relative lack
of damage to swords and spearheads recorded by
Bridgford (2000): perhaps the ringworks acted as a
deterrent to raiders.
It is now well established that the earliest hillforts
are of Bronze Age date. These appear to be defended
settlements with substantial earthen banks and tim-
ber ramparts (Avery 1993). The dating of hillforts
has taken a number of swings, with early enthusiasm
for a large number of hillforts in the Later bronze
Age being tempered by the possibility that many
hilltops saw activity in the Later Bronze Age but not
necessarily enclosure. Thus sites such as Mam Tor
(Coombs and Thompson 1979) in northern England
and Hog Cliff Hill in Wessex (Ellison and Rahtz
1987) can not be taken to be enclosed at that time.
Nevertheless, there are examples with clear dating
evidence in the form of radiocarbon dates or artefact
assemblages from the ramparts and ditches from
areas including Southeast England (Hamilton and
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Manley 1997), the Thames Valley (Miles 1997),
Wessex (Needham and Ambers 1994), the Southwest
(Ellis 1989), western England (Ellis 1993), Wales
(Musson 1991), northern England (Stead 1968) and
Ireland (Mallory 1995).
The only Later Bronze Age hillfort with apparent
direct evidence of conflict is Dinorben in Wales, with
defences dated to around 800 BC by radiocarbon
(Guilbert 1981). ‘In the bottom of the ditch there
were three fragmentary male skeletons, one with its
skull cleft in two’, according to Gardner and Savory
(1964: 45). This need not, of course, represent an
episode of conflict between groups. Many of these
hillforts appear to have relatively slight defences, at
least compared with Iron Age hillforts, but this need
not mean that their wall-and-fill ramparts (Avery
1993: 122-27) were of negligible defensive value. At
The Breiddin, also in Wales (Musson 1991) the extent
of burning of the rampart and the subsequent aban-
donment of the site for several centuries suggests to
the excavator that destruction by fire is a possibility
here. So a threat may well have existed. The threat
may not, of course, have been to the hillfort itself
much of the time, and Hamilton and Manley (1997)
argue that in Sussex in Southeast England the first
hillforts were like the ringworks (not found here)
predominantly concerned with looking out over the
landscape below to watch people and livestock. In
Wessex, ridge-end hillforts (Cunliffe 2004) were also
situated to oversee the landscape. Similarly, the
Beeston hillfort (Ellis 1993) in western England and
The Breiddin in Wales (Musson 1991) were ideally
suited to monitor movement in the landscape
below.
The other element to consider in the Later Bronze
Age landscape is the presence of horses in much
larger numbers than hitherto (R. Bendrey pers.
comm.) at sites such as Potterne in Wessex (Lawson
2000). As others have noted this makes the possibil-
ity of mobile raiders in war-bands, perhaps engaged
in cattle theft for prestige, a strong likelihood
(Harding 1999b; Osgood et al. 2000: 34). The slash-
ing sword and the spear would be the weapons of
choice of such raiders, while the ringworks and the
hillforts (slightly defended because a siege was high-
ly unlikely to be undertaken) acted as a deterrent.
The apparent emphasis on land and the inheritance
of land may have been more to do with controlling
the livestock on the land, with the stock at more risk
than the land itself.
Conclusion
First it should be clear that the British evidence does
not show an increasing trend to a more warlike soci-
ety through time, as a simple cultural evolutionary
model would imply. Instead, it seems that there are
two main horizons of conflict: the Early Neolithic
and the Later Bronze Age, with a long period of rel-
ative lack of conflict between them. This runs con-
trary to traditional models of Beaker invaders and
Wessex Culture warrior chiefs, but the sample of
defensible sites and skeletal remains is sufficiently
large to point strongly in this direction. There is
generally a good agreement between the different
classes of evidence – where there are skeletal remains
showing trauma there are also plausible weapons and
defensible sites. This sequence of cycles of intensity
of conflict also contrasts with the implications of
theories based on evolutionary psychology, which
provide no basis for the interpretation of lower levels
of conflict.
As far as the limited skeletal evidence is con-
cerned, war in prehistoric Britain was mostly the
business of men, although there are cases of females
suffering traumatic injuries from the Early Neolithic
onwards, and we should certainly not assume that
they were passive victims. It is certainly not clear
that warfare was the product of young men striving
for status. There are sufficient older males among
the violently killed to demonstrate that this can
not be an absolute pattern. Unfortunately it is not
possible at present to determine how old healed
injuries were.
Except perhaps at the end of the Early Neolithic
and in certain geographical regions in the Later
Bronze Age the materialist theory seems not to fit
either, as resources are not the apparent source of
conflict. Instead, less tangible notions of prestige
and honour seem to be at stake; even in the Early
Neolithic of Ireland, when sites may be destroyed in
conflicts over the movement of axes, it is extremely
unlikely that they were essential to economic pro-
duction, as there were no significant differences
between the various rocks used for axe production
in terms of hardness or durability.
Thus none of the generalised theories of human
conflict are particularly successful in providing a
model of the development of violence, conflict and
warfare in British prehistory, implying that we need
to develop more nuanced accounts of conflict which
situate it in its specific historical and social context.
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The importance of war as ‘prime mover’ towards
hierarchical political complexity has long been a
matter of debate. While there is little doubt that war-
fare was a significant force in the political dynamics
of centralised societies and in the rise of the state, its
role in acephalous societies remains unclear. Some
argue that war as an agent of cultural selection weeds
out less adaptive cultural institutions and technolo-
gy, thereby selecting for efficiency and complexity
(Carniero 1970). Moreover, because individuals will
not willingly give up sovereignty without coercion,
warfare is one likely mechanism for increasing social
hierarchy (Ferguson 1990: 11). Others contest the
role of warfare as a ‘progressive’ force in acephalous
societies on the grounds that personal involvement,
weak organisational structures, shifting alliances,
diverse motivations of participants, and inefficient
technology make warfare ‘unproductive’ for politi-
cal evolution (Brown 1978; van der Dennen 1995;
Fried 1967; Meyer 1990; Montagu 1976; Naroll and
Divale 1976; Otterbein 1970; 1994; Turney-High
1949; Wright 1942).
From existing evidence, it is not easy to deter-
mine if and how warfare contributes to generating
complexity in acephalous societies. Archaeological
indicators such as skeletal damage, weaponry, forti-
fications, or depictions of combat in art are usually
sparse for tribal societies, sometimes indicating little
more than the presence or absence of war. Most
ethnographic studies of war, excellent though they
are, have been conducted in tribal societies that
were undergoing rapid change owing to direct and
indirect effects of contact with western cultures
(Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). Moreover, ethno-
graphic studies of war lack time depth, lending
them to the conclusion that war has a homeostatic
function (Rappaport 1968; Hallpike 1973; 1987).
Ethnohistorical studies of tribal warfare have their
own difficulties, for example, interpretation of oral
records and biases of narrators. However, they still
hold considerable potential for exploring the rela-
tion of war to political developments because they
contain far more information on the objectives,
courses, and outcomes of war than do archaeological
studies, and yet have the time depth not available in
most ethnographic works. 
The objective of this paper will be to use ethno-
historical data from the Enga of Papua New Guinea
to explore the role of warfare in pre-contact socio-
political change over a period of some 250 years
following the introduction of the sweet potato and
prior to first contact with Europeans. Three questions
will be addressed: (1) In acephalous societies like
Enga, what is the impact of egalitarian institutions
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The Impact of Egalitarian Institutions 
on Warfare among the Enga: 
An Ethnohistorical Perspective
P O L L Y  W I E S S N E R /11
Akali taiyoko ongo kunao napenge.
The blood of a man does not wash off easily.
on warfare in contrast to exchange? (2) Given egal-
itarian constraints operative in Enga history, what
role did warfare play in generating the hierarchical
complexity that unfolded during the period consid-
ered? (3) Did the Enga experiment with warfare to
try to circumvent egalitarian constraints and use
warfare more productively in their strategies?
Background
The Enga are a highland horticultural population in
Papua New Guinea (fig. 1) who live at altitudes of
1500-2500 m above sea level cultivating sweet pota-
to and other crops in an intensive system of mulch
mounding to feed large human and pig populations.
They are well known in the anthropological litera-
ture through the works of Feil (1984), Gordon and
Meggitt (1985), Lacey (1975; 1979), Meggitt (1965;
1972; 1974; 1977), Talyaga (1982), Waddell (1972),
and Wohlt (1978), amongst many others. The Enga
population, which numbers approximately 230,000
today, is divided into a segmentary lineage system of
phratries or tribes composed of some 1000 to 6,000
members, and their constituent exogamous clans,
sub-clans, and lineages (Meggitt 1965). Patrilineally
inherited clan membership furnishes a pool of people
who cooperate in agricultural enterprises, defence,
procurement of spouses, raising wealth for a variety
of payments, and in the past, communicating with
the spirit world. Affinal and maternal ties estab-
lished by exogamous marriage and maintained by
reciprocal exchange provide access to resources and
assistance outside the clan. Except in times of war-
fare when affines may be on the enemy side, there
is little conflict between agnatic and affinal loyalties
– the clan sees the wide range of affinal ties held by
individual members as enhancing the clan’s strength
(Wiessner and Tumu 1998: 172). Approximately 10%
of men in eastern Enga and 30% in western Enga
join the clans of maternal or affinal relatives.
Enga women devote themselves primarily to fami-
ly, gardening, and pig husbandry, while the politics
of warfare, exchange, and pursuit of ‘name’ or repu-
tation, occupies much of men’s time and effort.
‘Name’ can be obtained through several channels:
warfare, ritual expertise, mediation, organisation, and
the management of wealth. However, great warriors
have little say outside of the context of battle, the
power of ritual experts is limited to their realms of
practice, while big men, the masters of mediation
and exchange, are the most revered leaders who
exerted strong influence in many contexts. 
The Enga hold a rich body of historical traditions
(atome pii) that are held distinct from myth (tindii pii)
in that they are said to have originated in eyewit-
ness accounts. Historical traditions contain informa-
tion on subsistence, wars, migrations, agriculture, the
development of cults and ceremonial exchange net-
works, leadership, trade, environmental disasters,
and fashions in song and dress. They cover a period
of some 250-400 years that begins just prior to the
introduction of the sweet potato along local trade
routes and continue into the present. Accompanying
genealogies allow events to be placed in a chrono-
logical framework (fig. 2). 
Between 1985 and 1995, Akii Tumu, Nitze Pupu,
and I collected and analysed the historical traditions
of 110 tribes (phratries) of Enga (Wiessner and
Tumu 1998).1 The results of our studies indicate that
the period between the introduction of the sweet
potato and first contact with Europeans was one of
rapid change. The earliest of historical traditions
recording events prior to the introduction of the
sweet potato describe the population of Enga as
diverse with people practicing subsistence strategies
that varied by altitudinal zone. Eastern Enga (1500-
1900 m above sea level) was occupied by horticul-
turalists who cultivated taro, yams, bananas, sugar-
cane, and other crops in the wide, fertile valleys of
the Lai and Saka. In central Enga (1900 m-2100 m)
roughly equal emphasis was placed on gardening,
hunting, and gathering. In the high country of
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F I G .  1 : Map of Enga territory, Papua New Guinea.
western Enga above 2100 m lived scattered mobile
groups who depended heavily on hunting and gath-
ering, while shifting horticulturalists lived a precari-
ous existence in the steep and infertile valleys below.
Marriage and exchange, on the one hand, and ten-
sion and misunderstanding, on the other charac-
terised relations between the two. In these early tra-
ditions, the thriving exchange economy is described
as revolving around the circulation of stone axes,
cosmetic oil, salt, plumes and shells; pigs receive
little note.
The introduction of the sweet potato released
many constraints on production and made it possi-
ble to produce a substantial surplus of pigs for the
first time (Watson 1965a; 1965b; 1977). Immediate
reactions to the arrival of sweet potato differed by
area, however, historical traditions from all areas
report substantial shifts in population distribution,
population growth, and the expansion of ceremonial
exchange and religious ritual in response to mount-
ing social and political complexities. Three large net-
works arose that can all be counted as systems of
ceremonial exchange (fig. 3). The first of these was
the Kepele cult network of western Enga that linked
more than fifty tribes of western Enga in a ritual net-
work. Kepele ceremonies drew hundreds, and, in later
generations, thousands of participants to initiate
boys, express the equality of male tribal members,
communicate with the ancestors, and host guests
from other tribes for the massive Kepele feasts. The
second was the Great Ceremonial Wars of central
Enga, tournament fights fought recurrently between
entire tribes or pairs of tribes to demonstrate strength
and brew the feasts and exchanges of enormous pro-
portions that followed. The exchanges following the
four Great Ceremonial Wars forged links between
the inhabitants’ four major valley systems and adja-
cent outlying areas. The third major exchange net-
work was the Tee Ceremonial Exchange Cycle, a
three-phase cycle of enchained exchange festivals
that encompassed the majority of clans in eastern
Enga and many clans of central Enga by first con-
tact. As the Great Ceremonial Wars and Tee Cycle
expanded in eastern and central Enga, bachelors’
cults, female spirit cults, and ancestral cults were
developed and circulated within Enga or imported
from neighboring linguistic groups. The circulation
of these cults did much to standardise values between
areas and specify what was valued (Wiessner and
Tumu 1999).
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F I G .  2 : Chronological scheme of events discussed in text.
Generations before present:
c. 9-12 • Introduction of sweet potato to Enga
and beginning of Enga historical tra-
ditions. (c. 250-400 B.P.)
8 • Population shift from high altitudes
to lower valleys
• Beginning of early Tee cycle
7 • Kepele cult first practiced by horticul-
turalists of western Enga
6 • First Great Ceremonial Wars fought
5 (c.1855-1885?) • Kepele cult imported into central
Enga, called Aeatee
• War reparations initiated for peace
making
4 (c.1885-1915) • Tee cycle expanded to finance Great
Ceremonial Wars
• Aeatee (Kepele) cult linked to the Tee
Cycle and Great Ceremonial Wars
3 (c.1915-1945) • Tee cycle begins to subsume Great
Ceremonial Wars
• Aeatee/Kepele cult used to organise
the Tee
• First contact with Europeans in early
1930s
• 1938-41 last Great Ceremonial War
fought 
• Tee cycle subsumes Great War
exchange routes
2 (c.1945-1975) • Tee cycle continues to expand
1 (c. 1975-2005) • 1975 Papua New Guinea's
Independence
Note: We have calculated a generation to be 30 years,
though certainly for the earliest generations time distor-
tions such as telescoping may occur. In view of this,
events that occurred in the second to fourth generation
before present were roughly dated in relation to known
occurrences; from the fifth to eight generation before 
present, they were sequenced by genealogy but no attempts
were made at dating. Prior to the eight generation, they
can be neither dated not sequenced. It is reassuring to
note that trends such as the spread of the Tee cycle or
major cults do show temporal consistency within and
between areas.
Around the fourth to fifth generation before
present, as the Great Ceremonial Wars expanded
under the forces of dramatic inter-group competition,
leaders of central Enga constructed complex alliances
of exchange to effectively tap into the wealth of the
Tee Cycle and to reinvest the great quantities of
wealth that flowed out of the Great War exchanges.
The cost, conflicts, and complexity of organisation
of the Great Ceremonial Wars and Tee Cycle became
formidable. In response, leaders imported the inte-
grative Kepele cult from western Enga and used it as
an occasion to unite clans and tribes for exchange
and organise the timing and flow of wealth within
and between the Great Ceremonial Wars and Tee
Cycle. The three networks became linked. In the
late 1930s the Great Wars were discontinued and
their networks replaced by the Tee cycle. The full-
blown Tee was vast, involving a population of some
40,000 people in eastern and central Enga at first
contact.
The impact of egalitarian institutions on
Enga warfare and exchange
Like many acephalous societies, Enga is governed by
the constraints of strong egalitarian institutions
stipulating potential equality. I define institutions
following the New Institutional Economics as “the
rules of the game” (North 1990) and their accompa-
nying ideologies that set values, priorities, and world
views (Ensminger 1992). I will refer to egalitarian
institutions rather than considering Enga an egali-
tarian society, because pronounced inequalities or
differences in spheres of influence do exist, for exam-
ple, in relations between the sexes. Rules and ide-
ologies of equality apply within the sexes – all Enga
married men hold equal rights to be granted land,
allocate household labour and its products as they
see fit, receive support by group members in procur-
ing spouses, be protected by the clan, have a voice
in decision making, and pursue status.2  Egalitarian
institutions and ideals apply to potential equality
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but not equality of outcome (Robbins 1994). Though
initially defined as equals, men are challenged to
excel and achieve status via words and actions that
are perceived to benefit the clan or sub-clan.
However, name and fame are transient and the
demise of big men is rapid when their actions are
not perceived as furthering clan interests or when
they infringe on the rights or resources of group
members. Ideals of potential equality are extended
to parallel units in the segmentary lineage system –
clans are considered equal to other clans, lineages to
other lineages, and so on.
Given the tension between potential equality and
encouraged inequality of outcome in the arenas of
status and influence, potential equality has to be
continually maintained. This task falls first in the
hands of individuals and then in the hands of line-
ages, sub-clans, or clans when the individual cannot
manage alone. Each man is expected to exert and
defend his equality and the rights of his household.
Consequently, assertiveness is admired, promoting
strong self-reliant individuals who make things
happen to increase the prosperity of family and clan.
Nonetheless, men who are weak still hold basic rights
to land, spouses, voice, and protection.3  Individual
assertiveness is only expected to go so far – when a
man is assaulted physically or verbally in the process
of defending his rights, or when he faces hardship,
group members are obliged to come to his assistance.
Thus, contrasting moralities exist, the one espous-
ing individual assertiveness, and the other, sociality,
empathy, solidarity, loyalty, and sacrifice for the
group.4
Egalitarian institutions differentially affect
exchange and warfare. For social and economic
exchange, they greatly facilitate cooperation by
reducing transaction costs, that is, assessing value,
protecting rights, and enforcing agreements (North
1990). For example, equality standardises informa-
tion for most forms of exchange by stipulating that
individuals are equals and that exchange should
therefore be balanced over the long run. Within the
clan or sub-clan, individuals offer help to others
knowing that as equals they will be able to request
and receive assistance when assistance is needed
without the fear that assistance given to others will
be used to build position and subordinate them.
With individuals outside the group, where the most
important exchanges involve significant delays and
temporary imbalance, equality of exchange partners
is crucial to foster the trust that wealth given will
be repaid. Under conditions of inequality and mis-
trust, delayed exchange is quickly eroded by fears of
exploitation. Finally, to be received as an equal facil-
itates the mobility that was so crucial for men who
moved from clan to clan to organise exchange. As
Kelly (2000) has pointed out, hierarchies do not
mesh easily. It is unlikely that the great exchange
networks that developed in Enga history could have
done so outside of the matrix of balance and trust
fostered by equality. And big men appeared to have
sensed this – in negotiating the import of cults, they
sought those which underwrote potential equality
between all men during periods of history when very
real inequalities were emerging.
While egalitarian institutions fostered develop-
ments in exchange, they inhibited the same in war-
fare. Three dimensions of potential equality exerted
profound constraints on warfare: rights over the
allocation of one’s own labour and the products of
labour, voice in decision making, and equal rights
to be defended by the clan members. Each of these
merit discussion.
Rights over labour and its products. Perhaps the most
strongly held right in Enga, as in other societies pro-
moting equality within the sexes, is the right of indi-
viduals over their own labour. Though fellow clan
members, affinal kin, or maternal kin choose to allo-
cate a portion of their labour or wealth to assisting
one another in a variety of activities, attempts to
appropriate the labour of others meet with strong
resistance. Men and women with established house-
holds never exchange their labour in return for pay-
ment – even allies in warfare are not compensated
for their efforts, only for lives lost.
An individual’s right to control over his or her
own labour and its products has two ramifications
for warfare. The first is that neither big men nor war
leaders can command or buy the services of warriors5,
nor can they subjugate the losers and appropriate
their labour. In all cases recorded in historical tradi-
tions, the defeated in warfare retreated or disbanded
to settle elsewhere rather than forfeit their equality
and independence. Second, because Enga cannot
appropriate the labour of others, it is labour rather
than land that is in short supply. Given a shortage
of labour, the only way by which to increase the
amount of wealth for distribution, other than by
augmenting the work force via polygamy6, is to con-
struct individual networks of exchange outside the
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clan and thereby obtain access to the produces of the
labour of others. Configurations of external exchange
ties follow marriage links and thus differ for each
household in a clan. When war erupts, it differen-
tially affects the economic status of each household,
generating conflicts of interest within the clan.
Households having strong ties in the enemy clan
seek to re-establish peace as soon as possible, while
those with weak ties may opt to continue fighting.
War can be particularly damaging to the households
of big men who hold the broadest exchange ties.
Participation in decision-making. A major forum
for maintaining equality amongst men is the clan
meeting held to discuss issues of corporate group
concern (Sackschewsky et al. 1970). In clan meetings,
each mature individual is expected to express his own
opinion, introduce topics, or ask questions to elicit
the thoughts of others. Information and opinions
are often phrased in symbolic speech that reveals
only part of a man’s knowledge or position at one
time. Other men listen attentively, trying to analyse
the speaker’s words and gestures for intent and new
information. Personal interests of the speaker are
then evaluated in view of clan interests. Finally,
opinions are synthesised so that individual positions
are aligned with those of other members of the
group and a decision is reached. Big men provide
insightful information, warn of the dangers of certain
actions, and seek to coordinate consensus, but do
not assert any jurisdiction over clan brothers nor
engage in blatantly persuasive speech, particularly
when the issue is warfare. They have more influence
than others if and only if they can convince their
‘brothers’ that their plans will optimally benefit the
group. Men who aggressively persuade others to fight
may risk blame when lives of men from other sub-
clans are lost. Required consensus for warfare makes
it difficult for any man to launch a war to pursue his
own Machiavellian interests; competitors within the
clan are extremely wary of each other’s motives.
Right to be protected and defended by the group. As
equals, men in Enga are neither judged positively
or negatively by clan members nor given official
recognition or punishment for their deeds. Certain
insignia or items of paraphernalia may be worn on
public occasions to advertise a man’s achievements,
however, it is the individual himself who chooses to
wear these at the risk of mockery should others not
judge his accomplishments as positively. The clan
confers no honours. Likewise if a man has committed
reckless acts or crimes, he will not be judged and
punished by the clan. For internal cases, the offender
and his kin must negotiate reparations for his deeds
or risk retaliation by the kin of the offended party.
In external relations, the entire clan backs a man,
for the clan’s reputation depends on the defence of
members. Women receive protection from their
husbands’ clans and their natal clans alike.
Guaranteed vengeance or affronts to group mem-
bers can be executed against any member of the
enemy group, following the principle of social substi-
tution which Kelly (2000) considers to be the hallmark
of true war. It assures backing for each individual
and signals the strength of the group relative to sur-
rounding ones. Unavenged wrongs generate intense
feelings of humiliation and insecurity. In a very real
sense the pain of violence or shame are shared by
clan members as expressed in the following quote:
Now I will talk about warfare. This is what our forefathers
said: When a man was killed, the clan of the killers sang songs
of bravery and victory. They would shout, ‘Auu’ (‘Hurray’ or
‘Well done’) to announce the death of an enemy. Then their
land would be like a high mountain (manda singi) and that is
how it was down through the generations. The members of the
deceased’s clan would become small (koo injingi). They would
be nothing. But, when they had avenged the death of their
clansman then they would be all right. Their hearts would be
open (mona lyangenge). In other words, when one fights and
takes revenge for the death of a fellow clansman, then one gets
even and back on equal footing. (Tengene Teyao, Yakani Kalia
clan of Wakumale, Wabag)
The assurance of clan backing, right or wrong, makes
men willing to undertake acts of verbal or physical
aggression that they might not otherwise contem-
plate. It also means that the rash actions of one man
or a small group of men could derail the course of
war or peace making. As a result, men hoping for a
short surgical strike often find their clans embroiled
in a enduring struggle fuelled by individual ret-
ributive action. It is perhaps for this reason that
education for warfare was tuned to make young men
ready and eager to defend their clans when attacked,
but cautious about initiating violence. Moreover
there were no initiations, cults, or other institutions
designed to valorise warfare and organise men into
a fighting force. Boys learned the skills of warfare at
an early age in mock wars with grass arrows and by
accompanying their fathers to wars. Stories of wars
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told and retold in men’s houses recounted feats and
defeats of past battles in rather factual terms and did
not praise war heroes. Sessions for dream interpreta-
tion made men assess clan position in warfare and
exchange. Proverbs and other teachings warned men
against reckless murder or seeking to join the wars
of allied clans (Gibbs 2002). Bachelors’ cults bonded
clan brothers for a number of activities, including
agricultural cooperation, exchange, and warfare, but
praise poetry detailing ideal men did not mention
prowess in warfare (Wiessner and Tumu 1988). 
In summary, the above egalitarian constraints
made it difficult for enterprising men to pursue indi-
vidual goals through warfare, assemble a fighting
force larger than the clan and allied volunteers, and
steer the course of war in a predictable manner.
Below I will illustrate some of these constraints in
action by briefly describing the course of a typical
Enga war from about 1940-1990 drawing on the
work of Meggitt (1977), Wormsley and Toke (1985),
Lakau (1994), Allen and Giddings (1982), and two
wars chronicled in my fieldwork of the 1980s.7 This
discussion will provide a baseline from which to
address the second question of this paper: the role
warfare in earlier generations of Enga history.
Enga warfare from c. 1940-1990
In considering Enga warfare three points should be
noted. First, like 94% of societies surveyed by Kelly
(2000), Enga clans are not always at war. Meggitt
(1977) recorded eighty-six wars recalled by elders for
fourteen clans of central Enga from approximately
1900-1950, suggesting that during this period Enga
clans may go to war every 5-10 years.8 Some clans go
through periods in which they fight frequently and
others may go for two or more decades without war-
fare.9 Second, the Enga have no permanent enemies
and engage regularly in marriage and exchange with
all surrounding clans during times of peace, though
they can specify neighbouring clans with whom
they fight more or less often. Third, Enga life
involves much verbal and physical violence, how-
ever, the majority of conflicts are solved through
mediation (Talyaga 1982). Why a few incidents esca-
late into armed conflict depends on historical rela-
tions, tensions of the time, success of immediate
attempts at mediation, and ulterior motivations of
those involved, including interest in taking land,
revenge, or pursuit of other political goals. 
Most Enga wars are the outgrowth of disputes
between individuals (Wormsley and Toke 1985:30).
Whether fighting breaks out spontaneously or mem-
bers of one clan wish to launch an attack on another,
a secret clan meeting (kambuingi) is held excluding
members with mixed loyalties (Sackschewsky et al.
1970). In such meetings, each man expresses his
opinions and then efforts are made to coalesce con-
flicting opinions into consensus. Internal conflicts
of interest may be considerable. Even if some men
are interested in gaining land, these desires are not
usually voiced, though regaining land lost in former
battles may be. This is because only one lineage is
likely to benefit from small areas of land gained, the
outcome of war is unpredictable, losses may be high,
and land taken is usually contested militarily for
generations. Big men must be careful in these cir-
cumstances to summarise the situation, warn of the
pros and cons of warfare, but not try to coerce fellow
clansmen. Once made, however, decisions to go to
war are binding, though decisions to seek peace may
be thwarted by a small contingent of angry men who
decide to take violent action. Men in a single clan
go to war for very different reasons: in response to
the triggering incident, to make a name in battle,
for the excitement and brotherhood, to gain a small
piece of land, to make a name through peace nego-
tiations, or to fight out old grudges in a new war.
There is little that leaders can do to prevent individ-
uals from pursuing private agendas. What unites all
men is the desire to uphold clan honour in the face
of provocation by another clan, whether this is ver-
bal insult, physical aggression, or the destruction of
property.
As opposing clans are composed of acquaintances,
relatives, and ‘yesterday’s friends’, numerous rites
and activities are performed to unite the clan and
distance the enemy. At the onset of the fight dehu-
manising songs are sung and insults are hurled
across the border zone to taunt the enemy. Pigs are
slaughtered to elicit the help of the ancestors and
rites of divination are held to determine what the
fighting will bring. Few men can resist the call of
brotherhood and the excitement of battle; the recal-
citrant are goaded with insults until they join.
Individuals draw on a repertoire of fight magic pur-
chased from ritual experts for skill in warfare and
protection from enemy arrows (telya lakoe nemongo),
while women observe practices believed to safeguard
their men. Should the events of battle take a turn
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for the worse, a secret clan gathering (yanda aiputi)
followed by rites of absolution is held to confess
past grudges and deeds against clan members. At any
point during a war if clan members feel the war is
going badly and attribute their losses to rifts between
brothers, a clan gathering (yanda aiputi) may be held
in a secret place during which each man confesses
past bad feelings, thoughts, or deeds against fellow
clan members followed by rites of absolution.
By day volleys of arrows are exchanged in an
atmosphere that may initially resemble a sports
match with intoxicating team spirit. However once
a man has been killed, ‘sport’ turns to rage. At this
point women, who have no say in decisions regard-
ing warfare, retreat with their children, possessions,
and pigs to stay with relatives for the duration of the
war (Kyakas and Wiessner 1992). As a war intensi-
fies, small groups of men undertake lethal ambush-
es and night raids to burn houses, greatly increasing
the probability of fatalities. With each man killed
or wounded, each house burned, or piece of proper-
ty destroyed, fear and anger take control and the
possibilities for peaceful settlement become more
remote. At such times men describe physiological
and emotional changes stimulated by fear, anger
and, very importantly, sleep deprivation; the effects
of these factors on judgment should not be under-
estimated.10
Units of conflict extend beyond the political and
territorial group of the clan, and for any given war,
some external ties are suppressed and other activated
when allies, usually men with affinal ties, come to
join the fight. Allies are a mixed blessing. On the one
hand the number of allies has an important impact
on the outcome of the fight. On the other, allied
deaths incur great costs to the host clan, particularly
if the enemy tries to incite tension within an alliance
by targeting and killing allied men (see also Strathern
and Stewart 2000). Moreover, allies may have their
own motives for assisting, for example, the desire to
fight out their own grudges on the land of another or
to weaken a threatening clan in somebody else’s fight.
For these reasons, the help of allies can be rejected.
If allies are accepted, a ceremony is performed which
commits the host clan to paying reparations for
allied warriors killed. As a war progresses, so do the
various motivations of everybody involved.
An end to a war may be called after days, weeks,
or months, for a variety of reasons: when losses on
both sides are roughly equal, when the offended
party feels they have taken revenge and balance of
power is restored, when either side fears that debts
incurred from allied deaths are too high to pay, or
when both sides tire of fighting and wish to resume
exchange. Whereas big men may have been unable
to exert much influence over the course of the war,
when reconciliation is desired, they take the lead.
The months that follow are devoted to re-establishing
balance and respect. First allies have to be appeased
and compensated for men lost, else war will break
out between allies and hosts. Next big men have to
initiate peace with the enemy. The process of recon-
ciliation is painful and fraught with problems caused
by internal disputes and the question of who should
pay compensation first. In wars of short duration,
land overrun by victors may be returned in the
interest of peace; in long and bitter ones as much
land as possible may be taken to punish the losers.
Land is the means of sustenance and space in which
individuals and clans assert themselves and realise
their ambitions. It therefore represents both pride
and independence. To take the land of another is the
ultimate humiliation. 
Enga say that ‘wars start from the tongue’, accord-
ingly people are careful with their words and allow
only skilled orators to negotiate peace. Meanwhile,
the bed and possessions of the victim are removed so
that his clan brothers will not be reminded of him
and seek revenge. When payment of reparations is
agreed upon, big men call a clan meeting in which
each male member is urged to contribute pigs and
cash to the war reparation exchanges. Clan meet-
ings are called again and again until the total sum
of wealth to be given is considered sufficient. War
reparations exchanges take place in three stages
over a period of two years or longer: (1) kepa singi,
the first payment of steamed pork to the clan of the
deceased in public; (2) saandi pingi or yangenge, initia-
tory gifts of pigs/piglets, goods and valuables given
in private by the clan of the deceased to the clan of
the killer to oblige the final payment of live pigs (3)
akali buingi, the formal payment on the clan’s cere-
monial ground of live pigs, cassowary, axes, salt, or
other goods and valuables to the clan of the victim
by the clan of the killer. Individual families give pay-
ments to their kin or exchange partners in the
enemy clan with larger sums directed to the immedi-
ate kin of the victim. Returns go directly to the donor
household; wealth is not pooled and redistributed
by big men, though payments are given during a
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coordinated distribution on the clan’s ceremonial
grounds. The three-phase reparation exchanges con-
ducted over a period of approximately two years
deters aggression with the promise of wealth to come
and plays on the healing hands of time. The clan of
the killer seeks to surprise the clan of the victim by
giving more than expected and thereby trying to
express respect and good will. Individuals, particu-
larly big men, salvage some of the losses incurred in
warfare by enhancing their reputations as peace-
makers and forming strategic alliances.
Once reparations are paid it is said that ‘the spear
is broken’, yandate lakenge, and that people ‘can stay
with good hearts’, mona epe palenge (Young 2002:
24). War reparations and balance of power restored
reactivate profitable exchanges between households
of the two clans. Nonetheless, new tensions can
be generated if any disgruntled men seek revenge
through payback murders. If land is gained by one
side, it is often left as barren no-man’s-land for years
or even decades until the victor begins to occupy
it, first by planting trees or grazing pigs and only
later by building gardens and houses. Meggitt (1977)
argues that the Enga rely on uninterrupted use of land
gained over time to effect social amnesia in which
de facto possession is converted into de jure title.
However, our historical studies, those of Wormsley
and Toke (1985), and even remarks made by Meggitt
(1977) indicate that social amnesia is not prevalent
among the Enga, nor is land taken in warfare regard-
ed as the legitimate property of the victors unless one
party disbands or migrates to another area. Many
wars have deep historical roots. 
In summary, owing to egalitarian constraints and
colonial influence, there is no indication that war-
fare was a moving force towards generating political
complexity between 1939 when warfare began to be
suppressed by Australian patrols and independence
in 1975. At best, it helped redistribute the population
over resources and establish balance; at worst it was a
negative force inhibiting developments. But was this
also the case for earlier generations? If so, or if not,
why? To address these questions, I will turn to his-
torical studies carried out by Akii Tumu and myself.
An historical perspective on Enga warfare
Historical traditions describing Enga wars of the past
abound. In our studies we systematically collected
migration histories, but not warfare histories nor
details of wars after c. 1920-30. To centre on recent
wars would have eclipsed other important issues and
made elders suspicious of the motives behind our
research (Wiessner and Tumu 1998). However, in the
course of recounting their tribal histories elders did
tell of wars that had a lasting impact on politics in
that they led to the separation of clans of a tribe,
generated lasting antagonisms, or set off migrations.
Because we have thorough and systematic data on
wars that led to migrations, but only sporadic data
on wars that had only short-term impact, we can
give no concrete figures on the frequency of war
through time.
Most Enga historical traditions recounting wars
are surprising in that they do not glorify war, valorise
the deeds of heroes, nor seek to establish right or
wrong. Avenging verbal or physical insults to the clan
or its members, whether deserved or not, is taken as
a just reason to go to war. In most war traditions,
names of clans are substituted for the names of indi-
viduals by two generations after the war occurred;
thus they can be used to justify interests of clans but
not of individuals. Some accounts of war are mere
sketches, while others are told in considerable detail.
For most it is possible to determine: (1) in which gen-
eration a war took place, (2) what was the triggering
incident, (3) who participated, (4) whether war was
premeditated or the product of unfortunate misun-
derstandings, (5) if motivations for the fighting were
altered significantly during the course of a war, and
(6) what was the outcome. The data on wars pre-
sented in Tables 1-2 are divided into three periods.
The first period covers events that occurred before
the eighth generation and is of unknown length.
We only have one fixed date from this period, the
mid-1600s when a volcano on Long Island erupted
and covered the PNG Highlands in ash. The second
period covers the 7-6th generations before present,
a time in which events can be sequenced but for
which we have no fixed dates. If generations during
this period are approximately 30 years, this may
cover a sixty-year period (c. 1795-1855); however
collapsing of generations may have occurred. On the
assumption that a generation is 30 years (Lacey
1975), the third period includes wars fought during
the 5-4th generations before present and can be
dated to approximately 1855-1915 from known
events (Wiessner and Tumu 1998: 33). We do not
have comparable, systematically collected data on
wars from approximately 1920 on. Unfortunately
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we cannot use Meggitt’s data for this time period
owing to problems with dating and compatible
methodology.11
Wars prior to the eighth generation
Prior to approximately the eighth generation, migra-
tions were common and appear to have been set off
by new opportunities provided by the sweet potato.
Population density is described as sparse, life as lone-
ly, and spouses hard to find. Clans often sought new
members amongst maternal and affinal kin to build
communities (see also Wohlt 1978). Of 84 clans in
eastern and central Enga who migrated in this peri-
od, 59 (70%) sought to join relatives residing in the
lower valleys while only 25 (30%) migrated as a result
of conflict (Table 1).12 Nonetheless, prior to the eighth
generation life was by no means peaceful. Accounts
of internal warfare abound, telling how brother clans
fought and redistributed themselves over tribal land
or how clans from different tribes fought to space
troublesome neighbours. A wide spectrum of wars is
described, ranging from skirmishes among hunters
in the high altitudes to full-blown wars involving
entire tribes and their allies. Virtually all wars from
this period began with personal disputes; some are
described as escalating from brawls, to combat with
sticks and clubs, and on into full-blown wars fought
with spears and bows and arrows. The most common
causes of disputes (84% of all cases) were over sharing
work, possessions, or meat, and the majority of wars
were internal, that is, between clans of a tribe (Table
2). For 12 out of 13 wars that ended in migration, the
losing party left voluntarily. For six of these (46%),
historical traditions mention the regret of the victors
at the loss of a brother or friend. In nearly half the
migrations, relatives living elsewhere encouraged the
losers to leave the area of conflict and offered them
good land. 
In the early generations, then, war appears to
have solved problems by dividing groups that had
grown too large to cooperate or by spacing trouble-
some neighbours. The outcome of most of these wars
was dispersal within tribal lands and re-establish-
ment of balance of power and exchange relations.
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Table 1. Number and average distance of migrations 
by generation for eastern, central Enga and the western
Lagaip up to the Keta river
Generation 8+ 7th-6th 5th-4th
number of migrant 59 22 9
clans
average distance 29 km 32 km 14 km
of migration
after warfare:
no. of migrant 25 71 29
clans
average distance 27 km 26 km 17 km 
of migration
– These data include only clans who were totally displaced
from the central valleys of Enga, not immigration into
Enga nor secondary migrations once groups had estab-
lished new residences in fringe areas.
– Total number of clans whose history was covered in
these areas is approximately 300. 
Table 2. Incidents that set off tribal wars by generation
Generation 8+ 7th-6th 5th-4th
events sweet potato migrations Tee, Great
population rise of Tee, Wars and
shifts Great Wars, Kepele flourish
Kepele cult
triggering incidents:
hunting/meat 12 (39%) 4 (19%) 4 (13%)
sharing
possessions or 14 (45%) 5 (24%) 3 (9%)
work sharing
pigs 1 (3%) 2 (9.5%) 3 (9%)
pandanus 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%)
political/ 1 (3%) 5 (24%) 7 (22%)
homicide** 
rape/adultery 2 (7%) 3 (14%) 4 (13%)
garden/land 0 (0)%) 2 (9.5%) 9 (28%)
disputes
total 31 (100%) 21 (100%) 32 (100%)
* 8+ encompasses of some 150+ years around the time 
of the introduction of the sweet potato or shortly after. 
** This category includes: homicide, disrupting a funeral,
refusal to help as allies, refusal pay war reparations, 
hindering exchange, etc.
If groups were too small to be viable after dispersal,
they recruited new members via affinal or maternal
ties. In the case of routing, land abandoned after
conflicts often could not be filled by the ‘victor’ and
was given to allies with the hope of replacing bad
neighbours with good ones. 
Wars of the 7th to 6th generation
The population shifts that occurred 8+ generations fol-
lowing the introduction of the sweet potato had their
repercussions in the 7-6th generations. Immigrant
groups so eagerly recruited in the 8+ generations
often did not provide the supportive neighbours their
hosts had hoped for. Within a generation or two the
hosts were at war with the hosted, and sometimes it
was the hosts who were then displaced. At this time
the number of voluntary migrations on the part of
those seeking new land decreased (Table 1). Though
sharing and cooperation still played a role in gener-
ating conflict, pigs, homicide, political disputes, rape
and garden disputes became more common causes
for armed conflict. For wars leading to migrations,
on which we have systematically collected data for
all generations, external wars became as frequent as
internal ones. Incidents of voluntary departure of
an offended party accompanied by expressions of
regret on the part of the offender declined. 
Wars of the 7th-6th generations appear to have
been larger in scale and led to larger population
movements in terms of numbers of clans displaced
than at any other time in Enga history. Some involved
entire tribes, for instance two wars of this period
together led to the replacement of the entire popu-
lation in the Ambum valley and the acquisition of
approximately 160 sq km of good agricultural land.
One of these wars was likely to have been motivated
by desire on the part of clans in the high country for
fertile garden land in the Ambum valley; the other
grew out of a personal dispute between two men
whose tribes already had more good land than they
could fill. In both cases the victors were hard pressed
to fill the land vacated and had to call on allies from
other tribes to occupy a share. 
Not only were many of the wars of the 7th-6th
generations large in scale but also extremely destruc-
tive. To give one description recorded by Roderic
Lacey:
...In those days warfare was prevalent and it was in one of
these wars that the sons of Yoponda and Nenaini became
involved. The war by which they were forced out of their ter-
ritory was against the Tendepa people and one other group
whose name I cannot recall. The war broke out after a quarrel
about a stolen boar and a tussle over a piece of land through
which one man was building a garden fence.
The war that followed was one of the longest that was ever
fought in the area. It went on and on until there was not more
food left and all the pig stock was destroyed too. When the
war was over, compensation payments (to allies) still had to
be made, but Nenaini and Yoponda had no pigs with which
to pay and so they were faced with another problem besides
war. (The problem was solved by the losers giving their land
to their allies as payment and migrating out of the area upon
the invitation of relatives.) (From R. Lacey, 1975: 259-60;
Narrated by Kale, Yoponda, Walya in November 1972, transl.
Nut Koleala)
Nonetheless, most wars that led to migrations for the
7th-6th generations appear to have developed out of
smaller disputes, escalated, and changed in intent as
the war progressed, just as did fights of more recent
decades. The following historical tradition from the
Lagaip valley of western Enga provides a good example.
Maipu, a ‘son of Diuatini’ (i.e. from the Monaini Diuatini
clan), lived at Poko near Mulitaka a long time ago (sixth to
seventh generation before present). A man from the Diuatini
Maipa sub-clan killed a man from the Kaia tribe and a war
broke out. During the war no Diuatini man was killed to
avenge the death of the Kaia man, and so when the war came
to an end, Kaia decided to avenge the death in a payback
killing rather than in a tribal war. Kaia offered a Diuatini man
one of their women in payment if he killed a fellow Diuatini
clansman. He accepted the offer and murdered a young man
from the Diuatini Kakaipu clan by sneaking into his house
and hacking him up with an axe while he was sleeping. The
man who was murdered had just gotten married.
The Diuatini Kakaipu sub-clan blamed the matter on the
Diuatini Maipu sub-clan who had started the war in the first
place. They told the Maipu sub-clan that they would later help
them in their war against Kaia, but that first they needed to
avenge the death of their own man. They did so one day when
a man from another Diuatini subclan was building a house. A
Maipu man came over to help him thatch the roof of his
house, and while they were working, a Kakaipu man, who had
been hiding in the bushes, jumped out and split the Maipu’s
man’s head open with his axe. Shortly after when a Maipu
man met a Kakaipu man, he murdered him in payback. By
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this time the situation had gotten very tense and a tribal war
broke out within Diuatini. Many people were killed. Maipu
clansmen and their wives and children fled to Maramuni by
the Molyoko track. Kakaipu and other Diuatini clansmen fled
by the Pawapi track. Most of them later settled near Pasalakusa.
(Apele Ipai, Diuatini Kakaipu, Maramuni)
Other wars motivated by political intent produced a
domino effect:
The story begins with four sons of Londeale, Wapo, Mangalia,
Koepe and Kalipa. One day they decided to hold a traditional
dance (sing-sing) at Tupisamanda, so Wapo and Mangalya clans-
men went to Kandepe to get some mambo oil to which was used
for traditional body decoration during dances. They arrived
back from Kandepe with the containers of oil and were upset
to find that their brothers had held the sing-sing in their
absence. Since they had missed the first, they staged their own
the next day. (Sing-sings were used as occasions to gather people
for exchange.)
Yambetane was annoyed with Sikini’s troublesome sons
since a second sing-sing would attract more people and lead
to more damage of gardens, theft, and so on. They fought
with Sikini and drove them back to Kapetemanda and then on
to Takenemanda where they took refuge. While they were at
Takenamanda, a man from the Itokone Lundopa clan betrayed
them. The Itokone Lundopa man made arrangements with
Yambetane for a rope to be lowered down the cliff below the
men’s house where the Sikini men were sleeping so that
Yambetane could climb up and attack at night. The plan
worked and two Sikini men were killed.
Later the Anjo clansmen from the Kandawolini tribe told
Yambetane that they had been betrayed by a Lundopa man
and that they should kill a Lundopa man in revenge. Anjo was
fighting Lundopa at that time and thus offered Sikini some of
their land at Mapemanda in the Pina area of the Lai valley if
they killed a Lundopa man. The Sikini Londeale men then did
as Anjo asked and killed a Lundopa man both to take revenge
and to obtain the land offered to them by Anjo. They then
moved to their new land at Mapemanda where Koepa and
Kalipa are today. Once settled at Mapemanda, Sikini Londeale
clans got into a fight with Lyongeni and Waingini over a bird
stolen from a trap, drove the latter out to Kompiama and took
over their land. They also drove out parts of Tinilapini and
remaining clansmen from Aiamane to Kompiama and took
their land.
Sikini Wapo and some of the Sikini Lakai clans remained on
the land in the Saka although their brother clans moved to
the Lai. (Gabriele Konge and Joseph Kambao of Sikini Koepa
clan, Pina)
In the last case the underlying impetus for the ini-
tial war was almost certainly politics of Tee exchange
which were often negotiated during traditional
dances. For the second bout of fighting, revenge
appears to have been the motive, and for the final
one, conflict that arose when an immigrant group
disrupted the balance of power in their new area of
settlement. Note that here, as in most historical nar-
ratives of the time, land was described as plentiful
and offered to immigrant groups who promised to be
good allies and to open opportunities for exchange.
In many wars of the 7-6th generations, if land was
vacated by the losers, it was shared with allies of the
victors or in some cases given to allies of the defeat-
ed before their departure. As in former times, war-
fare temporarily solved problems of difficult and
uncooperative neighbours by spacing conflicting
groups and in some cases replacing them by allies
anticipated to be better neighbours. 
As a result of the turmoil of the 7-6th generations,
three large ceremonial exchange networks mentioned
earlier were formed: the Tee ceremonial exchange
cycle of eastern Enga, the Great Ceremonial Wars
of central Enga, and the Kepele Cult network of
western Enga. By the 5th to 4th generations these
systems had expanded to form broader networks of
enchained exchange throughout Enga. All three sys-
tems put demands on pig production and external
finance. Access to the products of labour of people
in neighbouring groups became more important
than ever before. 
War in the 5th-4th generations
By the 5th-4th generations garden disputes, homi-
cide, and other political issues became the predom-
inant triggering incidents for wars (Table 2). As in
other generations most wars arose out of individual
disputes. Seventy percent of wars leading to migra-
tion were internal ones; voluntary departure of an
aggrieved party is unusual. However, the number of
clans who migrated after warfare decreased radically
in the 5th-4th generations (Table 1), and by the
3rd-2nd generations we only recorded five migrations
of entire clans for eastern and central Enga after
warfare, though numerous sub-clans disbanded and
resettled with affinal and maternal kin. Where the
real difference lies between the 5th-4th generations
and preceding ones is in the outcome of wars. For
the first time in Enga history, traditions tell of war
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reparations, which were formerly paid to allies only,
being extended to enemies in attempt to restore
peace without resorting to spatial separation. The
changing outcomes of wars can be attributed to two
factors. First, with a growing population, relatives were
not as eager to welcome new immigrants. Second,
and very importantly, opponents did not want to
expel neighbouring groups who provided valuable
partners in networks of enchained exchange; they
only sought to establish balance so that exchange
could flow. Emphasis shifts from battle descriptions
to efforts to restore balance peacefully. The follow-
ing tradition tells of how such efforts were defeated
by runaway aggression. Nonetheless, it is the peace-
makers who emerge as heroes.
Yoelya and Petakini were brothers. They were descendants of
peacemakers. Yokone was the son of Yoelya from the Wakemane
sub-clan of the Apulini Talyulu clan. Yokone was a married
adult. One day it happened that Yokone was passing by a
garden where the daughter of Piuku was working. Piuku was
a big-man of the Wataipa sub-clan of the Apulini Talyulu
clan. Piuku’s daughter was young and extremely beautiful and
Yokone was sexually aroused by the sight of her. He dragged
her to a secluded place and raped her.
After hearing of the incident, Piuku and his supporters
went over to the house of Yokone. They opened the door and
entered, taking several pigs which were inside. They did this
because Piuku was the leader of the Wataipa sub-clan and what
had happened to his daughter was a serious offense to him.
When they broke into Yokone’s house, they were fully armed
with spears, bows and arrows.
Petakini who was the cousin of Yokone heard of the rape
and immediately took one female and one male pig from his
herd and promised them to Piuku. He also said that he would
give him another pig which had not yet returned from the
bush to try to prevent the incident from escalating into fur-
ther violence. He told Piuku and his men to return home with
their weapons. Then Petakini went to Yokone and handed
over the pigs to him and Yokone took them and gave them to
Piuku and his men. Petakini who had come to witness the
giving of the pigs went back to his house in Wandi. Shortly
after he left, Piuku and his men who had accepted the pigs
planned to kill Yokone. They soon forgot the promise that
Petakini had made earlier that meant in effect that Petakini as
a big-man, would be able to increase the number of pigs paid
in compensation to Piuku for the rape of his daughter. 
Yokone and his men were fully aware of the tense situation.
They were armed and when Piuku and his supporters came to
attack Yokone, they made a counter attack. The two groups
fought and before long Piuku was fatally wounded with a
spear and died. The Apulini Kapeali clan took part in the fight
and supported Wakemane. Unaware that the fight had broken
out, Petakini, Tamati and a couple of other Wakemane men were
at Wandi when they heard a cry from the fight area announc-
ing Piuku’s death and then a song of victory sung by Wakemane:
‘The leader of Wataipa is now gone. The eaters-of-liver will
mourn for him.’ The eaters-of-liver refers to poor men.
On the same day Eneakali, the brother of Kanapatoakali,was
killed by the Wataipa. He was from the Yakani Kalia clan of
Wakumale and was visiting his cousin Petakini before his death
and so fought as an ally. The skirmish then escalated into a
full-blown war. Neighboring clans took sides and the Yakani
clans of Paluia and Sane came to help Wakumane in the fight.
The war went on for two weeks and then both sides agreed to
pause for two weeks to recover from their exhaustion. After
the break the war continued. It was a terrible war. It is said
that even the mourning house for Piuku was burned down.
After another two weeks of fighting, the warring clans sent
messages to one another and withdrew from the war zone.
The narrative goes on in some detail to tell of peace-
making, exchange of reparations, the renown achieved
by the peace-makers and the profitable exchange
that was resumed. No land was gained or lost.
Summary
Historical traditions indicate that war was always
prevalent in Enga life; whereas Enga say that long
ago life was quite different with respect to such mat-
ters as population, ritual, and exchange, we heard no
claim that there was a time before warfare. Although
population grew substantially during the period
considered, the presence, scale, organisation and
technology of war changed little. Some wars were
fought over land as Meggitt (1977) suggests and
others may have been motivated by the strategies of
Machiavellian big men as Sillitoe (1978) proposes,
however, there is little in historical traditions that
suggest these were the primary forces behind most
wars.13 Even though triggering incidents for wars
changed with the interests of the time, the overall
intent of most wars regardless of generation seems to
have been to solve problems with troublesome neigh-
bours after insult or injury and recreate balance of
power, relations of equality, and respect. This goal
could be achieved by spacing conflicting groups
and then re-establishing equality, routing neighbours
with whom problems seemed insoluble, or, in later
generations through the exchange of wealth in war
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reparations. Given a balance of power, wealth could
flow along exchange networks and people could tran-
scend the bounds of household labour in assembling
wealth for distribution. As Tuzin (1996) has proposed,
many wars were fought in the ultimate interest of
peace. That is not to say that balance and equality
were achieved with ease through warfare – as often
as not weak leadership, diverse interests of fighters,
unanticipated events of battle, and the need for
revenge propelled wars into vicious revenge cycles. 
Whereas the constraints exerted by egalitarian
institutions on warfare relegated warfare to a con-
servative, levelling force throughout Enga history,
it did have important indirect effects on the devel-
opment of ritual, exchange, and political complexity.
First it redistributed people over land, greatly expand-
ing the territory occupied by the Enga. Second, it
continually re-established the political matrix nec-
essary for exchange to expand and flourish – a bal-
ance of power and equality. Third, while conven-
tional warfare itself underwent little change, great
strides were made in restoring order through the
payment of reparations with enemy. The negotia-
tion and payment of war provided forum for the
emergence of leaders who had influence beyond the
borders of their clans and furnished an important
impetus for developing enchained finance. 
The Great Ceremonial Wars
The above results beg the third and final question
of this paper: ‘Did Enga experiment with warfare to
try to circumvent egalitarian constraints in order to
use warfare more productively in their strategies?’
Material contained in historical traditions indi-
cates that the answer to this question is a definite
‘yes’. Throughout Enga history, enterprising men
took advantage of any means available to them to
enhance the prosperity of their households and clans.
Warfare was no exception. From the eighth genera-
tion on there are historical narratives describing how
big men tampered with wars to construct formats
that would provide the benefits of war without the
disadvantages, for example by trying to construct
more ‘sportive’ wars of short duration to generate the
exchanges that followed. These efforts had either
limited success or were one-shot affairs that could
not be duplicated, however, there is one notable
exception: the Great Ceremonial Wars of central
Enga (Wiessner and Tumu 1998: ch. 10).
The Great Ceremonial Wars are said to have com-
menced in approximately the sixth generation. The
development of the Great Ceremonial Wars is not
well documented in historical traditions; however,
we do know that four Great Wars between different
pairs of tribes of central Enga were fought in repeat-
ed episodes at 10-30 year intervals beginning in the
mid-1800s until the early to mid-1900s. The last
great ceremonial war fought c. 1940. The Great Wars
developed out of large vicious wars between entire
tribes or pairs of tribes in the 8th-6th generations,
two of which appear to have been over resources
and two over seemingly minor issues. The Great Wars
were gradually constructed by altering the rules of
conventional war in order to preserve some of the
benefits of warfare without the destruction. That is
to say, they were designed to create larger units of
cooperation and profit from the exchange that
ensued between hosts, owners of the fight, and allies.
The purpose of the great Wars was summed up
by two of the elders who participated in the last
Great Ceremonial war:
The Great Wars were planned and planted like a garden for
the exchange that would follow. They were arranged when
goods and valuables were plentiful and when there were so
many pigs that women complained about their workloads.
Everybody knew what they were in for, how reparations were
paid for deaths, and what the results would be. They were
designed to open up new areas, further existing exchange
relations, foster tribal unity, and provide a competitive, but
structured environment in which young men could strive
for leadership. These qualities of the Great Wars made them
differ from conventional wars, which disrupted relationships
of trade and exchange, causing havoc and sometimes irrepara-
ble damage. The distributions of wealth that took place after
the Great Wars brought trade goods from outlying areas into
the Wabag area on the trade paths initially established by
the salt trade. (Ambone Mati, Itapuni Nemani clan, Kopena
[Wabag])
The underlying purpose of these wars was to bring people
together – they were formal and ceremonial. They were fought
to show the numerical strength and solidarity of a tribe and the
physical build and wealth of the warriors; figuratively it is said
that in the wars, ‘They exposed themselves to the sun’. The
Great Wars were events for socializing. After getting to know
each other, they would kill many pigs and hold feasts [Great
War exchanges] (Depoane of the Yakani Timali tribe, Lenge
[Wabag]).
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The Great Wars were fought between entire tribes
or pairs of tribes who were ‘the owners of the war’
and intermediary tribes who hosted men from the
respective sides. The hosts provided their guests with
food, water, entertainment, and front line fighters
for the duration of the war. The timing and location
of Great War episodes was first negotiated by fight
leaders (watenge), big men chosen from clans of the
‘owners of the fight’ for their ability to plan, put on
spectacular public performances, and organise
exchange. Then a mock attack was staged to spark
the war. For weeks before the battles began, people
from the hosting tribes on both sides received war-
riors in their own houses and began to make prepa-
rations, sing, dance and brew the fighting spirit.
Meanwhile fight leaders (watenge), drew up plans for
battle and the exchanges to follow.
On an appointed day hundreds of warriors, or in
later generations a couple of thousand, appeared
on the battlefield in full ceremonial regalia. Fight
leaders who engaged in flamboyant ritualised com-
petition announced a formal beginning. Each side
had one or two fight leaders from each participating
clan, who were big men renowned for their public
performance and ability to organise exchange. Fight
leaders were considered fair targets for humiliation,
for example, warriors sought to capture or to steal
their plumes, but it was considered foul play to kill
them for they were the men who would orchestrate
the Great War exchanges.14 Fighting took place in a
designated zone on the land of the hosts so that no
land could be gained or lost. By day warriors fought
in front of hundreds or thousands of spectators,
while the women sang and danced on the sidelines.
By night they ate, drank, talked with their hosts,
and courted their daughters. The immunity extend-
ed to war leaders did not apply to ordinary men
who did indeed die in battle, sometimes at the
hand of ‘friendly fire’ when mistaken for enemy.
But death rates were generally low because lethal
tactics such as night raids and ambushes were
frowned upon. For example, in the last Great War,
which lasted for several weeks and involved over a
thousand men, three men were killed on one side
and four on the other. The battles continued for
weeks or months until fight leaders decided to hold
a closing ceremony and cast their arms into the
river. In these ‘fights without anger’, no land could
be gained or lost, no damage was inflicted on prop-
erty, and the men who died were said to have given
their lives for a worthy cause. Their deaths were not
avenged.
Next a series of massive and festive exchanges
was initiated; they would continue for two to four
years. Essentially, they transformed the close rela-
tionships between hosts and hosted that had formed
during their weeks or months together into exchange
partnerships. First, the hosts paid war reparations
for allied deaths and then held a feast to mark the
end of the war and initiate the host payments from
the ‘owners of the fight’. Pigs and cassowary were
dramatically and ceremoniously presented for this
event. After some months had elapsed the owners of
the fight reciprocated with large distributions of raw
pork in which individuals gave to the families who
had hosted them. In the last great fight more than
20 participant clans slaughtered some 1000-2000
pigs on one day. Hosts and allies got up at dawn and
travelled over hill and vale from clan to clan collect-
ing pork from families they had hosted. It was said
that even the dogs could eat no more. During the
months that followed, hosting families gave another
round of initiatory gifts which were reciprocated
by the hosted in the form of live pigs decorated for
the occasion, marsupials, cassowary, goods and valu-
ables. In this way bonds that had been formed
during fighting were turned into exchange partner-
ships. Meanwhile the Great War courtship parties
generated post-war marriages.
After the closing feast, interaction between oppos-
ing sides that had been forbidden during the Great
Wars could be resumed immediately without ten-
sion, for the Great Wars were said to be without
anger. Furnished with new exchange ties, oppo-
nents became desirable exchange partners for one
another. However, no food distributed during Great
War exchanges was to cross enemy lines, a prohibi-
tion believed to be enforced by the ‘sky beings’ who
punished transgressors.15
The Great Wars were fought repeatedly at 7-20
year intervals from the early to mid 1800s on, peak-
ing in the early 20th century. Around the 5th-4th
generations big men tapped into the emerging Tee
cycle in order to bring pigs from eastern Enga to
provision the exchanges and send pigs flowing out
of the exchanges eastward to repay creditors. With
this additional influx of wealth, both the Tee Cycle
and Great Wars expanded greatly, creating networks
which linked the Lagaip, Lai, Ambum, and Sau val-
leys (see Fig. 3). The most recent Great Wars involved
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up to 3000 warriors, the exchange of between 6,000
and 10,000 pigs and many trade goods, by contrast
to most conventional wars that drew a couple of
hundred warriors and the exchange of 60-300 pigs.
Starting around 1900 the Great Wars became for-
midable to organise. As a result, three of the Great
Wars were discontinued well before Australian patrols
entered the area when their organisers decided it
would be more profitable to subsume Great War net-
works with those of the Tee Cycle. The last episode
of the fourth Great War was fought around 1940.
We do not know if this one would have continued
had Colonial intervention not occurred. Thereafter
only smaller, conventional wars that had always been
fought in the intervening years between the Great
War episodes persisted.
The Great Wars were ingeniously constructed to
circumvent the constraints of egalitarian institutions
and allow warfare to yield productive outcomes.
First they alleviated the need for revenge, so that the
Great Wars would not escalate or take an unforeseen
course, but proceed uninhibited to the exchange
phase. Second, exchange ties were disrupted with the
enemy only during the period of fighting; mean-
while, strong ties were forged with hosts during the
war. In some Great War episodes, reparations were
paid to enemies as well as hosts and allies. Third,
internal conflicts were few when land, property and
exchange ties were not at stake. With minimal inter-
nal conflict and shared motivations on the part of
most men – to be able to participate in the exciting
battles, demonstrate prowess, take part in social
events, and profit from exchange – the Great Wars
grew to much greater proportions than did any
other events in Enga history. The Great Wars accom-
plished what was intended but often not accom-
plished in conventional wars – to display strength
and establish relations with surrounding groups con-
ducive to profitable trade and exchange. And such
large-scale events provided unique opportunities for
strong leaders to arise. By the second generation
that some Great Wars were fought, historical tradi-
tions and genealogies indicate the position of Great
War leader was passed from father to son or nephew
in response to public demand for continuity in
leadership. Names of the Great War leaders were
known throughout Enga.
Concluding remarks
Egalitarian institutions that facilitate exchange vary
greatly between societies, as does the context in
which they operate. Their impact on warfare changes
accordingly. In other Highland societies such as the
Huli (Glasse 1968) and the Chimbu (Brown 1964;
1978) where men were potential equals, where
emphasis was placed on managing wealth, and
where substantial amounts of wealth were obtained
through external ties, warfare appears to be a level-
ing force with more indirect than direct effects on
the development of political complexity just as it
was in Enga. In the eastern Highlands groups where
marriage did not foster such strong exchange ties
and emphasis was not on management of wealth
(Du Toit 1975; Lindenbaum 1979; Godelier 1982a;
1982b; Robbins 1982; Watson 1983: 114), fewer inter-
nal dilemmas were generated by war. Consequently,
unrestricted warfare caused continual fear of anni-
hilation, conflicts were settled only by dispersal,
and the weak hierarchies that did develop applied
only to warfare and ritual (Du Toit 1975; Godelier
1982a; 1982b; Robbins 1982; Watson 1983: 93).
Despite such variation, when egalitarian institutions
preclude the exploitation of the labour and every
individual has a right to be defended and avenged
by the group, warfare may serve to vent anger, redis-
tribute groups over the landscape, promote the soli-
darity, or re-establish balance, however, it will not
be a moving force towards hierarchical complexity.
That said, New Guinea is a land of intrigue and
experimentation in all realms of life; warfare is no
exception. Enterprising men did indeed find paths
to circumvent egalitarian constraints on warfare. The
Enga achieved this by the ritualisation of war with-
out invoking hierarchical structures, but yet allow-
ing inheritance of leadership to arise out of public
demand for continuity of leadership for the organi-
sation of these popular events. By contrast, some
Sepik societies imported hierarchical ritual structures
for contexts linked to war, while secular equality
prevailed in day-to-day life. As Tuzin (1976; 2001) has
shown for the Ilahita Arapesh of the Middle Sepik,
the complex ritual organisation of the Tamboran
cult was imported from the neighboring Abelam to
provide a hierarchical structure that was activated in
certain contexts in order to to counteract tendencies
towards fission. Military strength was thereby main-
tained. The upshot was the formation of a commu-
nity of 1500 people in society formerly made up of
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small hamlets composed of but a few extended fam-
ilies (Tuzin 2001). Harrison (1985; 1993) describes a
similar situation for the Atavip in which ritual hier-
archy was an alternative form of social action that
temporarily altered the secular equality of daily life.
Hierarchical values celebrated in the male cult were
responses to the real and perceived exigencies of war
but had few repercussions on daily life. They existed
side-by-side with secular institutions of equality and
were only activated for unity or defence. It is perhaps
in institutions imported or generated to side step
the constraints of warfare in societies with strong
egalitarian institutions that the transition from war-
fare as a conservative to a progressive force may be
found.
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N O T E S
1 See Wiessner and Tumu (1998) and Wiessner (2002: 
electronic appendix) for an in depth discussion of oral
traditions as history and of our methodology.
2 Women also hold equal rights vis-a-vis other women –
rights to garden land, support from their husbands, 
payments to their kin for child growth, and protection
vis-a-vis other women. 
3 For example, studies by Meggitt (1974: 191, n. 43) indi-
cate that in the 1960s big men did not have significantly
larger land holdings than their fellow clan members,
though they had larger households and thus more family
4 The impact of contrasting moralities on individual per-
sonality has been noted in other areas of New Guinea
(Brison 1991; Harrison 1985; 1993; Robbins 1998;
Strathern and Stewart 2000: 65-66).
5 An exception exists when men are unable to execute a
pay back murder in a distant clan and hire a man from
an adjacent clan to do so. Such paid killers are despised
and can be expelled from their own clan to live in the
clan that hired them.
6 Polygyny is limited to some 10-15% of men who can
provide land, support, and equitable payments to affines
for all wives. Prior to contact, genealogies indicate that
men rarely had more than 2-3 wives.
7 I am grateful to Pesone Munini who collected detailed
notes on events of these wars in which I could not par-
ticipate.
8 Our historical studies conducted in the same clans as
Meggitt’s (1977) studies indicate that a number of the
fights recorded by Meggitt did not take place between
1900 and 1955 but well before 1900, including all four of
the clan routs given by Meggitt. Lakau (1994) has
reached a similar conclusion. Frequency of warfare and
rates of displacement of clans after warfare may thus be
overestimated in Meggitt’s studies.
9 The title of Young’s (2002) thesis, ‘Our Land Is Green and
Black’, reflects these extended periods of peace. As one
young man explained: clans can remain at peace for long
periods of time and when they do their casuarina trees
flourish so that their leaves are indeed green and their
trunks dark.
10 Men in 28 out of 49 (57%) households visited by Pesone
Munini during a war in 1985 complained of serious sleep
deprivation.
11 From our work and that of Lakau (1994), it is evident
that the wars which displaced entire clans that Meggitt
placed between 1900 and 1955 actually took place two
or more generations earlier. Because Meggitt’s data has
been destroyed, we were not able to check on the dating
of wars in groups that were not displaced. Moreover, our
methodology for collecting ‘causes’ of wars differed from
Meggitt’s. We recorded ‘triggering incidents’ as described
in historical traditions. As far as we can determine,
Meggitt asked retrospectively about the causes of war.
Both methods are valid but yield different results. Reasons
for a war given after a fight is over are often different
from the triggering incident, simply because different
motivations come into play once a war is underway. 
12 Western Enga is not included here because, unlike in
eastern Enga, many small migrations of lineages or 
sub-clans took place during this period.
13 The following considerations question Meggitt’s thesis
that the Enga fight over land: (1) frequency and severity
of warfare does not appear to have increased with popu-
lation growth, (2) it is labour not land that is short in
Enga, (3) war continues to rage today when land can no
longer be gained or lost, (4) land shortage or desire to
take the land of another does not enter into a single 
historical tradition as an explanation for war, though
people did have disputes over gardens that triggered
wars, just as they had disputes of a wide variety of other
issues. Even Meggitt suggests in his final chapter that
land shortage is perceived rather than real and that Enga
explanations may represent a culture-bound definition of
relative scarcity. Since perceived land shortage apparently
only becomes an explanation for war after contact with
Europeans, it is possible that land conquest as an expla-
nation is bound to inter-cultural communication – the
only explanation for warfare that the Colonial adminis-
tration accepted as a ‘rational’ one for warfare.
14 We were told of one incident in which young men
ambushed and killed a fight leader; they were praised 
in song by the women but scolded harshly by the older
men. The opponents accepted the death as a man lost 
in the Great Wars and did not take revenge.
15 Interestingly the sky beings, unlike the ancestors, were
not associated with specific tribes but were believed to
punish or protect all human beings depending on their
behaviour.
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Warfare in Melanesia and Manus
Just before the arrival of Western colonisers the
Admiralty Islands – now Manus Province in Papua
New Guinea (Fig. 1) – were a warlike environment.
This picture is confirmed both by the local oral tra-
dition and by observations from the early colonis-
ers. The ubiquity of warfare had a deep impact on
the local social system, of which it was a part, and it
is primarily this system that I wish to describe in this
chapter. Melanesian anthropology has contributed
an important body of ethnographic material as well
as theoretical sophistication to the study of tribal
warfare (see Knauft 1999; Brandt chapter 6; Helbling
chapter 9). Because warfare ended in Manus at the
beginning of the 20th century, the Manus material
has not really been integrated into the study of
Melanesian tribal warfare. Of the modern anthro-
pologists working in Manus, only Theodore Schwartz
(1963) pays due attention to precolonial warfare in
his major article on ‘systems of areal integration’,
which has been an important source of inspiration
for the present chapter. The basis for the following
reconstruction is, apart from extensive historical
material written in English, Russian and particularly
German (Otto 1994b), a body of oral histories which
I collected primarily during my first fieldwork in
Manus, mainly on Baluan Island, from March 1986
to March 1988. This material was not collected with
the aim of studying precolonial warfare, but out of
a general interest in social and cultural change. Its
extent and historical depth can by no means match
that of the oral histories collected by Wiessner and
Tumu among the Enga (see Wiessner chapter 11),
but it still provides an important additional per-
spective on precolonial Manus warfare. 
The study of warfare in Melanesia has provided a
range of theoretical frameworks for explanation,
which can be roughly divided into those with a
structural and/or functional focus, those with an
ecological focus, and those with a cultural focus. In
this chapter I will propose a framework in which
exchange and network relations have a central place.
Even though ecological division and specialisation
were part of and gave shape to the exchange rela-
tions, they cannot be seen as a proper explanation
for the prevalence of warfare. The same applies to
the unmistaken cultural focus on warrior prowess
and warlike aggressiveness. I think my focus on net-
works and exchange can best be seen as a variation
of a structural and functional framework, even
though precolonial warfare in Manus did not func-
tion to create larger groups by intern control and
external conflict. Warfare can be seen as a crucial
and sustaining element of the precolonial regional
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Warfare and Exchange in a Melanesian 
Society before Colonial Pacification: 
The Case of Manus, Papua New Guinea1
T O N  O T T O /12
Wohl nirgends ist der Kriegszustand ein so permanenter wie bei den Moanus, und eine Folge
davon ist, dass der Stamm, der sonst alle Bedingungen in sich vereint, um sich zu vermehren
und zu gedeihen, so verschwindend klein ist. An Veranlassungen zum Kriege fehlt es [...]
niemals, aber auch ohne Veranlassung allein aus Kampflust zieht man in den Krieg. Das Töten
eines Feindes ist die Hauptsache; die Eroberung des Gebietes ist Nebensache, tritt aber ein,
wenn der Feind gänzlich vernichtet und aus seinen Wohnsitzen vertrieben wird. Kriegsbeute,
bestehend aus Kähnen mit Zubehör, Muschelgeld und sonstigem Eigentum, wird nicht ver-
schmäht; Häuser werden in Brand gesteckt und Kochgeschirre zerschlagen. Was an Menschen
lebend in die Hände des Siegers fällt, wird als Sklaven fortgeführt, wer sich nicht flüchtet, wird
erschlagen, sei es Mann oder Weib, jung oder alt. Dabei werden die schauerlichsten Greueltaten
verübt und die Leute nicht selten zu Tode gemartert. Hat man Zeit, so nimmt man auch wohl
die Leichen der Gefallenen mit und verkauft sie an die Usiai. (Parkinson 1911: 400-401) 2
system of exchange, comprising small autonomous
groups that depended greatly on their exchange and
network relations with each other. Once the sustain-
ability of the exchange and warring relations was
undermined by colonial military technology and
organisation, the system collapsed and was super-
seded by a new system with colonial administrative
centres supported by the colonial military.
Manus at the time of colonisation (1885)
The people of the Admiralty Islands live in a varied
landscape. The main island is hilly and even partly
mountainous with steep river valleys and sharp
ridges with the highest peak rising to 718 metres.
The coast of this island consists for the most part of
mangrove swamps. To the west, north and north-
east of the main island are flat sandy islands with
large coral reefs around them, while to the south,
southeast and east are a number of higher islands of
volcanic origin. When Western colonisers reached
the archipelago in the latter part of the 19th centu-
ry, they found a population that had diversified and
specialised. The various groups of inhabitants had
adapted to different ecological niches and had devel-
oped specialised forms of livelihood. In the interior
of the main island people lived from their gardens
with taro as the main crop. They inhabited small
villages of less than 100 people mostly situated on
hilltops. Those with access to the coastal areas pro-
duced sago flour from the sago palm. People on the
small western, northern and north-eastern islands
had specialised in fishing and depended on exchange
with the inland people to obtain starch, sago leaves
and timber. The higher volcanic islands had fertile
soil and their inhabitants produced taro, yams, dif-
ferent kinds of fruit and nuts. These people lived
spread over their islands in small hamlets. Close to
these islands as well as along the south coast of the
main island, a fourth type of people lived in large
villages of 100 to 200 inhabitants with houses built
on poles in the shallow lagoons. These people spe-
cialised in fishing and trade and obtained most of
their food and building materials from exchange
with islanders and mainland people. These lagoon
dwellers are nowadays known as Titans (referring to
their language) but at the time of the first contacts
with Westerners they were mostly called ‘Manus
true’, as they dominated the initial exchanges and
confrontations. Whereas the Titans shared a language
and a common history, the other groups were lin-
guistically more diverse. Linguists have identified
around twenty-seven languages which can be divided
in four main groups.
188 . W A R F A R E  A N D  P R E - S T A T E  S O C I E T I E S  
F I G .  1 : Map of Manus.
In precolonial Manus villages were the largest
social units. A well-defined village leadership did not
exist, but in special situations such as during a major
feast the leader of the largest clan could act as such.
In the case of warfare the whole village would often
unite under one war leader. A village – typically called
‘place’ (for living) in Manus languages – was often
divided in a number of ‘little places’, which were
the residential units of clans: groups of people who
consider themselves related through descent from a
common ancestor. Both the larger ‘place’ and the
‘little place’ had proper names. A (little) place con-
sisted of several ‘houses’ which carried the name of
an ancestor. These named houses referred to patri-
lineal descent groups which owned land and other
kinds of property. Patrilineages were the smallest
social units with clearly defined leadership. Seniority
was an important principle of hierarchical classifica-
tion and the leader of a lineage was in principle its
most senior male member, just as the leading line-
age of a ‘place’ often descended from the eldest son
of the common ancestor. In practice, however, the
rules of descent were not always strictly observed
and could be subordinated to other considerations –
for instance, if the eldest son was unfit to be a leader,
one of his brothers could take over.
In most Manus villages, clans or ‘little places’
would have their own ‘men’s house’ in which the
unmarried men of the clan would sleep. In front of
the men’s house was a great open space for ceremo-
nial purposes, displays and dances. Like the smaller
houses for married couples which would be clustered
around the ceremonial space, men’s houses were
constructed from tree poles, bush ropes and sago
leafs. Some Manus villages, for example on Baluan
and Pam, did not have men’s houses. These, mostly
small, villages consisted of a number of large hous-
es divided in two parts: one half for the men, the
other for women and children. The women’s side
(um) had fireplaces for cooking and beds along the
walls, the men’s side (lui) also had beds and a large
entrance with a high doorstep on which the men
would sit watching the dancing space in front of the
house (kulului). If the house belonged to an impor-
tant leader, the front facade would be painted (on
sheath leafs of betel nut palm). Like men’s houses
in other villages, the importance of a leader could
also be expressed by hanging up a great number of
cowry shells (Ovula ovum) from the top of the
entrance.
Manus societies were characterised by a dual rank
system. A person could either belong to a ‘house’ of
high status which provided clan leaders or to a ‘house’
of low status. High status groups were called lapan,
which was also the name of the leader of such a
group. The followers of a lapan, which included the
low-status groups that supported a leading ‘house’,
were collectively called lau. Lapan rank was heredi-
tary just like lineage leadership but could be lost if a
leading family failed to live up to expectations. In
precolonial Manus there were two main areas in
which the continuing vitality and power of a lead-
ing family had to be demonstrated, namely, warfare
and the organisation of large, so-called lapan feasts.
The latter were a kind of mortuary feast to commem-
orate a deceased lapan. They were organised by the
lapan’s successor and were highly competitive: the
name of the new lapan depended to a large degree
on his organisational and oratory skills and the size
and the success of the lapan feast. In addition to
inheritance, the renown that could be gained from
these two types of enterprise, feasting and fighting,
was a crucial element in maintaining the lapan status
(Otto 1994a).
Exchange and networks
In the absence of strong and lasting political units,
exchange was the central socially binding mecha-
nism in the Admiralty Islands, both within villages
and between them. Exchanges had many different
forms: from the spectacular and large-scale distribu-
tions during lapan feasts, which occurred relatively
seldom, to the daily exchanges of limited amounts of
food and work between close relatives. Exchange was
a necessity for the islanders in order to obtain the
various items and foodstuff needed for survival. As
mentioned, various groups in the archipelago had
specialised in exploiting different ecological niches.
Therefore, the fishermen living on small low islands
and in lagoon villages had to exchange their fish
and shells for garden food and bush materials with
the people from the mainland and the larger islands.
This happened mostly during regular markets in
which two groups met formally and traded on the
basis of fixed barter rates. In addition one could
obtain necessary food supplies and other items by vis-
iting a trade friend who would be able to give credit. 
Apart from the direct exchange of food and raw
materials the economic system in Manus was also
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based on the specialised production of utensils and
luxury items such as shell money, wooden bowls,
soup ladles, carved beds and combs (Mead 1930;
1963[1930]: 221-22). Sometimes the production of
such items was considered a monopoly, which would
be defended with force if necessary, and sometimes
it was connected with privileged access to special eco-
logical resources such as clay for pots, produced on
Hus and Mbuke, or obsidian for spear points made
on Lou. These special items were often acquired from
trade friends or during lapan feasts but they were
also exchanged during smaller ceremonial exchanges
between kin. Thus exchange between people living
in different villages and islands was conditioned
both by ecological differences and specialisation in
production. But exchange also permeated daily life
within villages between near and more distantly
related kinsfolk. Here exchange was not primarily a
means to acquire the necessities for living; rather it
was a way to mark individual and group identities
and to confirm social relationships.
The important transitional events in an individ-
ual’s life – birth, marriage and death – were celebrat-
ed with a ceremony to which various groups con-
tributed with specific types of goods. What was
exchanged and by whom depended on the type of
event (Carrier and Carrier 1991; Schwarz 1963; Otto
1991). A marriage ceremony, for example, consisted
of a series of exchanges in which the family of the
bride contributed mostly food and cloth, while the
groom’s family provided primarily wealth items:
dogs’ teeth and strings of shell beads. During such a
ceremony the bride and groom were joined in
marriage, while at the same time a relationship was
cemented between their respective ‘houses’ which
would last for several generations; the children (and
grandchildren) of the bride would namely maintain
a relationship to the ‘house’ of their (grand)mother,
in relation to which they were classified as ‘son of the
woman’ (narumpein in the Baluan language), while
the male line was called ‘son of the man’ (narumwen).
Whereas rights to land were primarily inherited in
the male line, the ‘children of the woman’ would
keep secondary rights on the land of their mother’s
‘house’ as well as the obligation to assist this descent
group in large enterprises, such as lapan feasts. On
the other hand, at the death of a person, his or her
nearest patrilineal kin would still have to pay a
major gift to the ‘house’ of the deceased’s mother as
a final recognition of the debt to this group. Thus
exchanges not only established a person’s transition
from one status to another – from unnamed to named,
from unmarried to married and from living to dead
– they also defined alliances between various ‘houses’.
Two types of relationships were particularly impor-
tant in establishing such alliances: the affinal rela-
tionship created by marriage and the relation between
the children of a brother and sister created by birth.
The centrality of exchange as a key element in
Manus culture has been observed by previous ethno-
graphers of the region. Margaret Mead emphasised
the role of the individual in establishing exchange
networks:
In Manus we have seen that we are dealing with individuals
living in clusters with different degrees of common identifying
features, that all activity was initiated by individuals and was
carried out, not by lineages, or clans or villages as members of
the groups, but because the individuals initiating the proposed
affinal exchange, trading voyage or raiding party, invoked
lineage or clan or village membership as a reason for tempo-
rary co-operation by other individuals (Mead cited in Schwartz
1963: 59)
If instead of asking a Manus ‘to what do you belong?’ one
asks, ‘what are your roads?’ the answer is a network of various
degrees of intimacy covering all adjacent villages of the
Manus linguistic group, and a series of trade friends in far-
away villages. (ibid.)
Even though Mead’s description may be considered
extremely individualistic – not all choices of collab-
oration are equally free and there exist quite explic-
it and binding expectations of mutual obligation
between members of kin groups – she is certainly
right in stating that individual actors play an impor-
tant role in establishing and maintaining their own
personal networks of exchange. 
Also Theodore Schwartz emphasises the role of
individuals in establishing integrative networks. He
prefers to see the local leader or ‘“big man” as an entre-
preneur, integrator, node in a network rather than as
leader and representative of a group’ (Schwartz 1963:
68). Being such a node in an exchange network allows
for the temporary accumulation of enormous wealth,
which gives lasting prestige to the individual. 
Part of the fascination in the psychology of ceremonial
exchange derives from the temporary accumulation and dis-
tribution of magnitudes of wealth far beyond the means of
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any individual participant. Exchange allows large numbers of
people to participate in a travelling wave of wealth that accu-
mulates now on this spot, disperses, and then accumulates on
another spot in a complex social network, allowing great scope
for improvisational and entrepreneurial skills. The principals
of the exchange derive prestige from the temporary amassing
of wealth, but so also, to a lesser degree, do all participants in
the exchange who at another time will themselves be princi-
ples. This pattern is familiar and well described from many
parts of Papua New Guinea. For the people of Manus it provides
perhaps the central focus of life interest and enhancement of
self. (Schwartz 1982: 395-96)
Schwartz (1963) rightly points out that genealogies
are important in Manus, not as a biological record but
rather as a valuable topological record of possible
‘roads’ that can be invoked according to circumstance.
The widespread occurrence of adoption also points
in the same direction: kin connections are not only
determined by biological descent but are construct-
ed according to need and occasion. Interestingly,
Schwartz develops the network perspective to
encompass the whole archipelago in what he calls an
‘areal culture’: ‘That is, not only are the cultures his-
torically related but they are so interdependent cul-
turally, and otherwise ecologically, that each must
be considered as part-culture not sufficient or fully
understandable in itself’ (1963: 89). The type of inte-
gration thus established he characterises as a ‘partic-
ularistic, entrepreneur-centred, dispersed network’. 
Other anthropologists working in Manus after
Mead and Schwartz have also emphasised the impor-
tance of exchange. In particular Achsah and James
Carrier have analysed the structural and processual
aspects of exchange relationships (Carrier and Carrier
1989; 1991). Of course this is a well-known theme
in Melanesian anthropology more generally, which
has led to interesting theoretical developments.
Marilyn Strathern in particular has done much to
develop our understanding of exchange relation-
ships in Melanesia (see Strathern 1988; 1996; 2004).
Whether or not we conceive of Melanesian persons
as exchanging parts of their selves (thus becoming
partible persons as Strathern suggests), it is common-
ly accepted knowledge that groups exchange indi-
vidual group members (especially women, but also
children, captives and other dependents), and per-
sons exchange things but also immaterial property
such as rituals, magic and knowledge. Exchange and
the concomitant logic of reciprocity are central to
understanding Melanesian personhood and sociality.
Acts of violence can enter such reciprocity and dis-
rupt existing links but they may also establish new
social relationships. The complementary relation-
ship between warfare and exchange has often been
emphasised (Corbey chapter 3), but in this chapter I
want to highlight their possible integration within
the same social system instead of seeing exchange
as the solution to and conclusion of warfare. Contra
Mauss I see warfare as much as a social act as exchange
(cp. Harrison 1993: 21, 149). Precolonial Manus was
a type of regional system in which social groups
were small and could easily split and fuse (Schwartz
1963); therefore, exchange should be considered as
the crucial social glue that allowed the regional
system to function. I will argue that warfare entered
exchange relationships as another resource and
helped maintain the system of interdependent
exchange partners. But before developing this argu-
ment, we have to find out what kind of war was
waged in the archipelago.
Precolonial warfare
The first agents of Western colonialism considered
the Admiralty Islands as a wild and dangerous place,
even in comparison with other coastal Melanesian
societies that were colonised in the latter quarter of
the 19th century. Parkinson (1911) writes that the
state of war was more permanent here than else-
where (see quotation above) and Schnee (1904: 195)
compares the character of the Manus warriors with
that of his own soldiers from other places in New
Guinea in the following way:
Vielleicht dämmert auch in den braven Neumecklenburgern
und Bukas das Bewusstsein, dass sie es hier mit einem von
Natur intelligenteren, hinterlistigeren und in jeder hinsicht
gefährlicheren Gegner zu tun haben, als sie selbst es ihrer
natürlichen Anlage nach sind.3
Similar observations abound and there is no doubt
that warfare played an important role in the
Admiralties from the perspective of outsiders. The
earliest relevant sources stem from the short visit
by the English ship ‘The Challenger’ in 1875 and
two longer visits by the Russian explorer Mikloucho-
Maclay in 1877 (two weeks) and 1879 (four weeks).
The Challenger expedition resulted in a number of
reports (Spry 1877; Swire 1938), the most detailed
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ones ethnographically coming from the naturalist
H.N. Moseley (1876; 1879). Moseley observed a for-
tified village on one of the islands and noted that
each small island appeared to have its own ‘chief’,
whose ‘power seemed to depend on his fighting
qualities’ (1876: 414). Even though one of the chiefs
obviously had considerable power – for example, he
was able to take goods given to some of the men away
from them for redistribution in the group – Moseley
noted that no ceremonious respect was paid to him
at all. The inhabitants were most eager to trade for
(hoop) iron and must have known about and
obtained some of that material through previous
contact and exchange (1879: 451).
Mikloucho-Maclay’s descriptions are extremely
interesting as an early form of field anthropology:
he stayed and slept in the villages instead of return-
ing to the ship for safety. He tells about his close
escape from an ambush and relates the killing of a
trader who was set ashore during his first trip to
Manus, while he was able to free another who was
robbed but survived thanks to the mercy of an old
Manus man. Mikloucho-Maclay provides detailed
observations and also receives information from a
Malay man who had been held captive in a village
and whom he freed by paying a ransom. Among
other things he tells about a recent native raid on a
village where seven men were killed (1879: 174), but
also about an attack on a Western trading vessel by
a great number of warriors on canoes from the vil-
lage where one of the traders was killed. The captain
and crew were able to ward off the attack and appar-
ently killed or wounded more then fifty native war-
riors, who appeared unfamiliar with the lethal power
of Western firearms (1879: 156-57). Mikloucho-
Maclay asserts with certainty that cannibalism
occurred on the islands. He observed a young woman
tearing off and eating pieces of flesh from a human
bone and he received corrobatory accounts from the
men who were held captive on the islands that it
actually happened frequently (1879: 147, 176).
Concerning the issue of leadership, Mikloucho-
Maclay doubts whether there actually were chiefs
on the islands. Some men clearly had more authori-
ty than others but he ascribes this to personal qual-
ities and character rather than to position (1877: 79;
1879: 176).
In 1885 the Admiralties were declared a German
protectorate, thus formally becoming a colony of
the German Empire. Subsequently, the stream of
Westerners visiting the islands increased considerably;
this stream included administrators, missionaries,
and other people with an interest in native affairs.
In the colonial journal Deutsches Kolonialblatt (DKB)
a lot of information can be found about the popula-
tion, but the most comprehensive descriptions con-
cerning the last part of the 19th century and the
first decade of the 20th are provided in Parkinson
1911, Schnee 1904 and Nevermann 1934. The latter
provides a compilation of all the available sources
(including DKB), most of which are in German. One
could rightly criticise some of these descriptions as
coloured; for example, Schnee shows great admira-
tion for the fierceness of the Manus warriors. But on
the other hand his descriptions are so detailed and
informative that it was possible for me to compare
his story of the murder of a German trader and the
subsequent punitive expedition with oral evidence I
collected on the islands, allowing me, by combining
and interpreting evidence, to give an alternative
explanation of events, alliances and motives (Otto
1991: 89-98).
What picture emerges of warfare in Manus from
the combined evidence of these historical sources?
The main weapon used in fighting was the spear,
which had a point of obsidian or hard wood. There
were no bows and arrows and no shields. Warriors
would throw their spears and dodge the ones thrown
back at them. Another weapon was the dagger, but
this was mainly used for ambush. Warfare ranged
from open combat to surprise raids and ambushes.
Peaceful gatherings, such as markets and feasts, could
turn into violent clashes, and participants normally
carried their weapons along. If a whole village was
attacked, the defeated enemies would be killed, their
pottery and other property destroyed and the houses
set afire. Useful booty was taken and the dead bodies
eaten or exchanged with other villages. Some people
were kept alive: women would be taken along to serve
as prostitutes, especially for the young men (see also
Mead 1963[1930]: 221), and men were sometimes
taken as a kind of slave. Parkinson describes the occur-
rence of sea battles between warriors throwing their
spears from canoes. The main strategy was to kill the
steersman and capsize the canoe, and thereafter
spear the enemies lying in the water. The Western
sources mention frequent conflicts and villagers
were apparently on guard all the time. Villages were
built on small islands or on hill tops or surrounded
by palisades for defence purposes, and paths to the
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villages often had booby traps with hidden spears
and points. We get a picture of a time in which war in
its different forms was a common occurrence, per-
meating daily life and the organisation of society.
Stories about leadership and war
Another important source for our knowledge of
precolonial warfare is the indigenous stories about
lapans in the past. During my fieldwork on Baluan
(Fig. 2) from 1986 to 1988 I collected a considerable
number of these stories, many of them on tape. These
stories are the property of the houses that descend
from the lapans concerned and are rarely told in
public.4 They are handed down from generation to
generation within the lineage. However, as they
often go back six or more generations, during which
groups split up, moved and became autonomous,
there are generally several houses that guard the
memory of the same lapan. My collection has there-
fore allowed me to cross-check central events and
names and has revealed both consistency and inter-
esting differences in perspective.
A common theme of these stories is how lapans
received their status and power, because it appears
that many lapans in fact were not of noble birth, as
the cultural rule would have it, but obtained their
status through other means. One way was adoption.
The forefather of the two strongest clans of the
largest village on Baluan drifted as a boy from main-
land Manus to the island. Here he was found and
later adopted by two lapans who did not have a son
themselves. Another founder of a lapan line was a
war captive who was bought by a Baluan leader and
later given to another lapan for adoption. These two
boys became strong warriors and protectors of their
houses and clans according to the oral traditions that
guard their memory (Otto 1991: 59-60). In addition
to adoption, marriage was also an important strate-
gy to link a strong person to a house and it could be
used as a means of transferring the lapan status. In
the following I will follow one such lapan story in
some detail as an example of the kind of informa-
tion it contains. I have five tape-recorded versions
of the story but will use only one, as the differences
are not relevant in the present context. The chosen
version was told by the undisputed leader of the
house and direct descendant of the founding father,
whose story is told. Unlike some other stories, which
involve contemporary disputes, it appears unprob-
lematic to present this story in written form. The nar-
rator is Kalai Poraken, lapan of the Yongkul house
and the acknowledged traditional leader of the vil-
lage of Parioi at the time of my fieldwork.
Kalai begins the story by relating how two brothers
got into a quarrel about the fruits of a breadfruit tree.
One of the brothers, Marankopat, decides to leave
and goes to the lineage of his mother. His mother’s
brother takes him in, raises him and organises his
marriage. What follows is a verbatim translation of
the rest of the story:
In those days the side of Lipan would often attack the side of
Mun, which are the people of Sone, Parioi, Perelik, and Manuai.5
The men of Lipan would capture some people of Mun and sell
them to the islanders of Lou for obsidian and wooden bowls.
The people of Lou would then eat the Baluan captives. 
All right, Marankopat used to hear this when he still lived
in Munukut.6 He was married now and he asked his uncles to
build a house. They made a house for him. They erected the
houseposts and put the rest on it. While they were still working
on it, the men of Lipan went up the mountain to Manuai
village. They chased away the people7 and caught one boy.
They put him on a bed and four men carried him. They
went down along the road in Pumaliok on their way to Lipan.
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F I G .  2 : Map of Baluan.
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The mother of the boy was crying and called the name of
Marankopat. Marankopat took all his spears and ran to
Pumaliok. When he met the men of Lipan carrying the boy,
he killed one with his spear. They left the boy and fled, taking
the dead body with them. Marankopat untied the boy and
called the mother to come from Manuai and get her child back.
The mother came and received the child. Marankopat went
back to his uncles who were building his house. He said to
them: ‘The name of this house you are making is Yongkul’.
Then he told them the name of the spear with which he killed
a man of Lipan: ‘The name of this spear is Kumkilamut’. The
uncles finished the house, which was now called Yongkul.
The meaning of Yongkul, leaf of the breadfruit tree, is that it
protects you from sun and rain. Therefore, the house was
called Yongkul. If the men of Lipan would come again the
people of Mun could find protection under this house. The
meaning of the name of the spear, Kumkilamut, is that the
east side (Kum) could not come to fight any more and kill the
people of Mun because there was a strong man to chase
them away. 
Kalai goes on to relate his line of descent from
Marankopat (see Fig. 3). Another version tells how
the latter was married to the daughter of a lapan of
an important house in Parioi, who transferred lapan
status to Marankopat after he had demonstrated
prowess in fighting. The next episode of the story
describes how a descendant of Marankopat moved
to the village of Manuai to found another lapan
house, called PulianPaluai. The name literally means
‘mountain of Baluan’ and was intended to claim the
highest status for this house. Kalai recounts that
Marankopat’s son Keket had two sons, Popol and
Ngi Kuian. The wives of the two brothers had an
argument (apparently a common theme in lapan
stories) and Kuian decided to leave the village of
Parioi. He went to Manuai, taking his lapan status
with him. His line of descendants has provided the
leading lapan of Manuai ever since. The third episode
concerns a fight between the houses of Yongkul and
PulianPaluai. Kalai’s verbatim account continues
below. 
Version 1 (Kalai)
▲ Marankopat  ––––––– ▲ Keket ––––––– ▲ Popol  –––––– ▲ Poruan  –––– ▲ Poraken  –– ▲ Kalai
▲ Ngi Kuian  –– ▲ Aliokui
● Palmai
▲ H. Sapat  –– ▲ Tuwain  –––  Yamet
(MBuke)
Version 2 (Manuai 1)
▲ Marankopat ▲ Keket ––––––– ▲ Popol  –––––– ▲ Poruan  –––– ▲ Poraken  –– ▲ Kalai
● W. Posiam ▲ Ngi Kuian ––– ▲ Kanau  –––––– ▲ Aliokui
(Pumutmut) ● Palmai  –––––– ▲ Tuwain  ––––  Yamet
Version 3 (Manuai 1 and Poipoi 2)
▲ Keket Kopat ▲ Popol  ––––––– ▲ Poruan  ––––– ▲ Poraken  ––– ▲ Kalai
● W1 Tumulen ▲ Assungkiau
(Parioi)
● W2 Malemal ▲ Kuian ▲ Kanau  –––––– ▲ Aliokui
(Manuai) ● W1 (Leut) ▲ Ngi
● W2 Lil ● Palmai     ––– ▲ Tuwain  ––––  Yamet  –––– ▲ Kondai
▲ H. Sapat
(MBuke)
F I G .  3 : Genealogy of Yongkul.
All right, this clan split into two parts. One part went to Manuai
and was called Umtan Kuian and the other stayed in Parioi
and was called Umtan Popol.8 I will now talk about the time
of Aliokui and Poruan. The two had the following dispute.
Aliokui wanted to be the head lapan and Poruan said: ‘No, I
am in the original lineage of the lapan and I remain the head’.
This dispute came up and Aliokui looked for a way to kill
Poruan. Poruan went to the bush to work in his garden. Poruan
had two wives. One was called Posiam and the other Sapou.
In the afternoon they returned from their work and they were
ambushed by Aliokui and his line. They fought and Poruan
was killed. Poruan was carrying his son Poraken. When his
father died Poraken fell onto the ground and a stone wall
broke down and covered him. The group of Aliokui did not
kill Poraken. Poraken stayed alive.
All right, the people of Parioi wanted to take revenge on
Umtan Kuian for the murder of Poruan. When they were
mourning for Poruan and killed pigs for this purpose, they took
a prime part of a pig and put an obsidian dagger inside it.
They sent this to Umtan Palasip because a woman of Yongkul
had been married to this house. They followed this woman
when they sent the dagger to Umtan Palasip.9 Palasip cut the
piece of pig and found the dagger. He called his people and
said: ‘We have a big thing at hand now because they have sent
us this dagger’. They wondered who would be fit to eat the
piece of pig. One person was very skilled in throwing the
spear. His name was Kanau. He has descendants who live in
Manuai now. They told him: ‘You must eat this piece of pig
and kill Aliokui’. All right, they went to the lapang, which is
the place where they practised fighting. Palasip told Kanau
now: ‘If you do not shoot at Aliokui, I will shoot you’. When
they were ready to go, Aliokui called Kanau and said: ‘Let us
go to the fight’. They went and some others stayed behind,
because it was a practice ground and many people went there
to practise or to watch. Aliokui threw his spears up the hill
and the people there dodged them. Then the people uphill
shot their spears and the group of Aliokui moved backwards.
When they wanted to go uphill again, Kanau hit Aliokui with
his spear. One of the people on the hillside called out that
they had killed a man. The people thought that someone
from above had killed Aliokui, but this was a trick.10 Someone
from below had shot him. This was to pay back the murder of
Poruan by the line of Aliokui.
This short story about the house of Yongkul contains
a wealth of relevant information about practices of
violent conflict and warfare. In the first place one
can discern different types of warfare. The villages of
the east (Kum) were in a permanent relation of enmi-
ty with the villages of the west (Mun). This relation
would often take a formalised or ritualised form, as
on the practice ground, or could lead to incidental
raids on enemy territory leading to killings, destruc-
tion of property, and the taking of captives. From
other oral sources we know that periods of (relative)
peace alternated with periods of war. At the time of
the German punitive raid on the island in 1900 (see
above) the pressure from the west on the east was
so great that one clan had found it necessary to
build a palisade around its settlement. In the German
raid this palisade as well as the whole village was
destroyed (oral information). Also the murdering of
whole villages is kept in memory. There were always
some people who escaped and found shelter with
other clans. Their descendants were called puanin,
the fruits of war. The villagers of Baluan lived uphill
and away from the coast because they were afraid of
raids from the Titan people, who would come in
their big seagoing canoes. In remembered history
several groups of Titan people settled very close to
the Baluan coast, obviously with permission from the
locals with whom they entered relations of exchange,
in particular trading fish for garden produce. It is
likely that these Titan groups also provided a kind of
protection against raids from other Titan groups.
Clearly, Titan groups were in competition (and some-
times at war) with each other for privileged access to
agricultural villages.11
Violent conflict could also arise between closely
related descent groups. In the story related above
we have an example of an ambush in which close
relatives were killed by the aggressors. Deceit and
ruse were commonplace. One story relates how one
group (Luibuai) was invited by another (Muiou) to
a gathering with the stated purpose of commemo-
rating a dead relative. Once the guests were seated,
all in pairs, one guest next to one host, they were
attacked and killed with daggers which the hosts
had hidden in their curly hair. The reason given for
this is that the Muiou wanted to take revenge on
the Luibuai for using a kind of decoration that was
considered as the Muiou’s property. The dominant
Muiou were thus prepared to defend one of their
privileges in this bloody way. It is perhaps doubtful
whether these kinds of events should be called war,
but they certainly often resulted in one. For example,
the killing of Aliokui at the practice ground (see
above) led to a ferocious war between the people of
Mun and the falsely accused Munukut, who were
severely beaten.
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A central theme that is well illustrated by the
Yongkul story is the close connection between lead-
ership and prowess in battle. Marankopat became
the leader of a lapan house because of his warring
qualities and similar explanations permeate stories
about other lapans. It appears that at a time when
warfare was ubiquitous, being a good warrior was
the decisive quality for a leader. Even though my
informants emphasised that lapanship was heredi-
tary, the historical narratives they told me point out
that hereditary leaders used the means at their dis-
posal to get strong and aggressive men into the fam-
ily, namely, adoption and marriage. I was also told
that strong and warlike leaders would fill their fol-
lowers with fear and therefore were able to exact
more obedience and support than other leaders. My
investigation into the use of lapan titles (Otto 1994a)
supports the present argument about the centrality
of warfare in issues of leadership: the leaders of
dominant clans all had titles relating to warfare,
whereas lapans who had only titles referring to peace
belonged to less powerful groups.12
An important aspect of leadership is the strong
competition for status between leaders of descent
groups. In the story above, this competition between
closely related leaders leads to killing and warfare.
Status competition appears to be a very strong motive
in Manus societies (see Schwartz 1963). It often
caused groups to split as one leader would not accept
the dominance of another. This competition not only
engendered frequent violent conflicts but also caused
the groups involved in these conflicts to remain rel-
atively small. Fission of descent groups was the order
of the day and fusion happened only when defeat-
ed groups were too small to defend themselves and
had to join another, larger group for survival.
Clearly the quest for status was an important
motive for going into war and the demonstration of
prowess was probably a means to prevent others from
attacking one’s own group. But warfare also provided
other, more material spoils. There was of course
booty, but also dead bodies that could be eaten or
traded for coveted materials. In the story it is specif-
ically mentioned that human meat was exchanged
for obsidian, necessary for warfare, and wooden
bowls from Lou. This was a common theme and
explanation in many other Baluan stories. Finally,
warfare could provide human labour. On Baluan I
did not hear any stories about keeping captive
women as prostitutes, but there is frequent mention
of adoption or the keeping of captives as dependents.
In some cases this would eventually lead to exchange
relations with the groups from which the captives
originated.
A final and crucial point concerns the nature of
relationships and networks in the case of warfare. In
the story of the murder of Aliokui, the people of
Parioi used an ally in the clan of the victim to execute
the revenge. In this case an affinal relationship was
obviously considered as more important than clan
allegiance and the obligation established through
marriage was thus able to override the collaboration
and loyalty required between members of the same
clan. Because the identity of the real murderer was
kept hidden and another clan got the blame, a war
within the clan was avoided. But the episode clearly
supports Mead’s observation that individuals on
Manus could invoke different kinds of relation-
ships in the pursuit of their strategic aims (Mead
1961[1937]; Schwartz 1963). 
Warfare, exchange, and areal integration
The prevailing logic underlying warfare on Manus
was the necessity to retaliate. A strike always invoked
a counter-strike and every insult or offence called for
payback. If a group was not able to react, it was in
danger of losing its place as a centre of action and
agency, because it would become easy prey for others.
The maintenance of an aggressive and violent image
was therefore an asset in the relations between
groups. Alliances would be made but were unstable,
as they could easily be overturned by other interests.
In principle, no one could be trusted and therefore,
following the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma (see
Helbling chapter 9), it was better to attack and strike
first than to be caught off one’s guard.
At an abstract level one can consider the logic of
payback as a modality of reciprocity, albeit a nega-
tive form of reciprocity. Many have underlined the
centrality of reciprocity in Melanesian societies fol-
lowing Mauss’ logic of the gift, but it is less common
to extend this reciprocity to include forms of pay-
back (cp. Trompf 1991: 51-77, Harrison 1993: 16ff).
However, the gift versus counter-gift, strike versus
counter-strike, and action versus reaction rationality
appears to be a central theme both in practice and
in myth (Pouwer 1975). Having basically the same
logic, can negative reciprocity also be seen as having
the same effect as positive reciprocity, namely, the
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establishment of links and the integration of society?
I would argue it does. In the first instance an act of
violence or warfare of course disrupts a relationship
(as between the two lineages of Yongkul), but if one
takes a wider perspective it is possible to see that it
in fact contributed to the integration of small units
on Manus.
Firstly, warfare forced groups to find allies, thus
strengthening some relationships while disrupting
others. Warfare also produced spoils in the form of
booty, human flesh and captives, which entered
into existing exchange relationships and sometimes
even established new ones. Because of the rule of
negative reciprocity there was plenty of opportunity
to engage in war, as it was easy to find insult (evi-
dence from oral history). The famous ‘Kampflust’ of
the people of Manus (see Parkinson 1911 quoted
above) can be explained by the opportunities for
prestige provided by warfare, both for a war leader
and his young warriors. For them warfare could be a
profitable affair, as long as they remained on the
winning side; waging war was therefore one of the
options an entrepreneurial leader had. The other
main arena for prestige and status competition was
the organisation of big lapan feasts. This was by no
means an easier road, and possibly not even a safer
one, as oral history has it that a number of potential
lapans died while they were preparing their big feast.
This high mortality is ascribed to the use of powerful
magic by opponents and the lack of strength of the
would-be leaders, but in a Western frame of expla-
nation one could speculate about causes like exhaus-
tion and stress-related diseases.
The strong motivation for status led to fierce
competition, which in turn caused groups to split up
and enter into relations of conflict (and exchange)
with each other. This kept the groups as centres of
action and agency relatively small, making them
dependent on allies and thus on exchange relation-
ships with others. In other words, status competi-
tion and warfare had a conservative and integrative
effect on the system of regional exchange and inter-
dependence. War was also used to defend local spe-
cialisations of production and privileged access to
trading partners, thus augmenting the necessity for
exchange in addition to ecological differences (see
Schwartz 1963: 83-85). In short, warfare was one of
the resources at the disposal of entrepreneurial lead-
ers and a functional part of the regional system of
integration.
With the arrival and permanent settlement of
colonists this system changed fundamentally. It will
take another article to describe the changes in some
detail, but here I will briefly mention the main ele-
ments of the transformation. Firstly, the archipelago
saw the introduction of Western firearms, which had
greater destructive power than the native spears and
could reach further. There was fierce competition
concerning the acquisition of these new weapons,
which at first could only be obtained by attacks on
Western traders, many of whom were murdered.
However, the new warring relations established with
this new military technology proved to be very dis-
ruptive also for the victors, as more people were killed
and more groups eradicated than before (Nevermann
1934). In addition, the same period saw the spread
of major epidemics which killed many inhabitants
and in many places had disastrous effects on the
number of the population (cp. Gosden chapter 13).
This general disruption was aggravated and
extended by the increasing number of punitive raids
organised by the colonists who wished to punish
native groups for murdering white traders. Warring
native groups with their new powerful weapons
went on long raiding tours, but had little or no pos-
sibility to return to a more stable settlement. Their
villages were burned down by the white punitive
raiders and they had to remain on the run for
extended periods of time. In the long run this was
not a sustainable situation and after the establish-
ment of a permanent police station on Manus in
1911, a relatively fast and overwhelming transfor-
mation of the regional system occurred: the local
warriors gave up their weapons, both the captured
guns and their own spears, and transferred the power
to retaliate and execute pay-back to the colonial
authority. In my view this transformation was as
much an act of rational choice and consent within
dramatically changed circumstances as it was forced
upon the natives by the superior military power of
the colonisers. Pax germanica was established both
through force and consent as a new form of collab-
oration between indigenous populations and
German colonists.
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1 I thank Jürg Helbling and Helle Vandkilde for useful
comments on drafts of this article.
2 ‘The condition of war is probably nowhere as permanent
as among the Manus, and a result of this is that the tribe,
which otherwise harbours all conditions needed to grow
and thrive, is so vanishingly small. Causes for war are
never absent, but also without cause, merely out of lust
for battle, war is initiated. The killing of an enemy is the
main objective; the conquest of territory is of secondary
importance, but takes place when the enemy is completely
destroyed and is driven off his places of residence. Loot,
consisting of boats with equipment, shell money and other
kinds of property is not disdained; houses are set on fire
and kitchenware smashed. The people who fall into the
hands of the victor alive are taken as slaves; those, who
do not flee, are killed, be it man or woman, young or old.
In that connection the most dreadful and horrible deeds
are committed and people are not rarely tortured to
death. Is there time, one also takes along the corpses of
the fallen and sells them to the Usiai.’ (my translation).
3 ‘Perhaps the sterling New Irelanders and Bukas begin to
realize that they are dealing with an adversary who is 
naturally more intelligent, more cunning, and in every
respect more dangerous than they are themselves in their
natural disposition.’ (my translation).
4 The stories are used as evidence in the local land court if
a lineage’s status or property is under dispute.
5 Lipan is on the east side of the island, also called ‘Kum’,
and ‘Mun’ refers to the west side. 
6 This is the name of the clan of his father, which lived
uphill and belonged to the east side of Baluan. 
7 Another version relates the warriors’ destructive activities:
putting fire to the houses, killing the pigs, and breaking
the clay pots.
8 Umtan Popol means ‘house of Popol’ and this is the line-
age of Yongkul, who remained in the village of Parioi.
Umtan Kuian means ’house of Kuian’ and this is the new
lineage that moved to Manuai.
9 Umtan Palasip is a house in the village/clan of Manuai!
10 This event is also part of another clan’s history, namely
the Munukut, who were the victims of the deceit because
they were wrongly accused of killing Aliokui and had to
endure a severe pay-back.
11 The murder of the German trader on Kumuli near
Baluan and the subsequent raids are good examples of
this (see Otto 1991: 89-98).
12 A number of leading lapans had both warlike and peace-
related titles. The latter were often connected to original
inhabitants and owners of the land, whereas war titles
were obtained through fighting prowess and were often
in the possession of newcomers to the island.
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War is a simple three-letter word, but is not a sin-
gular category. It represents a spectrum of behaviour
from aggression contained within social rules to that
which erupts despite social regulation and is then
difficult to contain. Von Clausewitz’s famous defi-
nition of war as politics by other means, might in
Papua New Guinea, be formulated as exchange by
other means. Groups which are most closely locked
together in exchange relationships are also most
likely to fight, as the competitive spirit found in
exchanges spills over into more naked aggression.
This form of warfare is not benign, as Wiessner (chap-
ter 11) shows, but it is contained within rules and
can be brought to an end by mutually understood
forms of mediation. But occasionally war breaks free
from all social regulation, taking a form which is
hard to contain and thus threatens the very basis for
society. I want to look at one such case of uncon-
strained warfare, brought about by early colonial
relations in Papua New Guinea and I shall consider
the lessons that unregulated warfare holds for an
understanding of war as a whole.
Colonialism is basic to an understanding of war
in Papua New Guinea and war is vital to under-
standing colonialism. War was the point at which
the prestige of the colonist confronted the prestige
of local men. In many areas of New Guinea war and
exchange were the basis for male standing, so that
success in one or both of these arenas was vital to
gain a name in the region. In the Australian colonial
period (1914-1975) territory within New Guinea fell
under four different classifications: uncontacted,
contacted, pacified and under full control (similar
classifications were used by the Germans between
1884-1914). Pacification meant an acknowledge-
ment that the sole legitimate use of force lay in the
hands of the colonial state, which went rather further
than giving up warfare, also including local forms of
punishment and pay-back. Nevertheless, stopping
fighting between groups was the topic most men-
tioned in patrol officers’ reports and this is what was
foremost in their minds when thinking of pacifica-
tion. In most areas of the Bismarck Archipelago
people gave up warfare very readily in the early
twentieth century. Did this represent an easy victory
for the colonial forces and an acknowledgement
by local people of the overwhelming power of the
new police and military forces at colonial command?
Things are not as simple as that and in order to
understand ‘pacification’ we need to consider the
type of warfare that was given up, which was itself
an outcome of colonialism.
To understand the warfare that ceased we need to
embed it within colonial structures. The formal
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colonial period started in 1884 when Germany took
over New Guinea and Britain made Papua a colony.
But this formal starting point is somewhat illusory
in terms of the nature and genesis of colonial forces.
The creation of the colony of New South Wales in
1788 put New Ireland, Manus and, to some extent,
New Britain on novel sets of shipping routes between
Australia and Asia, so that ships’ crews came ashore
for water and fresh food in coastal areas of the
Bismarck Archipelago, swapping European goods as
barter. Whaling in the region also increased through
the nineteenth century, creating further contacts
between outsiders and New Guineans (Gray 1999).
Relations with outsiders changed fundamentally in
the 1860s and 1870s when the first recruiters and
traders became active in the Bismarck Archipelago.
The demands of the plantation economies elsewhere
in the Pacific (such as Samoa and the New Hebrides)
and the Queensland cane fields meant that reserves
of labour were regularly sought and the islands of
the Bismarck Archipelago represented a major supply
of ‘recruits’ (Firth 1973; 1977; 1986; Hempenstall
1978). Recruitment was largely unregulated and the
setting up of the German colonial government on
the Gazelle Peninsula in 1884 did little to change
this before 1900, when Governor Hahl took over. A
basic part of the trader’s and recruiter’s means of
operation was the rifle. Relations with local people
were often poor and deaths of whites and locals
were common, so that the rifle was the basis for self-
protection. Unlike in British Papua trading in guns
was not illegal in German New Guinea, so that the
rifle was part of the basic inducement to trade or
allow people to be recruited. Figures do not exist for
the numbers of rifles traded, but there are accounts
of whalers in the 1860s confronting people on the
shores of New Ireland, all of whom were armed. Guns
were regularly used in violence between whites and
locals but also became a part of local warfare.
The firm of Godeffroy und Sohn set up their first
trading station at Matupi in Blanche Bay near the
present-day town of Rabaul in 1874, and were soon
followed by the smaller firm of Robertson and
Hernsheim in 1875. They found the locals well-accus-
tomed to white traders and already speaking pidgin
(Hempenstall 1978: 119). The missionary George
Brown was also in the first trickle of settlement, and
he set up mission stations and made converts between
1877 and 1881. These early traders lived very isolated
lives, isolated that is from other Europeans, but they
were plunged into a mass of relations with local
people, which were not always that happy. Ten of
Godeffroy’s twelve agents died in the late 1870s,
and the firearms which were a part of early trade
exacerbated conflicts. There were said to be 700 guns
in Tolai hands by 1887 (Hempenstall 1978: 123).
In the Arawe Islands on the south coast of New
Britain I have collected oral historical accounts dat-
ing from the late nineteenth century, mapped old
village sites and taken geneaologies in an attempt
to understand the confused situation in the last
decades of the nineteenth century. These accounts
tell of whole villages being massacred partly due to
the use of rifles and of long-distance raids taking
place from villages on the south coast who attacked
those at the western end of New Britain, in the Cape
Gloucester area. The levels of death and the geo-
graphical scale of the warfare at this time were
unprecedented and alarming to people now, even
in retrospect. At this distance in time it is hard to
reconstruct in any detail quite what happened, but
it seems clear that the areas, like the Arawe Islands,
with a relatively high population and more access to
traders and recruiters than other groups suddenly
had a huge advantage in inter-group violence which
they used in the short term. If present-day accounts
do reflect some of the sentiments of over a century
ago, even the victors were nervous of the newly desta-
bilised situation. If war in New Guinea is exchange
pursued by other means, to kill your exchange part-
ners in large numbers is not a sustainable strategy.
The new, unbridled forms of warfare took place
against a background of other forms of disruption
and dislocation. People, particularly younger men,
left the villages in large numbers to work on planta-
tions, mission stations and in towns. We have no
figures for levels of recruitment in the nineteenth
century, but can gain some indication of the situa-
tion in the earlier period by looking at the statistics
of the early twentieth century. Between 1912 and
the start of 1914 there was a ban on recruitment in
the Sulka and Mengen areas and the whole coastline
from Cape Gloucester to Montagu Harbour. It was
noted that ruthless recruiting by the Forsayths (a
plantation-owning family) had made villagers flee
inland and one of their recruiters, Karl Münster, was
sentenced to three months jail, which was extremely
unusual (Firth 1973: 224, 228). In 1913 a Forsayth
recruiter broke the prohibition by recruiting labourers
for the company’s Arawe plantation from Rauto on
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the adjacent coast. In 1913 recruitment was reaching
its limit in coastal areas: it is estimated that nearly
every unmarried man in the villages of the north-
west coast of New Britain was a recruit that year or
had been one recently (Firth 1973: 173), and much
the same might have been true of the south coast.
The process of recruiting was obviously a violent
and destructive one, which had multiple effects. The
Germans estimated that there were 152,075 people
living on the Bismarck Archipelago in January 1914,
and although we should not let the spurious accu-
racy of this figure mislead us, it does provide an esti-
mate with some factual backing (Firth 1973: 142). Of
these 17,529 were working for Europeans or Chinese
in some capacity – that is getting on for 12% of the
population at one time.
The other set of devastating changes that came
about in the German period was epidemics of disease.
Smallpox and flu epidemics spread right through
New Guinea in 1893-4 and had major effects in the
Bismarck Archipelago (Parkinson 1999[1907]: 90-91).
Estimates of how many people died are difficult to
come by. In Witu plantations were set up on land left
vacant after 50% of the population died from small-
pox and the suppression of two uprisings in 1901
and 1903 (Firth 1973: 136). Witu was densely popu-
lated so it might have suffered worse than some areas
from density-dependent diseases. However, the
Arawe Islands also represent high levels of popula-
tion, and according to local testimony many died at
this time. A further devastating event which had a
major effect on the west end of New Britain and its
south coast was the collapse of the Ritter volcano in
1888. Ritter is out in the Vitiaz Strait and its collapse
created tidal waves (tsunamis) which wiped out vil-
lages in the Cape Gloucester area, along the coast
of Umboi and along the south coast, where local
people have stories of waves several metres high.
Loss of life would have been high on Gloucester and
Umboi, but less on the south coast where destruc-
tion of villages and gardens would have been the
main effects. This geological event, essentially ran-
dom when viewed in terms of historical process,
would have added an extra dimension to the confu-
sion and disruption of the times.
Up until 1900 was a period of chaos and mass-
death, now hard to document in detail, partly because
so many died that oral histories were wiped out
and because the unprecedented nature of the events
made narratives hard to construct. The last three or
four decades of the nineteenth century created a
radical break with the past and a newly destructive
warfare was central to that break. After about 1900
the new German administration under Governor
Hahl (1980) brought a new shape and structure to
life. From 1896 onwards Hahl also appointed a series
of village headmen, the luluais (a corruption of a Tolai
word for leader) and their deputies, the tultuls. Their
initial roles were to supervise road construction and
adjudicate in local disputes, such that they could
impose fines of up to 25 marks (10 fathoms of tambu
[shell money]). By 1900 there were forty-four luluais
on the Gazelle Peninsula and twenty-three in the
Duke of Yorks, which were the only areas of Hahl’s
authority. Government influence gradually spread
over the next fourteen years as new government sta-
tions and sub-stations were set up. The administra-
tive structure that the Australians took over in 1914
consisted of district offices in Kavieng, Madang and
Rabaul, plus second-class stations at Namatanai, Kieta,
Morobe, Aitape and Lorengau (Rowley 1958: 16). The
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F I G .  1 : Two Arawe men (names not recorded) displaying
shields, one wearing a pig’s tusk ornament as if for a fight.
Taken by Beatrice Blackwood in Kandrian, between June
and August 1937; PRM BB.P.13.222. Photo courtesy of
Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford.
administrative staff was not huge and was mainly
concentrated in Rabaul: in 1913 there were eighty-
four administrative staff altogether in New Guinea,
seventy-two in the Bismarck Archipelago and the
Solomons and twelve on mainland New Guinea. Each
station had at least one German officer, and these
officers laid and maintained roads, levied the head
tax, appointed luluais and tultuls, kept law and order,
and attempted some mild regulation of recruiting.
In the early twentieth century warfare was given
up suddenly and has never reappeared as an institu-
tionalised element of life. This might be seen as the
colonial power pacifying the natives and this is cer-
tainly how the Germans viewed the matter. But the
small numbers of German patrol officers who visited
most areas once or twice a year could not have forced
heavily armed local populations to give up war. The
response was a voluntary one on the part of local
people, perhaps using the colonial power as an
excuse, an external justification for what they want-
ed to do anyway.
War was given up with some relief, but also at a
considerable cost and that cost was paid in basic
social re-organisation. On the Arawe Islands where
people were previously spread among a number of
small hamlets on the south coast of New Britain and
a number of islands, they now cluster in big villages
on five islands and one area of the mainland
(Gosden and Pavlides 1994). In the present, people
in many parts of the province and particularly on
the coast live in villages of several hundred inhabi-
tants, but these were formed often around the
beginning of this century from a number of smaller
hamlets, each of which was defended and centred
around a men’s house (Counts and Counts 1970: 92;
Zelenietz and Grant 1986: 204). Chinnery (1925;
1926) has reported an identical form of organisation
for the Kaulong and other areas of the south coast.
These small hamlets seem to have been the basic
settlement pattern throughout West New Britain and
the Siassi Islands (Freedman 1970), being given up
on the coast fairly early in the history of European
colonialism and later (if at all) in the inland areas.
But this was not just a settlement pattern but a form
of social organisation based on cognatic ties which
allowed changing rights to land and other resources.
This single form of settlement pattern and social
structure is an ancient one dating back around 1000
years (Gosden and Pavlides 1994). It allowed for
both mobility of settlement and open links between
groups. What happened from the early twentieth
century onwards is that the settlement pattern
changed from small hamlets to large villages, but
the open network of connections continued and
expanded. People congregated into larger villages,
but were still able to move regularly from one area
to another on trading expeditions or to take up gar-
dening land in a new place through kin connec-
tions. New larger settlements formed a labour pool
for larger gardens to feed the settlements themselves,
but also the new needs of plantations and traders for
food. The new villages were also focal points in the
movement of people through the area utilising their
kin connections to travel far and wide. The large vil-
lages at first only existed on the coast, where govern-
ment influence is greatest, and settlement agglom-
eration happened later inland; in some areas, pre-
dominantly inland ones, it has never happened. All
these changes brought into question the nature of
the community and these questions of community
have considerable implications for the exchange
and use of material culture.
Museum collections and colonial histories
Studying colonial histories in New Guinea is not
easy and there is no single source which provides an
adequate understanding of the complexity of colo-
nial change. In addition to the oral and written his-
tories drawn on above, museum collections and their
attendant documentation are an important source
of evidence of how the types of material culture and
the uses to which things have been put have altered
over the colonial period. Recently Chantal Knowles
and I have organised a project analysing material in
museum collections from the south coast of New
Britain in order to chart the changes brought about
by the colonial period in this region (Gosden and
Knowles 2001), important amongst which is the
cessation of warfare. The material data used in this
study consist of four collections that were made
between 1909 and 1937, and the results of fieldwork
which was carried out by Gosden and Pavlides
between 1985 and 1992. This latter work involved a
survey of material culture then in use on the Arawe
Islands, including items used in exchange systems,
as well as those bought from stores. Initial results
from this work were presented in Pavlides (1988).
Information of recent movements and uses of mate-
rial culture can provide a point of comparison and
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contrast with the situation earlier in the twentieth
century.
Each of the collections was a result not just of the
material culture in use and circulation at the time,
but also of the interests of the collector, which needs
to be taken into account when analysing the struc-
ture of the collections. The first collector, A.B. Lewis,
had a special interest in connectivity and hence items
used in trade and exchange, taking care to discover
where things were made and how they had been
traded. Felix Speiser had general culture historical
interests and he tried to chart the movement of
materials across Melanesia in a fashion that might
indicate migrations of peoples and links between
them. We know least about J.A. Todd’s work, as he was
a Ph.D. student at Sydney who never finished his
thesis and published very little pertaining to the col-
lections he made. As far as we can tell, he was inter-
ested in totemism and objects that might reflect the
varying social groups people belonged to, as well as
the sets of symbols and beliefs lying behind these
groups. Beatrice Blackwood concentrated on tech-
nologies, especially stone tools and was generally
concerned to document the processes people used
when making things. The other factor is what local
people were prepared to sell, as any collection is the
outcome of negotiations. Despite their individual
biases, each collected a good range of materials
which were generally representative of the broader
changes in material culture through the earlier part
of the twentieth century.
The first of the collections was made by A.B. Lewis
who did fieldwork on the south coast of New Britain
from December 1909 to February 1910, as part of a
total of four years in the Pacific. As the first curator
of anthropology at the Field Museum in Chicago, a
major part of his interest was in collecting artefacts
which were well documented in terms of their pro-
duction, use and exchange. He has extensive field
notes which refer to the hundreds of objects he col-
lected (the exact number is not known at present,
but 324 have been counted for New Britain), plus
some 250 photographs of the area and of items in
use. The second collector – Felix Speiser – was in New
Britain in 1929 as part of a larger trip to different
parts of Melanesia in search of comparative materi-
al designed to throw light on Melanesian unity and
origins. He collected large numbers of artefacts (111),
well documented as to provenance, as well as pho-
tographs and a short film of initiation rites, in which
he had a special interest. All Speiser’s material is
held in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Basel. J.A.
Todd made two field trips to south-western New
Britain in April 1933 to April 1934, and in 1935 to
1936 while he was a Ph.D. student at the University
of Sydney. He made a collection of 185 items on his
first visit. This collection is now in the Australian
Museum, Sydney with some attendant documenta-
tion, although the bulk of his field notes, sound
recordings and photographs have been lost. The
final collector considered in the analysis was Beatrice
Blackwood of the Pitt Rivers Museum. She was a
curator and made an extensive collection of artefacts
(271 pieces) from the south coast of New Britain
during a seven month stay in 1937, together with
meticulous documentation of many aspects of life,
including genealogies, word lists and some 350
photographs. She also made a short movie film. She
was especially interested in production, technology
and skull deformation. A comparison and contrast
of the material in these collections provides vital
insights into the processes of colonial change.
In Table 1 percentages are given and these refer to
the number of potential classes of item in each col-
lection which falls into each of the categories. For
example, Lewis’ collection has examples of all the
types of containers that are known from the collec-
tions as a whole (100%), while he has only 44% of
the different types of musical instruments. Given
that each collection represents a particular ‘time-
slice’, we are attempting to look at change through
time by focusing on the increases and decreases in
the different types of objects within each collection,
bearing in mind the biasing effects of the interests
of the collectors. Let us compare Lewis’ collection
(1910) and Pavlides’ observations (1992): over a
period of 82 years, little change is discernible in the
collections in the categories of hunting and fishing,
food preparation and craft production. However,
over the same period, a major decline can be seen in
the availability and collection of objects associated
with warfare, stone tools, containers and material
culture pertaining to music.
Warfare and music were linked, and the decline
in the collected objects that are connected with
both of these aspects of life was associated with the
sharp decline in exclusively male artefacts collected
since Lewis’ visit in 1910 (see Table 1). Lewis arrived
at end of the old order on the south coast of New
Britain; there was still some fighting, and although
some large villages were to be found there were also
smaller defended settlements located away from the
coast. Men’s shields were decorated and the decora-
tion on the inside of the shield, nearest to the man’s
body, was his own and was repeated on the bark-
cloth belt worn around his waist (Fig. 1). Some types
of ornaments, such as pig’s-tusk mouth ornaments
could only be worn after killing someone in battle.
By the 1980s and 1990s when Pavlides carried out
a survey of material culture in the Arawe Islands,
shields and spears were absent there (although they
remained as items of ritual elsewhere in the region)
and pig’s-tusk ornaments had been revalued as items
of wealth any man of some standing could wear.
Ritual itself saw a shift from male-only forms to
those that involve the whole community. Circumci-
sion, marriage and death reflect entry into the com-
munity, a change of state within it, and exit from it.
Rituals surrounding these changes predominate
today and probably have done since just after the
First World War. The earliest collection, that of Lewis,
is the only one in which masks relating to the male-
only warku cult are found. Five examples were col-
lected by Lewis, and derived from warku ceremonies,
which were men-only and centred on the men’s
house, but these ceremonies might have been in
decline even when Lewis was there. Speiser discussed
warku with Aliwa, a local bigman. On 21 April 1929
Aliwa said that there were two warku masks, named
sala and einsparna, left on Pililo, all the others had
been destroyed by the missions or bought by whites
(including Lewis presumably). Warku masks were
used during circumcisions which were carried out in
the men’s house. Women were allowed to glimpse
them under certain circumstances, unlike in Siassi
or New Guinea, where warku were also found and
where it was completely forbidden for women to see
the masks. Warku masks are not found in any later
collections, and this accords with the testimony of
people in the Arawes, who said that warku cere-
monies had not been run for most of the last century.
Warku were also connected with bull-roarers, which
were still present when Blackwood was collecting
(she has two in her collection) but have subsequent-
ly disappeared.
The sale of the warku masks and ceremony is part
of a much larger movement of objects and ritual
between areas in New Britain that were earlier more
distinct in their material culture and ritual. There are
complicated reasons behind these movements of
ideas and rituals, partly to do with the opening up
of exchange networks and partly with the mixing of
people on plantations and missions which enabled
people from one area to learn about life in another
(Chowning 1969: 29). The earlier importation of
male-only ceremonies shifted to an emphasis on,
and acquisition of, community-wide ceremony.
Other sets of distinction which broke down were
those within the local communities relating to the
ownership or control of objects. At the beginning of
the twentieth century on the coast and later in inland
areas, only big men and women could own and con-
trol ritually powerful objects, such as mokmok, singa
and named pearl shells. Such items were dangerous
and could have ill effects on the community at large
if in the hands of the inexperienced or unskilled
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Table 1. Changes in the percentages of artefact types in each category between the four collections, plus Pavlides’ observations
Lewis Speiser Todd Blackwood Pavlides Decline
1910 1929 1935 1937 1992
Hunting and fishing 69% 62% 23% 62% 54% 10%
Warfare 75% 100% 50% 75% 0% 100%
Craft production 50% 17% 17% 83% 83% None
Axes and obsidian 33% 40% 10% 70% 0% 100%
Food prodn and eating 56% 44% 44% 33% 56% None
Containers 100% 50% 83% 50% 30% 70%
Ornaments and clothes 68% 58% 42% 47% 32% 30%
Valuables 53% 35% 59% 53% Increase Increase
Music 44% 78% 11% 78% 22% 50%
individual (Goodale 1995: 89). Now all men and
women own such stones, although it may be true that
the most powerful objects are restricted to the most
powerful individuals. The same was also true of cer-
tain forms of taro and other plants, which at one
time could only be planted by people with sufficient
personal power to control the magic associated with
their growth. Communities in western New Britain
have allowed the erosion of such distinctions over the
last century, which has opened exchange networks
still further. Although the evidence is not clear, it seems
that people of Aliwa’s standing and generation were
the last who had the power to enforce such distinc-
tions in ownership and use. Arawe communities
were much more internally fractured and distinct
from each other a century ago, but the breakdown
of a series of differences has led to a massive expan-
sion of the social universe that people now inhabit.
One indication of the greater size and intensity
of links between people has been an inflation in
payments of various kinds, especially marriage pay-
ments. The one category of items which shows an
increase in Table 1 is that of valuables. This increase is
made up of both a greater number of different objects
exchanged and a greater frequency of exchanges for
existing objects. These increases are difficult to
quantify, but it is certain that there has been an
inflation in certain types of payment, such as bride
price, with far more objects needed to complete a
bride price now than earlier in the century (Gosden
and Pavlides 1994: Table 2). Many objects are used
in a variety of forms of ritual, such as initiation or
death rituals, and it is likely that payments of all types
have increased. Such rituals and forms of exchange,
involving the kin group as a whole, are now central
to peoples’ lives and have replaced the male-centred
rituals of the nineteenth century. We feel that it is
no coincidence that most such rituals concern life
cycles and initiation of children into the group. Such
an emphasis on the group is partly as a result of the
many changes to the nature of group life, through
alterations of settlement patterns and movements of
people as a result of labour recruitment, as well as
shifts in the relationships between men and women.
The group as a whole was re-thought, and people
have used existing cultural means, constructed in
novel ways, to carry out this re-thinking.
People’s motivation to engage in exchange
expanded as other opportunities for social advance-
ment declined. For men exchanges helped compen-
sate for the lack of opportunities once found in war-
fare and which for women had existed in much more
restricted form while warfare was constant. Today
throughout the region peoples’ social reputations,
their names, are associated with the ability to host
song festivals, feasts and ceremonies and to engage
in exchanges. Both Maschio (1994) and Goodale
(1995) emphasise the two-way process whereby
people in western New Britain develop their indi-
viduality through social links with others. Relations
with other people and groups necessitate the hus-
banding of material resources, trade objects, the
creation and maintenance of links with others, and
the retention of knowledge about the social world
in general. Knowledge about objects and people and
the ability to use this knowledge constructively was
the basis for social success, and this is brought about
by both travel and a wide circle of friends.
Conclusions
On the south coast of New Britain, the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twen-
tieth saw basic re-organisations of the community,
gender relations and some of the values attached to
objects. War, part of the basis for male prestige, was
abandoned and the shields and spears used in fight-
ing disappeared or became accoutrements of dance.
The supply of guns dried up as recruiting was both
curtailed and more strongly regulated. In the move-
ments from hamlets to large villages gender relations
were re-thought. The fact that people could now
live in undefended settlements, changed the settle-
ment pattern and all the social relations within and
between settelements. The earlier separation of men
and women broke down and instead of sleeping only
in the men’s house, men with wives and children
slept in family houses, giving more prominence to
the nuclear family. Men-only rituals, like the warku
cult, were let go and the masks sold off. In their place
was an efflorescence of cult activity concerning the
nature of community and community membership.
The exchange networks which supplied valuables for
community-orientated rituals also expanded greatly.
Prestige, for women and for men, derived from spon-
soring rituals and the exchanges which funded them.
Exchange became war by other means, but with
more pacific aims.
Death through warfare, disease and tsunami and
absence of many due to high levels of recruitment
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all put the community under threat. Local responses
were hugely innovative, re-ordering many of the
key relationships composing local cultural forms.
Maleness was rethought and became less to do with
the use of force, concentrating rather on using exten-
sive cognatic relations to engage in exchange.
The colonial changes observed in New Britain are
not found everywhere in Papua New Guinea. In the
Highlands, for instance, as Wiessner brings out well
in her contribution, there is a much shorter and more
regulated colonial history which has unfolded since
the 1930s. Violence by colonial officers was at much
lower levels than on the coast, as by this time New
Guinea was a Mandated Territory under the League
of Nations and all local deaths at the hands of whites
had to be reported and explained. The sale of guns
to local people was banned. Local warfare has been
harder to eradicate and has seen a considerable resur-
gence in recent years unlike the situation on the
coast. The rather lesser traumas of the colonial period
may partly explain why western goods are regularly
incorporated into socially important exchanges in
the Highlands, whereas in many areas of New Britain
goods of western origin are rigorously excluded from
bride prices or initiation payments. Although
exchange has expanded this has not included west-
ern goods. The dangers of colonial contact, stemming
from an earlier period of trauma are still felt today.
War is not one thing, but many. Because war is
often part of the basic social norms of society it will
vary as these norms vary. Occasionally war breaks
the rules and has to be contained, as is the case here
for New Britain and other areas of the Bismarck
Archipelago. In either case, war is a crucial diagnostic
aspect of social forms, their core values and history.
Colonial change is often hard to track in detail, but
can be done using multiple sources of evidence from
oral histories kept by people from the region in
question, historical records and museum collections.
The combination of disease and unregulated war at
the end of the nineteenth century still stays in
people’s memories today in a general sense. Many
present ways of life also derive from the alterations
that these traumas brought about. These were, in
turn, due to a combination of local desires to stop
fighting and colonial needs to impose a monopoly of
state violence as the ultimate basis of colonial power.
Local and colonial desires combined to refashion life
fundamentally once war ceased.
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Warfare and the State /14-18

This section spans a wide field in space and time, nevertheless covering the
same subject, namely the relationship of warfare to the state. It ranges from
Europe to Africa and the Pacific. Claessen’s article (chapter 15) serves as intro-
duction with its general theoretical discussion of one of the main issues of the
War & Society project. War as part of the state concept is a commonly accepted
idea. Indeed it has been maintained time and again that the logistics and organ-
isation of warfare were crucial elements in the rise of states, the question being
the identity of the prime mover. War in pre-state or non-state societies was
sometimes even seen as a methodological misunderstanding.
We still grapple with the proper way of distinguishing war from other organ-
ised forms of violence. Several definitions have been suggested (Turney-High
1971; Keegan 1996: 89ff). For archaeologists these are somewhat academic dis-
cussions. We only have scarce and sometimes (most often) very particular
evidence of the scale of violence in prehistoric societies. The evidence needed
to define the level of violence as one proper for war – in Claessen’s definition
(chapter 15): ‘legitimised and organised deadly violence between centralised
polities (states and paramount chiefdoms)’ – is hardly ever conclusive before we
reach proto-history. While legitimisation is not accessible in archaeological evi-
dence, the deadly consequences sometimes are – cp. the section ‘Warfare, Rituals
and Mass Graves’. Considering the difficulties we have in defining when chief-
doms arose and what kind they were – not to mention paramount chiefdoms or
early states – we are left with general statements based upon precisely such
deliberations as those presented in this section. We have to take our clues from
the ethnographical and historical interpretations of, to us very late, phenomena
such as the (early) states and similar advanced social systems. This leaves out
99% of the history of mankind. Our difficulties as prehistorians transpire from
several sections in this book.
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Warfare and the State: 
An Introduction
H E N R I K  T H R A N E  /14
The concept
Henri Claessen demonstrates the reasons and ideas behind the assumption of a
causal interconnection between war and state focused upon war’s creative role
in this dualism (chapter 15).
A distinction has often been made between primitive and civilised (i.e. serious,
genuinely lethal) warfare (Keeley 1996). Primitive warfare was seen as limited in
space and duration with perhaps as high a social involvement as ‘proper’ war,
but to a certain extent ritualised, always brief and with strictly limited physical
consequences for the participants – the warriors. One gets the impression that
the fights were organised for the fun of it and as a way of letting off steam in
societies where conflicts might otherwise simmer too long and become too
detrimental (Otterbein 1970).
Cause and effect chains are inevitable elements of any historical research not
satisfied with establishing the pure facts. In any non-historical context it is
highly unlikely that we can obtain knowledge of all the possible causal elements
which led to the existence of a phenomenon, and surely we all realise that we
live in a complicated world where causes are normally multitudinous and the
decisive ones not so easy to distinguish. A priori it seems simplistic to say that
‘war makes states’. 
Access to resources and pressure on land are of universal importance to any
society and must be classic factors in social development and differentiation.
Warfare was certainly ever present as an alternative solution, no doubt linked to
the perception of ‘group identity’. Claessen sees the creative force of conflict
and war as of little value (chapter 15). Anyone not associated with the technol-
ogy of arms production will surely agree with him on general principles. That
war and the military in states could become an economic power of sometimes
destructive dimensions, e.g. in the later Roman Empire, is seen as connected
with developed forms of states. It was most likely caused by the enormity of the
state rather than vice versa.
The Betsileo case – apart from the distinction of skirmishes from war – raises
an interesting question: how can archaeology understand the chain of events
such as that leading to the differential development of neighbours and the for-
mation of hillforts? If such limited war activity in a certain historic context was
enough to lead to a hillfort system and an early state, was there proper war in
Europe before the establishment of the Roman Empire? Were the hundreds of
hillforts in Bronze and Iron Age Europe the results of a similar situation and can
they be taken as signs of state formation? 
Five factors leading to (early) state formation partly coincide with the four
factors behind conflict. They reflect reactions to the demands on society caused
by stress from increased population density. As Claessen warns us, even these
factors do not automatically lead to an early state. An independent action is
needed to trigger that development. His cautionary article presents a salutary
warning against oversimplified thinking (chapter 15)
Robert Carneiro (1970) has managed to lay a trail that has absorbed much
energy from his fellow anthropologists. Claessen (chapter 15) pinpoints the ambi-
guity of Carneiro’s models, but his distinction between derivative and causal
factors in the cause-effect chain is useful. That chains of events differ across the
world can hardly surprise in view of the enormous diversity in anthropological
experience – which makes it so hard for archaeologists to behave correctly in the
world of analogy: it is amazing how we have loved to infer from living society
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to dead society over 200 years of research and how often we have erred. The
usual problem with models pops up – if they are to be universal they become so
elementary that they become useless.
Scales of conflict 
Claessen finds that the relatively high number of casualties at the Dutch Middle
Bronze Age site of Wassenaar (chapter 15; cp. Thorpe chapter 10 and Osgood
chapter 23) does not justify the term war. This is where we may disagree. Is
war not wholesale murder and must it leave a certain number of victims? Do
efficiency and ruthlessness not constitute elements of war?
Of course the slaughter of small groups can be carried out by equally small
groups, but that does not exclude the possibility that these were parts of a larg-
er force practising proper war (e.g. at Crow Creek: Keeley 1996). So once again,
the evidence is not as easily interpreted beyond the simple statement of facts. If
war differs from skirmish or simple conflict – just as a matter of scale – we can only
speak of war when societies have become complicated or large enough to be states.
Africa
Jan Abbink (chapter 18) changes the perspective to state and ‘culture’ in sub-
Saharan Africa, examining recent attempts to see ‘culture’ as a decisive factor in
the recent state of affairs. Ritualised violence was here traditionally often exer-
cised to avoid larger bloodshed, and violent practice has led to ‘cultures of vio-
lence’. Abbink’s definition of war wants to propagate an interactionist view and
is non-material and therefore difficult to apply to prehistoric ‘cultures’ where
the elements of his definition are a matter of interpretation of mute sources.
One may ask whether Africa is a good general example because of the strong and
varied influence of colonisation and the reactions to it, not least the artificial
colonial and postcolonial forced groupings of heterogeneous, independent
‘cultures’ where conflict seems predictable and inevitable – because of the rup-
ture of old obligations? This reminder of reality would be good reading for well
meaning politicians. Six elements which are (were) important to the study of
conflict, resistance and warfare are listed by Abbink (chapter 18). Most of them,
if not all, occur on other continents.
The conflict with western ideals is here, as elsewhere, a central problem in
recent world affairs. We are back at the causal problem: can ‘cultural factors’
alone explain cultural change?
Whether cultural values have autonomous causal force is a matter of belief,
says Abbink. ‘Cultures of violence’ as the term goes, are seen as transitory
(chapter 18), which seems to be the only optimistic aspect of this devastatingly
wide spread phenomenon.
Ethiopia provides an example of a region where non-state warfare has been
known for more than a hundred years and apparently remains unchanged by
recent attempts at state formations.
Ecological crises and the present level of weapon technology are lethal ele-
ments in any ever so slightly unstable society (culture). The horrible efficiency
of modern weaponry is one of the far too many elements available to trigger a
circle of violence in Africa as in other regions (cp. Kapferer 2004). The old time
predictability has vanished, as the old people lament, and as any politician
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would surely agree. Our successors may be able to recognise, in the future
archaeology of our era, the gun in its development as the material expression –
and part-cause of this development. The African landscapes must be littered
with thousands of spent cartridges and other rubbish of violence as archaeolog-
ical sources; far outnumbering the handaxes of many millennia!
Cultural mediation seems to be the inevitable loser in face of the interna-
tional economy selling its fast, long distance destructive guns to anyone. What
would happen if the weapons import to Africa could be stopped? (I know it is
an academic question). The modern states in Africa crosscut all the traditional
cultural identities and one wonders how long they can survive – now with the
additional burden of AIDS. 
The Pacific
Claus Bossen takes us to the Pacific (chapter 17) – as do several other articles in
this volume. His cases are historically documented; Fiji and Hawaii are both
classic cases of chieftains, wars and early states.
That states make war is rather clear. Whether war makes states is of course the
central theme of this section. Bossen stresses the individual factors in any spe-
cific historical development. A monopoly of violence presupposes laws backed
up by law enforcement; however, individual and gang violence survives in even
the most developed states. Pre-modern states were surely saturated by violence
at home, in institutions, in the streets etc., completely outside the control of the
armed forces of a state apparatus.
Bosssen’s stance is that while leaders make war, war was not enough to make
a state, which seems a sound statement. He divides the discourse on how war
caused states to be formed into 1. the context of social organisation, 2. military
organisation, 3. the means to enlarge political power. They are all aspects of
social organisation. It is interesting that the motivation for state formation has
been seen as either rather egoistic (Fried) or altruistic (Service) which presum-
ably more than anything else reflects how we as individuals, anthropologists or
others, are oriented in our own social world. 
Bossen examines how war contributed to a change of social organisation
(chapter 17), which leads us to think of the Iliad. Homer’s early city states with
their kingly hierarchy would be an example of early states with warriors recruited
through the ‘(Indo) European’ model of ‘Gefolgschaft’ which is not quite the
same as a paid military force (cp. Vandkilde chapters 26 and 34). When is a
society in a constant state of war? Were the earliest Greek cities proper states?
War without a strict social organisation is just a shambles.
Can a centralised military command structure appear by itself, isolated from
social structures? One thing is efficiency but will such a system be adopted by
people who are engaged in different social relations in their ordinary lives? War
leaders (generals) were temporary, ad hoc, positions in Europe’s pre-states and
‘Gefolgschaft’ is a temporary and personal reciprocal obligation (Timpe 1998).
War organisation is only crucial in situations of constant outside threat and
with a suitable subsistence production.
Conquest is of course a result of war, but not an indispensable element of war.
Elements of warfare may be conducive to increased centralisation and hierar-
chisation in already centralised and hierarchised societies, nonetheless it is not
war itself, but the opportunities it may offer and the combination with other
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domains of power that may lead the way to state formation. It is never a simple
process. Fiji is a good example with historical sources on warfare and archaeo-
logical evidence in the shape of fortified sites. The fluid transition from small-
scale ambushes to the later large-scale operations is a good illustration of our
terminological despair. The effects of large-scale operations were serious for indi-
viduals and social groups (villages). The conquest of a village involved whole-
sale killing, which presumably would leave archaeological traces like the mass
graves in European prehistory.
In large-scale chiefdoms war was used to change eco-political conditions by
subjugation. 
Malcolm Webb is quoted by Bossen (chapter 17) as pointing out the role of
long distance trade. This raises another issue of common interest – the role of
peaceful external relations in the transformation of societies. With the steady
interest in this topic this looks like a fruitful alternative to violent relations.
Hawaii is another classic in anthropology with a very detailed historical record,
expressing enough power to deter attacks. In Fiji warring prevented a more
complex society based on exchange relations and the use of limited external
resources for the decisive victories – a special case one may ask? Only a combi-
nation of several areas of power led to the formation of states by war.
Protohistoric Europe
Heiko Steuer’s article (chapter 16) expands the chronological range of the other
contribution in this volume to the protohistoric Migration Period. He employs
historical sources, but the emphasis is archaeological. The general aim is to
produce a model of warfare and state formation.
The fluid state of Germanic and Gallic tribal units, at least as recorded by
their names, has become much clearer with recent research. Territorially they
were only defined by their relation to the Roman Empire; a case of periphery
reacting to its centre in fundamental aspects of social organisation. There is
hardly any doubt that the Barbarian societies were profoundly influenced by the
existence of the Roman state from Caesar’s time onwards. The migrations of the
period are now interpreted as military campaigns rather than the wholesale
movements of entire populations that we all believed in a generation ago – viz.
the Goths. Such tribal names are now taken to cover specific warrior bands,
although the Latin writers mention women as part of the phenomenon. Here
war is seen as indispensable to the tribal constitution and development of native
states. The warrior identity again appears in a continuous ‘state of warre’ –
annually recurring campaigns at least are suggested.
Symbiosis with great states seems indispensable to Barbarian social develop-
ment beyond the limes, already before the rise of the Roman Empire. The dis-
crepancy between the detailed historical information on geography and politi-
cal processes and the lack of corresponding support from archaeology is a sad
reminder of the absence of clear indications of these processes in mute prehis-
toric material evidence, in spite of our occupation with ethnic and migratory
problems for more than 100 years. Settlement data promise new ways out of the
methodical quagmire.
We are taken through a series of stages of increasing contact with the Romans
(cp. Green chapter 20) and their successors as dominant powers in Europe through
to the Viking Age. All the Barbarians, including Goths and Huns, were out for
I N T R O D U C T I O N . 215
gold, having seen its value during their service in the Roman forces. They knew
how to press the Romans who, after all, found it cheaper to buy peace than to
raise new armies. A crucial element in this symbiosis was milking the cow with-
out ruining the udder. So in a war period the warlords thrived, enabling them to
improve their standing and adapting Roman standards in art and other material
spheres, as archaeology clearly demonstrates. The spiral of warring, and gaining
by it, certainly assisted or even led to many changes in Barbarian Europe. 
Loyalty, apart from that of warriors and their leader, seems to have been a
very relative quality – very much like what we see now in modern tribal societies
in the East. Steuer’s model, though based upon concrete European historic (and
archaeological evidence), is suggested to have a wider use in regions where simi-
lar symbioses existed between states/empires and their unruly, greedy, and
mobile tribal neighbours (chapter 16). 
The interpretation of the most ubiquitous of archaeological sources, namely
graves with weapons, remains crucial to any archaeological assessment of war in
pre- and protohistoric societies. Were they only for professionals or for the
members of the ‘Gefolgschaft’ (or Roman units)? The answer will lead back to the
Bronze Age situations for which it is currently debated whether a ‘Gefolgschaft’
may be assumed without any historical evidence. It seems debatable whether
the motifs behind warrior bands were defence or attack and whether raids were
not part of the social set-up much earlier than this period – indeed the early
Neolithic site of Talheim and the Middle Bronze Age site of Wassenaar with mass
graves could be interpreted in this manner.
Without states the major component in the symbiosis would be missing.
They were at the same time instigators – by recruiting Barbarian warrior bands
to fight each other – and the object of the envy of all the other warrior bands.
So the close interrelationship would have led nowhere without the constant
presence and needs of the great State. This seems equally true of the specific
Roman case and in general. The value of Steuer’s study (chapter 16) lies in the
long series of imperial records of situations which enable him to present this
outline of the history and the ensuing model.
An elaboration and extension of it to other regions and periods is a tempting
prospect.
We must realise that there are no easy solutions. An increased awareness of
qualities and weaknesses is the only way to better models and safer conclusions.
That is what the articles forming this section have endeavoured to provide.
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In this article I will investigate if and if so, to what
extent, there is a connection between war and state
formation. This connection is often more assumed
than demonstrated, and it can be doubted if war is
a creative force behind state formation at all. I will
first make a distinction between war, and other
types of conflict, and present some views on the
concept of causality. Then I will discuss some theo-
ries and statements on the connection between war
and state formation. Finally I will try to answer the
question to what extent war has played a role in
the formation of states – or, for that matter, in the
development of hierarchy, chiefdoms or stratified
societies.
On the definition of war
A definition of war may resemble at first sight a
mere terminological exercise, but in view of the
importance that this concept is accorded in the con-
struction of theories such an exercise is warranted.
War is usually associated with large-scale, organised
violence between societies. When the term ‘war’ is
used, one thinks of extensive, well-organised chief-
doms and states. In the voluminous War, its Causes
and Correlates, Martin Nettleship states that ‘war is a
civilized phenomenon, different from primitive
fighting’ (1975: 86). He does not draw, however, a
line between ‘fighting’ and ‘war’. In his vision, one
should rather think of a continuum than in terms of
a sharp division.
The French anthropologists, Bazin and Terray, keep
all possibilities open when they call war ‘une pra-
tique sociale particulière’, which might be considered
a poor definition (1982: 10). There are several more
rather general statements on war, such as the one by
Marvin Harris (1977: 33), that war is ‘organized
inter-group suicide’. It is, however, Ronald Cohen
who casts the most light on the phenomenon of war,
by defining it as: ‘publicly legitimised and organized
offensive and/or defensive deadly violence between
polities’ (1985: 276-77). When the violence is
restricted to groups within a political unit, or
between small political units, fighting for revenge,
feuds, need for booty, or on the ground of consider-
ations of social and political prestige, he employs
terms such as ‘conflict’, ‘raid’, ‘attack’ and the like. I
shall follow him in this approach and limit the term
‘war’ to legitimised and organised deadly violence
between centralised polities such as early states and
paramount chiefdoms.
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War and State Formation: 
What is the Connection?
/15H E N R I  J . M .  C L A E S S E N
About causality
To establish causality in the social sciences or prehis-
tory is a tricky matter (Köbben 1970). Stated baldly,
one speaks of cause and effect when Phenomenon B
follows Phenomenon A after a certain period of time
and there is every reason to suppose that B would
not have been able to exist without A. The problem
is that in our sciences, the question of cause and
effect is a complex, often recalcitrant phenomenon,
however. After all, what is the cause of something?
How far should we penetrate back in time to find
‘the’ origin of something? One can easily conceive
of a situation in which Phenomenon A has appar-
ently been caused by Phenomenon B, but behind B
lurks an ‘instigator’ C – and in that case is B or C the
cause of A? (Claessen 2000: 8). 
Philippe van Parijs (1981: 4-20) has devoted a
great deal of attention to the question of cause and
effect in social evolution. In his view the scholar
should first establish the time sequence. Secondly
he or she should point out patterns that have been
established earlier, and finally, he or she should be
able to make the assumed relation comprehensible.
Thus there is absolutely no question of any ‘black-
box’ reasoning, only the beginning and end of which
are known. To give an example: imagine I raise my
hand and directly afterwards a small dog dies in the
street. Is this then a question of post hoc, ergo propter
hoc? Naturally, it is highly unlikely; imagine, how-
ever, that I raise my hand ten times and ten times a
small dog dies. Is there then any question of cause
and effect? At this point we must take recourse to
the assistance of van Parijs’ criteria: have there been
earlier confirmed regularities in this area? Is it possi-
ble to make the assumed relationship comprehensi-
ble? Because neither of these requirements can be
fulfilled, we are not yet able to register the hand-dog
relationship among the causalities.
We have to be very cautious when we want to
establish a cause and effect relationship – even when
many people suggest that such a relation exists. This
caution is especially necessary in the field of the
war-and-state formation theories, as we will see
presently.
Pre-state conflict
War and conflict are quite common phenomena in
human cultures. There is no reason to overestimate
the degree of peacefulness in the bands of hunters
and gatherers; there have been recorded many cases
of conflict and violence among these peoples (see
e.g. Lee and DeVore 1968), though full-fledged war
seems hardly to occur among such groups (Steward
1968: 333-34). Matters could also greatly escalate in
the prehistoric period, which is demonstrated by a
Bronze Age grave excavated in Wassenaar in the
western Netherlands in 1986 (Louwe Kooijmans
1993). This contained twelve bodies buried together.
One whole group – men, women, and children – was
killed at one and the same time; the bodies show
obvious traces of violence. This must have been an
organised attack, of which the purpose was the
destruction of the opponents (Claessen 2000: 104).
It is, the number of casualties notwithstanding, not
a case of war in the sense of the definition adopted
here. This view is confirmed by the findings in the
recently defended doctoral thesis of David Fontijn
(2003).
A slaughter on this scale easily outstrips the rela-
tively small number of victims who fall in the noto-
rious, endemic conflicts among the Yanomami. Here
the number of victims is restricted to but a few each
time (Chagnon 1968). It must be kept in mind that
the Yanomami, though being a small scale society,
base their subsistence mainly on horticulture. The
Yanomami can be considered a good example of a
society, living in a ‘State of Warre’ – a characterisa-
tion formulated in 1642 by the English philosopher
Hobbes. It is true that Hobbes did not claim that
warfare would be permanent in such societies, but
that a permanent ‘State of Warre’ would prevail,
because there were no institutions to prevent the
conflict. People would therefore have to live in per-
manent uncertainty and insecurity (Sahlins 1968:
4-6; Claessen 2000: 102).
Such a ‘State of Warre’ was not only found in rel-
atively simple societies, such as the Yanomami, but
also in the quite complex League of the Iroquois and
among their neighbours, the Huron (Claessen 2000:
105; Morgan 1851: 58; Trigger 1969: 42-53). With
regard to the Huron, Heidenreich (1978: 385) even
states that ‘Theoretically any man could plan and
organize a war party if he got enough support, but
in most cases this task was assumed by the experi-
enced war chiefs’. Neither among the Iroquois nor
among the Huron was there any question of profes-
sional soldiers, or a military organisation, an affair
of the Nation, or of any military action legitimised
by the Nation as a whole. The many conflicts, raids,
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attacks, and violence found with the Iroquois and
the Huron thus cannot be called ‘war’ in the sense
of the definition developed by Cohen.
On the connection between war 
and state formation
In his well-known theory of the origin of the state
(1970), Carneiro does not distinguish between war
and conflict; he uses the terms indiscriminately. This
theory deals with a population which is increasing
in size and lives in a limited area blessed with
resources. The growing number of people forces a
struggle for existence and the defeated groups are
faced with the choice of accepting subjugation (and
exploitation) or heading off into the desert. The
organisation which the victors develop to keep the
defeated groups in subjugation he calls the state.
Unfortunately, Carneiro does not tell how such
a state organisation was formed, and neither, how
such state organisation was supposed to function.
Famous and elegant though the model is, it is
ambiguous. In some publications it is used to defend
the evolutionary role of population growth and in
others to demonstrate that conflict lies at the root of
the development of more complex forms of political
organisation. Of course, the two influences are not
mutually exclusive, but this ambiguity does tend to
undermine the soundness of the proposed reasoning.
In fact, it is impossible to confirm much more than
that in this model conflict was the result of popula-
tion growth. This makes war or conflict a derivative
factor (Claessen 2000: 103). The state formation,
which eventually takes place in the circumscribed
area, does not solve the initial problems, because
the population pressure is not removed and it may
even increase. The development of remedies by the
leaders of the polity – apart from a forced migration
of those who lost the battle – may vary from irri-
gation works to trade. Undeniably these measures
increase the carrying capacity of the area and lessen
the relative population pressure. At the same time
they make it in their interest for the population to
remain in the area in which they are settled and
make it worthwhile for them to defend it.
The most significant objection to Carneiro’s cir-
cumscription model is the absolute character, which
he attributes to it: state formation has always and
exclusively taken place by these means (Claessen
2000: 95). In later publications Carneiro also invari-
ably makes circumscription, war and violence the
causal factors in the formation of the state, or in the
development of chiefdoms (Carneiro 1981; 1987).
In one of his most recent publications (2002: 90ff)
the same views come to the fore again. Here it is
stated that chiefdoms (the precursors of the state),
develop only in the Neolithic, when
several factors led Neolithic villages to transcend local auton-
omy and create the multi-village political units we call chief-
doms. These conditions were, essentially, the presence of agri-
culture, the existence of environmental or social circumscrip-
tion, population pressure, and warfare. Together, they formed
the necessary and sufficient conditions that triggered the
process. Almost irresistibly they led to the rise of chiefdoms,
and then, in more limited areas, to the emergence of the state.
Here he added more explicitly the presence of agri-
culture, but in the original formulations agriculture
already played a role. For the rest, the same views are
expressed: neighbouring villages have to be defeated
by force of arms, incorporation of the defeated poli-
ties in their own polity, prisoners of war must work
as slaves, close supporters are used to administer the
conquered territory, their own subjects are required
to pay tribute, and have to serve as fighting men in
times of war. It is the same story all over again. Cases
are known, however, in which war – in a circum-
scribed area – did not produce a state or a more com-
plex sociopolitical organisation, as appears from the
following examples.
– Martin van Bakel (1989) describes the situation
in the small, densely populated Polynesian island of
Rapa which with about 2000 inhabitants in an area
of 36 km2 in the beginning of the 19th century,
certainly can be considered a densely populated
‘circumscribed area’. The population was scattered
here over about twenty villages, each having some
arable land and access to the sea. Between the villages
great tensions existed; there was found a permanent
‘State of Warre’. In the course of time some chiefs
succeed sometimes in subjugating a few villages for
a short period of time, but up until the colonial era
the island population remained divided over a
number of virtually impregnable fortresses. There
were numerous raids and attacks, but never did one
of the groups succeeded in uniting the whole of the
island under one rule. All the attacks and violence,
combined with serious population pressure, did not
produce a state. Only when, with the arrival of the
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Europeans, firearms were imported, did the conquest
of some of the forts became possible (Van Bakel 1989:
140-60, 209-12; see also Hanson 1970).
– Timothy Earle (1997) presents data on the
Mantaro Valley in Peru over the period AD 500-1534.
He points out that ‘In the Mantaro Valley, warfare
merely resulted in a political standoff between hill-
fort chiefdoms. Here both detailed documentary
evidence and well-preserved fortified communities
testify to the limited significance of warfare as a polit-
ical strategy for the expansion of chiefdoms’ (1997:
111). Interestingly, it was specifically the Peruvian
valleys that were used by Carneiro to explain the
evolution of states by circumscription and war. But,
as Earle states: ‘The important point is that bur-
geoning warfare among these comparatively simple
societies corresponded with the collapse of regionally
integrated polities and does not appear to have facil-
itated political integration’ (1997: 113).
One cannot but conclude that the circumscrip-
tion-and-war-or-violence theory does not provide
a general explanation of the phenomenon of state
formation. The cases mentioned above fulfil all
requirements of Carneiro’s theory, but no state did
emerge here. Apparently more factors are needed to
make state formation possible than just war and cir-
cumscription.
This conclusion finds confirmation in Tymowski’s
article on ‘The Army and State Formation in West
Africa’ (1981). In it he describes how in two cases
(Kenedugu and the state of Samori) the formation of
a state was greatly promoted by military activities.
First, however, he points to a number of conditions
that the formation of these states actually made pos-
sible: 
In both cases, we have to do with communities which began
producing an economic surplus capable of maintaining a ruling
group much earlier than the states actually developed. In both
cases, too, the communities had knowledge of state organiza-
tion. It proved, however, neither to be the economic surplus
nor the readily available organizational models that automati-
cally caused states to emerge. (1981: 428)
There were factors hampering this process such as
periods of economic stagnation, and a lack of exter-
nal threat that would force these societies to organ-
ise in self-defence. Promoting state formation were,
according to Tymowski, such factors as population
growth in the early nineteenth century, and the
development of trade. ‘The need to ensure security
on trading routes was one of the stimuli for the devel-
opment of the state’ (1981: 429). Trade led to grow-
ing social differentiation, and growing commercial
opportunities for the ruling class. The interests of
the trading and the ruling groups began to merge.
To better exploit the population another sociopolit-
ical organisation was necessary, and to enforce the
new system an army was needed: ‘the victory in the
power struggle went to those who more quickly
and efficiently created an army’ (1981: 430). Thus in
Tymowski’s analysis, the interaction of an increasing
surplus production, population growth, trade, and
military activities led in the end to the emergence of
these two West African states. The army was used in
these polities to protect trade, and to keep their own
population in check. Though there certainly was
violence, there was no war (in the sense of Ronald
Cohen’s definition) connected with the formation
of these states; the army acted as a state police force.
There are also cases known in which increasing
political centralisation occurred, but where neither
population growth nor war has played a demonstra-
ble part. For example, Leslie Gunawardana (1981;
1985) describes how in medieval Sri Lanka differences
in the quality of land and the presence of irrigation
water led to differences in status and wealth between
the villagers and also to differences in prestige and
power among the villages concerned. In this situation
a stratified society evolved without either popula-
tion pressure or subjugation having had any effect
at all. The differences between the owners and the
non-owners, or those with very little land, were rein-
forced by the development of endogamous marriage
networks between the prominent members in the
various villages. The presentation of pieces of land
and the transfer of small-scale irrigation works to
Buddhist monasteries won the donors a wealth of
karma, which could legitimate their material advan-
tage over others. The situation Gunawardana
describes cannot be squared easily with Carneiro’s
model, for here it was mainly ecological, economical,
and ideological factors that led to a hierarchisation,
which in due course gave rise to the emergence of
chiefdoms (Gunawardana 1981: 136, 138). Only
when ambitious chiefs tried to merge a number of
chiefdoms into one large polity – or an early state –
did military activities began to play a role.
The same type of development is found with the
Kachin of Highland Burma (Leach 1954). The Kachin
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had an economy in which shifting cultivation was
the principal means of livelihood. They lived in vil-
lages, the inhabitants of which were related to each
other by a complex marriage structure in which the
brides went in one direction and the bride prices in
the other one. Under the prevailing ideology the
giver was more highly placed than the receiver. The
agricultural system presented one possible source
of disturbance of this balanced situation. Generally
speaking, the small fields did not give a high yield,
but every so often there were ripe crops to be har-
vested. At that particular moment the owners of that
field had an abundant surplus, and because the crop
could not be stored, it was the custom to organise a
feast for all the members of the village. The host of
the feast derived prestige from his action. However,
because every so often every family was in a posi-
tion to give such a feast, this caused little structur-
al change. But it might just so happen that one of
the families was able to give several feasts one after
the other. This did change the egalitarian structure
and the family concerned accrued more permanent
prestige to itself. The daughters of the prestigious
family became considerably more expensive and the
higher bride prices increased its prosperity – and thus
the prestige of the family – even more. If this trend
continued, the girls became too expensive for the
boys of the village. They then ‘constructed’ a new
marriage circuit, and the prestigious family now
entered a bride exchange circuit in which the nota-
bles of a wider area participated. If the prosperity of
the family continued the less fortunate villagers
sought an explanation for these uncommon devel-
opments. This was found in religious terms: the more
fortunate fellow-villagers apparently had better
access to the ancestors or to the spirits than the more
ordinary mortals. Now the development reaches a
crucial phase. Up to that point the position of the
notable family had been based on distribution: the
giving of feasts and gifts. But, once the villagers
understood how matters stood, the stream of gifts
changed direction. The villagers began to offer the
well-to-do family small gifts with the request that
they put in a good word for them with their ances-
tors. Naturally, this request was acceded to and with-
in the shortest possible time material goods flowed
in to the notable and he reciprocated this with
immaterial matters – a veritable realisation of Marx’
Asiatic mode of production (Claessen 2000: 60;
Friedman 1979).
These developments were not limited to the
Kachin; in fact the same events occurred in many
parts of Southeast Asia. The consequence of these
developments was in the end the emergence of a
number of rather unstable early states in the area, a
process described in detail by Renée Hagesteijn (1989).
As the mountainous terrain made effective war and
conquest practically impossible, ambitious chiefs
sought to enlarge their influence by strategic mar-
riages, and the concluding of treaties – which never
held longer than the life time of those who con-
cluded them. The whole complex of cause and effect
here has nothing to do with environmental or social
circumscription and just as little with war or popu-
lation pressure. In this case the qualifying factors
were incidental overproduction, the existence of an
ideology which accorded the giver a higher status
than the receiver, and the circumstance that after a
prolonged period of prosperity the villagers were
inclined to give the fortunate farmer presents in
return for blessings. Ideological factors clearly played
the crucial role here.
In other places relatively peaceful developments
can also be found. Conrad Kottak (1972) takes pop-
ulation growth as his point of departure. He describes
how, in the distant past, a limited number of people
lived on the shores of Lake Victoria in Africa. The
climate was good, the land fertile, and the lake pro-
vided fish. Under such favourable conditions, the
population grew and as time passed the whole shore
of the lake was inhabited. The unabated population
growth forced the societies involved to look for
more areas of settlement in the hinterland, at some
distance of the shore of the lake. Those who were
‘sent’ to the hinterland were the younger sons of
younger sons and their dependents. Those who
ended up in the hinterland were certainly not ban-
ished to a wilderness; the land there was fertile and
the climate was good. Their great disadvantage was
that they had no direct access to the lake (and con-
sequently to fish and trade). If they were able to
share in any of the benefits offered by the lake, they
were dependent on the generosity of the dwellers of
the lake shore – their older brothers and cousins. In
this case a situation arose in which not everybody of
the same age and the same sex had equal access to
the means of livelihood; that is to say there arose
what Fried (1967) defines as a stratified society.
Kottak’s model reveals how virtually without a ripple
a society can glide into a situation in which terms
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like ‘rank’ and ‘stratified’ are applicable; the whole
process happens just as silently as it did in Kachin
society (cp. Service 1975: 75-78 for a comparable
model).
Another phenomenon likewise contributed great-
ly to the development of ranking and stratification
– and the formation of chiefdoms and early states –
in Africa: the ideology of the firstcomer’s primacy.
Leadership in many societies was usually allocated
to the leader of the lineage which had settled the
area first and, by ‘opening up’ the land, had entered
into a ‘contract’ with the earth spirit(s), which con-
tinued to give him access to fertility in exchange for
offerings (Claessen and Oosten 1996: 368-70, and the
chapters on West Africa in that volume; Kopytoff
1999; Bay 1998). Small groups of cultivators who later
wanted to settle in this area and desired to make a
claim on the fertility magic of the ritual leader, the
earth priest, had to ask his permission and display a
certain degree of obedience. Treading this peaceful
path, gradually not inconsiderable territorial units
or villages emerged. This system of peaceful enlarge-
ment is still found in many places in Africa.
Zuiderwijk, who recently investigated the situation
in Cameroon, informs us that: 
The clan that first occupied the land and founded a village is
called the clan of the chiefs. In principle and often in practice
the chief is indeed a member of this clan. Clans that arrived
later were warmly welcomed, and even given virgin land to
cultivate, but they came to be under the symbolic authority of
those who arrived first. (1998: 92)
It is against this background that Igor Kopytoff states
that chiefs here do not so much ‘rise above their
neighbours as they were so to speak, ‘levitated’
upwards as more immigrants arrived and inserted
more layers at the bottom of the hierarchy’ (1999:
88). In the formation of most of the African early
states, especially those in West Africa, these ideolog-
ical principles lay at their foundation. In particular,
the assumed ritual influence of the ruler on fertility
provided a strong form of legitimation to the gov-
ernment (Claessen and Oosten 1996).
Our investigations thus far have shown that war,
even in a circumscribed area, does not always pro-
duce more complex sociopolitical structures; the
stagnating developments in Rapa and the Mantaro
Valley are cases in point. Moreover, there were found
instances in which stratified societies emerged
without war (or circumscription) playing a role at all
– as was demonstrated by the Kachin, the people
living on the shores of Lake Victoria, the villages in
Sri Lanka, and the political structures in Africa based
on the firstcomer-ideology. The article by Tymowski
showed that in West Africa not only an armed
police force, but also favourable economic and demo-
graphic circumstances were needed for the emer-
gence of states. War thus far does not seem a very
promising factor in explaining social evolution –
and yet mankind has fought numerous wars, and
committed numerous acts of violence. Why so
many wars?
Reasons for war and conflict
As was stated in the discussion of causality, there
often lurks behind Phenomenon B, another
Phenomenon C. In other words, causalities behind
causalities. Regarding war it can be safely stated that
in the majority of cases war was not waged for the
sake of war itself, nor was there conflict for conflict’s
sake. There was always some reason or a complex
of reasons lying at the base of it. In short, wars
between ‘civilised peoples’, as well as raids and fights
between societies which are classified as ‘lower’ are
derived events, instigated by other, more com-
pelling, factors. They thus cannot be included in the
explanation of evolution as independent factors,
even though they sometimes had enormous conse-
quences; still less can war or conflict be considered
to be a ‘first cause’, neither a ‘necessary’ nor a ‘suffi-
cient condition’ in the development of more com-
plex societies. The reasons for conflict and war can
be summed up globally in the following categories:
– Demographic causes (population pressure, exigu-
ous means of subsistence, shortage of land);
– Economic causes (shortage of food and/or raw
materials; the competition to control markets,
trade routes, or ports; the search for prestige goods
to bind people, etc.);
– Ideological causes (religious oppositions; ques-
tions of honor and shame; reciprocal obligations;
feelings of vengeance; struggles for succession);
– Politico-strategic causes (security reasons; elimi-
nation of threatening neighbors; claims to influ-
ential positions).
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It seems probable that in many instances more
than one of these causes simultaneously played a
role and the motivation for one participant in the
conflict will have differed from that of another
(Claessen 2000: 109-10).
The role of war
Little value should be attached to the creative force
of conflict and war as such. Hallpike (1986: 233-35)
has argued that military activities (under which he
includes war as well as conflict) generally have few
constructive consequences. Admittedly, some plan-
ning, coordination and leadership are required if
anything above a simple brawl is to be successful,
but that is as far as it goes. Above this, Hallpike
thinks the strengthening of leadership or authority
is more likely to occur if some form of leadership or
authority already existed before this strife.
Mere violence, however, cannot lead to permanent institu-
tions of political authority, and to my knowledge there is no
instance of military activity by itself ever having led to the
emergence of even chiefly authority. (Hallpike 1986: 235, ital-
ics in original)
Earle, who devoted a great deal of attention to con-
flict and war in his book about the evolution of
chiefdoms is very cautious in his pronouncements
about them. He has this to say about war (1997: 106):
Inherently warfare is limited in its effectiveness as a power for
central control. Although military forces may create a broadly
integrated polity, it can as well dissolve it by intrigue, coup,
and rebellion. The power of force rips at the social fabric, the
institutions of society. To be effective as a power of centrality,
coercive force must itself be controlled, a difficult task that is
achieved by binding the military with economic and ideologi-
cal tethers.
Apart from the difficulty of political leaders control-
ling the military, valuable developments can indeed
take place in the aftermath of conflict and war. This
holds especially when these are looked at from an
organisational point of view. In The Early State
(Claessen and Skalník 1978: 626) it has already been
argued that the origins of the state cannot be attrib-
uted to war, but can indeed be largely encouraged by
war and tension. Generally speaking, it can be said
that in conflict or war, regulations and provisions
have to be laid down. This requirement is just as
valid for the Yanomami as for the Incas or the
Carolingians. Scouts have to be selected and sent out;
their reports have to be processed. Warriors have to
be assembled. Rewards have to be organised, even
when the army had to forage from the land, and the
rewards for loyal servants have to be honoured, no
matter how the war has been concluded.
Political leaders who have numerous, loyal, fol-
lowers at their disposal sometimes experience great
difficulty in meeting their obligations in peacetime
– the Carolingians are a prime example of this. It was
above all in their empire where Gefolgschaft obliga-
tions played a great role that the leaders often found
themselves in great difficulties. Loyalty remained
intact as long as the leader looked after his followers
generously. This sometimes meant that new wars
and conquests were unavoidable, but could also lead
to pressure being brought to bear on farmers and
citizens to pay ever higher taxes. Better administra-
tive organisation was an absolute prerequisite and
we may assume that the waging of war or the threat
of war was partly responsible for the development
of this.
Elsewhere, in the empire of the Incas, the devel-
opment of a road system was a corollary of the never
ending wars; the other impulse for road-building
came from the necessity to transport great quanti-
ties of food and valuables. The seasonal wars in the
African kingdom of Dahomey were first caused by
the necessity of procuring people to sacrifice, and
later by the interesting possibility of selling them
as slaves – a development that resembles greatly the
repeated wars of the Aztecs to make a sufficient
number of prisoners for the necessary human sacri-
fices (Claessen 2000: passim). Here Cohen’s dictum
that ‘states make war’ is fully realised (Cohen 1985).
Emergence of states with or without war
Thus far it has been demonstrated that for the emer-
gence of rank, stratification, or chiefdoms war
and/or circumscription was neither a necessary nor
a sufficient cause. One might argue, however, that
for the formation of states war or violence (or even-
tually circumscription) was a necessary factor, or that
in cases where a state emerged, war and/or violence
(and/or circumscription) played a crucial role. Before
going into this matter, I will first define the early
state: an early state is a three-tier (national, regional,
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local level) sociopolitical organisation for the regulation
of social relations in a complex, stratified society, char-
acterised by a shared ideology of which reciprocity
between the strata is the basic principle; the ruler (the
central government) has the legitimised power to enforce
decisions (adapted from Claessen and Skalník 1978:
640). How then did this type of sociopolitical organ-
isation develop? Let us take as an example the for-
mation of the (early) state of the Betsileo (based on
Kottak 1980).
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century the
Betsileo lived in the eastern part of the southern
highlands of Madagascar. They pursued irrigated rice
cultivation. In the seventeenth century they were
threatened by a group of inhabitants from the coast
who were in search of plunder and slaves. This threat
drove them to seek help from one another and they
retreated to the hilltops, around which they built
fortifications. It should be clear that no war (as
defined above), ever took place here. The worst that
happened were some skirmishes. As time passed,
increasing numbers of people found their way to
these relatively safe places and the need for more
clear-cut leadership made itself felt. The existing
traditional forms of leadership (family and clan
chiefs) gradually ceded place to a more formal hierar-
chy and the originally somewhat amorphous sacred
qualities which were ascribed to clan chiefs were
now transposed to the most prominent of them,
those who had won themselves status and power in
the administrative apparatus, which was beginning
to take shape. This is the way in which a process was
set in motion, which after a good century or more
carried the Betsileo to the stage of an early state.
The development took a completely different course
among the Isandra who lived close by. The Isandra
were cattle-herders, who were used to leading a
nomadic life with their herds; their sociopolitical
organisation was quite limited. When the threat of
the coastal people began to be palpable in their area
they chose the most obvious solution: they withdrew
to safer places with their herds and only returned
after the raiders had left the area. During those
tumultuous years virtually nothing changed among
the Isandra; whereas among the Betsileo a state
structure came into existence.
This case makes several interesting observations
possible. The first is that the development of the
state was not planned beforehand; it was the unex-
pected outcome of living together in the hilltop
forts. Second, it is a clear example of Gregory
Johnson’s thesis that a growing number of people,
living together for a longer period of time, need to
develop stronger forms of leadership – or fall apart
(Johnson 1982; Claessen 2000). The Betsileo had to
choose between stronger leadership or slavery. One
might say that these hilltop forts were a kind of cir-
cumscribed area. That is correct – but contrary to
Carneiro’s theory there was no fighting among the
Betsileo in the forts; as far as there was fighting, they
fought foreign raiders. Third, the previous existence
of an ideology of sacred leadership appeared to be
very important: with the help of this ideology a
stronger type of leadership could be explained and
legitimised (a phenomenon we found also to be
crucial among the Kachin, and the villages in Sri
Lanka). Fourth, the survival of the Betsileo demanded
a lot of management on the side of the rulers. The
‘servant of the community’ by his management
activities became its master (Friedrich Engels, quoted
in Claessen 2000: 29). And, finally, the whole exer-
cise was set in motion to preserve the irrigated rice
fields – and thus their food supplies. There was the
danger of plunder and slave hunts, and to defend
themselves the Betsileo organised the hilltop forts
and were successful in their defense. Violence against
the enemy certainly was found here; the term ‘war’
seems not to be warranted to characterise the skir-
mishes, however.
If we try to generalise the conclusions above,
combining them with the data from the cases pre-
sented earlier in this chapter, it seems that the fol-
lowing factors – in a complex interaction – are con-
ducive to the formation of an early state (cp.
Claessen and Oosten 1996: 5; Claessen 2000: 188;
Claessen 2002: 107-11):
– Population growth. This leads, when the society
in question stays together, to a more complex
sociopolitical organisation, and makes an increase
in food production inevitable.
– An ideology, which explains and legitimates
(stronger) forms of leadership. This ideology is
usually an elaboration of already existing ideas. 
– The domination of the economy. A larger popu-
lation and a more developed form of leadership
demand an increase in production. This demands
more management, and more land has to be
brought under cultivation. Better transport and
better storage facilities have to be developed.
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– A more complex sociopolitical organisation
demands more functionaries, more juridical meas-
ures and more stratification. Over time a complex
administrative apparatus – or bureaucracy – will
emerge.
– A limited military apparatus or police force. This
is necessary to maintain external independence
and internal safety. This apparatus in its turn
makes possible a stronger administrative organi-
sation and a more developed economy.
Even when these factors are found together, an early
state will not emerge automatically. According to
Patricia Shifferd (1987: 47ff):
Continued centralization, although clearly observable taking
human civilization as a whole, is certainly not inevitable for
individual cases. In fact such continued centralization was the
least common outcome in the sample at hand.
Some action or event – internal or external – is
needed to trigger the development. Such action or
event may even have taken place long ago, not
directed especially towards this goal. When such a
process is set into motion, it tends to enforce itself,
and the various factors influence each other. The
process can be compared with a snowball: once it
comes into motion it grows faster and faster (Claessen
and Skalník 1978: 624). In the case of the Betsileo the
‘event’ (Claessen 2002: 110-12) was the threat posed
by slave hunters; in the two African cases it was the
need to protect trade; in some of the Southeast Asian
polities it was the introduction of new religious
ideas with the help of which the ruler could devel-
op a stronger form of legitimation (Hagesteijn 1989).
It is certainly possible to distinguish these factors,
but it is also clear that they are closely intertwined.
Sometimes war was involved in the development
towards the state. In the cases presented here the
role of war and conflict as an evolutionary factor
was limited, or secondary only. Neither war nor con-
flict (or for that matter, circumscription) should be
considered as a sufficient or a necessary factor. Even
less so could war be considered causal to the devel-
opment of the state, for in that case there should
have been first war, and then, as a consequence of
it, the formation of a state.
Concluding summary
We are now in the position to formulate an answer
to the question posed at the beginning of this paper:
is there a connection between war and state forma-
tion? The answer must be that there is some con-
nection, indeed, for several times war, fighting, or
violence, was connected with the formation of states,
chiefdoms or other types of more complex socio-
political organisations. This connection, however,
should not be considered a causality; at best it was
a corollary of the developments. In all cases pre-
sented a number of interacting factors played a role
in the formation of a chiefdom or state. Neither
war, nor other types of violence, appeared to be a
necessary or sufficient condition in their develop-
ment. Moreover, instances were presented in which
neither war, nor circumscription, played any role in
the formation of a more complex sociopolitical
organisation.
War, however, is not wholly without influence.
There have been developments triggered by war, such
as the erection of defensive structures, the develop-
ment of a better administrative organisation, etc.,
developments that were conducive to stronger or
better types of sociopolitical organisation. However,
when leaders did not succeed in ‘taming’ the mili-
tary, in tying the warriors to the government, the
effect of war and strife was in the end only destruc-
tive; greater units did not develop; never ending
fighting came in its place (cp. Earle 1997). One might
argue that destruction is also an evolutionary force
– and I will not deny it – but the aim of this article
was an inquiry into the connection between war
and state formation. That connection appeared to
be a limited one.
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The subject: the background 
It is my intention to formulate a model on war. But
it is not warfare itself that will be considered in all
its aspects (Steuer 2001; Jørgensen and Clausen 1997),
but rather the causes and effects of wars conducted
by war lords and their warrior bands. Wars from the
4th century BC to the 10th/11th century AD will be
considered in devising the model – wars spanning a
period of more than a thousand years, from the
ancient Celts to the Normans. Based upon the reports
in the written sources, characteristic phenomena
(Erscheinungen) will be singled out as criteria for
defining this type of warfare. Not all criteria will be
obtainable for every epoch, but in the overall view a
varied number of criteria can confirm the compara-
bility of the armed conflicts and therefore also their
socio-political backgrounds. (This model is not a
newly formulated thesis. Most of it can be found in
Wells 1999). The question of the expression of these
events in the archaeological sources will only be
raised in the second place, and it will be shown that,
contrary to general opinion, warrior bands can never,
or rarely, be recognised using archaeological methods.
On the contrary, following the conclusion of the
socio-political process – the birth of tribes and states
– the later occupation of land as a result of these wars
would leave marks on the archaeological remains.
The Celtic and Germanic societies of central Europe
of the first millennium were permanently changing.
These variations appeared regularly, to some extent
in waves or phases. We can abstract the rules; but
history does not repeat itself, that is why the various
epochs are not completely identical. The different
reports in the written sources describe this change
in an indirect manner. The recorded names of the
active groups – we will call them tribes following
Caesar, Tacitus and the later Ammianus Marcellinus
– emerge and disappear again. The names of tribes
during the time of Caesar (100-44 BC) (De Bello
Gallico, 58-52 BC) differ from those of the time of
Tacitus (55-116/120 AD) (Germania, 98 AD) or those
of Ammianus Marcellinus (second half of the 4th
century), Gregory of Tours (ca. 540-594) (Historia
Francorum), or the time of the Carolingian and
Ottonian historians. 150 to 250 years lie between
each of these reports, the equivalent of five to eight
generations.
Various ethnogeneses (tribalisations) are reflected
in the change of the names, but even in the preserva-
tion of an old name the old tribe does not continue.
A new ethnogenesis creates other political entities.
There are Ariovistusus’ Suebi, the Suebi of the age
of Tacitus, the Suebi (Suevi) of the migration period
in Spain, etc. The same applies to the Marcomanni
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during the times of Ariovistusus or Maroboduus and
those of the Marcomannic Wars 166-180 AD, which
are not the same tribe. The Alamanni, mentioned for
the first time around 300 AD, were made up of var-
ious groups of Germanic people, then constituted
themselves in a second ethnogenesis (tribalisation)
in the Merovingian Empire around 500 and then
again for a third ethnogenesis (tribalisation) in the
dukedom/duchy of the 8th/9th century.
What are these tribes? Are they the population
of territorial units, the unification of several settled
landscapes with large numbers of villages (Siedlungs-
kammern)? It is a matter of discussion whether the
tribes which are mentioned by name in the ancient
sources emerged only as territorially bound units in
reaction to the overly powerful threat of neighbour-
ing empires or states; as the open ranked society based
on clan-like organisation with its numerous inner
dependencies had become obsolete. The Celtic tribes
with their central oppida mentioned by Caesar are a
reaction to the pressure of the Mediterranean states
and only appear in the Middle and Late La Tène
period with the aid of returning mercenaries. The
Germanic tribes may only have constituted them-
selves due to the pressure of the Celtic oppidum-civil-
isation on the Germanic clans, to which Germanic
mercenaries in the service (army) of Celtic nobility
may have contributed on their return home.
Ethnology has pointed out this development for
Africa during the colonial age of the 19th century:
before the intrusion of Europeans there would appear
to have been none of the tribal structures that later
on became apparent and which up to today provide
a continuous cause for conflict and wars (Vail 1989;
Sigrist 1994; Lentz 1998). Today the political and
social organisation of rule under Shaka (Marx 1998),
the founder of the Zulu tribe or realm, is under dis-
cussion in this way, and likewise the deadly conflict
between Hutu and Tutsi, today two different tribes,
but before colonisation two different economic
structures: farming and cattle breeding.
The idea of tribes (gentes), of a people (Volk), and of
a nation developed as part of the nation-state think-
ing of the 19th century. Events in the present (in
the Balkans, in Africa etc.) show that ethnic clashes
may also be conflicts among rival bands of thieves
(warrior bands).
But it is impossible to speak about these terms
(termini) in all their complexity in this paper. In
recent decades there has been a very controversial
and many-sided discussion concerning the terms
‘tribe/Stamm’ or ‘ethnogenesis/tribalisation/Stammes-
bildung’ (compare developments for instance from
Wenskus 1977 to Pohl 1998 and 2002, or also Bowlus
2002; Barth 1969). In numerous lemmata the Hoops
Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde (Pohl
1998) tried to specify this discussion in its many
aspects. For some other terms like ‘Gefolgschaft’ (comi-
tatus), i.e. followers or retinue, problems in the trans-
lation from Latin into German or the English lan-
guage exist as well. For the structuralist attempt – an
old one, not a poststructuralist or contextual attempt
– made in this paper it may be enough to formulate
a model as an idea.
‘Völkerwanderungen’, translated as migrations of
whole peoples, were in fact not migrations of peoples
but rather military campaigns. These campaigns only
had temporary camps as stations, not permanent
settlements. Campaigns of warrior bands could be
undertaken without difficulty, as the landscape was
relatively empty. Although the landscapes were
populated completely and systematically with settle-
ments like a network in distances not more than 5
kilometres as a rule, there was still enough space to
allow larger military units with their horses to pass
through, either unnoticed or officially sanctioned.
The groups called in the sources by names such as
Suebi or Langobardi were warrior bands and not neigh-
bouring societies living in villages with families or
kinship groups based upon relationships among
relatives, and with a clan-system. Perhaps only the
leading clans went by these names. Through their
concepts of order, ancient writers equated the names
of the mobile and multi-ethnic warrior bands with
inhabitants of the territories from which some of the
warriors were drawn. The authors, with their back-
ground in the Roman Empire, did not recognise the
principal difference between warrior bands and rural
populations with the same names. The names ran-
domly appear next to one another, not because parts
of tribes had migrated to other countries, but because
a military unit had been divided and deployed at
various places.
The Völkerwanderungen of that period therefore
are not the migrations of tribes with the whole fam-
ily, their mobile belongings, cattle and all, as was
believed in earlier research, but rather campaigns of
warrior bands whose wars only much later led to the
occupation of land. Their emigration did not leave
the native lands depleted of their population.
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Depopulation had completely different reasons and
backgrounds. For instance:
– The Germanii disappear from the territories east
of the river Elbe long after the end of the so-called
migration-period in the 6th century, and Slavic tribes
immigrate.
– The landscape of Anglia (Angeln) in modern
Jutland, and other areas along the coastline of the
North Sea, only appears to become depopulated more
than a century after the emigration to England
around the middle of the 5th century; it would there-
fore seem that only latecomers were concerned.
– People, i.e. warrior bands, left the densely pop-
ulated areas. Even when these warrior bands settled
in new countries, no major changes came into effect
in the native areas, a fact that can be attested in the
archaeological features – the structures of the villages
show no change. At the very least no decline in the
density of the population can be registered.
Wars are an immanent part of social change.
Ethnogenesis or tribal constitutions (tribalisations)
and the development of states were not possible
without wars. One therefore has to consider the effect
of the feedback. Because higher organised societies
(empires) influenced their surroundings, tribes devel-
oped, taking the place of clan-societies, in order to
defend themselves. Warrior bands split off after the
constitution of these tribes. Because warrior bands
appear and influence the higher organised societies
(kingdoms or empires) through mercenary services
or as organised bands of thieves (warrior bands) –
threatening them militarily and through raids –
they in turn attempt to influence the tribal commu-
nities through paying mercenaries or drawing up
contracts with these groups in order to use the tribes
and warrior bands for their own ends.
War 
War is the armed conflict between groups of men,
i.e. armies of various sizes (Steuer 2001: 347ff).
a) The armies or warrior bands or ‘Gefolgschaften’
as military units can be levied from the villages of a
territory in order to protect them. Out of the clan-
based society – due to the necessity of organisation
– a tribe will arise, possessing its own territory. This
tribe can then even erect special fortifications to
defend the settlement area as a whole, as can be
observed during the later period of the Roman Iron
Age when constructions consisting of ramparts,
palisades and ditches were erected along the borders
on land or in the sea. The territories were up to 30
to 50 kilometres wide. These areas of roughly 2500
square kilometres would incorporate about 100 vil-
lages with areas of 25 square kilometres per village,
each village consisting of 10 households with 10
inhabitants per household which in turn leads to a
total population of 10,000 people. Up to 20% of this
total number could go to war, which means that
such an area could raise an army of up to 2000 war-
riors. Another method of reckoning is based on the
number of weapons in the find from Illerup: based
on the ratio of excavated shield-bosses made of silver,
bronze and iron which are 6 to 30 to 350, a leader
with a silver shield commanded a warrior band with
the strength of a Roman ‘centuria’ (60 to 80 soldiers).
The entire force could easily have reached the size of
a Roman ‘auxilia’ unit with 1500 to 2000 men, cor-
responding to the number of warriors from the area
of one tribe in the Germanic territories. The warrior
in the burial of Gommern in Saxony-Anhalt with
his precious grave-goods and silver fitted shield
corresponds to the leaders in the military unit from
Illerup in Jutland, and he would have been one of
the leaders of the warrior-contingent from the 30 kilo-
metre wide settlement landscape around Gommern.
b) The military units (army) can be made up of
warriors and a leader (king, rex or dux) who com-
pletely separate themselves from the structures of
the clan or tribe and move about in an ‘unattached’
manner in order to plunder and pillage (gaining
the spoils of war-booty ‘Kriegsbeute’). Warriors from
various tribes came together and the old ethnic affil-
iations lost their meaning.
c) These military units can be recruited and offer
their services to a higher order of state (an empire) as
auxiliary units, or as groups of mercenaries.
Warfare is a lifestyle, combined with a certain
mentality of the warrior (Bodmer 1957). This is a
behaviour which accepts war as a way of life and
struggle of existence (besides the rural life), from
which a warrior or noble caste emerges. War was
waged almost every year in the early historic soci-
eties of the first millennium. The function of a mil-
itary unit varied, depending on its role in the for-
mation of a tribe or the constitution of a state. The
organised states or empires, as in the cases of the
Roman Empire or the Merovingian Empire, waged
war annually along various borders, sometimes in
defence, but mostly in order to expand their political
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power and to obtain war booty. The warrior bands
in turn waged war every year in order to ‘earn’ their
living, either against other armies or, more often,
against the settled communities of tribal societies,
or they waged war against the more organised states
in the form of raids.
The historical phases
Early and Middle La Tène 
Celtic mercenaries appear during the 4th century
in the area of the Mediterranean, for example in
the wars of the tyrant Dionysius (c. 430-367 BC) of
Syracuse against Carthage. The invasions of Celtic
warrior bands into northern Italy commenced soon
after 400 BC, culminating in the plundering of Rome
under Brennus and the battle at the river Allia in
387. The withdrawal from Rome was achieved with
the payment of 1000 pounds of gold. The Celtic
occupation of land began in the ager Gallicus along
the Adriatic coast. The Celtic groups named in this
migration were the Senones and the Boii, as well as
the Insubres. None of this can be proved archaeolog-
ically; only solitary assemblages with weapons and
belt ornaments are to be found among the cemeteries
of local character from the 5th to the 3rd century
BC; settlements remain unknown. The Celtic immi-
grants would appear to have adapted immediately
to the local culture, to have acculturated them-
selves. But there is a cultural feedback to the areas
from the north of the Alps to the river Marne, mir-
rored in the decorative style of the jewellery.
A general feature of importance to this discussion
is that mobile warrior bands allow themselves, as a
first step, to be recruited as mercenaries. They return
to whence they came with their pay. The early Celtic
minting of coins in gold and silver imitates the
coins of Phillip (*382, king 359-336) and Alexander
the Great (*356, king 336-323). These mercenaries
come from the cultures on the fringes (Randkulturen
– cultures in peripheral or border regions) of the more
state-like higher organised societies. In the next phase,
they resort to wars of aggression under the leadership
of warrior-kings (Heerkönige – war leaders, command-
ers). The name Brennus is an occupational name and
relates to the Breton word brennin – which means
king. The names of the ‘tribes’ in the written sources
are not valid for whole peoples, but rather for the war-
rior bands. The occupation of land only begins later
and is not reflected in the archaeological evidence.
Late La Tène
Around 72/71 BC Ariovistus, rex Sueborum (Pliny
Historia Naturalis 2,170) or rex Germanorum (Caesar
de Bello Gallici 1,31,10), appears among the Sequani
as a leader of mercenaries. They had employed him
and his 15,000 warriors for the war against the
Haedui. The number grew to 120,000 as time passed
on. In the decisive battle against Caesar 58 BC 24,000
Harudes, descendants of the warriors that had once
roamed Central Europe with the Cimbri, as well as
Marcomanni, Triboki, Vangiones, Nemeti, Eudusii
and Suebi – totalling at least 7 different groups –
could be found amongst the armies. That this coali-
tion was made up from various individual warrior
bands is a remarkable fact. Where Ariovistus came
from is still unknown – he may have been a Tribokian.
But these names again do not describe peoples, but
rather warrior bands that may indeed mainly have
been recruited from just one tribe.
Ariovistus remained as a mercenary leader in Gaul
and controlled one third of the territories of the
Sequani. The campaign ended in the year 58 BC with
his defeat, after which the troops moved about for 14
years ‘without a roof over their heads’ (qui inter annos
XIIII non subissent / Caesar de Bello Gallici 1,36,7).
There are no archaeological traces of Ariovistus’ cam-
paigns. But archaeologists think they may be able to
prove an occupation of land through the ‘Germanic’
finds in the Wetterau and from the Rhine-Main area
to the northern part of the upper Rhine in the Late
La Tène period. There can be no doubt that there are
correspondences in the inventories of pottery and
weapons between the Polish Przeworsk Culture and
cultural groups in central Germany, Thuringia and
the river Elbe region. There is a cultural link between
the groups along the Rhine and the cultures further
east. It cannot yet be decided if this is an extension
or expansion of an archaeological culture group
(Kultur- or Formenkreis), or if it is an immigration of
people towards the Rhine, as the archaeological finds
in both regions are contemporaneous. But there is
no connection between the mobile and very mixed
warrior bands of Ariovistus and the rural settlement
areas along the Rhine and Main rivers with influ-
ences from the areas of the Przeworsk Culture, as
Suebi from distant territories only made up a small
part of the troops.
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The age of Arminius 
Ariovistus was not only the enemy of Caesar, but
was also amicus populi Romani in the year 59 BC.
And the Cheruscan with the name of Arminius from
the stirps regia of the tribe was a Roman citizen and
belonged to the class of eques, he was a Roman
knight: he had been to Rome and led a band of mer-
cenaries, an auxiliary unit, in the Roman army. In
the famous Varus-Schlacht (clades Variana), or
‘Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald’, some ‘tribes’, the Marsi,
Bructeri, probably Chatti and later on Langobardi and
Semnones, could be found fighting alongside the
Cherusci under his command. The term Cherusci
sociique is used. Again a coalition of various warrior
bands came together, some groups may earlier have
been in action as auxilia, or other groups that had
not been in Roman military service. The so-called
‘Germanic Battle of Freedom’ under the leadership
of Arminius was – according to the historian Dieter
Timpe (Timpe 1970) – no popular uprising, but
rather the mutiny or rebellion of Roman mercenar-
ies, of a regular or normal auxilia.
One other war lord of this period was Maroboduus,
genere nobilis (Gaius Velleius Paterculus 2,108,2), a
Marcoman who had also been to Rome before he
made himself a king. He then assembled a coalition
of various warrior bands, made up of Lugii, Zumi
(Zumern), Butoni, Sibinii (Sibiner), Semnones and
Langobardi, a force of 70,000 foot soldiers and 4000
horsemen. The areas of settlement of the Marcomanni
in Bohemia, to where, following his differences with
Arminius, Maroboduus had retreated, and the
emigration of the Marcomanni after the death of
Maroboduus into Slovakia are said to be recognis-
able archaeologically. These are, however, patterns
of rural settlements which cannot have had any
direct connection with the mobile warrior bands. 
The age of the Marcomannic Wars 166-180 AD 
The wars of Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus
were conflicts involving the Roman army in defence
against the warrior bands that were threatening the
Roman provinces from the interior of the Germanic
territory. In the beginning, the Victuales and
Marcomanni, as well as others, are mentioned (Marcus
Aurelius 14.1: Victuales et Marcomannis cuncta tur-
bantibus aliis gentibus), who demand the allocation
of land as a tribute following their raids. An army of
6000 allied Marcomanni, Langobardi, Obii and others
is mentioned in the year 166-167. Later on, the
Marcomannic king Ballomarius is mentioned as con-
ducting negotiations and as speaking for 11 lega-
tions (Cassius Dio 71.3.1a), therefore as a leader of a
coalition with ten other war lords. The traces of the
Marcomannic Wars are said to be clearly recognis-
able in the archaeological record, for example in the
presence of Roman weapons – swords with ring
pommels and coats of ring-mail – as well as spurs
(Stuhlsporen) of the special Musˇov-type in a corridor
of traffic between Jutland and Bohemia via the river
Elbe. A feedback into the areas whence the Germanic
armies came could thereby be recognised. 
The so-called Völkerwanderungszeit, 
or Migration Period in the 3rd and 4th centuries
The invasions of Alamans, Franks and Saxons into
the Roman Empire began as raids of warrior bands
who wanted to pillage. Some of the warrior bands are
directly employed as mercenaries, not least as gar-
risons of the Roman forts along the imperial borders
of the Rhine and Danube in late antiquity.
The Roman commander – and later emperor –
Julian won the battle of Argentoratum (Strasbourg,
France) over an Alamannic army in the year 357.
The Alamannic leaders were king Chnodomar and
his nephew Serapio/Agenarich, who had assembled
a coalition of five kings (Vestralp, Urius, Ursicinus,
Suomer and Hortar) as well as ten regales (on horse-
back) and a respectable number of nobles (optimates),
in total 35,000 armed men (armatores) on the side of
the Alamanni. There were 17 war lords for 35,000
men, which meant that every one of them had
2000 to 3000 warriors under his command. Other
Alamannic kings are known from this period, as
found in the descriptions of Ammianus Marcellinus;
for example, the brothers Gundomad and Vadomar,
and the son of Vadomar with the name of Vithikap,
were leaders of war bands – which at times waged war
upon Rome, and at other times were in the service of
Rome as leaders of mercenaries. In the Roman mili-
tary handbook, the Notitia Dignitatum from the time
of around 400 AD, there are mentions of Germanic
units, the Brisigavi iuniores and the Brisigavi seniores
from the Breisgau, the Lentienses, the warriors from
the Linzgau, and others. The Romans recruited
warriors from regions in which Alamannic groups
had begun to settle. A phase of occupation of land
ensued, following the initial period of raids and
service as mercenaries, constituting the basis for the
first ethnogenesis (tribalisation) of the Alamanni.
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Archaeological traces from the beginnings are very
rare. There are only a few burials, the total number
being out of all proportion to the strength and
numbers of the armies of which we know. It may
therefore be assumed that at first these war bands
returned to their homelands on both banks of the
river Elbe some hundreds of kilometres from the
Limes. The discoveries of enormous lost booty from
the Rhine, as in the cases of Neupotz and Hagenbach,
are proofs of this thesis. In the areas of origin beyond
the rivers Elbe and Saale, in Thuringia, the so-called
princely graves of the Hassleben-Leuna group are
interpreted as the burials of leaders of mercenaries
and their families. A number of years ago Joachim
Werner (1973) pointed out the rich furnishings with
vessels made of bronze and glass, with Aurei as
Charon’s-pennies and with knobbed bow fibulae
(Bügelknopffibeln) – Roman officers’ fibulae – to mark
mercenaries from the ‘Gallisches Sonderreich’, the
separated Empire of Gaul under emperor Postumus.
It appears that from the 3rd to the 5th centuries
warrior bands moved to the south from beyond the
river Elbe and later made way for the ethnogenesis
(tribalisation) of the Alamanni. Warrior bands from
northern Germany headed into northern Gaul and
led to the ethnogenesis of the Franks, and the warrior
bands of the Angles and Saxons from the coastal
area of Schleswig-Holstein contributed to an ethno-
genesis in England.
The density of settlement after the acquisition/-
occupation of land only began to increase during
the 5th century in the Alamannic area. Military hill-
forts and rural settlements belonged to this pattern.
Only during this phase does an increase in the
population become archaeologically evident, which
maintains close cultural relations to the areas of ori-
gin beyond the Elbe. A steady flow of people towards
the south is also recognisable, but so is a cultural
feedback which influenced material culture, from
fibulae to ceramic inventories.
It remains unanswered how far the Roman mili-
tary-belts of the 4th/5th century – which can be found
in grave furnishings in Germany – should to be
seen as indicators of returned mercenaries. Germanic
craftsmen themselves began to produce belt mounts
of that type even quite far from the border to the
Roman Empire as a result of a fashion trend. It is
rather the deposits of gold coins, ring-jewellery and
fibulae which were probably the possessions of for-
mer high-ranking leaders of mercenaries.
The Vikings in the west during 
the 9th and 10th centuries 
The number of raids of the Danish and Norwegian
Vikings into the Carolingian Empire was on the
increase from 840. War lords with war bands came
in order to plunder with their ships that could trans-
port 30 to 60 oarsmen and warriors. In the beginning
they returned to the north, but later they began to
spend the winters in enemy territory. With 100 ships
easily 3000 to 6000 men were involved. The Danish
king and war lord Harald Klak offered mercenary
services, and Louis I (‘The Pious’ [died 840]) granted
him a fief in Friesia, so that he would fight other
Vikings. The Danish king Horik I offered Louis his
support for the same reasons. He also demanded
Friesia, and furthermore the lands of the Abodrites
as fiefs. In order to give his demands more weight,
he sent several hundred ships against Hamburg.
As the Germanic kings and war lords had offered
mercenary services and ‘foeratii contracts’ after their
raids in Roman times, so the Viking kings were now
attempting the same.
Under the reign of Karl II (‘The Bald’, dem Kahlen
[838-877]) the payment of ‘Danegeld’ began. It was
the time of the Viking irregulars under independent
chiefs, who in turn were linked in alliances. A chief
or war lord by the name of Weland let himself and
his followers be recruited by Karl for payment, and
fought other Viking irregulars/bands. He had access
to 200 ships and wanted 5000 pounds of silver as
well as provisions for driving other Vikings away.
Such alliances between Vikings and local rulers were
also to be found in England and Ireland before the
Vikings openly resorted to raiding. A great band or
army of Vikings gathered in the year 865 in Kent
and remained together until 879; the army con-
quered several Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. Parts of this
army began to settle in England from 876 onwards;
others moved on against France in 879 and besieged
Paris in 885 and 887, but returned to England in
892 and were defeated by Alfred the Great. This so-
called Great Army, a coalition of numerous war lords
and their armies, was continuously strengthened
through fresh units. Attempts at colonisation only
began after 900 (see Coupland 1998).
The Normans and the Mediterranean 
during the 11th century 
The Viking leader Rollo spent the first ten years of
the 10th century fighting for booty in the area of
232 . W A R F A R E  A N D  T H E  S T A T E
the river Seine. He was granted a fiefdom in the year
911 after converting to Christianity – land at the
estuary of the Seine, later known as Normandy. He
thereby became the first duke of Normandy. The
descendants of Rollo tried to strengthen the fiefdom
and to incorporate the ‘Viking’ nobility in a tighter
fashion, but parts of this group rebelled and moved
on to new raids in the Mediterranean.
The first group of Norman knights appeared in
Salerno in southern Italy in the year 999: They were
a group of pilgrims returning from Jerusalem and had
stopped over in Salerno when the city was attacked
by Saracens. They procured weapons and horses
and chased the Saracens away. The lord of Salerno,
Gaimar IV (999-1027), wanted to employ them as
mercenaries, but they returned to Normandy accom-
panied by envoys who in turn were to employ others
as mercenaries. Other versions mention that warriors
from Normandy appeared in southern Italy at the
latest in 1015-16. They were in the military service
of the local nobles and therefore in the service of
the emperor against the Muslims or Saracens and
Byzantine enemies. 250 Normans are listed as defeat-
ed mercenaries in a battle against Byzantine forces;
various later sources mention contingents of 300
knights under the command of leaders who were
granted Sicilian towns as fiefdoms.
The Norman Robert Guiscard followed his brothers
to southern Italy in 1046-47, conquered Calabria
and became duke of Apulia and Calabria as well as
Sicily. He sent his younger brother Roger (26 years
old) with just 60 knights to hold the area of Calabria.
The conquest of Sicily followed in 1061 through a
first wave of attack with 13 ships and 270 knights
which was then joined by a group of another 170
knights in the second wave of attack in order to con-
quer Messina. The battle and victory of 700 knights
over 15,000 Muslims followed. Sicily, which had
become Muslim in the 9th century, had been re-
conquered for the empire in the later part of the
11th century; Palermo was taken in 1072, the last
Muslim outpost fell in 1091.
The rules of the war lords and war(rior)
band warfare
Criteria for this special kind of warfare can be given
with the help of the following scheme of develop-
ment:
1 In the beginning it was mercenaries from the cen-
tral European clan and tribal communities who
offered their services to the armies of the more
advanced organised states. They returned home
with gold and silver which they had received as
pay, as well as with concepts and ideas of the more
advanced forms of societies.
2 The formation of warrior bands under the leader-
ship of war lords – who gathered entourages of
warriors around them – followed next; the war
lords and their warriors emerged from the old
tribal society, separated from it and became indi-
vidual entities with their own names that had less
and less involvement with their communities
and lands of origin.
3 In order to keep these warrior bands together, the
war lords had to see to it that a steady income was
ensured, which in turn was gained through war-
fare, although sometimes the mere threat of war
was sufficient to trigger payments of tributes.
These raids were aimed at areas outside the home
territories, often enough (in terms of civilisation)
more organised – and therefore promising more
booty – political entities, empires or states.
4 Successful leaders attempted to strengthen their
armies, for which they needed more income, which
in turn meant that they had to wage wars more
frequently, in the end almost continuously. This
phase is characterised by a lack of fortifications,
as territory was of no importance to warrior bands
that were constantly on the move.
5 In order to be successful against growing military
resistance from the affected areas a number of
leaders joined together and formed military coali-
tions.
6 After a series of raids the warrior bands began to
occupy and at the same time to settle in the terri-
tories they had fought in, instead of returning to
their lands of origin. Or the most powerful leader
attempted to build his own empire in enemy ter-
ritory. He thereby had to assert himself against his
opponents. The threatened countries solved the
problem through the inclusion of war-band leaders
into their own system of government (foederati
or fiefdom contracts). They then tried to use these
forces against further threats from without. In the
case of a lack of a local government organisation,
the leaders formed their own empires on the ter-
ritories of the state which they had occupied, or
where they could settle as mercenaries.
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All these proceedings refer to Central or temperate
Europe – from this part of the world I have provided
examples, but it may also be possible to apply this
sequence to other districts and cultures in the world
– with individual features dependent on the special
character of the epoch. Generalisation is only possible
in a limited manner, but will be attempted here for
model-forming purposes. Comparisons are possible
with other parts of the world and other epochs, for
instance in the special circumstances of neighbour-
ing traditional and nomadic empires, as in China
(Barfield 1989).
The movement from warrior band to empire or
territorial government always follows a pattern of
which the individual stages cannot – or at best in
some stages only – be archaeologically recognised. It
is only the final goal, the completed occupation of
land and new settlements complete with an ethno-
genesis (tribalisation), which leaves its traces in the
archaeological material. The signs of the constitution
of a tribe are (1) the filling of the area of settlement
with latecoming immigrants and (2) the connection
to the various lands of origin (the Saxons in England
and lower Saxony; Franks and northern Germany;
Alamanni and the area between Mecklenburg and
Bohemia beyond the river Elbe; Normans in Italy
and in Normandy).
It is an unanswered question, then, what the fur-
nishing of male burials with weapons in Early La
Tène, in the Roman Iron Age, in Merovingian times
and during the Viking Ages may imply.
Are weapons symbols of social status and rank, or
indeed signs of actual participation in combat, or
even in wars? In all cases only a small proportion of
the total numbers of male burials from each period
include weapons in their inventories; these weapon
assemblages often depend on the age of the dead
man. There is a difference between younger and older
warriors. For the early period there is also the possi-
bility that at first only members of warrior bands or
auxiliary units of the Roman Empire were buried
together with their weapons.
Pattern of interpretation
The function of the warriors in the constitution(s)
and development(s) of tribes (tribalisation) and
states (empires, territorial governments) is recognis-
able through the described stages.
In conclusion it can be said, that (Fig. 1): Warfare
forces clan societies to organise themselves in tribes.
Tribes develop, which have to set up military units
in order to fend off threats and to defend themselves.
A part of the warrior group joins together to form
warrior bands that offer services as mercenaries or
undertake raids. A cyclical development creates war:
The contrast between states at different levels of
development and between states and clan-based
societies leads to warfare, which in turn leads to the
constitution of tribes. As tribes developed, warfare
between tribes followed. As warrior bands, which
searched for and needed ‘work’, developed on
another level (higher than tribes and above and also
independent of the tribes), the raid was invented
and mercenary services offered to state-organised
societies. These always had reasons for waging war
against their neighbours.
The question must be asked, why did the social
form of organisation called the warrior band and its
behaviour – the annual raid – develop? They must
have had either a regular or specific function in
European history; the regularity with which this
behaviour can be observed cannot be overlooked.
Possible explanations could be:
1 The warrior bands always existed, as they were
necessary due to certain inner structures of their
societies. A part of the young warriors could not
live in the rural surroundings of the settlements
at home because, for example, of laws regulating
inheritances which stood against them. They sep-
arated themselves from the clan and tribal soci-
eties. The wars necessary for their income were
mostly internal, as can be seen in the Celtic world
(sacrificial areas as in the case of Gournay in
France) or in the Germanic world (the great weapon
deposit of Illerup in Jutland). They only appear
sporadically in historic sources – mainly when the
raids were conducted against more organised states.
2 The co-existence of states – with varied levels of
organisation – and open ranked societies, clan and
tribal societies, forces the cultures along the fringes
(border lines) to adopt the new organisational form
of the warrior bands which make profits by mer-
cenary services or raids on the of more advanced
political entities.
The cyclic developments can thus be explained
by the fact that there are always new structures of
states emerging, which in turn influence their
neighbourhood. That is why my repeated model
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can be used – and not only for the times begin-
ning with the Celts and the La Tène period, but
equally for the Hallstatt period and earlier epochs
of temperate Europe.
– The Mediterranean world with Greece, Rome and
Carthage influenced the clan-based societies of the
La Tène period – the first recognisable response
being the Celtic mercenaries in the area of the
Mediterranean.
– The secondary structuring development of tribes
and areas of rule (oppidum-civilisation) in the
Celtic world in turn influenced the early Germanic
world of beyond the Rhine. The first recognisable
response was the Suebi mercenaries of Ariovistus
employed by the Celtic lords of the Sequani.
– The Roman Empire in its varied stages of expan-
sion influenced the Germanic world, after inte-
grating and assimilating the Celtic world in the
Empire as the Gallic provinces. During the Roman
Iron Age far inside the Germanic countries areas of
rule developed which defended themselves with
ramparts and trenches. How many of these basic
units merged into a tribe still remains unknown.
100 tribal districts of the Suebi are mentioned by
Caesar (de Bello Gallici 4.1). These sent out 1000
armed men every year on raids, altogether 100,000
men – perhaps a reflex of this situation. (Caesar
goes on to report that the rest of the warriors stayed
at home in order to do their farming so that their
families would have an income, but were sent out
the following year when it was their turn). The
‘Suebenknoten’ (knot of the Suebi), the characteristic
knot of hair worn on the side of the head of the
warriors, is spread across the whole of Germania,
and Tacitus points out that it was an honour for
a warrior to wear this knot (Germania 38).
The first response outside Germany was the
bands of mercenaries serving as auxilia-units in
the Roman army since the times of Arminius. A
later response was the groups of mercenaries
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F I G .  1 : Warfare and transformations of tribes and states.
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made up of the so-called Alamanni and Franks
who served during the 3rd century.
– The Frankish Empires of the Merovingian and,
even more so, the Carolingian dynasty had the
same stimulating effect on the Scandinavian
peoples. Scandinavians can be traced back to the
Merovingian or Vendel period where they had
been employed as mercenaries of the Franks (so-
called ring-swords may be signs of such alliances:
Steuer 1987).
– Raiding bands of Vikings are employed as merce-
naries against other bands of Vikings, the situa-
tion later being resolved through the granting of
fiefdoms.
– Mercenaries from Normandy conquer the Muslim
south of Italy and found a kingdom. 
The feedback such activities provided to the
places of origin only become apparent when
written sources report on it. Otherwise, the devel-
opment from clan- and family-based societies to
tribal societies and from that stage – with the key
word ‘centre of wealth’ – to early areas of rule
(empires, states) can only be deduced in an indi-
rect manner (compare: Mortensen and Rasmussen
1988; 1991).
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The epigram ‘War made state and state made war’
seems to emblematically condense recent discus-
sions of the emergence of the European nation-state.1
Various works indicate the close inter-relations
between war, military organisation, and the devel-
opment of medieval bureaucratic organisation, and
the significance of these connections to the emer-
gence of the territorially based nation-state with its
(claimed) monopoly of violence (e.g., Giddens 1985;
McNeill 1982; Porter 1994; Tilly 1990). That ‘...state
made (and makes) war’ is beyond doubt when look-
ing at European history. More generally, once an elite
group has gained privileged access to basic resources
and thus a position of power, it can employ military
organisation to protect its interests internally and
externally. But what about ‘War made state ...’? Is
there really a connection between the organisation
for defence and attack and the emergence of the
state? Does the search for protection against exter-
nal threats result in complex organisation with inter-
nal subjugation, either by consensus or through
warring leaders who use military organisation to
suppress the people they were meant to protect?
The coincidence of frequent, often prolonged wars
and the rise of modern nation-states in Europe in the
last millennium offers a good case through which to
argue this in the affirmative. But the long-durée of
this development also suggests that it was not the
logical outcome of pre-set conditions. Various actors
had to play their cards right in the right social struc-
tural conditions in the right historical context.
The dictum ‘War made state’ has a long history in
European thought concerning the emergence of the
early (‘archaic’) and European states.2 However, accord-
ing to archaeological and anthropological evidence,3
while wars have been fought throughout human
history, states remain rare occurrences in world his-
torical terms. Depending on how one chooses to
define a state, such political entities may only have
emerged ten to twenty times before the European
nation-state and its subsequent establishment of a
global system of nation-states through commercial
and military enterprise during the last two centuries
(Mann 1986). War, conquest and military organisa-
tion are apparently not sufficient to cause state for-
mation, and pre-state societies seem to have in-built
anti-state features that discourage stratification and
military leadership from developing into class divi-
sion, a monopoly of means of violence, and a bureau-
cratic, political organisation.
In the following, I pursue the problematic of war
and early state formation by focussing on what are
now the two island groups of Fiji and Hawaii at the
time of European contact around 1800. Fiji and
C H I E F S  M A D E  W A R  A N D  W A R  M A D E  S T A T E S . 237
Chiefs Made War and War Made States? 
War and Early State Formation in 
Ancient Fiji and Hawaii
C L A U S  B O S S E N /17
Hawaii seem especially suited for the analysis of this
question, since their highly hierarchical societies
frequently engaged in wars, conquests and quests for
political domination. Furthermore, ancient Hawaii
was close to or already an early state, while stratifica-
tion and central government was less institution-
alised in Fiji. They therefore offer good cases through
which to pursue a comparative discussion of the
dynamics of war, leadership, and the institutionali-
sation of power. After a short theoretical overview of
the discussion of war and early state formation, I
analyse the cases from Fiji and Hawaii, respectively,
and conclude with a comparative discussion of the
dynamics of war and early state formation. I argue
that while leaders did make war, war was not suffi-
cient to make state. To approach this problem, I adopt
two conceptual strategies. Firstly, I circumvene the
question of definitions, and instead of trying to
define, for instance, ‘chiefdom’ or ‘early state’, I ask
how war contributed to changes in or the reproduc-
tion of social organisation. I assume that early state
formation was not a sudden, definitive break with
previous social structures, but instead an ongoing
process of construction and deconstruction that only
sometimes resulted in a stable, early state of some
permanence. While definitions are useful devices to
indicate what we are talking about, a strict focus
upon these in cases of state formation – i.e., cases that
are somewhere between ‘chiefdom’ and ‘early state’
– would make the argument about war and early state
formation depend upon definitions instead of throw-
ing light upon the processes involved. Secondly, I
divide the very different arguments of how war causes
early state formation into three groups according to
whether they treat war as a context, as military
organisation or as a means. By these two conceptual
strategies I hope to achieve a framework within
which processes of war and early state formation
can be discussed in a comprehensive way.
War and state formation
Early state formation has been the subject of a long
debate. In addition to war and conquest, the follow-
ing causes for its occurrence have been suggested:
the emergence of private property, the central man-
agement of irrigation systems, the development of
social classes, population pressure, and long-distance
trade.4 None of these have been established as a suf-
ficient or necessary cause by itself in state formation,
and ‘single-factor explanations belong to the kinder-
garten state of state theory because origins are
extremely diverse’ (Mann 1986: 50). According to
contemporary consensus, the formation of early states
is a complex process involving an (indeterminate?)
number of factors. Considerable effort has been
made to provide extensive overviews of these factors
and their varying constellations in different contexts
of state formation (Claessen and Skalník 1978; Cohen
1978; Haas 1982; Mann 1986). An inherent problem
in this discussion has been the lack of a common
definition of the state and of the kind of society that
preceded it.5 There is furthermore no agreement on
what kind of process was involved in the transition
from non-state to state. Different approaches and
definitions direct attention to different interconnec-
tions. A classic case is the long-time debate between
a conflict and an integration position, exemplified
by Morton Fried (1967) and Elman Service (1975). Is
the state primarily formed to safeguard the interests
of an economically dominant class (Fried’s posi-
tion), or is the state formed as a social organisation,
which has superior capacities to protect and inte-
grate its members (Service’s position)?6 Those who
argue for the prominence of war in state formation
actually argue that war leads to stratification as well
as a better form of social organisation and integra-
tion. In order not to get into the egg-and-hen prob-
lem of deciding which traits of the state came first,
I adopt a broad perspective and ask how war may
contribute to either of these: i.e., through centralisa-
tion, stratification, a putative monopoly of violence,
or the institutionalisation of government on a ‘basis
superior to kinship’ (Fried 1967).
War as the motor behind social evolution was pro-
posed by Herbert Spencer in Principles of Sociology
(1967), originally published between 1876 and 1896.
In more recent times, Spencer’s intellectual heir,
Robert Carneiro, has argued for ‘the centrality of war
in political evolution’ (Carneiro 1990: 190). People
only accept limitations of their sovereignty through
force, according to Carneiro, and war is thus the
basis for the formation of chiefdoms as well as
states:
Given the universal disinclination of human groups to relin-
quish their sovereignty, the surmounting of village autonomy
could not have occurred peacefully or voluntarily. It could –
and did – occur only by force of arms. (Carneiro 1990: 191) 
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As a mono-causal theory, Carneiro’s position has
been refuted by cases where statehood has been
achieved without evidence of warfare (Claessen and
Skalník 1978; Haas 1982; Mann 1986). However, his
remark upon the difficulties in establishing coercive
authority is central. It remains to be explained, ‘how
authority was converted into power that could be
used either coercively against the people who granted
authority in the first place or to deprive people of
the rights of material subsistence’ (Mann 1986: 49).
Coercive rule presupposes an organised body of men
of enforcement, which presupposes the compulsory
extraction of surplus production for its sustainabili-
ty. Somehow people have to be forced by circum-
stances to accept coercive rule and not withdraw
their products or disperse outside the reach of gov-
ernment. Non-state societies nevertheless seem to
have in-built structural features which work against
the establishment of coercive control by one part of
society over the other. Malcolm Webb states the
problem thus:
The problem is the specification of mechanisms whose opera-
tion would in time generate a monopoly of coercive force in
the hands of the tribal leadership, in a situation where the
previous lack of such a monopoly would of itself seem to pre-
clude the possibility of ever securing just such a monopoly.
In other words, the full emergence of state would appear to
require eventually the final overthrow of a previously existing
traditional system of authority, social controls, and resource
allocation whose inelasticity and whose decentralized and
localized organization would indeed have very largely inhib-
ited even the initial concentration of power and resources
required for further significant steps in this direction. Despite
the areas of continuity, or seeming continuity, between
advanced tribal and incipient state systems of governance, the
shift from the former to the latter entails a basic and total
alteration in the manner in which the authority of the leader-
ship is ultimately enforced and upheld. (Webb 1975: 157)
As mentioned above, there are multiple roads to
statehood and therefore multiple ‘mechanisms’ that
may lead to such a shift in the mode of power.
Malcolm Webb suggests that long-distance trade
enables privileged groups to establish themselves as
a separate class that has the economic resources for
a paid military. Michael Mann, who emphasises a
multi-causal theory, argues that the ‘mechanism’ is
a gradual condensation of various networks of rela-
tions that effectuates a ‘caging’ of people into society
(Mann 1986: ch. 3). In the present context I only
consider the theories that propose war as a state-cre-
ating mechanism and briefly outline the strengths
and weaknesses of these theories below. Particular
attention is given to Robert Carneiro’s theory (1970)
because of its centrality in the discussion.
The role of war
War as a road to state formation is attractive because
it apparently offers a plausible explanation for the
appearance of subjugation, centralisation of govern-
ment, and greater social complexity. In general, it
has been argued that war promotes social change in
three basic ways. First, war is considered a context
for social organisations, and the argument is that in
a constant environment of war more complex soci-
eties have a higher chance of survival because the
centralised co-ordination of large groups of warriors
provides more concentrated military power. Second,
the focus is on military organisation: the premium
on effective military organisation is seen as leading
to the more rapid development of state-like traits
such as centralisation and subjugation in the mili-
tary during war, spreading to the rest of society even
when the war is over. Third, war is regarded as a
means to increase political power. The conquest of
other groups, it is argued, leads to subjugative strati-
fication and superseding forms of government. Robert
Carneiro’s theory falls into this third category.
The first approach sees war as a context within
which social organisation develops. During times of
war, the argument goes, organisation of defence and
attack may be developed into higher degrees of com-
plexity that enable higher efficiency, and hence more
complex societies emerge. The evolutionist Herbert
Spencer (1967) provides an early example of this
approach, and Elman Service (1975) argued that war
would make people accept the power monopoly of
an emerging state since ‘good government’ would
enhance their chances of survival by offering a more
powerful organisation for their protection (Service
1975: 270). While the logic of how war and social
development might be linked is well constructed in
this approach, it leaves two questions unanswered.
Firstly, how is the transformation of social organi-
sation achieved? Even granted the questionable
assumption that all members of the group agree
upon the desirability of such a change, reconstruc-
tion of society is a difficult task,7 and the approach
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leaves the political transformation involved in a black
box between war and higher complexity. Secondly,
some societies apparently do not develop into larg-
er entities of higher complexity. Herbert Spencer
explained this by the extensive dispersion of these
groups or by the fact that they lived in peace with
each other (Spencer 1967: 33). However, war and
development cannot be equated and neither can
peace and stagnation. Some societies are continu-
ously at war with each other but do not develop
higher complexity; war is instead part of the repro-
duction of social structures (Harrison 1993; Gardner
and Heider 1968). The context approach works best
as a long-term, survival-of-the-fittest explanation of
state formation or to explain development through
the threat of annihilation, but otherwise it leaves
the process of change in the black box.
The second approach argues that military organi-
sation spreads to the rest of society. The assumption
is that since military power is most effective when
organised on the basis of centralised command and
a clear-cut hierarchy, frequent war will lead to a
higher level of subjugation, centralisation, and hier-
archy in military organisation than in the rest of the
social organisation. If this military organisation is
adopted in times of peace by the rest of society, the
social structure shifts towards more hierarchical struc-
tures with more centralised control. Whereas the
first approach assumes a close connection between
social and military organisation, the second approach
assumes their separation and reintegration. First,
military organisation develops at least semi-inde-
pendently of social organisation, which is then trans-
formed into the model of the military. The crucial
points, however, are whether a military organisation
could become semi-independent of social organisa-
tion and whether military organisational capabili-
ties could spread into other areas of social life.
Military leaders may be cherished by their soldiers
and the people they defend in times of war, but
have no power in times of peace. The successful war
leaders Geronimo of the Apache in North America
and Fousive of the Yanomami in South America
could not transform their military success into ‘civil’
authority (see Chagnon 1974: 177-80). Elman Service
(1975) argued that a centralised leadership is agreed
upon by consensus because of the benefits for soci-
etal survival that it offers. While this may apply in
times of war and explain the emergence of a sophis-
ticated military organisation, it does not explain
why such forms of organisation would spread to
the rest of society in times of peace. People may
relent their sovereignty to military command in
order to survive, but under which circumstances
would they not revoke that decision in times of
peace. Furthermore, centralised, hierarchical com-
mand may not at all be a suitable way to organise
agricultural production, trade, political organisation
or religious life. The thesis thus seems most plausible
in circumstances where a society is under constant
threat of being annihilated and where especially
economic production may suitably be conducted
under centralised, hierarchical command – such as
large irrigation systems.
The third and final approach sees war as a means
to increase and transform political power. The con-
quest of other groups provides a means to acquire
access to additional basic resources. The conquest
theories have the strength of explaining not only
how centralised command and hierarchy emerges,
but also how stratification, i.e. privileged access to
basic resources in the sense of Morton Fried (1967),
comes about. The conquest theories posit that the
subjugation of one group by another and followed
up by the extraction of tribute or tax from the con-
quered group leads to stratification where previously
only egalitarian or ranked political relations pre-
vailed. Over time military rule is transformed into
institutionalised government, laws, and the assimi-
lation of the two groups into one people. Herbert
Spencer (1967) argued in this way, and more recently
Robert Carneiro (1970) has taken up this line of
argument, his theory having become one of the
most cited and central contributions to discussions
on the relation between war and state formation.
Carneiro argues that in a situation where a group’s
access to land is limited by circumscription (because
of ecological conditions, the presence of other groups,
or the concentration of scarce resources) a point
will arise when it is more feasible to conquer the
land of another group than to intensify production
by working harder or to invent new technologies
of cultivation. Because this point arises before pro-
duction is maximised, Carneiro argues, the conquer-
ing group can achieve higher levels of production
by coercing the conquered group. Through such a
process chiefdoms arise through the incorporation
of several villages into one polity. The replication of
the process on a larger scale accounts for the rise of
states through the incorporation of several regions
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into one polity. Through a process of internal evolu-
tion, previous reciprocal or redistributional exchange
relations are transformed, and a society appears
where one powerful stratum taxes a subjugated stra-
tum appears.
While neat and elegant the theory actually only
explains why and how entities grow larger through
conquest, but not how political organisation changes.
Carneiro does not elaborate upon the ‘internal evo-
lution’ through which political transformation is
achieved and instead takes the state for granted at
this point (Carneiro 1970: 736). So his theory does
not actually explain what it intends to do and thus
shares the general weakness of the conquest theo-
ries, which assume that the relationship between
the conquering and the conquered groups acquires
a new quality after conquest. For the theory to work
the conquered cannot merely become incorporated
into existing exchange relations. A group conquered
by a chief and paying their yearly tribute like other
groups of the chiefdom would not be part of a state
but of a chiefdom. While conquest may explain the
subjugation of another group of people, it does not
explain the transformation of political power or the
social structure as such. The theories offer plausible
contexts in which higher levels of social complexity,
subjugation and stratification should develop, but
not how this would transgress the existing social
structure. They assume but do not explain how and
why development of political organisation occurs.
The different approaches invoke different causal-
ities to explain state formation. The context approach
assumes that social and military organisations reflect
each other and thus change together in a context of
frequent war. The focus on military organisation
assumes instead that the military can develop prior
to social organisation and then by usurpation or
consensus be reintegrated on a higher level. Finally,
the focus on war as a means proposes conquest as
a means to assure basic resources and increase polit-
ical power. They can of course be combined into a
scenario that makes a strong case for the centrality
of war in social change and state formation. But
their distinct weaknesses should be remembered.
We cannot assume that war means development
and peace stagnation, since war might be part of
social reproduction, and even if war is an impetus to
social change we need to specify when war trans-
gresses existing social structure and how political
change takes place. On the other hand, we cannot
assume that military organisation is independent of
social organisation and as a result can develop in
advance, but need to specify under which circum-
stances that independent military development and
the subsequent adoption of military organisation by
other sections of society would take place. Finally,
while war may be a means to gain access to basic
resources and to enlarge political entities, it does not
by necessity entail the transformation of political
organisation. Hence, ultimately state formation as
political transformation is not explained, only made
probable.
David Webster (1975) is one of the few to have
addressed the problem of political change within the
context of war. He bases his argument on Carneiro’s
theory (1970) and goes on to consider the problem
of structural change in terms similar to those of
Malcolm Webb (1975) mentioned above: 
On one hand, the structure of ranked society, with its hierar-
chical organization of political authority, centralization of
some forms of economic activity, and at least incipient forms
of wealth accumulation and differential consumption, prefig-
ures basic characteristics of the state – concentration of wealth
and coercive force in the hands of a small segment of society.
On the other hand, the kinship idiom which integrates
ranked societies would seem to frustrate the evolution of
state-type institutions in several fundamental ways. In such
societies wealth accumulation is limited by the reciprocal rela-
tions of the chief to his producer-kinsmen. Effective monop-
olisation of coercive force is difficult because what limited
access to force the chief possesses is largely derived from his
redistributional activities. (Webster 1975: 460)
According to Webster, chiefs tread a fine line between
receiving gifts and blatantly and coercively mobil-
ising labour and taxation. If chiefs demand too
much, their people will abandon them. In a quest to
monopolise power the system would therefore
become unstable. Another source of instability is the
competition between almost equals in the hierarchy
for the position of chiefs (Webster 1975: 466).
Warfare can, however, Webster argues, overcome
the hindrances to social structural change under cer-
tain circumstances, and he invokes in the process all
three approaches presented above. Continued warfare
would put a premium of higher chances of survival
on those chiefdoms with a stable military leadership
and a stable political leadership (thesis one above),
thus dampening internal competition and conflict.
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Furthermore, territorial conquest would allow the
incorporation of small pieces of land outside of nor-
mal kinship obligations (thesis three above). This
land could be monopolised by military leaders whose
privileged access to wealth would enable them to
augment their power, either in order to become
heads of state or to employ their own military to
enforce their rule (thesis two).
Constant warfare not only provided an important and highly
adaptive managerial function for emergent elite segments of
society, but it also stimulated the acquisition of small
amounts of ‘wealth’ (i.e., basic resources) which were external
to the traditional system and could be manipulated in various
self-serving ways by these same groups to dampen internal
dissension and attract supporters. Out of this milieu devel-
oped political and economic special-interest groups, which
ultimately provided the basis for social stratification. (Webster
1975: 469)
The way out of the structural constraints of non-state
(chiefdom) societies is thus privileged access to basic
resources through war, which also stiffens competi-
tion between would-be leaders and thus allows polit-
ical power to stabilise. Essentially this means that it
is the opportunities provided by war for tying the
concentrated, coercive power of the military into
other areas of society that may enable social struc-
tural change. The extra-military factor for Webb was
long-distance trade, while the factor for Webster was
acquisition of land outside the sphere of redistribu-
tion by chiefs.
The above overview of theories on war and state
formation can be summarised in the following way:
while war may indeed spur the development of social
complexity and military organisation and lead to
subjugation, by itself it does not explain the processes
that lead to changes in the social structure as such.
The processes leading to changes in political organisa-
tion in connection with war require further descrip-
tion and analysis, and the arguments of Webb and
Webster suggest that it is the linkage of the power of
the war leader with other domains of power that may
effectuate such a change. War between the Fijian
groups in the first half of the 19th century and the
Hawaiian groups at the end of the 18th century pro-
vide evidence to support such an analysis: war was
frequent within these groups, led to the conquest of
people and land, and was a means for warring leaders
to expand their power and domain. An examination
of war in these island groups will thus address all
three of the above theses of the connection between
war and social structural change. Additionally, it
offers the opportunity to further assess the argu-
ments of Robert Carneiro (1990).
War and conquest in Fiji 
in the early 19th century
Though Abel Tasman passed by the Fiji islands in
1643, the first information on the inhabitants
acquired by Europeans was given to James Cook in
July 1777 when he visited nearby Tonga:
Fidgee lays three days sail from Tongatabu in the direction of
NWBW, they describe it as a high but very fruitfull island
abounding with Hogs, Dogs, Fowls and all the kinds of fruit
and roots that are found on any of the others. It is not subject
to Tongatabu on the Contrary they frequently make War on
each other and it appeared from several circumstances that
these people stand in much fear of those of Fidgee, and no
wonder since the one is [a] Humane and peacable Nation,
whereas the other is said to be Canibals, brave, Savage and
Cruel. (Beaglehole 1967: 163, my insertion)
The Tongans here probably gave Cook one side of
a local version of the stereotypic Noble Savage-
Barbarian dichotomy used by European discoverers
and travellers to categorise people outside Europe.
Cook was obviously endeared by the islands of pres-
ent-day Tonga, which he called the ‘Friendly Islands’,
and susceptible to such a stereotypic characterisa-
tion. Accounts by travellers coming to Fiji later on
would however add nuances to this depiction of the
inhabitants of ‘Fidgee’ island, though they confirmed
that these people did fight wars. Captain Cook,
however, sailed on to discover Hawaii without visit-
ing the Fiji islands.
The first wave of Europeans came after sandalwood
had been discovered on Vanua Levu, the second
biggest island in the group, in 1801. Accordingly,
European ships regularly visited Vanua Levu from
1804 to 1813, at which point most of the sandal-
wood had been cut and the number of European
ships decreased. Trade in beche-de-mer, a sea slug of
great value in China, caused them to resume sailing
to Fiji in the 1830s, and a little later the first mission-
aries arrived. A short-term boom in cotton led to an
influx of Europeans from Australia, and in 1855
they started to dominate local politics. The various
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accounts of these people provide useful information
about war and its role in the societies of this group
of islands on its own terms.8
Wars were frequent on these islands in the first
half of the 19th century and archaeological evidence
testifies to the existence of fortifications for several
centuries (Frost 1979; Palmer 1969; Rowlands and
Best 1980). Wars could range from ambushes and
raids involving just a few warriors to large-scale cam-
paigns, battles and sieges with thousands of warriors.
Bows and arrows, clubs, slings and spears were used
with casualties ranging from nil to hundreds of dead
men, women and children. In the wake of European
trade, muskets were introduced and strengthened
those few parties that disposed of them, but the
advantage wore off as they became more widespread
in the 1850s. While they tended to replace the bow
and arrow, their impact on the way that wars were
fought was minor: village fortifications were provid-
ed with higher earthen moulds as protection against
enemy bullets. On top of the moulds, the usual pal-
isades and entrances ports were built around the vil-
lage (Clunie 1977).
The reason for the relatively frequent occurrence
of war was, in the words of the missionary Thomas
Williams, the ‘many independent governments, each
of which seeks aggrandisement at the expense of
the rest’ (Williams 1982[1858]: 43). However, these
‘governments’ were not all independent. In addi-
tion to the independent or ruling groups, there were
three statuses: bati (border), qali (tributary) or kaisi
(slave). In Kaisi villages lived those who had suffered
total defeat in war and were relegated to the status
of slaves. Qali villages had surrendered or acknowl-
edged the superiority of the leading group, to which
they were paying an annual tribute of first fruits
consisting of staples, woven mats, women and other
valuables. Bati villages were more independent, non-
tribute paying villages often situated between neigh-
bouring confederacies and thus those first involved
in war. There was considerable variation in the inter-
nal organisation of each group, especially between
the more egalitarian western groups and the more
hierarchical groups in the east, but a general pattern
of basic kinship-based organisation on the basis of
which political alliances were made was generally
common (See France 1969: 9-18; Routledge 1985:
28-29). Since state formation (or lack thereof) is in
focus here, I shall concentrate on the most hierar-
chical societies of Eastern Fiji, which were also the
ones that had developed into the largest entities.
The dominating confederacies here were those of
Bau, Rewa, Verata, Cakaudrove, Bua and Lakemba;
and the basic social entity was the yavusa (clan), in
which all members claimed a common descent and
which was sub-divided into mataqalis (sub-clans) and
itokatoka’s (extended households).9 Several yavusa
might gather together into a vanua (tribe) and sev-
eral vanua could in turn form a matanitu (confed-
eration). Within a yavusa each mataqali would be
assigned particular services in everyday life and on
ceremonial occasions in return for the protection of
the community and the right to cultivate land
(France 1969: 15). A yavusa usually formed a village
and was based on kinship and common descent.
The latter could be extended to the level of vanua,
which, however, like the matanitu, mainly consisted
of political alliances. Though in general applicable,
this ideal model was never present, since the growth
or decrease of a population and a victory or defeat
in war might compel groups to separate from their
own village or to migrate to become part of other
villages.
Each entity was led by a ruling group from which
the chief was chosen on the basis of descent and
aptness as a leader and warrior (Routledge 1985: 35).
While chiefs in the western part had to rely on the
consent and approval by their kin, chiefs in the east-
ern part had absolute power and were shown the
utmost respect (see, for example, Lockerby 1922: 21;
Williams 1982[1858]: 22). In these highly hierarchi-
cal confederacies where chiefs had absolute power,
wars were frequently fought for all kinds of reasons:
perceived sleights of honour, revenge, to acquire
‘long pigs’ (humans) for consumption, to procure
women as concubines, or in a quest for power. Most
wars were small, involving only ambushes, raids
and skirmishes in which single or small parties of
warriors attacked other warriors or unsuspecting
men, women or children in the gardens, out fishing
or the like. This required skills in handling weapons,
knowing how to dodge arrows or stones or throw
clubs, and in making hidden attacks on various ter-
rains, but by individual warriors or small groups
with only small organisational demands. In the fol-
lowing, I concentrate on the large-scale wars, valu ni
tu, which were wars between matanitu and required
more organisation, co-ordination and command over
numerous contingents of warriors over extended
periods of time. Though sometimes fought because
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of some small insult or breach of convention, they
eventually led to the inclusion of new tribute-pay-
ing qali or kaisi slave villages and the acquisition of
new territory by conquest.
The wars
Wars in Fiji in the first half of the 18th century were
part of social life. Boys were taught the skills of war
from an early age and for adult men war was an
occasion for them to prove their worth (Clunie 1977:
42-44). In parts of Fiji, it was customary to honour a
man who had killed with his club with the title of
koroi in a four-day ceremony. A warrior who had slain
ten enemies was awarded the title of koli and the
right to wear a cone shell, tora, on his arm. Killing
another ten, twenty or thirty enemies was awarded
with new titles and armshells. Before entering a
large-scale war the gods were consulted and offerings
made. Individual warriors would bless their weapons
or go through rituals of invulnerability before going
to war, and on behalf of the whole group the chief
would present major offerings. In the case of victory,
the warriors would present the bodies of slain ene-
mies to the gods before eating them. But if the cam-
paign was unsuccessful the warriors and chiefs might
let their disappointment and anger out on the gods,
to whom they related as if they had human person-
alities (Erskine 1853: 247). 
Large-scale wars, Valu ni tu, tended to be openly
conducted, formally declared, and involved armies
marching to attack fortified towns. A council of
chiefs, priests and elders would weigh the pros and
cons, consider the loyalty of qali and bati chiefdoms,
consult the gods, and if things looked favourable
formally declare war. After the decision had been
made, considerable diplomatic negotiation and
communication ensued in order to secure support.
Orders are sent by the Chief to all under his rule to be in readi-
ness, and application is made to friendly powers for help. A
flat refusal to comply with the summons of the Chief, by any
place on which he had a claim, would, sooner or later, be vis-
ited by the destruction of the offenders. Efforts are made to
neutralise each other’s influence. A sends a whale’s tooth to B,
entreating his aid against C, who, hearing of this, sends a larger
tooth to B, to bika -’press down’-the present from A; and thus
B joins neither party. Sometimes two hostile Chiefs will each
make a superior Chief the stay of their hopes; he, for his own
interest, trims between the two, and often aids the weaker party,
that he may damage the stronger, yet professing, all the time,
a deep interest in his welfare. (Williams 1982[1858]: 44-45)
The paramount chief or a close relative renown for
his capabilities in war would be appointed ‘war
chief’, turaga-ni-valu, to lead the army into battle.
While heralds were sent to allies to secure support,
non-involved villages were warned of the imminent
fighting in order for them to stay within their prem-
ises, since ‘the warriors once unleashed tending to
slay anyone they strayed across, not pausing to con-
firm whether he or she was friend or foe’ (Clunie
1977: 13). All men who could use a weapon would
be drawn into the irregular army, which could
number thousands of warriors. Before going into
battle, a review was held where the chiefs and their
contingents of warriors were presented with whale
teeth, gifts of food, and promised further gifts in
the case of victory. The chiefs and warriors would in
return pledge their loyalty to the paramount chief
and boast of their deeds of bravery and the damage
they were going to do to the enemy (see Williams
1982[1858]: 46-48; Lockerby 1922: 31-32). Sometimes
paramount chiefs would give away weapons and
promise more weapons and possibly women in
return for success. Though villages were most often
inter-related, the only loyalty that counted to a war-
rior at the time of war was that to this tribe and his
chief (Willams 1982[1858]: 45). In the case of large-
scale war, allegiance was paid to the paramount
chief, though the army was still organised on the
basis of the village, or yavusa.
A period of ambushes and raids, sometimes lasting
for months, often preceded the large-scale war,
which might not even eventuate. When it did, the
attackers advanced on the fortifications of their
opponents, with scouts and friendly villages report-
ing enemy movements and the defenders slowly
retreating to their fortifications if the advance could
not be halted. Fortifications were either built on
hilltops or on the ground and testify to their con-
siderable experience with war. Villages had palisades
all around with a few gates that led the attackers
through winding corridors into the village. The cor-
ridors had small holes through which the defenders
could shoot at the attackers while they were winding
their way through, trying not to step on the spikes
on the ground and avoiding spears aimed at them
from the platforms on top of the corridors. On the
outside, the villages were enclosed by one, sometimes
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two, three or four ditches broken by a few earthen
causeways or bridges that could be withdrawn at
times of war (Clunie 1977: 14-19; Lockerby 1922;
Jackson 1853). The attackers usually did not storm
the fortifications immediately after the defenders’
retreated into their fort; instead they took time to
clear the area for snipers, and if the fort seemed
strong and resistance fierce the attackers erected their
own defences, lines of communication and escape
routes. The attackers might continue to be highly
motivated but were sometimes demoralised and gave
up the attack. If the attack was to be made, the allied
contingents were briefed by the turaga-ni-valu and
they would attack with the battle-flag of masi (bark
cloth) tied to the end of each of their spears (Clunie
1977: 26). Forts were seldom taken by a head-on
attack, and if they were at all defeated it was only
after a prolonged series of small attacks, false retreats
and sometimes treachery. If taken, the palisades
were broken down, the defending warriors, women
and children killed, and the village burnt down.
Before this happened it might, however, have been
possible to negotiate a surrender, which was ratified
by the presentation of a basket of earth with a reed
stuck into it. This symbolised the surrender of tribal
land to the winning chief. Whale teeth, tabua, other
valuable property, and young women of high rank
often accompanied the presentation. Depending on
the conditions of surrender, the attackers might burn
down the town and take weapons, food and other
property as spoils of war. They might force the defeat-
ed tribe into slavery, force them to pay tribute regu-
larly, or drive them from their land for a period of
time or forever. Landless tribes might then resettle
with a friendly tribe to which they nonetheless
would have to pay tribute.
Large double-hulled canoes, drua, which could be
more than thirty metres in length and carry up to
250 warriors, were essential for transporting armies
and to extend influence and power geographically.
Chiefs had these drua built by their own people or
commissioned from Fijian or Tongan specialists.
The construction would take five to seven years and
was a costly affair only to be carried out by a power-
ful chief. Battles were also fought at sea with flotillas
of small canoes and large double-hulled canoes.
Allied fleets could number more than a hundred
canoes and thousands of men (Clunie 1977: 21-23).
Usually the tactic would be to ram into the other
canoe, possibly after having launched waves of
arrows or bullets at it, and then try to finish the
enemy off by hand.
There were of course difficulties in launching valu-
ni-tu, large-scale wars. Gathering together the differ-
ent contingents of warriors, which sometimes num-
bered thousands, and possibly transporting them
on board canoes across the sea to the enemy fort
demanded high levels of co-ordination. Supplying
food provisions for the army was a problem and lim-
ited the duration of campaigns to a few weeks or
months. Plundering enemy fields, fruit trees and
coconut palms was a means to enlarge the army’s
own supplies, in case the enemy had not already har-
vested as much as possible and destroyed the rest.
Much skirmishing took place between foraging par-
ties from both sides, and warriors began to eat dogs,
cats, lizards and snakes to display toughness and
endurance (Clunie 1977: 31).
On top of this, forging an alliance in the first place
was a major problem, and because of this intensive
diplomatic communications followed a decision to
launch a major war as described above. While the
support of qali villages and chiefdoms could usually
be relied upon, those that had bati status were more
independent and their support had to be secured
and further allies sought. Even though allegiance
was secured before engaging in war, the situation
was never totally in hand. Treachery and deception
played a major part in Fijian warfare, and villages
and chiefdoms might change sides during the parade
or even during the fighting. Allies might pretend to
support one side but launch a surprise attack and
kill the turaga-ni-valu and his warriors, or join the
siege of a fort just to lead the attackers into ambush.
As a result, contingents of warriors were always alert
and quick to retreat at the cry of treachery. The
sources on Fiji in the first half of the 19th century
are full of accounts of the plots, treacheries and
deceits employed during war. The position of power
that chiefs and their generals had was therefore not
unchallenged or at any time totally secure, which
brings us back to the question of the position of
chiefs in general.
The power of chiefs
Generally, there were six classes of people in eastern
societies: 1. kings and queens, 2. chiefs of large islands
or districts, 3. chiefs of towns, priests and mata-ni-
vanua (heralds), 4. distinguished warriors of low birth
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and chiefs of clans (mataqali), 5. common people and,
finally, 6. slaves by war (kaisi) (Williams 1982[1858]:
32). More particularly, the yavusa of Bau, situated on
a small island of the same name, was led by the Roko
Tui Bau (Sacred lord of Bau) whose person was sacred,
never took part in wars, and concerned himself with
spiritual matters. The temporal chief, the Vunivalu
(root of war), was commander-in-chief and executive
sovereign, who almost had as many privileges as the
Roko Tui Bau. Naulivou, who successfully engaged in
a series of conquests to enhance Bau’s position in
the late 18th and early 19th century, curtailed the
powers of the Roko Tui Bau in the process (Routledge
1985: 43). The Roko Tui and the Vunivalu were from
different mataqalis, just as the mata ni vanua (heralds)
and the Bete (priests), who were next in the hierar-
chy. The mataqali Lasakau provided the warriors,
while mataqali Butoni were fishermen (Thomson
1968[1908]: 61-62). Just below the Roko Tui and the
Vunivalu were the chiefs of bati and qali villages, while
the kaisi (slave) villages were at the absolute bottom.
The latter provided the chief with the daily food
and were employed to maintain houses and boats or
to carry out whatever tasks were needed. The com-
peting confederacy of Rewa similarly had a Roko Tui
and a Vunivalu, but the former had not relinquished
its executive powers, nor had the latter reduced
these to secondary status. Below these two ruling
families were six mataqali, which supplied the her-
alds, mata-ni-vanua, and had no obligations toward
the chiefs other than leading the army into battle
and making ambushes (ibid.: 366). Next in the hier-
archy were chiefs of aligned yavusa, some of which
were qali or bati. At the bottom again were the kaisi
villages, of which one chief, Cakonauto, claimed to
have seventy which provided him and his village
with provisions on a daily basis. Cakonauto would
occasionally amuse himself by shooting at the people
of Drekete and Noco when they came with food.
Samuel Jackson gives the following account:
...the reason he [Cakonauto] gave for this almost unaccount-
able cruelty to the slave people was, that they were a very
rebellious and formidable people some forty or fifty years ago,
and almost got the upper hand of Rewa, and that Rewa had
rather a hard struggle to extricate herself from the threatening
and disagreeable situation she was placed in. Of all the slave
people Drekete was the worst and the ‘vura’ (or ringleader);
and at the time of their hardest struggle, the Rewa people
swore that, if they did succeed in quelling and get the upper
hand of them they would for ever after keep them in the most
abject slavery. (Jackson 1853: 463, my insertion)
As mentioned above, the person of a chief was sacred
in Bau and Rewa, and some chiefs even claimed
divine origins. They were thought to impart a degree
of sacredness on everything they touched and were
surrounded by a considerable amount of tabus – i.e.,
special rules of behaviour sanctioned by religion.
They ate alone, sometimes fed by attendants since
they were not allowed to touch food, and commoners
were expected to show profound deference when
meeting a chief. A special royal dialect existed in
which ‘not a member of a chief’s body, or the com-
monest acts of his life, are mentioned in ordinary
phraseology, but are all hyperbolized’ (Williams
1982[1858]: 37). The entourage of a chief consisted of
two or three personal attendants, two or three priests
and a number of wives (ibid.: 24-26). Amongst the
men of official importance were the mata-ni-vanua,
heralds, whose function it was to bring messages
from the chief and to associate chiefdoms, each of
which would have their own heralds stationed. Bau
would thus have a whole group of heralds from other
chiefdoms present as a kind of diplomatic corps.
Mnemonic sticks or reeds were employed to deliver
the exact wording of messages (ibid.: 27).
Chiefs were chosen from the chiefly mataqali, in
principle on the basis of seniority and primogeni-
ture so that the eldest brother would replace a dead
chief or, if no brothers were living, the eldest son.
This principle, however, was complicated by the fact
that rank was inherited from the mother and most
often would reflect the kind of support a son would
be able to get from his mother’s clan (yavusa). Also
of importance was the acknowledgement of aptness,
which would be judged according to the personal
abilities of the candidate. Aptness must be assumed
to have included a combination of political acumen
in manoeuvring safely within the troubled waters of
the intrigues of the chiefly court and prowess in
warfare to assure and enhance the standing of the
chiefdom. The position of chief was sacred almost to
the level of the lower gods, and he had absolute
power over commoners and slaves including choice
over life and death and eviction of whole villages
from the land they occupied. Land rights were basi-
cally of three kinds: the most exclusive was the right
to the house site which was vested in the occupant
of the house and which usually was not terminated
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by the death of the head of the household, but
passed one of his sons. Rights to cultivated lands
were held by extended families, tokatoka, subject to
the provision of services assigned to the tokatoka’s
mataqali and payment of an annual tribute, sevu or
first fruits, to the chief who granted the right to use
it and the provision of services. Services and tribute
were just as much recognition of the chief’s authority
as of his superior rights to land, and unmet obliga-
tions would be met by eviction (France 1969: 15). The
group would then seek the protection of another
chief to whom they would have to provide services
and tribute. Chiefs could give personal land rights
as gifts to acknowledge bravery in battle, for defend-
ing a corpse in battle (since it was the ultimate
humiliation to the person and his family to be eaten
by the enemy), or for having had the role of mourner
of a chief. Basically the extent of the land to which
a chief could grant rights corresponded to the area
he could defend. Powerful chiefs could thus accom-
modate more escaping, evicted and defecting groups
than lesser ones and hence by granting rights of
cultivation they accumulated more tribute and more
services. Tribute would either be presented at the
chief’s place or collected by the chief, who would
come with his entourage, which would then have to
be hosted (Thomson 1968[1908]: 59). Most of the
tribute would be redistributed and a good chief was
generally considered to be a generous chief.
The considerable powers of a chief were however
restricted by several factors. Since there were usually
several candidates for the title, a chief continuously
had to face the possibility of treachery from his rivals
and the possibility of small groups or even vanua
defecting to other matanitu. Chiefly councils further-
more restricted the authority of the chief. Decisions
to make war, alliances or judgements of law would
be made by councils that would not allow the chief
to arbitrarily push through decisions. Finally, the
predicament of the chief was enhanced by the insti-
tution of vasu (literally, ‘nephew’), according to which
a man could appropriate anything he might want
from his maternal uncle or those under his uncle’s
power except the wives, home and land of a chief.
Vasus provided, according to Thomas Williams ‘the
high-pressure power of Fijian despotism’ (Williams
1982[1858]: 34); ultimately no chief whose sister
had a son was his own master. Under the direction
of a chief a vasu was a powerful political instrument
in Fiji, and thus chiefs sought to marry high-ranking
women of other chiefdoms since through their sons
they would therefore have considerable claims on
that chiefdom.
Conquest and social change in Fiji
Warfare in Fiji in the first half of the 19th century
depended upon and was part of the prevailing social
relations outlined above. It was an avenue to greater
power for ambitious chiefs, part of male identity,
and its enduring threat of war led to the fortification
of villages. Though some clans were given the role
of warriors, as in the case of Rewa, where the six
mataqali of Sauturaga had no other obligations than
to lead warriors in war, the army consisted of all men
capable of carrying weapons. Armies were raised on
the basis of alliance or the status of bati or qali and
organised on a tribal basis under the command of
the Vunivalu. The question is, however, the role of war
in the transformation of social structure. There seems
to have been a kind of self-reinforcing dynamic that
could effectuate a conglomeration of single villages
and chiefdoms into larger entities, since a chief
could enhance his annual tribute and amount of
services by subjugating other villages and chiefdoms.
The more villages he could hold in a qali relation or
defeat totally and thus reduce to the status of slaves,
the more whale teeth, food, services and women he
would be able to claim. These could be used to com-
mission the production of more weapons and more
double-hulled canoes (drua) to be employed or given
away to allies, which likewise could be raised in larg-
er numbers with more wealth. Thus bigger armies
could be raised to conquer yet more villages. However,
two observations caution against embracing a ‘chiefs
made war and war made state’ position. Firstly,
alliances and larger political entities were not only
the result of conquest, but also of the conscious use
of vasu relationships. Also, the successful chiefs of
rising Bau, Naulivou and Cakobau required sons of
tributary and friendly chiefs to live on the island
of Bau to acquire a distinct Bauan point of view
(Routledge 1985: 43). While there is no doubt that
conquest played a major part in the formation of
matanitu, it had to be supported by political alliances
through marriages, reciprocity of gifts and mutual
support. Secondly, while conquest was an important
dynamic in the political life of the matanitu of Fiji,
it did transform basic social relations. Depending on
the definition we may consider confederacies like
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Bau and Rewa to be either complex chiefdoms or
inchoate early states.10 
Carneiro argues in an examination of the case of
Fiji that ‘From the point of political evolution, the
salient feature of chiefdom-level warfare is, of course
that it led to conquest’ (Carneiro 1990: 207). However,
according to Carneiro, states were not formed in Fiji
because the motive for war was not only conquest
but also revenge. It seems questionable to base the
cause of evolution on the motives of actors, and
Carneiro wisely strengthens his argument by argu-
ing that the wrong motives led to consequences that
did not imply evolution or change in political
organisation: 
The aim of much of the fighting in Fiji ... was the destruction,
even annihilation, of the enemy, not only his person but his
property. Thus, chiefdom-level warfare often exhibits the
‘regressive’ element of destruction and dispersion rather than
the ‘progressive’ one of amalgamation and consolidation.
(Carneiro 1990: 207)
Warfare in Fiji did however lead to amalgamation
and consolidation. Carneiro argues that there was
not enough of it, which is nevertheless a quantitative
argument. The crux of state formation, however, is
not quantitative aggrandisement of power, but qual-
itative change in political organisation. He does not
explain how less revenge and more amalgamation
and consolidation would amount to this.
War and conquest in Hawaii 
in the late 18th century
Having sailed past the Fiji islands in 1777, Captain
James Cook arrived half a year later, in January 1778,
at a group of islands that he first named after Lord
Sandwich and which later would be called the
Hawaiian Islands.11 Cook’s journal of his third and
fatal journey into the Pacific Ocean was published in
1784, and a brief comment mentioned the favourable
prizes some of his seamen had obtained in China for
a few furs from North America. Accordingly, in 1786
the second European ship to visit the islands inau-
gurated a fur trade between North America and
China that would last almost a decade. The Hawaiian
Islands became important for the provisioning of
salt pork, yams, fresh food and firewood, which the
islanders traded for iron tools and before long also
for muskets and cannons. When Captain George
Vancouver, who was with Captain Cook in 1778,
came back to Hawaii in 1790, he remarked the fol-
lowing:
The alteration which has taken place in the several governments
of these islands since their first discovery by Captain Cook, has
arisen from incessant war, instigated both at home and abroad
by ambitious and enterprizing chieftains; which the commerce
for European arms and ammunition cannot fail of encouraging
to the most deplorable extent. (Vancouver 1984: 477)
During the 1790s, muskets and cannons spread in
the islands, local islanders worked on the trading
ships, and the Hawaiian chiefs started adopting for-
eigners into their courts to train their men in the
use of muskets and cannons (Kuykendall 1968: chs.
2 and 3; Sahlins 1992: 36-54). Though arms and
cannons quickly became important in the quest for
power by different chiefs they did not substantially
alter the form of warfare (Howe 1984: 158). However,
in 1795 the chief of Hawaii, Kamehameha, con-
quered the neighbouring chiefdom, which included
the islands of Maui, Oahu, Molokai, Lanai and
Kahoolawe. Kamehameha could now dominate the
trade with Europeans and establish privileged access
to weapons, which led to the formation of the first
polity encompassing all the Hawaiian islands under
the rule of Kamehameha. The privileged access to
outside sources was a major factor in Kamehameha’s
consolidation of his rule and the transformation of
political structures, and in the following the focus is
therefore on war and social structure before 1795.
In the 1780s, the eight Hawaiian Islands (Hawaii,
Maui, Oahu, Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Niihau and
Kahoolawe) were divided into four major polities
that fought for supremacy under the leadership of
their respective high chiefs, ali’i nui. Each polity was
in turn subdivided into districts, moku, administered
by lesser chiefs, ali’i ai moku, appointed by the ali’i
nui. Districts were then subdivided into sub-districts,
ahuapua’a, which were led by the konihiki appointed
by the ali’i ai moku. There was a distinct difference
between the class of ali’i, from which the chiefs and
their administrative nobility came, and the class of
commoners who cultivated the land, the maka’ainana.
The commoners were not organised into kinship
units, but consisted of an ‘assemblage of ego-based
bilateral kindred (interrelated to varying degrees by
marriage) rather than corporate kinship units’
(Hommon 1986: 57. See also Sahlins 1992: 31-33).
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Upon the conquest or succession of a new chief, new
chiefs of the districts and sub-districts were appointed.
Whereas the class of ali’i were cosmopolitan, or
rather pan-archipelagic, in their orientation, the com-
moners lived in self-sufficient, endogamous groups
within the sub-districts, though they might migrate
if their chiefs became too oppressive (Malo 1903:
92). In addition to the ali’i and maka’ainana there
was a group of people without status, the kauwa,
who were slaves, probably either because they had
broken important prohibitions or as the result of
conquest (Ellis 1979: 106; Kamakau 1964: 8; Malo
1903: 96-101). This social structure appears to have
been relatively homogenous throughout the islands
and to have been established centuries before con-
tact.12 Archaeology and mythical history suggest
that a cleavage between commoner, maka’ainana,
and noble, ali’i, had developed by 1600 (Hommon
1986; Kirch 1985).
At the time when Western ships made contact
with Hawaii, war was frequent (Fornander 1880;
Kamakau 1992: 230). Warfare would typically be
occasioned either by the death of the high chief and
the ensuing quest for power between successors and
their allies or by ambitious chiefs attempting to
enlarge their domain. According to Hawaiian myths,
the attainment of political power through warfare
goes, as far back as the 16th century and the high
chief of Hawaii, ‘Umi (Hommon 1986: 67). Patrick
Kirch (1985) writes as follows:
The political history not only of Hawaii but of the other
major islands as well, during the final two centuries prior to
European intrusion, was one of constant attempts by ruling
chiefs to extend their domains through conquest and annex-
ation of lands. Campaigns extended beyond the borders of
individual islands, and Moloka’i was a frequent prize of both
the Maui and O’ahu chiefdoms, ... The expansion of a chief-
dom was generally short-lived, followed within a generation
or two by collapse and retrenchment, frequently precipitated
by usurpation of the paramountship by a junior collateral able
to enlist the aid of other mal-content chiefs and warriors.
Thus the late political history of the Islands was cyclical.
(Kirch 1985: 307)
The wars
The chiefs declared and led the great wars of ancient
Hawaii. There was no standing army or separate
group of men trained exclusively for war. Instead, all
able-bodied men were potential warriors that the
chiefs could call upon. Wars were fought with slings,
spears, javelins, daggers and tripping devices, and
while clubs were used they did not have the same
significance or high status as in the rest of Polynesia
and Fiji. Bows and arrows were not used (Hiroa
1964). In general, all men learned fighting skills
when growing up through stone-throwing, slinging,
wrestling, throwing the javelin, and engaging in
sham battles. Hawaiian warriors seem to have devel-
oped admirable skills in throwing and dodging stones
and spears. Commoners learned the skills of war from
each other, while the men of the ali’i were supposed
to be especially capable warriors: ‘All the chiefs in
the government were trained in military exercises
until they had attained greater skill than was pos-
sessed by any of the common people’ (Malo 1903:
261). Included in the chief’s court were specialists,
kalaimoku, who ‘were well versed in the principles of
warfare. They knew how to set a battle in order, how
to conduct it aright, how to adapt the order of battle
to the ground’ (Malo 1903: 259).
There were two great reasons why a kalaimoku had superior
ability as a councillor to others. In the first place, they were
instructed in the traditional wisdom of former kalaimokus,
and in the second place their whole lives were spent with
kings. When one king died, they lived with his successor until
his death, and so on. Thus they became well acquainted with
the methods adopted by different kings, also with those used
by the kings of ancient times. (Malo 1903: 261)
Chiefs and their courts were highly skilled in warfare
and the male commoners constituted ‘in times of
peace a reserve army, each individual of which kept
his weapons in readiness in his house’ (Emory 1970:
233). The Hawaiian polities seem to a have been high-
ly effective in mobilising their troops and conducting
war. They might transport themselves on foot across
an island or in small and large double-hulled canoes
that could reach all the other islands in the group.
The passage between Oahu and Kauai, however, had
such strong a current and the sea there was so rough
that Kamehameha’s first attempt, in 1796, to subju-
gate this last polity under his rule failed (Kuykendall
1968: 47-48). By 1810, however, Kamehameha’s power
and naval capabilities were so great, enhanced also
by the acquisition of European ships, and the chief
of Kauai (and Niihau), that Kaumualii accepted
Kamehameha as his superior without conquest. 
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Sham battles were part of being militarily alert and
were frequently held. George Vancouver witnessed
such a battle on Monday the 4th of March 1793:
The party consisted of about an hundred and fifty men armed
with spears; these were divided into three parties nearly in
equal numbers, two were placed at a little distance from each
other; that on our right was to represent the armies of Teteeree
and Taio [Kahekili, chief of Maui, and his younger brother
Kaeo. Two of Kamehameha’s main opponents at the time],
that on the left the army of Tamaahmaah [Kamehameha].
Their spears on this occasion were blunt pointed sticks, ... the
battle began by throwing their sham spears at each other.
These were parried in most instances with great dexterity, but
such as were thrown with effect produced contusions and
wounds, which, through fortunately of no dangerous tendency,
were yet very considerable, and it was admirable to observe
the great good humour and evenness of temper that was
preserved by those who were thus injured. This battle was a
mere skirmish, neither party being supported, nor advancing
in any order but such as the fancy of the individuals directed.
(Vancouver 1984: 832-33, my insertions)
Warriors that wanted to prove their military skills
would walk up in front of the line of opponents and
challenge them. With a spear in their left hand they
would parry some of the spears thrown at them,
while with their right hand they would catch spears
in flight and return them. Vancouver was much
impressed:
In this exercise no one seemed to excel his Owhyhean majesty
[Kamehameha], who entered the lists for a short time, and
defended himself with the greatest dexterity, much to our
surprize and admiration; in one instance particularly, against
six spears that were hurled at him nearly at the same instant;
three he caught as they were flying, with one hand, two he
broke by parrying them with his spear in the other, and the
sixth, by a trifling inclination of his body, passed harmless.
(Vancouver 1984: 833)
After a short intermission, the first skirmish-like battle
was followed by another, which was quite different:
The warriers who were armed with the pallaloos [long spears],
now advanced with a considerable degree of order, and a scene
of very different exploits commenced; presenting, in compari-
son to what before had been exhibited, a wonderful degree of
improved knowledge in military evolutions. This body of
men, composing several ranks, formed in close and regular
order, constituted a firm and compact phalanx, which in
actual service, I was informed, was not easily to be broken.
(Vancouver 1984: 834)
In consultancy with the priests the chief decided
upon actual warfare and war strategies. The chief sent
out messengers to the districts and villages under the
chief’s command to summon a number of men in
proportion to the kind of war at hand. Rising to the
task of being warriors, men would bring their own
weapons, candlenuts for torches, calabashes for water,
dried fish, or other portable provisions. Sometimes,
another officer from the king’s court would check
whether the men summoned came along: ‘if he
found any lingering behind who ought to have
been with the army, he cut or slit one of their ears,
tied a rope around their body, and in this manner
led them to the camp’ (Ellis 1979: 99). The shame
and humiliation of staying at home, however, often
made it unnecessary to send this officer around. They
sometimes launched attacks after only brief prepa-
rations, while at other times they spent up to a year
building war canoes, crafting weapons and securing
provisions (Kamakau 1992: 28, 74). Meanwhile, spies
could be sent out to assess the strength of the enemy
(Kamakau 1992: 55ff).
The form of warfare could range from surprise
attacks upon the unsuspecting opponent to for-
malised battles where time, place and mode of fight-
ing had been agreed upon previously (Handy 1970:
234). The former most likely occurred in quests for
more land, whereas the latter would seem to war
as the last means in disputes arising from slanders,
minor injustices and revenge that were solved
through negotiations. Conventional warfare took
place when two renowned warriors, one from each
side, would start the battle by fighting between
themselves while the rest of the army looked on
from the sidelines (Ellis 1979: 104). Another form of
conventional warfare was the kukulu, whereby the
two armies would face each other in two single lines
and await the cry for the battle to begin (Malo 1903:
259, 268). In less conventional battles, the armies
would be organised into different formations suited
to the landscape in which the fighting took place. In
the kahului formation, soldiers formed a crescent,
whereas the army was organised into the makawalu
formation – groups of soldiers spread irregularly in the
terrain – when the grounds was level with scrub (see
Malo 1903: 259-60, 268-69; Emory 1970: 237-38).
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Commoners were led by their own chief, who in
turn took orders from a superior chief, forming a
hierarchy that replicated the hierarchy of the social
structure, with the paramount chief, the ali’i nui, at
the apex (Ellis 1979: 101).
The nobles were supposed to be especially skilled
in warfare, and great warriors could earn fame and
prominence. Kamakau 1992 describes a celebrated
warrior:
…a chief from Kolokai [was] celebrated for his skill and
strength. He would toss an antagonist in mid-air and tear at
him, so that he was helplessly mangled when he reached the
earth. Ka-makau-ki’i, a famous fighter from Hawaii, was a swift
runner, so strong and sure with his spear thrust or other death-
dealing weapon that he never missed a hair of even a louse on
a man’s head, and so quick was his grasp that he could catch
a bird before it took wing. (Kamakau 1992: 80, my insertion)
One example of the warrior ethos was the defiance
of eight famous warriors of Oahu who on their own
went to counter a surprise attack by Kahekili, chief
of Maui, on their island: ‘It was a chivalrous under-
taking, a forlorn hope ... but fully within the spirit
of the time for personal valour, audacity, and total
disregard of consequences’ (Fornander 1880: 223).
Wars would sometimes last only one day, with
the armies getting no further than marching up in
front of each other before a truce was achieved, or
they could consist of skirmishes lasting months
(Fornander 1880: 139). At other times wars would
develop into battles lasting several days (five seems
the typical number. I’i 1959: 70; Fornander 1880:
139) or into sieges of the fortifications into which
the enemy had retreated after having lost a battle.
Fortifications could either be natural points of defence
or constructed forts, and some were renown for being
impregnable (e.g. Fornander 1880: 98). Sieges might
be long and unsuccessful (Fornander 1880: 147), and
in some cases victory was only achieved by cutting
off water supplies (I’i 1959: 116). Victorious armies
would kill enemy warriors, women, old people and
children. The conquerors made the survivors their
slaves. If the defeated chief was captured alive the
conquering chief might sacrifice him to the gods as
a final confirmation of the new holder of the office
of power (see Valeri 1985). Chiefs of the winning
party were appointed as holders of the offices of
chief of district and sub-districts and in this way
land was redistributed amongst the winning party.
Warring chiefs of Hawaii
War in ancient Hawaii was an important means for
getting power and a social field in which ali’i and
maka’ainana could achieve fame as great warriors.
The economy of these societies and the rules of suc-
cession to office after the death of a paramount
chief made warfare an attractive option for chiefs
and their rivals. 
Ideally, succession to the office of ali’i nui was
determined by rank, which was inherited from the
father as well as the mother. Determination of rank,
however, was often difficult since a chief might have
several wives, and the eldest son of the first wife
might thus have a lower rank than a younger brother
whose mother was of higher rank. The system encour-
aged marriage to close kin, since the highest possible
rank within a domain would be achieved by a child
of a son and daughter of the ali’i nui and his highest-
ranking wife. Slightly lower rank would result from
marriage between a brother and half-sister or
between cousins (Malo 1903: 80-82; Kamakau 1964:
4-5). Genealogical relationships were much entangled
and as a result assessing rank was often extremely
difficult, leading to contestations between several
equal or near-equal successors to the office of chief,
so a war between contenders who sought the support
of factions within the polity often followed the death
of a chief (Valeri 1985: 159-60). The stakes could be
high since the new ali’i nui would re-appoint the
lower offices of chief and the status quo might thus
be in danger. If a group of chiefs felt themselves at a
disadvantage with the new division of the land,
they could contact a rival to try to get him to lead a
revolt and have him installed as paramount chief.
Accordingly, for example, the chief of Hawaii,
Kalaiopuu, appointed his son Kiwalao as his suc-
cessor, but a group of chiefs disappointed by
Kiwalao’s redistribution of land succeeded in having
Kamehameha, cousin to Kiwaloa, lead a successful
revolt and become the new paramount chief of
Hawaii (Howe 1984: 155; Fornander 1880: 299-310).
So the ali’i nui derived his position from a combina-
tion of rank and the ability to obtain support from
the most powerful aggregation of interest groups.
The latter claim would often have to be proven
through internal warfare and subsequent conquest
of the ali’i nui position. Once in power, a chief
would have to look out for and maybe kill potential
usurpers by such methods as poisoning (Fornander
1880: 142, 218).
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Ultimately, the ali’i nu owned the land, granting
the lesser chiefs rights to a district of land on the
condition of an annual tribute. In the same manner,
these chiefs in turn subdivided their districts off 
to lesser chiefs, who eventually granted the
maka’ainana land to cultivate. The annual tribute on
all levels would be paid in connection with the
Makahiki festival in the form of first fruits to the
immediate superior chief, who on his part would
present a tribute to his superior (Sahlins 1992: 25-
27; Valeri 1985: 156-57). On the lower levels of this
hierarchy most of the tribute would consist of taro
and other daily food staples, but on the higher
levels, where tribute would come from more distant
lands, the tribute would be paid in the form of pigs,
dogs, salted fish, bark cloth, canoes, nets, mats and
feathers (Sahlins 1992: 28). Either because they were
more storable and incorporated more labour or
because of their symbolic value. The accumulated
goods of tribute would then be redistributed, with
the greatest shares going to those closest to the ali’i
nui, while the maka’ainana would get nothing
(Valeri 1985: 204). In ancient Hawaii, the chiefly
economy was thus characterised by differential
redistribution.
An ali’i nui basically had three ways in which to
enhance his status. Firstly, he could marry as many
high-ranking wives as possible, thereby ensuring that
his successor and children have a high level of sanc-
tity. In this way the mana of his successor and children
would be high and therefore they would deserve a
high degree of reverence from lesser chiefs and maka-
ainana in particular. Social life was restricted by a
system of religious prohibitions, kapus, that espe-
cially related to relations between men and women
and entailed rules of abject behaviour towards the
paramount chief (I’i 1959: 58-59; Malo 1903: 50, 83;
Valeri 1985: 90-95). The position of the chief was
supported by religion, which, in its royalist version,
depicted the paramount chief as the embodiment of
the society as a whole and as the apex of a hierarchy
that gradually approximated the divine status of the
gods. The position was enacted in the luakini ritual,
in which the king sacrificed a human, who might be
a defeated chief or the first killed in a battle (Valeri
1985). The strength of a chief’s sanctity was not just
a given essence, but implied efficacy (ibid.: 90-105),
and thus had to be enacted and shown through the
volume of tribute and valuables, the building of
temples, or conquest. 
Secondly, a chief could try to raise the produc-
tivity of his polity to the highest possible limits.
Depending on the strategy of the chief this could
become manifest either in larger amounts of tribute
presented at the makahini festival and the ensuing
higher amounts of valuables ultimately presented to
him as ali’i nui or it could become manifest in the
building of temples, which required large numbers,
sometimes thousands, of people investing their
labour in construction while being fed by those still
remaining in agriculture. In some cases such a demon-
stration of power would be enough to discourage
enemies to attack. ‘It can thus be said that kings
fight by building temples and not only by arms’
(ibid.: 235).
The strategy of productivity, however, had the
inherent danger of alienating the commoner people,
the maka ai’nana. An ali’i nui had to balance his
enactment of his absolute powers with the risk of
rebellion by lesser chiefs or commoners if they con-
sidered his rule too oppressive or exploitative.
According to Marshal Sahlins, the threshold of pop-
ular resentment was rather low, and since the com-
moners were neither bound to the soil nor consan-
guineally connected to their chiefs, they could chose
to migrate or revolt (Sahlins 1992: 30). David Malo
lists the chiefs who were killed by the commoners
(Malo 1903: 258), and Kamakau (1992), for exam-
ple, tells the story of the two sons of the ancient
king of Hawaii, ‘Umi-a-Liloa, who inherited the Hilo
and Kona parts of the island, respectively. In the
end, however, the younger brother, Keawa-nui-a-
’Umi, became ruler of all of Hawaii, since the elder
brother, Ke-li’i-o-kaloa, exploited his people too
harshly.
[Ke-li’i-o-kaloa] deserted the advice of the wise, he paid atten-
tion to that of fools, thus forsaking the teachings of his father
and the learned men of his kingdoms. He deserted the god
and oppressed the people. These were his oppressive deeds: he
seized the property of the chiefs and that of the konohiki of the
chiefs, the food of the commoners, their pigs, dogs, chickens,
and other property. The coconut trees that were planted were
hewn down, so were the people’s kou trees. Their canoes and
fish were seized; and people were compelled to do burden-
some tasks such as diving for ‘ina sea urchins, wana sea urchins,
and sea weeds at night. Many were the oppressive deeds com-
mitted by this chief Ke-li’i-o-kaloa. Therefore some of the
chiefs and commoners went to Hilo, to Keawa-nui-a-’Umi, and
offered him the kingdom of Kona. (Kamakau 1992: 35)
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The third strategy for enhancing status was to acquire
more (cultivated) land, which meant more tribute and
more prestigious valuables, red feathers and bark
cloth, and thus higher status for the ali’i nui and, to
a lesser degree, his court. So there was a premium on
acquiring more land, which could only be achieved
by conquest, since all of the Hawaiian islands were
already divided into different polities, and success-
fully conducted conquest simultaneously meant
more tribute and the diminishing of the status of
the defeated chief. This avenue to greater status and
power had its self-reinforcing dynamic, since the
ability to build double-hulled canoes, commission
weapons, and raise big armies increased with the
number of people and amount of tribute and services
the ali’i nui could command. Warfare as a strategy to
keep and enlarge power can be neatly summarised
through the example given by Fornander (1880) of
the ancient chief of Hawaii, Kalaniopuu: 
... at the usual redistribution of lands at his accession, appar-
ently all were satisfied or none dared to resist. For several years
afterwards he occupied himself diligently in reorganising the
affairs of the state, augmenting the warlike resources of the
island, building war-canoes, collecting arms, &c, and his own
and the neighbouring islands enjoyed a season of rest from
foreign and domestic strife and warfare.
But Kalaniopuu was ambitious for fame in his island world
by warlike exploits and by enlarging his domain with the
acquisition of neighbouring territory. Possibly also he may have
been moved by reasons of policy, such as finding occupation
abroad for the yong and restless chiefs with who every district
abounded. Suddenly, therefore, he concentrated his forces and
war-canoes at Kohala, and, without previous rupture of peace
or declaration of war, he invaded Maui... (Fornander 1880: 146)
As with the other strategies for increasing status, war
also entailed dangers. In addition to the obvious risk
of badly losing a war campaign, a warring chief
risked rebellion at home while conquering abroad.
Accordingly, after having conquered Maui in 1790,
Kamehameha had to return to Hawaii quickly and
abandon further conquest because of a revolt against
him (Fornander 1880: 235-41). To be a successful
chief of ancient Hawaii thus required careful and
skilful manoeuvring between different factions
amongst the nobles, pushing levels of tribute to high
levels of productivity without causing a rebellion,
and enhancing mana through marriage strategies,
which also might pave the way for alliances.
In sum, the paramount chief of the Hawaiian
Islands was a position that was religiously sanc-
tioned, partly inherited, and at the apex of a differ-
entiated redistributive economy. The might of the
chief grew with the domain over which he could
claim paramountcy, since more lands meant more
tribute, more status, and the ability to enlist more
labour. The power of the chief might be invested
in the building of luakini temples, which in some
instances involved thousands of people that had to
be fed and organised. In other instances, however,
the accumulated goods would be used to build canoes,
request more weapons, and raise armies. These could
then be employed to attack and hopefully conquer
more land and people, which in turn would enable
yet another round of fighting through actual con-
quest or temple building.
War and conquest in Fiji and Hawaii
In a comparative perspective, Fiji and Hawaii are
quite similar in various respects. In Fiji as well as in
Hawaii, chiefs made war frequently and, according
to archaeological evidence and oral history, had been
doing so for centuries. The position of chief was reli-
giously sanctioned and occupied an intermediate
place between gods and humans. Access to the posi-
tion of chief was gained through a combination of
inherited rank (implying degrees of sanctity), mili-
tary skills, and the ability to gain support from other
groups. In Fiji and Hawaii, the warring chiefs had a
small retinue of warriors based mainly on close kin
and relied upon alliances with other chiefs and upon
subordinate chiefs when they wanted to raise armies.
Though motivations for war might vary from per-
ceived sleights or questions of honour to outright
quests for chiefly paramountcy, large-scale warfare
took place and required the co-ordination and com-
mand of thousands of warriors, access to large canoes
and weapons, and considerable amounts of food.
However, there were also distinct differences. In
war, Fijians relied on bows and arrows for long-dis-
tance hostility and upon clubs for close combat,
while Hawaiians used spears and javelins for combat
at a distance and swords with shark teeth for close
encounters. Fijian warfare seemed to centre on forti-
fications and sieges; Fijians had developed consider-
able skills in building and organising their defence
through fortifications and, inversely, in conducting
sieges. In Hawaii, outright battles were more common,
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and Hawaiians had developed different battle for-
mations for encounters in the open. The closed kind
of phalanxes that Vancouver witnessed does not seem
to have had any parallel in Fiji, just as the signifi-
cant role of treachery and shifting alliances during
battles and sieges does not seem to have been of sig-
nificance in Hawaii. The prevalence of battles instead
of sieges and the ability to form different battle for-
mations seems to indicate that war in Hawaii was
based on more stable and complex military organi-
sation.
This difference in military organisation seems in
turn to be based on a difference in social organisation
as such. While the distinction between the chiefly
elite and commoners was distinct and implied the
absolute, despotic right of chiefs over commoners in
both Fiji and Hawaii, the internal political relations
between various chiefs were different. Paramount
chiefs in Fiji could through intrigue, conspiracy and
conquest influence who was to acquire lesser chiefly
positions, but they could not by right of their posi-
tion decide this by public decree as in Hawaii. The
turaga ni matanitu of Fiji could demand tribute and
request warriors and services from subjugated qali
villages, but apparently not from the same position
as the ali’i ai mokus of Hawaii. The ability of Hawaiian
chiefs to commission the construction of irrigation
and fishponds, and thus invest their power in eco-
nomic relations, also does not seem to have had an
equivalent in Fiji. Furthermore, while Hawaiian reli-
gion had developed a hierarchy amongst its myriad
of gods, at the pinnacle of which were a few central
gods who were the object of central rituals and tem-
ples, Fijian religion seems to have been less focused.
In contrast to Hawaii, in Fiji there was no overall rit-
ual including all groups within the territory of the
paramount chiefs where tribute was paid. Buildings
for worship existed in both cases, though the Fijian
Bure Kalous propably could not match the Hawaiian
lukakinis in degree of work-investment. The differ-
ence in military organisation between Fiji and Hawaii
thus seems related to a parallel difference in the
degree of centralisation.
In both Fiji and Hawaii, a self-reinforcing dynamic
existed in which the successful conquest of another
polity meant access to more resources in the form of
tribute, people, food and wealth. This in turn could
be invested in raising yet more warriors and weapons
for new conquests, and in this way larger political
entities were built, leading to the formation of large
polities in Fiji. In these confederacies, however, polit-
ical relations were inherently unstable since internal
revolt or defection might challenge the power of the
leading chief. In neither case was the power of the
chief based upon military prowess or success alone.
The right alliance between chiefly families in cases
of marriage was necessary to procure a suitable, high-
ranking chief, who had to achieve a leading position
within the field of qualified heirs or usurpers through
military prowess and political acumen to forge
alliances. There is no evidence of a non-chiefly war
leader who revolts against his chief by using his
command of military power. A basic difficulty of such
a task was that armies were mobilised from various
sections of the political entity and only forged into
a unit as long as the political hierarchy was stable.
If a paramount chief was challenged, the army was
most likely to break down into smaller unities accord-
ing to political allegiance.
In a comparative perspective, a higher level of
organised warfare in Hawaii seems to parallel higher
levels of centralisation in politics, religion and econ-
omy. It is a matter of definitional choice whether
this difference should be considered one of degree
or of quality. The travel accounts of early Europeans
speak of ‘chiefs’ and ‘kings’ in both cases, and while
more recent anthropological literature tends to
regard the groups in Fiji as ‘chiefdoms’, those of
Hawaii are referred to as ‘chiefdoms’ (e.g., Earle
1997; Cordy 1974), ‘early states’ (e.g., Claessen and
Skalnik 1978) or something in between (Hommon
1986). Instead of trying to solve the question of def-
inition, it seems more fruitful to pay attention to
the role of war in reproducing or changing social
organisation. In both cases, war was obviously a
means to achieve and enlarge political power. While
this also implied a centralisation of rule as long as
the conqueror was successful, there is no evidence
that further stratification, more bureaucratisation,
or a higher degree of monopolised violence was the
result. Rather, in Fiji and Hawaii, war did not surpass
existing social structures, but might be regarded as
part of it, since the ability to launch wars was inte-
gral to the power of political leaders.
The central problem was that while war could
enlarge political power, it took more to use this
power to transform existing structures. Naulivou
and Cakobau of Bau, Fiji, consciously used the vasu
relationship to convert their military success into
political power, just as the ali’i nui of Hawaii
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acquired high-ranking wives to enhance their sons’
mana. However, in both cases these attempts at con-
version were soon neutralised by competing, equal-
ranking claims to vasu or mana. The result was sev-
eral competing successors whose rivalries often
reduced the built-up power base.
Chiefly rule in Fiji and Hawaii relied upon differ-
ent forms of power: economic, political, ideological
and military. While war and conquest offered a self-
reinforcing dynamic through which chiefs could
acquire more power, more was required to stabilise
and make this a lasting, qualitative difference. Instead
we must envisage a dynamic combination of exist-
ing historical conditions, actions of one or more
actors, and a reconfiguration of forms of power to
make warring leaders, deliberately or unintentionally,
come out of warfare as heads of state instead of war-
ring chiefs. The different fates of Fiji’s Cakobau and
Hawaii’s Kamehameha are interesting in this respect.
Kamehameha of Hawaii won a decisive battle against
Oahu in 1795. Under normal circumstances, the
shifting fates of Hawaiian chiefs might also have
been Kamehameha’s, and his supreme dominance
only temporary. Kamehameha, however, could use
his temporary supremacy to secure a dominance of
trade in firearms and other goods with Europeans
and thus further enhance his power and advantage
over rival chiefs. Furthermore, his heir, Kamehameha
II, under the strong influence of his mother and
Kamehameha’s favorite wife, Kaahumanu, abol-
ished the kapu system, which amongst other things
meant that rivals could not legitimise claims to his
position by reference to mana. The fate of Cakobau
in Fiji was quite different. He gained temporary
supremacy over Rewa in 1845 when the town of the
latter was burned down and a chief loyal to Bau,
Cakonauto, was subsequently installed in Rewa.
Cakonauto, however, died in 1851, and in defiance
of Bau, the Rewans installed Qaraniqio, whose aim
was a new, independent and powerful Rewa. The
Bauans staying at Rewa were ejected and an impor-
tant bati chiefdom, Kaba, defected to Rewa. By 1855,
Cakobau and Bau were in severe difficulty, and only
by converting to Christianity and thereby securing
the support of the Tongan King and his army could
Cakobau remain the dominant chief of Fiji. In a
position of dominance, Kamehameha could engage
upon major political reform and further institution-
alise his power after 1795; however, Cakobau became
dependent on local European immigrants and the
Tongan warriors. The already existing degree of
institutionalised hierarchy as well as incidental his-
torical circumstances seem to have made the differ-
ence (see also Routledge 1973).
‘…and war made state’?
Hawaiian and Fijian chiefs went to war to aggran-
dise their power and status, and chiefs like
Kamehameha and Cakobau, who could achieve a
self-reinforcing dynamic whereby war meant more
tribute and larger armies, which in turn meant
greater military power, could build up large confed-
eracies. None of them relied on war and military
alone, but they had their power enhanced by their
divine status and had to build alliances to remain
chiefs. As outlined above, however, war did not
make the state. To achieve this, the configuration of
different sources of power had to be right, and even
then the process relied on contingent factors. What
implications does this have for the three approaches
to war and state formation presented initially?
These approaches focused on war as context, mil-
itary organisation and means, respectively. The con-
text approach posited that a situation of constant
war would promote the development of social com-
plexity because of the advantages gained in respect
to protection against outside attack. At first glance,
this approach would seem to be confirmed by the
war practices of Fiji and Hawaii, since wars were fre-
quent and the people invested considerable co-oper-
ative efforts in building fortifications and carrying
out large-scale war campaigns. The political units in
Hawaii were already larger than the kinship units,
which were only relevant at a local level, ahuapua’a,
and while in Fiji kinship and ancestral descent was
important for constituting clans and sub-clans, the
vanua and mataqali, they already practiced the asso-
ciative incorporation of groups that fled from sup-
pression or had been expelled. However, the local
kinship groups were also involved in the exchange
of goods, valuables and women on a scale that sur-
passed these units, and that might arguably be con-
sidered the basis for extra-local cooperation and asso-
ciation. One might even argue that had it not been
for the frequency of war, these exchange relations
might have developed to an extent in scale and
intensity that would have effectuated the formation
of a complex society. In Fiji, establishing alliances
with other groups was essential in war-making, and
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the outcome of campaigns might decide whether one
group would be required to pay tribute to another,
so in the short term war did effectuate larger-than-
local, subjugating networks. In a long-term perspec-
tive, however, the problem was to stabilise these.
The fact that authority had not yet developed into a
form of stabilised state organisation despite centuries
of warfare and conquest testifies to this.
In a short-term perspective, we may find support
for the propositions of Herbert Spencer (1967), who
argued that frequent war, stratification and despotic
rule are (evolutionarily) related, and those of Elman
Service (1975), who argued that political leadership
and larger social entities arose because of the advan-
tages this provided in questions of attack and defence.
In a long-term perspective, the question arises why
even larger, more centralised and bureaucratic enti-
ties did not develop. There might be two answers to
this: either war itself is not enough to transform social
relations and has to be tied into other forms of
power to enable this or it might have fragmenting
as well as centralising effects. The combined use of
different sources of power by chiefs in Fiji and
Hawaii, as described above, supports the former
proposition. In support of latter proposition, I argue
that subjugation by force and the creation of vasu
claims by acquiring high-ranking women as war
tribute create strong motivations for defection and
an unwillingness to meet moral obligations. Hence,
the violence of war disrupts the construction of
vast, lasting exchange networks based on reciproci-
ty. While these might also create stratification, the
absence of violence makes it easier to tie them in
with moral and therefore integrative obligations.
The second approach to war posited that the pre-
mium on effectiveness in warfare would result in
military organisation becoming more hierarchical,
centralised and subjugating than other sections of a
group’s social life. It was objected that this would
only occur if military organisation and status could
be transferred from structures of war into structures
of peace. The comparison of Fiji and Hawaii suggest-
ed that their military organisations relied on other
social relations, and there were no indications that
subjugation or centralisation existed to a higher
degree in the military than in other social hierarchies.
There is therefore little to suggest that military
organisation might separate and develop along an
autonomous trajectory, and the question of re-inte-
grating the military into the other social areas is
thus void. War and military organisation were cer-
tainly sources of fame and status. Any exceptionally
skilled warrior would gain fame in Fiji and Hawaii,
but by already being part of the chiefly clan or the
ali’i he could become a paramount chief. So, the fact
that the political leaders owed their status to reli-
gious sanctity as well as military prowess does make
military skill a source of power, but it simultaneous-
ly limits its potency to the elite groups. In Fiji, the
ritual for acknowledging great warriors after war
consisted in the warriors being isolated for four days
before receiving the honours from the chief. This
ritual neutralised attempts by a great warrior to con-
vert his feats of war into political power, unless he
initiated a revolt immediately upon return. 
The third thesis posited that the state would form
as the result of conquest. The basic weakness of this
thesis was that while conquest may result in larger
units it does not per se result in social structural
change. In Fiji as well as Hawaii, war resulted in sub-
jugation and sometimes even in the relegation of
whole groups to the status of slaves. But that did not
imply a basic change in the social structure of these
organisations. Conquest was an important means in
the struggle of chiefs to become more powerful, but
even for the most successful, such as Cakobau and
Kamehameha, this did not amount to transforming
the social structure as such. The matanitus of Fiji were
inherently unstable, a stable hierarchy of power never
eventuated, and a routine and rule-regulated kind of
bureaucracy never developed. Over time, of course,
this might have developed. In Fiji, Bau’s founder,
Naulivou, was the head of a more hierarchical group
than those of Western Fiji, and a local flotsam of
Europeans and their muskets reinforced his military
power. But even though the coincidence of more
hierarchy and muskets did give Bau a certain advan-
tage for some years, this did not lead to a permanent
position of power. In Hawaii, the paramount chiefs
of the main islands had been at war for centuries,
apparently within the same basic social structures.
Only at a contingent time in history did this change,
when Kamehameha secured dominance over the
archipelago and used a near-monopoly on trade with
Westerners to secure this position and subsequently
change the political organisation. Even then, con-
verting this position of power into a new social
structure required the establishment of new prac-
tices, such as the abolition of the kapu system by
Kamehameha’s heir. 
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Hawaii and Fiji are extraordinarily well-suited to
help illustrate the relation between war and social
structure: wars were frequent, war was a means to
enlarge the power of chiefs, and there was no rele-
gation of war to the margins of society, which
would have inhibited higher levels of subjugation
and central command in military organisation from
spreading to the rest of society. War was of central
importance but nevertheless did not result in state
formation. The central problem is that whereas
organised violence is a concentrated, coercive form
of power, it is difficult to extend spatially over large
areas and over extended lengths of time. It therefore
has to tie in with other forms of power – for instance,
political, religious, ideological and economic. This
is, of course, what the chroniclers of European state
formation also show in addition to the ‘war made
state and state made war’ epigram (Giddens 1985;
Mann 1986; McNeill 1982; Porter 1994; Tilly 1990).
War alone did not make state, and this explains why
chiefs who made war only made state when military
power and success could combine with other social
areas of power under the right historical circum-
stances. 
N O T E S
1 The epigram is usually accredited to Charles Tilly (1975:
42), whose work The Formation of the Nation State in Western
Europe (1975) was a main impetus for this discussion.
2 On war and early states, see Claessen and Skalnìk (1978:
7-14), Haas (1982: 133-40), Fried (1967: 213-16), Service
(1975: 271-73) and Claessen (2000: 103-12).
3 See Martin and Frayer (1997), Keeley (1996) and
O’Connell (1995).
4 For overviews see Claessen and Skalnìk (1978) and
Cohen and Service (1978).
5 On the problem of definitions, see Claessen and Skalnik
(1978), Cohen (1978) and Jones and Kautz (1981).
6 For a thorough discussion of these positions, see Haas
(1982).
7 On conflict versus integration approaches to state 
formation, see Haas (1982).
8 For instance, the sandalwood-trader Lockerby (1922), the
absconding seaman Jackson (1853), the missionaries
Williams (1982) and Waterhouse (1997), the wife of a
beche-de-mer trader Wallis (1983[1851]), and the exploring
expeditions of Erskine (1853) and Wilkes (1845).
9 These are the standardised terms later elevated to ortho-
dox tradition by the colonial administration and reflect a
Bauan perspective. See France (1969: 9-18), Clammer
(1973) and Routledge (1985: 28-29).
10 Cordy (1977) defines a complex chiefdom as ‘stratified 
or incipient stratified societies with two or more chiefly
rank or status levels and two or more chiefly redistribu-
tion levels. The upper levels of these societies are free
from subsistence work and the paramount decision-
making level has control of some force in his sanctions’
(Cordy 1977: 92).
The inchoate early state exists, according to Henri
Claessen and Peter Skalník, where ‘Kinship, family, and
community ties still dominate relations in the political
field; where full-time specialists are rare; where taxation
systems are only primitive and ad hoc taxes are frequent;
and where social differences are offset by reciprocity and
close contacts between rulers and ruled’ (Claessen and
Skalník 1978: 23).
Bau and Rewa furthermore seem to fit into Robert
Carneiro’s definition of a state as ‘an autonomous political
unit, encompassing many communities within its territory
and having a centralised government with the power to
collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and
enforce laws’ (Carneiro 1970: 733).
11 In the following I use ‘Hawaiian’ to indicate the whole
group of islands while ‘Hawaii’ is used for that particular
island.
12 However, Kamakau writes the following: ‘The chiefs did
not rule alike on all the islands. It is said that on Oahu
and Kauai the chiefs did not oppress the common people
they did not tax them heavily and they gave the people
land where they could live at peace and in a settled 
fashion’ (Kamakau 1964: 231).
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Introduction: 
relating warfare, politics, and culture
This chapter explores the connections between cul-
ture, politics and warfare in Africa. Warfare, as the
organised use of massive violence by states, insurgent
groups or other collectivities for various political or
predatory aims, is still frequent in contemporary
Africa. Violence, defined as the human practice of
intentional and contested rendering of harm or lethal
force, aimed at intimidation or enforcing dominance,
is a universal in all societies at some point or other.
But some societies are alleged to be more prone to
it than others. State societies with the so-called
monopoly on the legitimate use of force do not nec-
essarily evince less inter-personal violence or war-
fare than stateless or ‘tribal’ societies known from
the anthropological record. Indeed, processes of state
formation show phases of intense violent action
aimed to establish hegemony by newly emerging
elites claiming the monopoly of the means of vio-
lence and the extraction of surplus and other
resources. While other chapters in this book evaluate
the more strictly anthropological, comparative or
archaeological aspects of warfare, in this chapter I
will discuss a certain geographical area – Sub-Saharan
Africa – from a broader political anthropology per-
spective. 
In popular discourse and media images, postcolo-
nial Africa often figures as a continent of ceaseless
internecine wars and ethno-regional conflict. Many
countries have or had either an internal armed con-
flict or a high level of communal violence. The terms
‘low intensity warfare’ (van Creveld 1991), ‘new
wars’ (Kaldor 1999) or ‘anarchy’ (Kaplan 1994) are
often seen as applying particularly to the African
situation, especially after the end of the Cold War.
Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Guinea, or the Saharan Republic are notori-
ous examples, in which hundreds of thousands of
people died in the past decade alone. It is, however,
difficult to consider the continent as showing uni-
tary political or historical traditions that would
explain the mayhem. Only factors like the low level
of socio-economic development, steady ecological
decline, inequalities and a great lack of legitimacy of
regimes and state elites are common across the
region. What seems sure is that indigenous African
traditions of political culture, community media-
tion and leadership accountability do not articulate
well with the state structures that were imposed in
the colonial period or with those that emerged in
the African post-colonies. In many accounts of state
decline and persistent every-day violence in Africa,
explanatory recourse is taken to what we might call
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the cultural argument: not only are political and eco-
nomic inequalities or elite misrule seen as responsible
but also ‘culture’, held to be the complex of values,
norms and inherited ‘traditional’ ways of doing
things. Culture is seen as involved in (re)producing
enmity, rivalry and violence, or as creating certain
preconditions to it (cp. Ferme 2001) In the recent
debate on differing historical paths of development
(cp. Landes 1998; Harrison and Huntington 2000) it
is also contended that cultural elements are often
decisive. 
Without disputing neither the dismal realities of
contemporary violence and warfare in Africa (see
Mkandawire 2002; Richards 1996; Braathen et al.
2000) nor their puzzling supernatural aspects (Ellis
1999), nor the force of cultural traditions (cp.
MacGaffey 2000; Ferme 2001), this chapter seeks to
critically assess the cultural argument on the basis of
a discussion of some African examples. In this con-
text, some reflection on culture in general as well as
on African political culture – with the necessary
caveats about its complexity and diversity – is neces-
sary, to estimate the role of states and political elites
in (re)shaping violent representations and practices.
One interesting point is that in debates on vio-
lence in Africa that started with the genre of resist-
ance studies in the 1950s (cp. van Walraven and
Abbink 2003), the explanatory arguments were not
so much cultural but political and economic in
nature, stressing the context of colonial oppression,
inequality in the global system of power, and the
emergence of justified resistance. In the early 21st
century, there is a moment of resigned despair about
ongoing violence and bloodshed without clear polit-
ical ideologies or aims. This makes analysts look for
cultural-historical factors, now coupled with a sense
of pessimism about the spread and impact of AIDS
on the continent (cp. de Waal 2003). It is remarkable
that comparatively little attention was paid to modes
of ‘traditional’ conflict resolution and why they
failed. These were part of African political culture (cp.
Zartman 1999), but were largely bypassed or neu-
tralised by colonial rule and postcolonial state power
in a discourse emphasising the ‘civilisational short-
comings’ of African societies. With examples of the
mutilation and torture policies of, e.g., RUF in Sierra
Leone and Renamo in Mozambique, the internal
wars in Sudan, Liberia and in Congo after Mobutu’s
demise, the dominant image is that the kind of wars
and practices of violence in Africa – while not
unknown in other parts of the world – are particu-
larly ‘uncivil’, evoking a deep sense of shame among
those involved and among more distanced observers
powerless to prevent them (cp. Keane 1996: 95).
Violence and African political culture
Violence can be analysed in a variety of forms, among
them ritual and political. African political culture
and power structures had a high degree of ritualised
violence (MacGaffey 2000), both expressive of inter-
nal tension and political rivalry as well as canalising
them. Indeed, as MacGaffey contends (ibid.), the rit-
ual enactment of violence frequently served to
avoid real bloodshed. A supernatural connection
was often evident in the exercise and control of vio-
lence itself, as in the institution of ‘divine kings’ or
of substitutive sacrifices (Simonse 1992; de Heusch
1985). Much of Africa’s violence and warfare is easi-
ly explained politically – related to indigenous state
formation, political rivalry, resource competition
and conquest. In this there is similarity with other
continents, not the least Europe (see Tilly 1985). Its
political cultures were, however, quite dissimilar. In
the early 20th century, African resistance against
colonialism and national oppression became impor-
tant. Initially, in the late 19th century, Africans
resisted the imposition of colonial rule in a frag-
mented, localised manner, contesting the defeat of
indigenous rulers and political units, the introduc-
tion of new labour regimes and production systems,
and the undermining of culture and religion. Later,
movements emerged that became ideologically
motivated rebellions, especially during and after the
Second World War. Contemporary movements are
less clear in their aims or programs (Mkandawire
2002). In the current age of new wars (Kaldor 1999)
the challenge is to find out what indeed are the
motivations and ideals for which people fight, and,
if any, how to explain them. It is easy to see that
there are manifold bases for resentment and protest,
but most contemporary insurgencies lose their orig-
inal aims in the ongoing practices of warfare and
violence. Instances are the SPLM in southern Sudan
(which has been quite oppressive of smaller ethnic
groups in the South), or even more, the Somali
armed factions, and the various rebel movements in
the DR Congo.1 There is a need to understand the
generalisation of violent practice into what has been
called ‘cultures of violence’ (cp. Abbink 1998: 273).
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Culture
If we speak about culture and its role both as a
‘source’ of violent expression as well as a resource or
framework for conflict resolution, two problems come
up. The first is: what is culture? Can it be defined in
a workable manner after the critiques of the 1980s,
is there a shared and transmitted framework of
thought, symbols and behaviour or a habitus that is
normative for a group of people, and if so, do all who
are reckoned to it subscribe to the culture’s assumed
or normative values? I here advance a concept of
culture that recognises cognitive and symbolic
coherence2 on the one hand, and fluidity and mal-
leability of collective identity references and ways of
life on the other, as the latter are embroiled in and
constituted by practice – patterns of enduring mate-
rial engagement with natural conditions, and of com-
modity production and division of labour. Culture is
a complex of (cosmological) ideas, value orienta-
tions and practices of a group that, while dynamic,
evinces some historical durability, sharedness, and
a thematic profile or ‘style’. Ideas of kinship and
relatedness, and beliefs about humans and the
supernatural, such as witchcraft and ‘hidden forces’,
often play a great role, especially in African cultural
traditions. Thus, an interactionist view, based on the
articulation of material and political processes on
the one hand, and of socio-cognitive internalisation
of lived differences on the other, is pleaded for.
The second issue is the evaluative dimension: are
cultures equivalent and to be respected as such? In
view of the great differences in the degrees of ethno-
centrism and enmity towards others,3 one is inclined
to say no, unfortunately not.4 The culture concept –
in the sense of referring to the shared, inherited tra-
ditions of a collective group – has had a chequered
history and is tied up with the history and identity
of ‘nations’, of which in Germany the counter-
Enlightenment thinker J.G. Herder was one of the
most prominent ideologues. Although Herder wrote
at a specific juncture of European history and aimed
at reinstating the role of the fragmented German-
speaking nation against the large, more unified
imperial structures of Britain and especially France
(with their emerging universalist-revolutionary
Enlightenment discourse), he recognised one impor-
tant thing: the problematic relationship between
existing cultural difference and national, or nowa-
days predominantly ethnic, identity, and the politi-
cal form this would take. His approach implied that
there is a latent (and often not so latent) ethnocen-
trism prevalent in virtually every cultural/national
group. This fact makes consensus politics based on
the recognition of shared aims and values very diffi-
cult. And even then we assume that some groups
already possess the cognitive or social value of recog-
nising that people have legitimate differences rooted
in their own history and in principle the right to
express them. But it is easy to see the quite varying
degrees in which value is attached to either violence
or mediation and accommodation across cultural
traditions. The idea of mediating conflict is itself a
cultural value not cherished by all.
This leads to another relevant issue in the debate:
in the appeal to ‘cultures’ as factors in warfare or as
resources in conflict resolution it is be recognised
that they are not homogeneous wholes easily com-
pared. We cannot be sure that all these so-called cul-
tures are warlike or, on the other hand, appreciate
debate, dialogue and exchange. What institutions
or social strata or organisations exist within those
nations or cultures that exhibit either warlike or
conciliatory discourse? What formations of power
and what ‘cultural requirements’ show a predisposi-
tion to warlike activities? It has, for example, been
claimed that the culturally crucial bridewealth system
of the Nuer pastoralists in the Sudan had an inbuilt
tendency for violent expansion (Kelly 1985). But the
culturally very similar Dinka did not have this pre-
disposition. 
The state in Africa
In Africa, levels of collective, political, violence
seem higher because of the problematic nature of
state formation and dismal economic development
in the wake of colonialism. In the light of quite dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds and systems of political
control within postcolonial state boundaries,
African politics are a challenge to general political
theory and philosophy. Major political thinkers like
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza and, in the
early 20th century, M. Weber and G. Sorel wrote
about violence and politics in Europe. How would
their ideas and theories relate to African realities, to
‘culture’ and to models of the person and of the
political in Africa? In the decentralised and largely
non-literate societies of pre-colonial Africa a dis-
course on politics and political man similar to that
in Europe did not emerge.5 But there were complex
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local ideologies or cosmologies of power, usually
related to religious notions (as in the Aksumite
empire, the Ashanti kingdom, imperial Christian
Ethiopia, or the Islamic empires and emirates in var-
ious parts of Africa), and the relation between reli-
gious norms and political authority was often tense
in Africa as well.
In the colonial period, European powers forged
authoritarian states in Africa with often racist over-
tones that were imposed on dispersed and small-scale
polities. The new borders forcibly brought together
groups that were often strangers and that had not
been based primarily on a territorial concept but on
personal-political loyalties and cultural affinity. The
colonial state thus sat uneasily on a wide variety of
socio-cultural and political traditions. The new elites
fostered by the colonial authorities were partly arti-
ficial, with little grass-roots support, and their stay-
ing on in postcolonial times was predicated on net-
works of patron-client relations and on a balancing
act between ethnic and regional interests. Patterns
of mimetic rivalry between elites or aspiring elites
from various ethnic or regional origins contributed
to violent responses. Postcolonial states were not
successful in promoting socio-economic develop-
ment, internal peace or legitimacy. According to
Chabal and Daloz (1999) many now seem to thrive
on disorder, made into an instrument of power.
Diversity 
To appreciate the role of cultural factors in conflict,
warfare and conflict prevention, the idea of deep-
seated diversity must be recognised. Cultural diver-
sity in Africa is reproduced in everyday contexts and
does not go away, not even in the march of globali-
sation. It is constructed in representations, notions
of relatedness (e.g., kinship), socialisation patterns
and behavioural routines, and has an embodied char-
acter. The expectation that people in developing
areas will give up their own life ways and cultural
representations in the pursuit of ‘development’,
wealth, etc. is of course incorrect. For example, while
many people in the ex-colonial, developing world
are drawn to modernity, they have little interest in
what they often see as the empty culture of
Westerners, without religion, without ethical codes,
without clear family norms of mutual assistance,
reciprocity, etc.6 This implies that when debating
conflict solutions and restoration of ‘normality’, an
initial position of respect should be taken towards
existing diversity – although this is not to say that
all cultures are equal or equivalent. I do not plead
for cultural relativism, which I find logically unten-
able and morally unsound.7 But as people with such
divergent backgrounds, representations and politi-
cal aims clash in zones of conflict, the search for
shared moral criteria and autonomy requires taking
these divergences seriously and exploring their scope
and relevance. It is not only a question of uncovering
the ‘material interests’ and ‘resources’ over which
people are held to fight. Even if these are at stake,
the ‘language of violence’ is clothed in cultural, often
ethnic, terms.8 Indeed, it is hard to see how cultural
factors cannot be involved.
When looking for features of African cultures that
might shape responses to conflict, resistance and
warfare, the following elements emerge:
a) In most African societies, the cultural commit-
ments of people are not to large, overarching
structures, but with clan- and kin-groups, territo-
rial groups, or occupational groups: a more col-
lective not an individual frame of reference. 
b) Age grading and authority based on seniority or
(status) hierarchy had political relevance. Senior
elders had ritual and other obligations to other
sections of the population, however.
c) Legitimate authority was buttressed by ritual-reli-
gious mediation figures, e.g. local priests, earth-
shrine holders, sacrificers, diviners, or divine
chiefs/kings.
d) Social life was pervaded by notions of reciprocity,
with expected rights and duties, and compensa-
tion for tort.
e) Political culture was primarily shaped by lines of
personal loyalty, not of territorially-based author-
ity.
f) Personal status and social adulthood was often
shaped by non-civic, non-political mechanisms
like initiation and ritual transitions, which created
primary social identities for people.
It should be noted that although conflict and war-
fare were frequent in Africa, especially in dramatic
phases of state building and expansion through con-
quest, there was also a cultural stratum of organised
ritual and corporate group relations that allowed
mediation and peacemaking and in fact permitted
groups to live in relative peace in non-state condi-
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tions. For instance, pastoral societies like Turkana,
Dinka, Samburu, Maasai or Boran were largely suc-
cessful in ‘acephalous’ self-regulation. 
Recognising the above characteristics, it can be
concluded that Western political theory, which
emerged from the political philosophers cited above,
and was based on ideas of individual rights and
duties before king or state, does not find automatic
application in African societies. Even if they con-
tained ideals of freedom, personal dignity, equality
before the law or the ruler, and justice and equity
based on reciprocity, they structured them in different
ways, not easily translatable into a formal ‘political
system’ as we know it.
The role of culture in conflict: causal lines?
A recent theoretical approach in conflict studies had
tried to shed new light on the role of culture. Authors
like S. Huntington, L. Harrison and D. Landes, polit-
ical scientists and historians,9 have come to correlate
certain cultures or ‘civilisations’ with values and
behaviour that make them relatively more prone to
certain social and other processes than others (e.g.,
economic and social development, material progress,
institutional improvement, or on the other hand
stagnation, conflict, levelling, the recourse to vio-
lence in political life). Basically they stand in the
tradition of Max Weber with his classic work on the
Protestant ethic, and rehearse, in a more sophisticated
form, ideas derived from the modernisation theories
of the 1950s.
Indeed, culture has a role to play: people act on
ideas and representations, not on unmediated mate-
rial interests. Perceptions of relative deprivation,
ideals of a better future, equality, group solidarity,
religious purity or unity, etc. drive collective move-
ments. What the above school of thought has
achieved is the reopening of an important debate,
and a renewed attention to the interaction of cul-
tural representations and material progress. They
have underlined that there are affinities that matter.
This position has also indicated the limits of histor-
ical-institutional approaches to conflict, violence,
lack of development, etc. But the question remains:
can ‘cultural factors’ in themselves be explanatory in
accounting for these problems? Such a reductionist
view would deny that cultural traditions are prone
to change and suggest cultural change is to be
explained by culture. 
However, a properly historical view of culture
recognises that people are situated actors, drawing
upon historically inherited bodies of meaning and
ranges of choice. The analysis of how cultural ele-
ments shape conflict, warfare and mediation
remains a running task for social science because a
huge amount of factual, empirical developments in
local societies is simply not known or is glossed over.
Neither are the cultural dialectics of interpersonal
relations and the generative mechanisms producing
humiliation and resentment (cp. Miller 1993; Bailey
1991) sufficiently taken into account. But, while
cultural values play a great role, it seems to be a state-
ment of faith to say that they have autonomous
causal force.
‘Cultures of violence’ 
as an outcome of warfare 
The term ‘cultures of violence’ is regularly used in
recent studies on war and conflict. When not clearly
defined and made testable in a comparative per-
spective, it is a very problematic concept. If cultures
of violence10 do exist, one can imagine the difficulties
of ever reaching workable peace and reconciliation
deals. My opinion is that first of all the term is a
metaphor with limitations. But ‘cultures of violence’
– as social formations where power is based on
unmediated violent performance, and where public
discourse is shaped by symbols and acts of violence
and intimidation – can exist, usually for short peri-
ods. They may appear as a semi-institutionalised,
objectified domain of generalised violent action.
They could emerge in times of dramatic transitions
– systemic political change, a power vacuum, eco-
nomic upheaval, and decline of a traditional social
order, often resulting in youth revolt and in the
establishing of a regime based on policing and power
enforcement. Many revolutions, regime changes
and violent collective movements can be correlated
with processes of social exclusion and blocked mobil-
ity that hit younger generations, who then search
for alternatives: either migration, crime or armed
revolt. The latter can go wrong and drag on for much
longer than expected – fighting and resource extrac-
tion become a ‘way of life’ with an economic logic,
and this is why an entire society can be drawn into
a state of disruption and violence as a result.
Somalia (moriyaan or war lord gangs), Sierra Leone
(RUF) and ex-Zaire (various militias and rebel groups
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after the disappearance of Mobutu in 1997) are
telling examples. A culture of violence in the more
ethnographic sense, as a habitus of violence, where
acts of intimidation, killing and impunity become
sources of prestige-building and achievement among
peers, is also frequent. Examples are the drug trader-
dominated sub-cultures in the slums of Brazilian
cities, the rule of the Lord’s Resistance Army in
northern Uganda, and the highly militarised pas-
toral groups like the Karimojong, where a man with-
out a Kalashnikov and a public status of killer is no
longer respected (Mirzeler and Young 2000).
It is likely that in the coming decades, despite all
efforts to the contrary, violent conflicts in Africa,
either political or more diffusely social or criminal,
will become more general. Conditions of external
dominance, continued economic exploitation, polit-
ical inequality and incompetence, decline of the
monopolies of the state, and un-reflected globalisa-
tion processes contribute to this and will have max-
imum impact on fragmented local societies, that
have lost their moral fibre due to the decline of age
graded authority structures, economic survival
problems, the growing subjection of women, and a
decline of traditional religious-ritual mediation
practices.
The example of southern Ethiopia
Ethiopia is one of the oldest states in Africa, dating
its precursors to the 4th century BC. The Christian
mediaeval Ethiopian highland state of Aksum that
emerged in the first century AD expanded gradual-
ly in rivalry with traditionalist societies and later
with small Islamic emirates on the Red Sea coast.
Ethiopian history was thus marked by almost con-
tinuous warfare and violence. This tradition of war-
fare and identity forged in war allowed it to resist
European colonialism in 1896, when an Italian colo-
nial invasion army was beaten at Adua. Internally,
Ethiopia was a strongly hierarchical country and
never attained any solid unity in the face of its
culturally and religiously heterogeneous character.
The imperial era ended in 1975 with the deposition
and secret killing of Emperor Haile Sellassie. A
socialist-Marxist dictatorship reigned until 1991
and installed a regime of fear and intimidation (cp.
Abbink 1995), testing the country’s civilisational
basis and very survival. Tens of thousands of young
people were killed in the ‘Red Terror’ period and
several hundred thousand in civil wars in the north
and east. On the state level, one could speak of a
culture of violence being instituted. A new political
system was established after a military victory in
1991 of an ethno-regional guerrilla movement from
a minority region (Tigray). It instituted a system of
ethnic self-government, creating ethno-regions and
de-emphasising national identity. This ideologically
novel approach led to a decentralisation and ‘local-
isation’ of conflicts, this time all in ‘ethnic’ terms, but
did not offer institutional means and mechanisms
for solving them (cp. also Dereje 2001; Tronvoll
2001). A combination of factors inherent in the eth-
nicised political system and wider, global, develop-
ments seemed to lead to the continued presence of
the sub-text of violence in the political system and
discourse of Ethiopia, to which thousands have
fallen victim. 
As an illustration of the connection of warfare,
culture and politics, I focus briefly on a case-study of
some developments in a multi-ethnic setting in
southern Ethiopia (Abbink 1998; 2000). It is similar
to a few dozen other cases occurring in Ethiopia and
elsewhere in Africa. On such a local scale, universal
processes of group differentiation, the role of culture
in violent conflict, the laboriousness of conciliation,
and the mechanisms of social reproduction of con-
flict can be recognised quite clearly. It is in these
local contexts that everyday perceptions of conflict
and the options or seductions of violence and war
are reproduced.
Southwestern Ethiopia is marked by heterogene-
ity. Small-scale ethnic group or ‘tribal’ warfare was
frequent, mostly between groups occupying different
niches in a wider politico-ecological system of rela-
tions. Highland farming groups opposed lowland
pastoralists, with smaller groups of hunter-gatherers
in between and choosing sides according to their
best survival chances at the moment. Southwest
Ethiopia and the adjacent areas of Kenya and Sudan
have in past two decades have seen a notable trans-
formation if not acceleration of violence and warfare
between ‘ethnic’ communities,11 both among each
other and between some of them and the Ethiopian
state. The region is home to a dozen agro-pastoralist
groups (e.g., Suri, Baale, Mursi, Kara, Dassanetch,
Nyangatom, Toposa, Hamar, Bashada, Bodi) and a
smaller number of farming peoples (Bench, Tishana-
Me’en, Dizi, Aari, Dime) and hunter-gatherers
(Kwegu, Band, Menja), each with different languages
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and cultural backgrounds. The area has in fact seen
regular patterns of non-state warfare over a period of
more than a hundred years (cp. Fukui and Turton
1979; Alvarsson 1989). While the nature of violent
confrontation is changing, the violence and warlike
battles in this region have shown no sign of relenting
in the past decades, despite (or due to?) an encroach-
ing central state.
A linkage that I studied in particular was that of
the Dizi sedentary peasants and the Suri agro-pas-
toralists (and to a lesser extent with the people in
the small, mixed towns) in the Maji area (Abbink
1998; 2000). Conditions of recurring ecological cri-
sis, population movement and growth, the rapid
spread of modern semi-automatic weapons since
the late 1980s, and certain state policies form the
backdrop for recent developments in this area: a near
permanent state of armed incidents, cattle raids, and
killings. These conditions articulate with cultural
factors that generate both diversity as well as cross-
cutting mechanisms for mediation and co-opera-
tion. As said above, the current violence relates to
older forms of so-called ‘tribal’ warfare (there was no
golden era of tribal peace in this area) but is essen-
tially changed by recent political developments in
Ethiopia, such as new resource competition over
land, cattle and alluvial gold, and the ethnicisation
of politics and local administration under the guise
of a new federal policy of ‘ethnic self-determination’.
From Sudan there is the ongoing impact of the dev-
astating civil war between the Islamist government
and the insurgent movement SPLA fighting for an
autonomous Southern Sudan just across the border.
Violent conflict between Suri and Dizi is marked
by two aspects: intensification (more frequent
recourse to violent acts, more cruelty and more dead
and wounded per encounter), and its cyclical nature.
A truce is rarely achieved, and if one is made it is soon
broken. This seems to reveal a crisis in customary
mediation practices between the groups. There is
a view among the local people that ‘...it never used
to be so bad like this in the past’. They feel their soci-
ety to be in disarray. This is not a predictable view
that one might expect elders in general to give,
because oral traditions and life histories seem to
indicate that the past was indeed of a different order.
Historically, the construction and discourse of dif-
ference between the ethno-cultural groups, through
the maintenance of ritual codes and recognised sym-
biosis, served to manage and ‘restrain violence’ and
create predictability. The current transformation of
a state of organised group conflict, that was inter-
spersed with ritualised mediation establishing peace
between collective groups, into a pattern of gener-
alised, ‘low intensity’ warfare practised by members
of these groups in a dispersed and unsanctioned
manner is fuelled by material factors of resource
pressure and demographic growth, by changes in
arms technology, and by the new discourse of ‘ethnic
claims’ made in the Ethiopian political arena. The
process visible here is also well-known among the
Nuer (Hutchinson 2001) and the Karimojong
(Mirzeler and Young 2000), for example, and reveals
that the balance of power between groups – and even
their very construction as ‘ethnic groups’ – is caught
in widening flows of goods, new power configura-
tions and ideologies that reshape ideas of politics,
group interest, cultural belonging and identity, as
well as the value of ‘mediation’.
Among the Suri and Dizi (as with neighbouring
groups), this recent escalation of violence is thus
related to a devaluation of organised ‘traditional’
conflict resolution, formerly defining or constraining
the relations between them. Discursive mediation
was provided by the ritual code, as when represen-
tatives of the contending parties came together to
perform a ceremony of reconciliation, with a joint
sacrificial livestock killing and ritual use of the ani-
mal parts. The new state authorities, while claiming
a monopoly over the regulation of violence, did not
substitute their own ways of mediation or conflict
resolution. They bypassed local leaders, devalued
mediation meetings, and imposed state ‘solutions’
based on police and army force (cp. Abbink 2000).
In a significant move, the state authorities even for-
bade ceremonial stick fighting among the Suri as
being ‘too violent’. 
At present, the ethnic groups convert their systems
of ritual mediation and conciliation into practices of
short-term violent ‘settling’ of disputes. This is large-
ly based on the perception of what group at that
particular moment is strongest in terms of fire-power,
economic position, or in its relations to the state.
The essential point seems to be that the construc-
tion of power between groups is shifting, and that
inter-cultural values of mediation are ‘put on hold’.
It can be easily recognised that the use of semi-auto-
matic rifles as a tool in violent confrontations (since
the mid-1980s) has played a specific role, enabling
warfare on a ‘higher’ level, with more dead and
W A R F A R E  I N  A F R I C A . 267
wounded than under the previous technological
regime of spears, clubs, knives, and old three-shot
reloading rifles.12 New weapons have a far-reaching
social effect, finding new ‘targets’, creating a rupture
in self-perception and social experience among local
people, and lead to a reconfiguration of gender rela-
tions. The gun also becomes the object of a ‘cult’ of
violent performance.
This process is accompanied by an attempt at
boundary construction: cultural or ‘ethnic’ difference
is asserted, either on the basis of material or imag-
ined concerns, and is being brought in as a conflict-
generating element. Suri and Dizi hardly inter-marry
any more, and trade has gone down. In its turn, the
‘boundary’ becomes an ideological, ‘primordial’
reason to fight out differences instead of discursive-
ly mediating them. In this respect, the conflict
between the groups in the Maji area – an area not
notably transformed by forces of economic or cul-
tural ‘globalisation’ – is no different from ‘ethnic’
group conflicts in post-modern industrial or mod-
ernising societies in, for instance, Eastern Europe or
ex-Yugoslavia. One also sees that boundaries are cre-
ated not on the basis of pre-existing, fixed ethnic or
tribal groups but the other way around: collectivities
based on presumed ethnic markers are defined due
to conflict over material issues. The conversion of
the ritual codes and social patterns of co-operation
into violence has predictable regularities based on
political ecology (state versus local society, emerging
perceptions of resource competition, and new
weapons technology) and its ideational reflection,
or better, its cultural appropriation, in the various
local societies. ‘Culture’ or cultural difference in this
sense is not a self-propelling cause of conflict.
The present-day violence in southern Ethiopia,
however, seems to defy initiatives to revive recon-
ciliation (cp. Abbink 2000). The reason is that the
actual performance of violence has significantly
transgressed the accepted cultural or ritual bounds
(e.g. killing women and children in the fields or on
the road, killing elders not involved in any fighting,
shooting captured cattle from a distance). Usually,
instead of reconciliation revenge is sought, seem-
ingly based on the idea, also according to Suri elders
who reject the violence of the younger age grade,
that ‘the gun solves problems’ and ‘saves time’.
Mediation is rejected when retribution is so easy.
With men possessing at least one automatic rifle per
person and it having become a necessary symbol of
‘manhood’ and even of social identity of the junior
age grade members, a Suri ethos of violent self-asser-
tion was reinforced, at the expense of notions of bal-
ance and conciliation. This might be identified as
the beginning of a ‘culture of violence’, and it can
be recognised in many emergent violent conflicts. A
barrier to dialogue and ritually negotiating difference
has been created. We could extrapolate the crucial
elements of this case to other social settings, even in
large-scale societies. Cultural mediation is extremely
vulnerable in the face of dramatic shifts of power.
Conclusions
African state regimes, modelled on a political
modernity that does not fit the ethnic and cultural
realities of African societies, pursue a totalitarian,
imposing logic of governmentality that undermines
or manipulates cultural bases of belonging, and
enhances antagonistic responses to its exercise of
power – even in the federal forms as in Ethiopia.
‘Seeing like a state’, in James Scott’s felicitous phrase
(1998), does not only refer to the ill-guided social
engineering attempts like villagisation, huge infra-
structure projects, or collectivisation of agriculture,
but extends to schemes of guided decentralisation
and local rule, ideological and cultural policies, and
ethnic divide-and-rule. In these domains, there is an
ill-understood, or just plainly neglected, vernacular
of cultural understandings of what also constitutes
authority, value, and legitimacy that eludes state
politicians and planners, and subverts their schemes
(cp. Donham 1999).
‘Cultures of violence’, as societies that come to
evince a pattern of institutionalised violence defining
the political and civic order, are still rare and usually
temporary. In Africa, classic examples are the terror
rule of the 19th century Zulu king Shaka (Walter
1969) or, in modern times, Renamo rule in its terri-
tories (Seibert 2003): in both political regimes state
practices of intimidation caused fear and terror to
trickle down to the level of the common people,
making violent practice contagious and general.
Nevertheless, developments in conflict and warfare
in the current globalising world suggest that the
emergence of cultures of violence will become more
widespread. Contributory factors here are the degen-
eration of armed insurgencies into movements of
forced extraction of resources and the exploitation
of the common people, and a world-wide spread of
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organised crime (and private business deals shading
into crime, e.g., the arms trade). Criminal activity
tends to become socially rooted and thus gives rise
to new forms of political authority and exploitation,
blurring the boundaries between a legitimate consti-
tutional state and informal formations of power
(incidentally, Europe is not excluded from such
processes). 
In Africa one notes not only the decline of the
state as an accepted mechanism of social redistribu-
tion and furthering of the common good, but also
the recent emergence of violent youth movements
showing a mixture of street politics, crime-fighting,
cultural revivalism and illegal activities of their own.
Salient examples are the Mungiki in Kenya, the Bakassi
Boys and the Odua People’s Congress in Nigeria (see
Wamue 2001; Harnischfeger 2003; Akinyele 2001).
These movements have ideas and programs of reform,
social recovery or ‘cleansing’, but also tend to insti-
tute a culture of self-righteous violence and urban
warfare that makes itself the local norm. While the
state, as an idea and an effective institution, is reclin-
ing or crumbling in much of Africa, the current
phase of social transition shows new political and
cultural forms of organisation that redefine collec-
tivities. In the interstitial spaces of failing states and
emerging informal global networks, new human
collectivities claim agency on the basis of ethnic,
cultural and religious elements, which are combined
to forge new units and frameworks of power.
Through their informality, hybridity and their con-
nections to hidden and often mystical dimensions
of meaning, these groups are transforming politics,
culture and the exercise of violence in Africa. States
in Africa only rarely provide a joint discursive space,
and people are ‘retrieved’ by non-state identities or
loyalties emanating from local cultural assumptions. 
In reframing the role of state and culture in analy-
ses of African warfare a few general conclusions
come up. First it seems obvious that a denial of the
relevance of cultural notions and images in present-
day struggles is unwarranted. Culture, seen as an
unbounded but more or less coherent reservoir and
repertoire of inherited meanings internalised by a
group of people, shapes their habitus and behavioural
patterns in situations of conflict and war. As bound-
aries emerge in conflict situations, people draw
together on presumed ‘identity markers’. These are
of a cultural nature. Apart from that, practices of vio-
lence and warfare – their ‘style’ – go back to patterns
of the pre-state past. This does not logically entail
that some ‘cultures’ follow a war logic or are by def-
inition ‘more violent’ than others. This depends on
social and political conditions, not least the impact
of emerging states and political regimes that establish
themselves with force over communities based on
kinship or traditional forms of authority. The mod-
ern state in Africa, barely a hundred years old, has
decisively reshaped conflict and warfare. This usually
led to increasing antagonisms and evoked contesta-
tion and revolt. The postcolonial state of the last
forty years has shown itself to be a predictable mech-
anism of elite resource extraction and ethno-regional
patronage, subverting the indigenous notions of
equity and reciprocity. In the political life of the post-
colony, ethno-cultural differences were made the
bone of contention rather than the bridge for
accommodation.
Hence, while a cultural dimension in warfare and
conflict is ever-present and is often underestimated,
a theory of culture and agency is needed that reflects
the dialectic of cultural tradition and political agency
in wider structural conditions. Popular and political
science approaches that seek a direct explanatory link
are therefore unsatisfactory. The cultural argument
to explain warfare is weak. A theoretical approach that
reflects the constitution and workings of cultural ele-
ments in shaping the ‘commitments’ of people in
social and political interaction is useful in the analysis
of local constructions and constitutions of politics,
conflict and warfare, but only if these processes are
set in a broader dynamics of environmental and polit-
ical forces. ‘Cultural’ factors change and respond to
these, but do not determine their outcome.
N O T E S
1 While editing this paper in mid-2003, messages about
‘tribal massacres’ in north-western Congo kept coming
out, e.g., one in April whereby about 200 to 300 people
were killed , and one in October, when 65 people were
massacred, including 45 children (see http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/africa/3169860.stm). See also the BBC report on
Congo by F. Keane, ‘Africa’s forgotten and ignored war’,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_
own_correspondent/3201770.stm.
2 To say ‘unity’ would be too strong.
3 See for instance, Schlee 1999.
4 See also the debates in UNESCO’s World Culture Report
2000 (Paris, 2001), and Edgerton 2000.
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5 But since the late 19th century, African traditions of
political thought have emerged, cp. Boele van Hensbroek
1999; Kiros 2001.
6 A similar attitude is often seen towards rich Asians and
Arab-Islamic people. Their arrogance is resented.
7 Cp. Spiro 1986 and 1996.
8 See Braathen et al. 2000.
9 Cp. Huntington 1997; Harrison and Huntington 2000;
Landes 1998.
10 I discussed this earlier in J. Abbink 1993.
11 Here distinguished on the basis of differences in language,
different histories of origins, and separate political iden-
tities, despite partly overlapping ecological niches and
even cultural traits.
12 When I arrived for the first time among the Suri in
southern Ethiopia in 1988, I still saw many men armed
with spears. A decade later, no more spears were to be
found, not even after an intensive search: they were 
discarded or reforged into agricultural tools. In their
stead, however, automatic rifles have now become part
of the personal equipment of any adult man.
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Warfare, Rituals, and Mass Graves /19-24

This section comprises three articles presenting archaeological and osteological
material plus a broader article on the treatment of prisoners of war or what are
presumed to be such persons. They may not be POWs in the proper sense of the
word – i.e., male fighters – but rather hostages or persons captured in connec-
tion with other conflicts (ancient POWs; cp. Gelb 1973).
The notion that the physical act of violence leaves traces such as traumata
which may still be recognised centuries after the lethal event is relevant to all
of these persons. This in itself is not as simple as it may sound given that there
are many ways of maltreating and killing people and animals without leaving
traces on the skeletal parts of the corpse. Recent atrocities may be listed that
involved inflicting maximal harm on the soft parts of the body, and the well-
preserved bog bodies of the north European Bronze and Early Iron Age were nor-
mally strangled rather than killed by having their throat cut. Other gory details
may be found in Miranda Green’s article. Even well-preserved bones do not lend
themselves immediately to the study of pre-mortal lesions. The pathologist has
to know what to look for and be able to distinguish between the kind of violent
treatment that interests us here and other marks such as from the dissection of
a corpse in connection with culturally required complex burial rites – for
instance, in the Neolithic – or from conditions preventing a timely and normal
burial in sacred ground such as with Norse Christians under Arctic conditions
(Jørgensen 2001), among whom high-ranking persons were even salted or
boiled before being transported to their final resting place. Elsewhere similar
cases may have existed in contexts which we do not understand (Hansen 1995:
125ff, 162ff, 254ff). 
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Warfare, Rituals, and Mass Graves: 
An Introduction
H E N R I K  T H R A N E /19
The use of analogies
The articles illustrate the very important archaeological issue of the extent to
which we are permitted to transfer analogies from other fields of individual and
social behaviour to our prehistoric past, where nearly everything is different
except perhaps the tool kits – stone or iron?
In Miranda Green’s article the transfer is as direct as possible within a roughly
contemporary Europe, but there are nonetheless source-critical, methodological
problems which are not easily transcended. The most spectacular archaeological
evidence represents actrocities frequently not covered by the Romans, presumably
because they were not allowed anywhere near sites like Gournay, and informing
the occupying force may have been worse than letting your war leader down.
One may also ask whether the protohistoric cases are close enough to purely
prehistoric ones as regards the simple matter of scale to be genuinely applicable.
Green treats the situation in Early Rome and its Barbarian European semi-
circle to the north and west as perceived and described by the Romans. Her article
may be read in conjunction with Steuer’s to compare this aspect to the general
trend in warfare during those Iron Age centuries. She compares these descrip-
tions with the archaeological evidence that has recently significantly increased
and improved in respect to our objectives here. While practically all the indi-
vidual pieces of evidence certainly speak of violence and humiliation, without
contemporary written evidence the war context could be hard to establish for
all cases. In this respect the Celtic (Gaulic) sites of Gournay and Ribemont with
their masses of destroyed iron weapons and male bones provide evidence of
large-scale conflicts which deserve to be called wars, similar to the later weapon
deposits in Danish bogs.
Degrading your opponents
The phenomenon of humiliation is much overlooked but is surely elementary
to all societies. It may be assumed in the cases mentioned even if human bones
are absent from the Scandinavian weapon sacrifices. Humiliation includes arch-
typical elements that may be assumed to be universal and others that are cul-
turally specific and therefore not easy to infer by analogy to historical or ethno-
graphical cases.
Revenge
Treating the sexes differently seems to be a universal phenomenon – for exam-
ple, the selling of women and children and the killing of males. We interpret the
past in our own image. If we are normal citizens in a civilised country we tend
to assume that people of the past behaved rationally and decently too in spite
of all the evidence to the contrary. Placing the enemy under the victor’s foot
must at all times have been a very degrading and insulting act, as proven by its
continuous use in royal iconology – from Narmer’s palette to Achaemenid Persia
and Imperial Rome (e.g., Porada 1965). It is easy to forget that going berserk is
ancient Norse behaviour and that other drug-induced behaviour no doubt guid-
ed people in many situations – without making them shamans.
War is a collective effort involving psychological excitement in order to
overcome the individual’s fear and exhaustion. In situations of stress, normal
behaviour, no matter how rational it may have been, tends to be forgotten or
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disregarded (Camus 1947). Even in our own era, gentle, decent men may return
from the hell of the trenches (Graves 1929) to a VC earned in a moment of
extreme duress – the apogee of a fine warrior (Dinesen 1929). This must have been
all the more manifest in an ancient society where culture was saturated by the
warrior’s ethos – as the Latin writers imply and describe for their contemporary
Barbarian neighbours and they themselves were, too.
Hallucinogens are not easy to discern, but I think we have to count on their
presence when looking at behaviour that seems unnecessarily gruesome. They
may explain something. No doubt stress (read warfare) aided in the transgression
of thresholds of behaviour, and the common excitement carried the violence
much further, as numerous ethnographic cases inform us. This is the sort of
behaviour that we may transfer to the other silent cultures without too many
reservations. Human resilience and the human will to survive is amazing and
nearly infinite, with cultural limitations (van der Post 1970; Levi 1957).
Forensic analysis of traumata
Poor 5000 year-old Ötzi, apparently no longer a humble shepherd but a man of
status, has now, after the initial clumsy and degrading de-icing, received the full
attention of a battery of forensic specialists (Discovery, 7 Dec. 2003). He appar-
ently fought several opponents at close range during his last forty-eight hours.
The fatal flint arrow in his back was fired from c. 30 m by a person from Ötzi’s
home valley on the south side of the Alps who followed (or stalked) him all the
way up the very difficult slope where he expired. That is the present story, but
even the exemplary preservation and application of the most modern forensic
methods do not allow more than a tentative reconstruction. We shall never
know what lay behind the slaying – a feud, a quarrel over status, a local war? 
His traumata were ignored for years because the otherwise scrupulous scien-
tists thought that the damages to skin and so forth were caused by the brutal
way in which the frozen corpse was recovered. We have here another classic case
of how difficult it is even for scientists to realise what they see; they only examine
what they imagine should be there to examine – so much for objectivity.
The pathologists who present their respective analyses of the much less well-
preserved Bronze Age and Medieval evidence of mass killings from Scandinavia
take pains to inform us of the methodological problems involved in dealing
with ancient skeletal material. This is a necessary reminder that when using the
results of other disciplines we should consider them on their terms rather than
ours. Both cases also illustrate that the archaeological context is not always as
simple as non-archaeologists would like it to be – and as we ourselves would
hope. The excavators of the Sund skeletons were far from clear about what they
had actually found (Farbregd et al. 1974), an uncertainty which cannot but be
projected onto the interpretation of the bones and their relevance for wider
speculations. The Sandbjerg mass grave had to be emptied so fast that elemen-
tary details are not available and some observations on the bones which might
have been made in situ could not be made. On the other hand, Pia Bennike had
the opportunity to handle the exhumation, which no doubt has improved the
quality of the find greatly in this respect.
Both cases show how old and new excavations are needed to construct a
fuller picture of the individual case. The difference in method and the loss of
information are rather severe sometimes – such as at Tormarton, Sandbjerg and,
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indeed, Sund. The Tormarton case is presented by the (re-)excavator, who has a
different approach to the two speared men and their mates in the ditch. The
context is territorial through its association with the ditch and as a still not
crystal clear, element of the demarcation. The slain men are regarded as the
defenders destroyed and thrown in their own ditch. It is a good story, but not a
closed case – archaeological cases rarely are. The twenty-five plus Sund skeletons
are notable among the cases presented here in representing a section of a (com-
plete?) local population. This is very different from the all-male populations of
the Sandbjerg pit and the Tormarton ditch. The ages represented at Sund range
from infant to mature adult, and both sexes are among them – eight children,
ten women and eight men (Torgersen 1974); without a doubt, this is one of the
few Bronze Age skeleton samples from Scandinavia where children are reason-
ably represented, whereas in the burials they are heavily under-represented. The
Sund population is in fact the largest from a single site in Scandinavia. The small
number of contemporary skeletons from southern Scandinavia where the full
Bronze Age culture flourished contrasts with the situation at Sund. This may
sound odd considering the wonderful preservation conditions of the Middle
Bronze Age oak coffins with their clothes and wooden artefacts (Jensen 1998);
however, that preservation only too rarely coincides with a corresponding
preservation of the deceased, apart from their hair. The few skeletons that have
been somehow preserved have been neglected too often, as the bones from
Sund certainly were for years. The discrepancies in post-burial preservation and
post-excavation conditions manifest themselves here, as it so often happens.
Therefore, the Sund material unfortunately stands rather alone. It is no wonder
that the excavators were not quite at ease with the interpretation (Farbregd et al.
1974). We have to look toward Central Europe at a much earlier stage for decent
populations which repay intensive studies of health and so on which are known
from extensive cemetery material from Early Bronze Age Austria and neigh-
bouring regions (e.g. Neugebauer 1991; Hårde chapter 24).
Context of violence
The main problem here, as in any purely archaeological source, is what the
social context of this violence was. The Sandbjerg case is no different in the
absence of relevant historical sources. Sund reminds us of other, very rare mass
graves from Talheim and Wassenaar (cp. Thorpe chapter 10, and consider the
time span), and we take these at face value as representing an entire local com-
munity that had received a treatment similar to that measured out to the vil-
lagers of Fiji when a village was stormed (Bossen chapter 17). Only at Sund there
were no villages, but rather dispersed single farms. Is this an unfortunate farm-
stead’s inhabitants who were killed? Why? Was this just a raid that took a group
of them by surprise so the raiders could abduct the livestock and crops? Did
any escape?
These collective murders are a rather recently observed phenomenon and
present a range of theoretical issues which deserve closer scrutiny. We will do
well to realise that mass graves are a phenomenon with many facets deserving
individual consideration and definitions. Collective tombs are a well-known
phenomenon at different times and places, some representing simultaneous
interment in one and the same tomb or grave pit and others not serving as mass
graves in the proper sense of the term but rather as collective recipients for
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successively buried corpses placed in tombs or pits which were accessible for
reuse (cp. Thrane 1978). Neither of these groups necessarily have anything to do
with violent conflicts. The first group could rather be the result of epidemic dis-
eases, while the second group may have no more than a cultural explanation.
The immediate interment of a group of people in a common burial pit, well
ordered or haphazard, may have different explanations depending upon the
nature of the occasion and the care of the group that buried the corpses. Without
traumata we cannot assume that such burials reflect war or violence.
Even when written sources inform of mass graves, archaeological evidence is
sometimes not available, as in Anglo-Saxon England (Härke 1978: 91).
Massed skeletons, associated with clear destruction levels, are known from
Near Eastern cities and forts like Tepe Gawra, Hasanlu or similar sites (Tobler
1950: 25f; Muscarella 1989), from Roman Europe – for instance, the famous
clades variana, the battlefield in the Teutoburg Forest (von Carnap-Bornheim
1999) or Gelduba/Krefeld Gellep (Pirling 1996), and of course elsewhere; these
are just random samples. Here the corpses were left as they fell in the last bat-
tle, so they are not graves, properly speaking. At Wassenaar they were neatly
arranged in anatomical order according to sex and age – a regular burial which
we must attribute to the survivors or neighbours who felt obliged to follow the
rites of passage (Kooijmans 1996). The accumulated multiple (collective) graves
of the late Aunjetitz culture are different in such aspects as their accumulation
over a certain amount of time and the strange distribution of bones of individ-
uals in different levels (cp. Hårde chapter 24: Kettlasbrunn in eastern Lower
Austria and Nizˇna Mysˇl’a in eastern Slovakia). Similar situations suddenly appear
later (cp. Rittershofer 1997). Buried outside the regular cemeteries these mass
graves must illustrate a different social context. Whether the individuals were
natives or outsiders from other communities is an open question. Treating one’s
own people this way would only seem meaningful if their status justified this
humiliating treatment. The locality of Sund could be consistent with a collective,
rather disrespectful interment of a group which still deserved a burial – within
a circular ditch, as one might expect in a proper burial enclosure, with or with-
out a covering cairn.
Quite different are the Tormarton and Sandbjerg men who we assume repre-
sent the warrior element of local society, or possibly not that local at Sandbjerg.
Here we meet men who died together, or at least they were interred as a group,
and thus give us insight into the size of warrior units – if only minimal.
Unfortunately, we have no direct way of asserting how large a segment (if at all)
of the local force is represented by these deceased persons. We do not know how
large a fragment of the population of Sandbjerg (and Sund) was made up of the
total fighting force or local population. How professional – i.e., non-local – were
they? In that specific period a mixture of natives and foreigners – the latter
mainly professional soldiers – might be expected to join in battle. In a city like
Næstved there would have been people around to take care of the inhumation,
whatever the motivation may have been.
Who were the defenders and who were the intruders? These are questions
that we cannot answer yet but that may be answerable when the use of DNA
analysis is so universal that we are able to distinguish local populations. In
small-scale warfare (typically at the raid level in the Bronze Age?), the raiders
presumably would have come from such a similar environment that not even
this scientific approach could distinguish aggressor from aggressed.
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So, even under optimal conditions, the truth seems more elusive than it
appears to be when present-day methods of pathology are applied to murder
cases. This is a constant and vital difference between ‘historical’ and contempo-
rary evidence. Rather than being a pessimistic view this is a conservative one
that is slightly more sceptical about holes in the arguments which could be
refuted in court. Before concluding it is sound procedure to examine not only
the bits of evidence but also the chains of thought linking them together into
an argument as well as the logic behind that thinking. Of course, it makes for
less exciting material but may be more challenging for the reader.
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Ancient Greek literature is rich in references to the
treatment of high-ranking prisoners-of-war, treat-
ment that on occasion took the form of sacrificial
killing in the context of aversion or reprisal rituals.
The quotation above relates to a composite act of
honour and revenge by Achilles in the extremity of
his grief at the death of Patroclus, his close comrade-
in-arms. He was a warrior of high status whose death
could only be avenged by the retaliatory killing of
equally noble prisoners. Furthermore, honour could
be satisfied and compensation deemed acceptable
only if the reprisal killing involved several deaths in
payment for the one. The passage illustrates well the
essential ambiguity with which foreign prisoners-of-
war could be regarded in antiquity. Their high rank
might be acknowledged in their selection as appro-
priate offerings in ritual acts of reciprocity and sub-
stitution. However, their lesser worth, as outsiders,
foreigners and vanquished enemies, is reflected in
the perceived necessity of sacrificing several lives as
compensation for one.
Issues concerning attitudes to prisoners-of-war
possess a strong pulse of contemporary resonance in
the emotive images of Taliban prisoners captured
during the war in Afghanistan, following the terrorist
attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and dis-
seminated in media coverage throughout the world.
These captives, suspected of Al Qaeda involvement
in international terrorism, have been treated in a
manner that combines the perceived need for high
security with a heavily ritualised attitude, on the part
of the US government and military. Such treatment
is associated with what is presented as deliberate
humiliation, de-humanisation and denial of identity.
In addition to their transportation from Afghanistan
on a twenty-six-hour flight to the military base at
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, if we are to believe the
reports available to us (for example in the BBC 10.00
news January 15, 2002; Purves 2002: 14), the deten-
tion of these prisoners involves shackling and soli-
tary confinement in ‘cages’ with open-mesh walls,
so that they can be seen by their captors at all times.
Graphic pictures display kneeling captives, hooded
or blindfolded, wearing red uniforms and ear-protec-
tors. The description of the removal of their beards
(this last a direct contravention of Afghani Islamic
religious tradition), seems to reflect attitudes of
extreme hostility, fear, contempt and denial of basic
human rights that resonate alarmingly with past
military approaches to foreign prisoners. 
Similarly, records of experiences during the Second
world War speak of the totality of the prisoner-of-
war experience: capture, the journey towards the
prison-camp, interrogation, were all perceived as rites
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Nine dogs had the prince, that fed beneath his table,
and of these Achilles cut the throats of twain, and 
cast them upon the pyre and twelve valiant sons of
the great-souled Trojans slew he with the bronze – 
and grim was the work he purposed in his heart – 
and thereto he set the iron might of fire, to range at
large. Then he uttered a groan, and called on his dear
comrade by name: ‘Hail, I bid thee, O Patroclus,
even in the house of Hades, for now am I bringing
all to pass, which aforetime I promised thee. Twelve
valiant sons of the great-souled Trojans, lo all these
together with thee the flame devoureth. 
(Homer Iliad XXIII: lines 175-84; trans. Murray 1963: 507-509)
of passage in a weird, surreal world of dis-identity
and helplessness as foreign captives (Liddle and
McKenzie 2000: 310-28). Gratuitous violence, degra-
dation and deprivation were regularly meted out to
prisoners-of-war both in German (op. cit.: 322) and
Japanese camps, and to foreign civilians in the latter
(Cooper 2000: 42-48; Cooper 2001: 49-52; Cliff 1998). 
This paper seeks to investigate the symbolism and
ritualisation associated with warfare and, in partic-
ular, the symbolic treatment of war-captives in later
European antiquity (Fig. 1). Issues concerning deten-
tion, restraint, foreignness, deprivation of status,
shame, humiliation and loss of identity are of primary
interest. While most prominent consideration is
given to archaeological data, the evidence of Classical
literature is also consulted. These ancient texts pro-
vide a perspective on ancient attitudes to warfare,
defeat and imprisonment which, to a degree, may
be used to complement and contextualise material
culture, despite the oft-discussed biases and distor-
tions present in the Greek and Roman texts dealing
with ‘barbarian’ practices. 
Conceptualising the defeated
So ended the battle by which the tribe of the Nervii, and even
their name, were virtually wiped out…In describing the disaster
their tribe had suffered, they said that from their council of
600, only three men had survived, and barely 500 from their
fighting force of 60,000. Wishing it to be seen that I treated
unfortunate suppliants mercifully, I took the greatest care to
keep them safe. (Caesar De Bello Gallico II: 28; trans. Wiseman
and Wiseman 1980: 54)
This is a chilling account by Julius Caesar of the
genocide that befell the fiercely intractable Gallo-
Belgic polity of the Nervii at the hands of the late
republican Roman army in 57 BC, during the early
campaigns in Gaul. It serves as a stark reminder that
ethnic cleansing is not new and that war in antiqui-
ty could annihilate entire tribes. Caesar’s somewhat
detached description of the Nervians’ fate contains
the telling phrase ‘Wishing it to be seen that..’; moral
responsibility thus gave place to expediency and a
perceived need for a particular image of balanced
clemency to be projected back to the Roman Senate
(and, of course, relayed to other Gaulish tribes) lest
Caesar appear to have let his bloodlust run amok. 
The prisoner-of-war is, by definition, a subjugated
being, the victim of belonging to the losing side in
battle. From the perspective of conquerors in any
society, past or present, attitudes to captured forces
are likely to be complex and to include conceit,
relief, anger and fear. Such composite perceptions are
exemplified by recent and current conflicts through-
out the world, most notably in the treatment of
Taliban terrorist suspects (above). In modern warfare,
war-captives may be the only means of confronting
enemies face-to-face, and they may thus represent
the entire hostility of the opposing forces. In both
ancient and modern conflicts, issues of strangeness,
foreignness and ‘otherness’ are powerful images of
defeat. We must remember that for both past and
present-day communities, a foreigner may not
belong to a faraway place but may simply be some-
one not of one’s community or even non-kin. 
Imprisonment in the context of war or peace is
associated with disempowerment, defunctionalisa-
tion, de-humanisation, shame, isolation, detention,
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F I G .  1 : Human body placed in disused grain storage pit
at the Iron Age hillfort of Danebury, Hampshire, southern
England. © The Danebury Trust.
reclusion, deprivation of liberty and privacy, and
coercion. Feelings of anonymity and group-identity
by the imprisoned might be reinforced by a uniform,
by being roped or chained together (Fig. 2) or even
by nakedness (Hill 2000: 317-26). In her study of
Peruvian Moche material culture of the 1st millen-
nium AD Erica Hill has examined issues of corpore-
ality, in the context of war-captivity and sacrifice,
arguing that images of naked, roped-together sacri-
ficial prisoners can be read as a means of denying
individual identity (Hill 2000: 317).
If we follow Foucault’s argument (1977: 231-38),
captivity additionally involves both actual and sym-
bolic transformation of being, not only from free to
incarcerated but also from individual to corporate
personhood. Indeed, if we apply such a model to pris-
oners-of-war, their transformative state might include
the change from high to low status. In antiquity (as,
unhappily, in certain more recent contexts) the war-
captive’s sudden alteration in fortune would most
likely be associated with enslavement, a change from
free warrior to ‘owned person’ (Freeman 1996: 172).
For prisoners-of-war, the sense of humiliation and
isolation are reinforced: they are detained in an alien
world, by those whom they have been taught to
despise. Their deprivation of their power to fight is
represented by being bound or placed in a chain-
gang. Their weapons might be symbolically destroyed
and/or set up as trophies by the victors. Additional
shame might accrue to war-captives were they forced
to act as informers on their own people: Caesar tells
us (de Bello Gallico II, 16-17) that he regularly used
Gaulish prisoners to gain information about the
enemy. 
In the ancient world, most prisoners-of-war would
have ended up being executed or sold as slaves,
sometimes in huge numbers. Linear B tablets relating
to the Late Bronze Age Aegean record lists of slaves,
either captured in warfare or bought, consisting
mainly of women and children from Asia Minor.
Homeric epics depict a Mycenaean world in which
defeat in battle resulted in death for adult men and
the enslavement of non-combatants (Nikolaidou
and Kokkinidou 1997: 194-97). Two examples from
Roman wars serve to illustrate the extent of this
trade in vanquished foes. In the mid-3rd century
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F I G .  2 : Cardiff University students wearing one of the late Iron Age iron slave gang chains from the watery deposit at
Llyn Cerrig Bach, Anglesey, North Wales. © National Museums & Galleries of Wales.
BC, during the First Punic War, Rome captured the
Sicilian city of Acragas and enslaved the entire Greek
population of 25,000 (Freeman 1996: 320). A century
later, Roman campaigns against the Iberian Lusitani
resulted in the enslavement of 20,000 prisoners
(Cunliffe 2001: 372).  
In seeking to explore symbolic and ritualistic atti-
tudes to war-captives in the ancient world, it is nec-
essary to engage with the phenomenon of warfare
itself. Fighting an enemy involves risk (of defeat,
injury or death), collectivity, issues of identity, con-
frontation of other worlds and power:
A first principle of successful campaigning in war, once
active hostilities have begun, is to concentrate all the 
forces that you can muster and make for your enemy’s
source of power as speedily as possible, there to deal 
him the decisive blow which in turn will place your
secondary objectives within your power.
(Frere and Fulford 2001: 45)
Thus, warfare and war-captivity are each associated
with group activity, with issues of power, with the
tension of enmity and the necessary hierarchy of
winning and losing, superiority and inferiority. Such
asymmetrical relationships between victor and van-
quished are graphically illustrated by the war-iconog-
raphy of ancient Egypt, where the conquering ruler
may be depicted as a huge standing individual, bran-
dishing a weapon in one hand, while in the other
he grasps the hair of much smaller, kneeling, often
bound captives, sometimes shown in groups (Welsby
1996: 25, fig. 6; 44). The clutching of the prisoners’
hair is a well-known leitmotif of insult, contempt and
indignity (see below), as are the discrepant sizes of
the images and the contrast between empowered
upright stance and the disempowered degradation of
kneeling, which both diminishes and incapacitates.
Imaging the captured: a comparative 
case-study from the Nile Valley
Although far away from our study-area, it is useful to
take a sideways glance at ancient Nile Valley victo-
ry-iconography since it provides an evocative insight
into attitudes towards prisoners-of-war and the man-
ner in which defeated foreign enemies were present-
ed on royal conquest-imagery. There is a grammar of
representation whose origins can be specifically
traced back as far as the New Kingdom of the mid
second millennium BC. But elements of this tradi-
tion belong to a much earlier period, to before 3000
BC, when a tomb was built at Hierakonopolis in
Upper Egypt, its walls carved with a scene depicting
the conquering ruler, brandishing a weapon as the
symbol of his might. He towers above three diminu-
tive war-captives, who kneel bound at his feet, teth-
ered together by a rope he holds in his hand (Filer
1997: 57). Perhaps the most powerful image of
conquest appears carved on the walls of the New
Kingdom temple of Rameses II at Abu Simbel, near
Aswan (Shinnie 1996: 83, pl. 19b). Nubian prisoners
are depicted, roped together at the neck, with their
arms tied behind them; their necks jut out and their
heads are all bent forward in the identical attitude
forced by the neck-rope, and are thus robbed of any
individuality. Most interesting, though, is the way
these captured people are portrayed: their negroid
features are emphasised, in a manner designed to
stress their foreignness, their difference from their
Egyptian conquerors. As Peter Shinnie points out,
this is all the more significant in so far as skeletal
remains of Nubians belonging to this period do not
show markedly negroid characteristics. 
The ‘grammar’ of Nile Valley war-prisoner imagery
was maintained in Nubia throughout the rule of
the Kushites (from the 8th century BC until the 4th
century AD). The Lion Temple at Naqa again depicts
conquerors, king Netekamani and queen Amanitare
(who reigned at the end of the 1st century BC/early
1st century AD). They are portrayed as huge in pro-
portion to the hapless captives whose heads they
smite as they crouch in large numbers at their feet,
bound at wrist and neck (Shinnie 1967: fig. 24).
Other imagery of foreign war-prisoners sends out
similar messages of utter subjugation: to the same
period as Naqa belongs a small bronze figurine, from
Meroe, of a captive, lying helpless on his face, naked
apart from a round, feathered cap, his arms bound
behind him at the elbows and his ankles tied togeth-
er, his feet bent up and back until they rest against
the bent forearms (Welsby 1996: 60-61, fig. 20). A
large stone statue of a similarly trussed prisoner
comes from Basa, but this one is being devoured by a
lion. Kushite rulers had such images strategically
placed at gathering-points in the landscape, particu-
larly at hafirs (reservoirs), as a means of reminding
people of their power (Welsby 1996: 37-38, fig. 10).
One such ruler, king Shorkaror, who reigned during
the earlier 1st century AD, had himself represented
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on a rock carving at Jebel Qeil standing upon a
group of fettered war-prisoners (Welsby 1996: 60).
Even more evocative of humiliation (to modern
western sensibilities at least) is the carving from the
Lion Temple at Musawwarat es Sufra, dating to c. 220
BC, depicting three prisoners kneeling one behind
the other, linked by a neck-rope the end of which is
grasped by the trunk of an elephant which appears
to be in charge of them (Welsby 1996: 44, fig. 12).
Scrutiny of ancient Egyptian and Kushite iconog-
raphy reveals the extent to which certain ideas con-
cerning conquest are emphasised and reinforced:
prisoners-of-war are presented as small, less than
human, often unclothed, their foreignness exagger-
ated and their helplessness emphasised. But at the
same time, the level of physical restraint applied
appears to depict them as worthy opponents, dan-
gerous adversaries whose savagery demands their
bondage hand, foot and neck. Similar apparent para-
doxes in attitudes to foreign war-captives resonate
throughout antiquity and, indeed, occur in modern
contexts. It is as though the might of the conqueror
who, needless to say, has control over the propa-
ganda of war-imagery, has to be expressed not only
in terms of relative status but also in the presenta-
tion of risk faced in battle and the consonant valour
of the victors.
Bondage in Iron Age Britain and Gaul
Steeds too he adds, and darts from foemen...
And captives he had bound, hands lashed behind,
To send as offerings to the shade, and, slain,
Dash with their blood the fire... 
(Virgil Aeneid X: lines 59-93; trans. Rhoades 1957: 243)
In constructing his epic poem in praise of Augustus,
Virgil deliberately modelled his imperial eulogy on
the Homeric tradition of the Iliad and the Odyssey,
in which suprahuman heroes consorted with the
gods in a world where people and divine beings
shared a numinous landscape. This passage presents
the eponymous Trojan war-lord Aeneas in mourning
for the death of Pallas, his comrade-in-arms slain by
his enemy Turnus, Prince of the Latins. The episode
appears to be a conscious imitation of the episode in
the Iliad in which Achilles presides over the funeral
of Patroclus (Iliad XXIII) with which this paper
begins. Like Achilles, Aeneas conducted reprisal-sac-
rifices in revenge and honour for his friend, rituals
in which several Latins were killed in compensation
for the fallen hero of the winning side. Virgil specif-
ically alludes to the binding of these Latian captives
prior to their sacrificial murder and the consign-
ment of their corpses to the funeral pyre (Green
2001: 142).
Bound bodies 
The sacrificial war-victims described in both the
Iliad and the Aeneid are each foreign and noble but
only the Latin captives are mentioned as being fet-
tered. This difference between the two heroic texts
is probably not significant; there is abundant evi-
dence, from material culture, iconography and
ancient literature, that the Romans and their adver-
saries in western Europe bound or chained their
prisoners-of-war. But skeletal remains from Aegean
communities of the early 1st millennium BC, too,
demonstrate that the binding of sacrificial war-cap-
tives was also practised in the Greek world at around
the time Homer wrote his two great epic poems. At
Eleutherna in Crete (Stampholidis 1996: 164-89), a
young nobleman was cremated and his remains
placed in the central area of his tomb. At the edge of
a second, unlit pyre was the inhumed corpse of a
man of similar age and of equally robust physique,
suggesting that he, too, may have been a warrior.
The limbs of this second individual had been tightly
bound and show signs of deliberate mutilation and
he had been decapitated; he clearly met his death
within the context of the first man’s cremation. It is
possible that the inhumed body belonged to a slave,
killed as an ‘attendant’ sacrifice, to accompany his
master to the underworld, but it is perhaps more
likely that the site of Eleutherna provides archaeo-
logical testimony to a reprisal sacrifice similar to that
enacted by Achilles to avenge Patroclus or Aeneas in
compensation for Pallas. Such a killing of a high-
ranking hero might, at one and the same time, rep-
resent retaliation and sacrifice. The ritual victim’s
limbs might have been abused to dishonour him as
a defeated foreigner, and as a vengeance-killing, and
his decapitation might also be thus explained. As
Stampholidis has observed, reprisal killing in Homeric
literature was sometimes carried out in this manner
(Odyssey XXIII-XXIV; Iliad XI: 145ff; XII: 202ff),
perhaps to signify dishonour, ritual insult or trophy-
taking. The broader issue of head-ritual in the con-
text of warfare is discussed later in this paper. 
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As at Cretan Eleutherna, skeletal evidence from
western Iron Age Europe sometimes suggests the
binding of war-captives in a quasi-punitive, quasi-
ceremonial context. Indeed, Graeco-Roman literature
on ancient Gaul and Britain provides testimony to
the ritualistic aspects of detention and punishment.
The fate of the Arvernian war-leader Vercingetorix is
a good example: after the fall of Alesia in 52 BC, the
freedom-fighter was kept, a chained prisoner, in Rome
for five years before he contributed to the spectacle
of Julius Caesar’s Triumph in 46 BC and his public
and highly ritualistic execution by strangulation
(Freeman 1996: 364). There is a small but significant
body of Gallo-British evidence for the binding of
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F I G .  3 : Multiple human bodies, placed in flexed position in a cleared grain silo at Danebury, Hampshire, southern
England. © The Danebury Trust.
individuals tentatively identified as prisoners-of-war
who may have been victims of human sacrifice. Two
Iron Age sites – Danebury in southern England and
Acy-Romance in the Ardennes region of northern
Gaul – provide a fascinating insight into the way such
individuals may have been treated. On both sites,
there seems to have been an emphasis on physical
restraint, including binding and confinement in
small spaces. 
The ‘pit-tradition’ at Danebury endured for at least
the first half of the 1st millennium BC. A pattern of
ritual behaviour observed at the site involved the
clearing-out of disused grain silos dug into the chalk
and the subsequent deposition of whole or partial
human bodies (Fig. 3), those of animals, ironwork
and other material in what seems to have been votive
activity. This could, perhaps, be associated with the
final phases of an ongoing negotiation with the
spirit-world in respect of fertility and crop-growth,
a discourse that began with the sinking of the corn-
storage pits, and continued with their use, closure
and clearance. The complex rituals perhaps con-
cluded with the emplacement of thank-offerings
(Cunliffe 1992: 69-83) in the pits that had been
guarded and blessed by the infernal powers into
whose territory they had encroached. Several of the
human bodies (for example Green 2001: figs. 54, 56,
57) were crammed into tiny spaces (Fig. 4) and/or
were so tightly flexed as to suggest that their limbs
were originally bound. Some bodies were weighted
down or crushed by great blocks of chalk or flint
(figs. 5-6), again as if to express the symbolism of
restraint and, maybe, to suggest their burial alive,
whether or not such a fate was actually meted out to
these victims. It can only be conjectural to identify
these persons as prisoners-of-war, but some had sus-
tained head or body injuries consistent with warfare
and the vast majority of the pit-burials comprised
young adult males, in the prime of their fighting
lives. They were special burials, in so far as they rep-
resented only about 6% of the estimated population
at Danebury, or perhaps one interment every few
years, and the absence of grave-goods could be inter-
preted as significant in terms of contempt, low status
and denial of identity. All of these might be indica-
tors of appropriate attitudes to foreign, defeated war-
dead though, of course, there may be many other
possible interpretations. 
Danebury was by no means the only southern
British Iron Age fortified site to have produced bound
‘pit-bodies’. An evocative burial, again of a young
man, was excavated at South Cadbury, Somerset; he
– significantly perhaps – had been bound and placed
in a tightly-crouched position upside-down in a pit
cut into the rear of the late Iron Age earthen ram-
part (Alcock 1972: 103, pl. 31). It could be argued
that the emplacement of this individual within the
hillfort defences reflects honourable status, as befit-
ted a war-hero whose valour lived on after his death
and imbued the rampart with spiritual strength
(Green 2001: 146). Conversely, his binding and his
position head-down may instead be associated with
insult and low rank. Indeed, such apparent ambigu-
ity might reflect the paradoxical status of a valiant
prisoner-of-war, an enemy whose fighting-prowess
was symbolically harnessed to enhance the defences
of those who captured and executed him. The inver-
sion of his body is interesting: it may be associated
with facilitating his entry into the otherworld or
with symbolic contempt. Sacrificial prisoners-of-
war are represented upside-down in Moche ceramic
iconography (Hill 2000: 317-26): the Bronze Age
rock carving at Hamn in Sweden depicts a line of
inverted armless prisoners tethered by their feet
(Coles 1990: 61, fig. 48). 
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F I G .  4 : Human body folded into small space at edge of
grain storage pit at Danebury. © The Danebury Trust.
The deposition of bodies face-down may, in cer-
tain specific circumstances, equally serve to make
statements concerning status, contempt or other
attitudes to special dead that might be linked to the
despatch of captives: it is interesting that the young
male bog body from Lindow Moss in Cheshire
(north-west England), who was probably the victim
of human sacrifice during the 1st century AD,
received serious head-injuries sustained as he knelt
before his assailant. He was garrotted and his throat
slit before being kneed in the back and pushed face-
down into a marsh-pool (Stead et al. 1986). Equally
enigmatic is the burial of a mature woman, who
died in the middle Iron Age near Northampton, in
the Midlands: she, likewise, was interred face-down,
but with her head upraised as though she had been
buried alive; oddest of all was the lead torc round her
neck, broken in two and placed back-to-front, with
the terminals on her cervical vertebrae (Jenkinson
2002; Chapman 2001: 1-42). Her strange burial,
wearing a neckring uniquely of lead, suggests she was
special; in this instance, the torc may indicate sym-
bolic bondage, and the use of a heavy base metal
could signify the contempt meted out to a foreign
prisoner, hostage or war-slave. Continuance of this
kind of ‘humiliation’ treatment of the dead in
Roman Britain is attested by evidence from a recently-
cemetery at Southwark in London in which the
remains of an adult male were discovered, his legs
bound together and a spear driven through both
ankles (Denison 2002: 6). 
Acy-Romance (Ardennes) was the site of a settle-
ment including a public central ritual space and a
cluster of cemeteries (Lambot 1998; 2000; Green
2001: 130-31, 145). To the early-mid 2nd century BC
belong a series of curious interments, of some twen-
ty or so young men, in a seated position, around the
edge of the central sacred place; three others were
aligned towards the rising sun. All these bodies had
been subjected to an idiosyncratic ‘biography’ prior
to their eventual burial. Evidence suggested to the
excavators that each person was squeezed into a
small wooden crate and lowered into a deep ‘dessi-
cation-pit’ until the flesh had dried and then re-
interred in its final resting-place. The deliberate con-
finement of the corpses in the wooden containers
appears analogous to the small spaces into which
some of the southern British Iron Age pit-bodies
were inserted, as if symbolic imprisonment were
being effected. Like those interred at Danebury and
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F I G .  5 : Body of a man, probably with hands bound, in
grain storage pit at Danebury. © The Danebury Trust.
F I G .  6 : Deliberately crushed human skeleton from a
Danebury pit. © The Danebury Trust.
elsewhere in central southern England, the Acy-
Romance seated men were buried without grave-
goods, as if to stress their alien, low-ranking status
or the denial of their individual identity. At Acy, the
box-burials are in stark contrast to a series of rich
cremations found in the cemeteries, which included
elaborate grave-furniture containing liturgical equip-
ment, some of which seems to identify the deceased
as religious practitioners. Bernard Lambot (1998) is
of the opinion that the seated burials at Acy repre-
sent victims of human sacrifice. This interpretation
has to remain speculative but one further body from
the site supports the enactment of ritual murder
here: this also belonged to a young adult man but
his body lay extended and in such a position as to
testify that he died with his hands tied behind his
back at the wrists. His skull provides clues as to the
violent manner of his death: he was killed by a savage
blow to his head from an axe; of great interest was
the discovery, in one of the rich cremation-graves,
of an implement whose blade closely matches the
head-wound of the fettered victim.
The site of Fesques (Seine-Maritime), excavated
by Etienne Mantel, has revealed significant evidence
for the abnormal treatment of human behaviour:
the remains of twenty-six people were found, includ-
ing some in a seated position. The foot-bones of
some of them show signs that the bodies had been
suspended, alive or dead: if alive, then they would
inevitably have been bound. The human remains
were accompanied by huge quantities of animal
bones, all occurring on a large site, tentatively inter-
preted as a place of assembly. Jean-Louis Brunaux
(2000: 16-18) has compared Fesques with the public
gathering-place mentioned by Caesar (de Bello
Gallico I: 4) as belonging to the Helvetian chieftain
Orgetorix. If the bodies were strung up, they would
appear to be analogous to the treatment of people at
places like Ribemont (below), but some were found
deliberately positioned in a seated attitude, highly
reminiscent of the Acy-Romance burials. Brunaux’s
view is that the bodies at Fesques exhibit a Gallic
community’s response to the need for both divine
and earthly justice and that the suspended bodies
were those of transgressors, offered to the gods in
retribution either after battle or for flouting rules
of social conduct. In making this argument, he
points to iconography on painted Greek vases, in
which bound, seated victims are depicted (Brunaux
2000: 16). 
Bondage associated with ritual behaviour is well-
attested in Iron Age Europe. Some of the northern
bog bodies show evidence of such physical restraint
in the context of what appears to represent sacrifi-
cial killing. A good illustration of such practice is the
body of a teenage boy, cast – arguably as a sacrificial
act - into a peat-marsh at Kayhausen in Schleswig-
Holstein (Fig. 7) during the second-first century BC
(van der Sanden 1996: 93, 141, pl. 117; Green 2001:
122, 158, fig. 59). His hands had been tied behind
his back with strips of woollen cloth, his feet bound
with a folded cloak; another length of cloth had
been passed between his legs, pulled taut and
wound tightly round his throat, with the effect that
any attempt at struggling would throttle him. It is
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F I G .  7 : An adolescent boy placed, bound, in a bog at
Kayhausen, Schleswig-Holstein, North Germany, in 2nd-
1st century BC. © Anne Leaver (after van der Sanden
1996).
most unlikely that this young boy was himself a
combatant prisoner-of-war for he suffered from a
sufficiently severe congenital hip-defect as to cause
him considerable difficulties in walking, but he
could nonetheless have been a casualty of warfare or
even a hostage. In the context of symbolic bondage
during the north European Iron Age, a comment by
Tacitus may be highly significant. In his treatise the
Germania, the Roman imperial commentator noted
a singular religious custom among the Semnones, a
tribe belonging to the powerful Germanic confedera-
tion of the Suebi:
At a set time all the peoples of this blood gather,
in their embassies, in a wood hallowed by the
auguries of their ancestors and the awe of ages.
The sacrifice in public of a human victim marks
the grisly opening of their savage ritual.
In another way, too, reverence is paid to the grove.
No one may enter it unless he is bound with a cord.
By this he acknowledges his own inferiority and the
power of the deity. Should he chance to fall, he
must not get up on his feet again. He must roll
out over the ground. All this complex of 
superstition reflects the belief that in that grove
the nation had its birth. and that there dwells the
god who rules over all, while the rest of the world
is subject to his sway.
(Tacitus Germania XXXIX; trans. Mattingly 1948: 132-33)
An image is thus presented of the grove deity’s devo-
tees, playing out the role of subservient prisoners or
sacrificial victims, fettered to the spirit of the wood
and helpless in the supernatural domain. The refer-
ence to falling and rolling over suggests to me that
the worshipping visitors to the sacred grove behaved
as though they, like the Kayhausen boy, were bound
hand and foot.
Manacles and chain-gangs: 
the material culture of restraint
What furnace in town,
What anvil isn’t forging their heavy
chains? That’s how 
most of our iron is used – in fetters!
Well may you fear
That none will be left for plowshares,
hoes or spades in a year’
(Juvenal Satires III; trans. Creekmore 1963: 62)
The poet Juvenal published his first book of Satires
(I-V) in c. AD 110, when in his mid-forties. He begins
the first poem by explaining how he was spurred on
to write satire by the moral corruption and hypocrisy
he witnessed all around him in Rome. A self-con-
fessed homophobe, xenophobe and mysogynist, his
work is nonetheless an amusing and informative
commentary on the social values obtaining in the
city during the high Roman imperial period. The
focus of Satire III is the urban crime-rate, hence his
remark about the enforced waste of iron resources
on the manufacture of fetters.
Manacles and chains were not reserved for law-
breaking criminals but were often used to control
large numbers of owned persons, of whom ancient
slave-keeping societies were rightly apprehensive.
Thus, the unfree workers at the silver mines of
Laurion in Attica were kept chained together (Murray
1988: 218), so that they could neither escape nor
overpower their captors.
Classical writers on their ‘barbarian’ neighbours
in Gaul and Britain describe how high-ranking pris-
oners-of-war were chained, probably more as a sym-
bolic gesture than because it was necessary. Tacitus
presents a vivid picture of the British freedom-fight-
er Caratacus, who had led the south Wales polity of
the Silures in a tough campaign against the Romans
in the mid 1st century AD. When British defeat
seemed inevitable, Caratacus fled for sanctuary to
Cartimandua, ruler of the powerful northern hege-
mony of the Brigantes, only to be delivered as a
captive to the Romans by the quisling queen. Tacitus
(Annals XII: 33-35) describes Caratacus’s display at
the emperor Claudius’s triumph in Rome:
For the people were summoned as though for a fine spectacle,
while the Guard stood in arms on the parade ground before their
camp. Then there was a march past, with Caratacus’ petty vassels,
and the decorations and neck-chains and spoils of his foreign wars. 
Next were displayed his brothers, wife and daughter. Last came
the king himself.
Using his favourite medium of oratio obliqua
(reported speech), Tacitus gives Caratacus a proud
soliloquy which includes the noble phrase ‘humilia-
tion is my lot, glory yours’ and a persuasive presen-
tation of arguments as to why Rome and Claudius
should be magnanimous to defeated enemies.
‘Claudius responded by pardoning him and his wife
and brothers’, releasing them from their chains.
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Contemporary material culture supports the image
of the chained prisoner described by Tacitus and
others; imagery depicts captives bound or in chains,
and sometimes the fetters themselves survive in the
archaeological record. The site at Quidney Farm,
Saham Toney (Norfolk) lies in the environs of what
appears to have been a major focus of symbolic
activity, attested by the series of ritual pits at Ashill
nearby. Metal detectorists at Quidney Farm discov-
ered an assemblage of late Iron Age and Roman-peri-
od metalwork, including sets of horse-gear and a pair
of iron manacles, similar to those found at Silchester,
dated between the 1st and 3rd centuries AD (Bates
2000: 230). If, as suggested, Saham Toney was the site
of a significant Icenian tribal centre, then it is not
unlikely that assemblies and other gatherings took
place here, perhaps involving the judgement of
criminals or war-prisoners who may well have been
fettered while on public display. The presence of
horse-harness implies that some kind of military
display may have occurred here, in which case it is
all the more likely that the manacles may have
restrained a battle-captive.
Another British site producing wrist-shackles is
Read’s Cavern, Churhill in Somerset (south-west
England). Here, a cave-deposit, dated to between
about 50 BC and AD 43, produced the skeletons of
four people, including a child together with animal
bones, pottery and metal artifacts, including a pair
of iron manacles (Bristow 1998: 325). The notion
that the assemblage may have other than mundane
connotations is supported both by the cave-situation
and the identification of cut-marks on the human
bone, as if some kind of ritual activity was taking
place, involving defleshing or even cannibalism,
both of which have been noted as occurring else-
where in late Iron Age and Romano-British contexts
(Aldhouse-Green 2001: 56-61).
To the Roman period belongs a small copper-alloy
amulet (Fig. 8), in the form of a naked prisoner
bound at the wrist with a rope that also encircles his
neck (Green 1978: 48, pl. 138; 2001: col. pl. 20). Like
the Kayhausen boy (see above), the double binding
seems to have been so arranged that any attempt at
struggling to free the hands would result in self-
strangulation. The figurine comes from Brough-
under-Stainmore in Cumbria, and it is tempting to
interpret the image as that of a prisoner-of-war,
maybe even a human sacrificial victim. Tim Taylor
has suggested (2002: 146) that death by throttling
may have had specific rationales, associated with
denial of freedom for the dead soul. Strangling or
hanging arrests expiry of the last breath, and it is
the dying exhalation that, for many societies, signi-
fies true death and the ability of the soul to migrate
to the Otherworld. The deliberate intention to leave
‘vexed ghosts’ wandering in limbo may have been
seen as an exquisite form of punishment for an
abnormal life or as a means of rendering the sacrifi-
cial victim as an especially potent divine gift.
Late Iron Age sites in Britain and Gaul have pro-
duced rare but unequivocal examples of gang-chains,
made of wrought iron and used to restrain five or six
people by means of hinged collars connected to
coarse-linked chains. Two massive gang-chains (Fig.
9) were found in the rich metalwork assemblage
ritually deposited at Llyn Cerrig Bach on Anglesey,
off the north-west coast of Wales (Macdonald 1996:
32-33; Parker Pearson 2000: 8-11). Other British
gang-chains include those from a rich late Iron Age
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F I G .  8 : Romano-British copper-alloy amulet in the
form of a bound prisoner; Brough-under-Stainmore,
Cumbria, north-west England. © The British Museum.
chieftain’s grave at Barton (Cambridgeshire) and a
gang-chain designed for six people from the oppidum
at Bigberry in Kent, one of the fortified sites quite
possibly attacked by Julius Caesar in the mid-1st cen-
tury BC (Wiseman and Wiseman 1980: 95). A frag-
mentary example, of 2nd century BC date, was found
in 1999 at a site known as Le Petit Chauvort, Verdun-
sur-le-Doubs (Saône-et-Loire). Vincent Guichard,
Director of the Centre Archéologique Européen du
Mont Beuvray, argues convincingly (pers. comm.)
that Gallo-British iron gang-chains were ritualised
objects, used in the transport of prisoners-of-war
and/or sacrificial victims rather than merely as a
means of moving large numbers of slaves around. He
points out that these instruments of restraint almost
always come from special contexts: ritual desposits
in water, sacred sites, graves or in association with
martial equipment. Furthermore, the incredible
investment of time, resources and craftsmanship in
producing these chains has to be considered. The
manufacture of these objects demanded great black-
smithing skills (Green 2002) and the chains them-
selves were probably heavily invested with value
and meaning.
One of the significant, but under-recognised,
factors in the use of gang-chains, whether in prehis-
toric or more modern contexts, is the notion of
spectacle, theatre, performance, high visibility and
public humiliation. Chaining people together by the
neck forces each captive to stand or walk stooped,
with his head down: this has already been noted in
the depiction of Nubian prisoners in Egyptian war-
iconography (above). An experiment was done in
about 1990 by the National Museum of Wales, using
Cardiff University students and one of the Llyn
Cerrig gang-chains (Green 2001: col. pl. 21). Each
individual, however much he varies in height from
his fellow-prisoners, has to assume a corporate stance
and, in fact, to surrender his personhood to the
anonymous collective of the group, who all behave
as one (see Fig. 2). Associated with this is the pro-
tracted process of putting people into the chains
and taking them out. Placing several people in a
gang-chain is a complicated procedure, and the first
person in will wait a considerable time for all his
fellow miscreants to be chained up with him.
Likewise the first one in will inevitably be the last
one out and again will wait perhaps for some time
to be freed. The implication is that the most impor-
tant, dangerous or despised captive will be enchained
first (S. Aldhouse-Green, pers. comm.)
In order to appreciate the gang-chain as a sym-
bolic piece of punitive theatre, we should turn to
Michel Foucault’s description of the French penal
system in the earlier 19th century (Foucault 1977:
257-61). The chain-gang as a means of transporting
convicted French felons only ceased in 1836. In
what Foucault termed ‘penitentiary science’, it had
a multiple role providing ritual, spectacle, shock and
deterrent value. The ‘ritual’ commenced with the
fastening of the iron collars, each about an inch
thick, at the Bicêtre prison, where the head warder,
known as the artoupan acted as temporary black-
smith. It took three men to fasten the ring: one to
hold the block, the second to hold together the two
halves of the collar round the captive’s neck, and
the third to strike home the bolt and thus close the
circle. As the ring was fastened, the hammer-blows
shook the prisoner physically and there was always
the frisson of risk that the hammer would strike his
head rather than the iron bolt. Once the chain-gang
was in place, it would then move through the French
countryside in a ritualised performance, bringing
villagers from their homes to marvel at the spectacle.
Foucault describes the way the crowd hurled insults
at prisoners or gaolers as they passed, depending on
their sympathies, and how ‘in every town it passed
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F I G .  9 : Late Iron Age iron slave gang chain (one of 
a pair), from the watery deposit at Llyn Cerrig Bach,
Anglesey, North Wales. © National Museum of Wales.
through, the chain-gang brought its festival with it’
(1977: 261). The departing prison-gang was per-
ceived almost in the manner of a scapegoat, taking
away with it all the ills of the community and cleans-
ing the regions through which it passed (ibid.: 259;
Green 2001: 144-45). 
We can learn a great deal from scrutiny of the
French chain-gang, in terms of the ritual and sym-
bolism associated with its production and use. It
was clearly by no means a simply functional con-
traption, designed solely to detain and control. The
highly visible, public manner in which individuals
were chained up, by gaoler-smiths, the noise, heat
and danger, followed by the movement of the chain
from village to village across France, created a spec-
tacle attracting crowds and inducing an almost reli-
gious air of festival and collective catharsis. One other
dimension to the French chain-gang is its potential
as a weapon. Foucault refers (1977: 261) to the risk
run by prison-warders, once the chain-gang was set
up, for it was then possible for prisoners to act
together and engulf their guards in the chain, that
could be used to bludgeon or to strangle them.
In King Leopold’s Ghost, a highly evocative account
of colonialist rule in the Belgian Congo of the 1890s,
Hochschild (1998: 119) describes the use of the slave
gang-chain. In the words of a Congo state official at
the time ‘A file of poor devils, chained by the neck,
carried my trunks and boxes towards the dock’. It
was reported that the death-rate in the Congolese
chain-gangs was so high that light steel chains were
substituted for the heavy iron collars previously
employed, and that there was a constant demand
for new supplies. There was also an economic prob-
lem in linking people together in this way, for if the
gang passed across a bridge over a river and one
person lost his footing and fell in, the whole gang
was lost (Hochschild 1998: 130). But at the end of
the 19th century, the horrific spectacle of lines of
children in chains, orphan-victims of colonial raids
on villages, could still be seen, on their way to
Catholic mission stations (ibid.: 134-35). The history
of the Belgian Congo serves as a stark reminder
that not only adult prisoners or miscreants were
chained. The Congolese children, though, were –
in a real and tragic sense – prisoners-of-war. Seen
from the perspective of such 19th century chain-
gangs, in France and the Congo, the ritualistic
aspects of Iron Age gang-chains take on a grim and
startling focus.
Iconographies of humiliation
On an engraved Bronze Age rock-panel at Hamn,
east of Kville in Sweden, is depicted a martial scene
including warriors and boats, perhaps involved in a
coastal raiding party. But the imagery of this panel
also includes what appears to represent a group of
prisoners-of-war, hanging upside down by their feet
from a horizontal bar or timber (Coles 1990: 61, fig.
48). These small figures are distinctive, not only in
their inverted position but also in the way they are
depicted armless. Like a chain-gang, the group is
tethered together but they are unable to walk and
the absence of their upper limbs carries a powerful
message of disempowerment: they have, quite liter-
ally, been disarmed and are thus shown in an atti-
tude of utter, dehumanised subjugation.
There is a body of iconography from late Iron Age
and Roman Europe depicting defeated captives
chained, bound and humiliated. A sarcophagus of
Roman date in the Mansell Collection at Rome depicts
a group of conquered Gauls, wearing torcs, kneeling
or sitting on the ground while heavily-armed
Roman footsoldiers and horsemen bludgeon them
into submission; one victim is shown with his hands
tied tightly behind him (Wiseman and Wiseman
1980: 52). The triumphal arch set up in the 1st cen-
tury BC at Carpentras (Vaucluse) in southern Gaul
again depicts native prisoners, this time chained
together with their hands tethered behind them
(ibid.: 197). One of the captives is clearly of high sta-
tus for he wears a tunic of chain-mail, an expensive
and highly-prized late Iron Age piece of military
hardware, probably designed more for show than
defence. The juxtaposition of chain-mail and chain-
fetters lends a piquant irony to the carving, in so
far as the former reflects power and status and the
latter their reverse.
A group of victory-sculptures from the northern
frontier regions of northern Britain exhibits a com-
plex grammar of humilation-imagery, wherein con-
quered Britons are presented according to stereotypic
topoi of insult, disempowerment and foreignness,
usually bound and seated. On these stones, barbar-
ians are depicted in attitudes of subjugation relative
to their triumphal Roman opponents. One distance-
slab built on the Antonine Wall, from Bridgness,
West Lothian is of especial interest for included in
the discrepant symbolism of conqueror and van-
quished are the issues of number and relative posi-
tion. A single Roman cavalryman is depicted at an
S E M I O L O G I E S  O F  S U B J U G A T I O N . 293
aggressive gallop; below him are four captives, one
beneath the hooves, another fatally injured in the
back by a spear, a third bound and seated on the
ground, facing the viewer and the fourth, also bound
and seated but also decapitated (Ferris 1994: 25;
Keppie and Arnold 1984: no. 68, pl. 21). 
Trajan’s Column was built as a piece of flamboy-
ant imperial propaganda to celebrate and commem-
orate Roman triumph over Dacian barbarism in the
earlier 1st century AD. It presents a fine assemblage
of iconographic evidence for the humiliation and
physical restraint of foreign prisoners-of-war. Several
scenes depict Dacian captives, hands bound behind
them (Le Bohec 1994: fig. 29; Settis et al. 1988: 315,
pl. 57). A grammar of foreignness is very clear: fre-
quently the enemy is depicted by Roman sculptors
as expressly different from Roman soldiers. Thus the
Dacians are shaggy-haired, bearded, half-naked or
wearing civilian dress: flowing robes and heavy
cloaks (Settis et al. 1988: 279, pl. 21). Sometimes they
wear oriental-style ‘Phrygian’ caps, to emphasise their
barbarity and otherness (Le Bohec 1994: fig. 29).
One interesting feature is the way that Dacian pris-
oners are repeatedly depicted as held by the elbows
or with a Roman soldier grasping them by the hair
as they are presented to the emperor (Settis et al.
1988: 431, pl. 173). Both the elbow-restraint and the
grabbing of hair have been mentioned earlier in this
paper within the context of Egyptian conquest-
imagery; the latter seems definitely to have been a
gesture of contempt, insult, a means of both physi-
cal and spiritual subjugation. Furthermore, just as
Egyptian war-imagery exaggerates the negroid for-
eignness of Nubians (see above), so do some carv-
ings on Trajan’s Column: Numidian cavalry, auxil-
iary-fighters attached to the Roman army, are repre-
sented with crinkly hair in dreadlocks and negroid
features, engaging with Dacian infantrymen (Settis
et al. 1988: 356, pl. 98). 
One curious scene (Settis et al. 1988: 326, pl. 68;
Le Bohec 1994: fig. 32) depicts a group of three
naked prisoners in a tower-like edifice, hands bound
behind them, being tortured by elderly, grim-faced
women who grasp tufts of their hair and threaten
them with firebrands and daggers. The presence of
the women would seem to suggest that these vic-
tims are Roman soldiers, suffering at the hands of
Dacian women, who may even – perhaps – be iden-
tified as priestesses. The scene is highly reminiscent
of a ritual enacted by the north European tribe of
the Cimbri, as recorded by the 1st century Greek
geographer Strabo (Geography VII: 2, 3), wherein
prisoners-of-war were sacrificed by aged female
priests (see below). 
In a further repeated pattern of submission, Trajan’s
Column shows frequent images of Dacians in atti-
tudes of supplication. Many are depicted kneeling
before Trajan on one knee, hands outstretched to
implore mercy from the emperor or prostrated before
him (Settis et al. 1988: 386, pl. 128; 349, pl. 91; 387,
pl. 129). It is clear that many of these are noblemen;
some are very elderly (Settis et al. 1988: 501, pl. 243).
One carving depicts a group of ‘barbarians’, kneeling
in a plea for clemency, being threatened by Roman
soldiers. Dacian prisoners may sit shackled at the
feet of their captors (Settis et al. 1988: 315, pl. 57);
some defeated chieftains are even depicted commit-
ting suicide rather than surrender their freedom (Le
Bohec 1994: fig. 104). One panel depicts a group of
Dacian ambassadors, bearded, semi-naked and
wearing Phrygian caps (Settis 1988: 439, pl. 181).
Another shows what appears to represent the whole-
sale deportation of a Dacian community – old men,
women and children – from a captured city (Le Bohec
1994: figs. 113-14), in precisely the manner described
by Julius Caesar as being inflicted on the defeated
inhabitants of Gaulish settlements. 
So Trajan’s Column may be interpreted as the
embodiment of conquest and submission, as pre-
sented by the conquerors. The Dacians are barbar-
ians, individuals rather than part of a disciplined
professional army; they wear effete, uncivilised dress,
unkempt hair and beards and both women, children
and the elderly are part of the native scene. Defeat
is shown by bondage, humiliation, deportation,
enforced supplication; the conquering Roman forces,
led by the towering figure of the soldier-emperor
Trajan, are depicted in attitudes of contemptuous
triumph over Dacian commoners and noblemen
alike. 
Julius Caesar’s commentary on the Gallic Wars (de
Bello Gallico), compiled in the mid-1st century BC,
contains accounts of subjugation that accord well
with the conquest-imagery of the Antonine Wall and
Trajan’s Column. Caesar’s testimony paints a grim
picture of the fate that befell the defeated, particu-
larly those chiefs and communities that fought hard
for their freedom. As mentioned at the beginning of
the paper, capture in the context of war against
Rome usually resulted in enslavement or execution.
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(But sometimes, when the prisoner was of high status,
he was first exhibited in Rome.) Defeat meant
enforced movement of whole groups from their
ancestral homelands or the use of captives as bar-
gaining-counters. Caesar describes the fate of Gaulish
freedom-fighters and their leader Vercingetorix after
the siege of Alesia in 52 BC:
I [Caesar] took my place on the fortifications in front of
the camp and the chiefs were brought to me there.
Vercingetorix was surrendered, and the weapons were laid
down before me. I kept the Aeduan and Arvernian
prisoners back, hoping to use them to regain the loyalty
of their tribes. The rest I distributed as booty among the
entire army, giving one prisoner to each of my men.
(DBG VII: 89; trans. Wiseman and Wiseman 1980: 176).
Plutarch presents a powerful image of the defeated
chieftain:
Vercingetorix, the supreme leader of the whole war,
put on his most beautiful armour, had his horse carefully
groomed, and rode out through the gates [of Alesia].
Caesar was sitting down and Vercingetorix, after riding
round him in a circle, leaped down from his horse, stripped
off his armour, and sat at Caesar’s feet silent and motionless
until he was taken away under arrest, a prisoner reserved for
his triumph
(Plutarch Life of Caesar; trans. Warner 1958: 240-41).
War-captive iconography even belonging to peoples
living across the world from Iron Age Europe can,
nonetheless, resonate with the kind of attitudes and
presentation we have discussed above. (We have
seen examples already in the royal triumph-images
of New Kingdom Egypt.) The Moche communities
inhabiting the northern coast of Peru between about
AD 100 and 800 left behind remnants of a material
culture in which conquest, capture and enslavement
were habitually employed as subjects for icono-
graphic representation on ceramic vessels. Erica Hill
(2000: 317-26) argues with conviction that the
Moche used the human body to explore perceptions
and meanings associated with their social structure,
tensions and change within that structure. One of
the themes of Moche art is human sacrifice, the vic-
tims apparently selected from conquered communi-
ties. This representation of enslaved prisoners-of-
war is highly reminiscent both of Egyptian con-
quest-imagery and that of Iron Age Europe and the
western Roman empire, in so far as topoi of degrada-
tion and physical restraint are repeatedly expressed.
Moche sacrificial art includes scenes wherein lines
of prisoners are bound together, sometimes by neck-
ropes very similar to gang-chains and sometimes
tethered by horizontal poles (Hill 2000: 320, figs. 1,
2). A guard or priest-warder may be depicted hold-
ing the tethering-rope and walking behind or in
front of the captives. The discrepant manner in
which prisoners and warders are treated is highly
significant: the prisoner is naked, the captor fully-
clad, often armed; the captive may be represented
upside-down (ibid.: fig. 3), an iconographic device
designed to be read as a ‘docile’, submissive and bid-
dable body as opposed to the vigorous life-force
exhibited by the gaolers. Hill’s figure 3 shows a naked,
inverted prisoner-of-war in company with two
heavily-armed warriors. 
Interestingly, vulnerability and humiliation may
be depicted by means of clear, often exaggerated
representation of genitalia, between splayed legs,
whilst denial of individual identity is attested by the
generalised blandness of facial features. As has been
identified in Egyptian and Roman imagery (above),
the Moche captive’s hair may be grasped by his cap-
tor, partly to represent defeat and partly to secure
the head upright for decapitation. (We shall see later
that the taking of trophy-heads is depicted on some
of the scenes of Dacian defeat on Trajan’s Column).
On Moche prisoner-art, the captive’s hair may be
shown cut short and disarranged, a feature that Hill
(2000: 320-23) has interpreted as signifying the
altered state of the war-prisoner, disempowerment
and abrupt loss of status. 
The bodies of Moche captives may also be depicted
mutilated, dismembered, with disaggregated body-
parts, perhaps in symbolism of sacrifice, degrada-
tion and both somatic and spiritual dissolution. The
dismemberment of the Bronze Age prisoners on the
Swedish rock carving at Hamn – also depicted upside-
down – thus springs sharply into focus. It may even
be possible to apply such a perception to the way in
which human bog bodies were sometimes apparently
mutilated pre-mortem and to the disarticulation of
some of the Iron Age bodies from British sites such
as Danebury.
In summary, a range of themes associated with
bondage, humiliation, contempt and submission
can be identified in Iron Age and Roman Europe,
themes that contain strong resonances with the
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triumph-imagery of other ancient communities,
such as those of Egypt and Peru. Witness to such
attitudes to inferior, captured status is borne by lit-
erature, iconography and the artefactual evidence
for restraining devices. The whole assemblage of data
is indicative of complex symbolism in which con-
testing tensions of rank and submission are played
out on a public stage. As Foucault reminds us, we
should not underestimate the power of theatre, of
performance and the potency of the messages such
displays conveyed from their initiators to their con-
sumers.   
War, sacrifice, and status
Meanwhile, Themistocles was offering sacrifice alongside the
admiral’s trireme. Here, three remarkably handsome prisoners
were brought before him, magnificently dressed and wearing
gold ornaments. they were reported to be the sons of
Sandauce, the king’s sister and Artayctus. At the very moment
that Euphrantides the prophet saw them, a great bright
flame shot up from the [animal] victims awaiting sacrifice 
at the altar and a sneeze was heard on the right, which is a
good omen. At this, Euphrantides clasped Themistocles by
the right hand and commanded him to dedicate the young
men by cutting off their forelocks and then to offer up a
prayer and sacrifice them all to Dionysus, the Eater of Flesh,
for if this were done, it would bring deliverance and victory
to the Greeks. Themistocles was appalled at this terrible and
monstrous command from the prophet, as it seemed to him.
But the people, as so often happens at moments of crisis,
were ready to find salvation in the miraculous rather than 
in a rational course of action. And so they called upon the
name of the god with one voice, dragged the prisoners to
the altar and compelled the sacrifice to be carried out as the
prophet had demanded.’
(Plutarch Life of Themistocles XIII, 2; trans. Scott Kilvert 
1960: 90-91)
Plutarch’s piece refers to an episode during the
Persian Wars, just before the Battle of Salamis in 480
BC, led by Themistocles and the Athenian fleet. The
passage contains a great deal of interest in so far as
a direct connection is made between battle-captives
and human sacrifice within the context of great crisis.
The Persian prisoners-of-war are young, male, good-
looking and noble and the account demonstrates
the importance of acknowledging the juxtaposition
of high status and captivity in antiquity. Like
Homer’s ‘valiant sons of the great-souled Trojans’
(see opening quotation), these young, high-ranking
prisoners were clearly considered as valuable royal
hostages, and were deemed by the Athenian seer
Euphrantides as appropriate sacrificial victims to
Dionysus, even though ritual murder was repugnant
to Themistocles. 
One significant detail about the Salamis episode
concerns the treatment of the sacrificial victims’
hair: we have seen that the conquest-iconography
of both ancient Egypt and imperial Rome (Trajan’s
Column) includes a seemingly aggressive image of
subjugation, namely the grabbing of the captive’s
hair by the victor. Plutarch presents us with a varia-
tion on this theme that may help develop the way
we read this action. By cutting off the Persian pris-
oners’ forelocks, Themistocles is initiating the sacri-
ficial process, claiming the victims as the property
of the gods and robbing them of their identity. Hair
is a significant part of the persona; in many soci-
eties, rites of passage involve cutting or growing hair
and beards. In recording the rebellion of the Rhenish
tribes against Roman imperial rule in AD 70, Tacitus
describes a ritual action by the freedom-fighter
Civilis, saying that ‘After his first military action
against the Romans, Civilis had sworn an oath, like
the primitive savage that he was, to dye his hair red
and let it grow until such time as he had annihi-
lated the legions. Now that the vow was fulfilled, he
shaved off his long beard’ (Tacitus Histories IV: 61;
trans. Wellesley 1964: 247). Interfering with other
people’s hair against their will constitutes a physical
assault and a symbolic violation: cutting or shaving
hair (Fig. 10) changes appearance and may signify
an attempt to alter perceptions associated with age,
identity, gender and status. 
It is significant that so many northern European
bog bodies, suspected as being sacrificial victims or
otherwise marginalised individuals, show signs of
their heads being shaven shortly before death. This
happened to the young girl drowned and pinned
down in a marsh at Windeby in Schleswig-Holstein
sometime in the first few centuries AD, and to
another adolescent girl, strangled and placed in a
peat-bog at Yde in the Netherlands: in both cases,
half their hair was shaved shorter than the rest. A
male bog-victim at Windeby also had had his hair
shaved close; and a mature Danish female ritual
murder victim from Huldremose had her hair cut off
and placed beside her, one strand woven round her
neck (Green 2001: 117-18; van der Sanden 1996;
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Glob 1969: 114-16). It is interesting that, in dis-
cussing the customs and mores of certain Germanic
tribes, the Roman author Tacitus specifically men-
tions the infliction of head-shaving as a shaming,
punitive act, along with public stripping, flogging
and ejection from the marital home, on women
caught in adultery (Germania XII), treatment which
– like the more modern practice of tarring and feath-
ering – was designed to degrade and dehumanise
transgressors. It is worth mentioning a modern anal-
ogy, to which my attention has been drawn by Helle
Vandkilde (pers. comm.): after the Germans capitu-
lated in Denmark at the end of the Second World
War, vindictive Danes showed their desire to humil-
iate and wreak vengeance on the enemy by forcibly
cutting off the hair of girls identified as German. 
One of the panels on Trajan’s Column appears to
depict a group of naked Roman prisoners-of-war in
the charge of elderly Dacian women (see above),
who threaten them with fire and sword. Such an
image resonates strongly with a passage in Strabo’s
Geography, where he describes ancient Cimbrian
priestesses engaged in the sacrifice of battle-captives:
They were grey with age, and wore white tunics and over these,
cloaks of finest linen and girdles of bronze. Their feet were bare.
These women would enter the [army] camp, sword in hand, and
go up to the prisoners, crown them, and lead them up to a bronze
vessel which might hold some twenty measures. One of the women
would mount a step and, leaning over the cauldron, cut the throat
of a prisoner [of war], who was held up over the vessel’s rim.
Others cut open the body and, after inspecting the entrails, would
foretell victory for their countrymen.
(Strabo Geography VII: 2, 3; trans. Jones 1924)
Like the young Persians at Salamis, described by
Plutarch, Strabo’s Cimbrian victims were human
sacrifices, ritually killed in the context of warfare for
the purpose of ensuring victory. The Persians were
princes; we have no information as to the social sta-
tus of the Cimbrians, but the reference to crowning
is interesting. Such adornment implies that the pris-
oners were decorated for their ritual murder, in
much the same way as domestic animals were
adorned prior to their sacrifice in Classical cult-prac-
tice. Similarly, we have references to human scape-
goat sacrifices taking place at the southern Gaulish
city of Massilia, founded as a Phonecian Greek colony
in 600 BC and maintaining a mixed Gallo-Greek
culture centuries later. The scapegoat or pharmakos
was a familiar phenomenon in Greek city-states: an
individual of low status was chosen from the com-
munity, treated as a pampered and revered person
for a time and then driven out of the city, heaped
with curses and carrying away the townsfolk’s dis-
eases and misfortunes with him, thus purifying the
community (Hughes 1991: 139-65). According to
Roman literary sources, the Massilian scapegoat cer-
emony differed from the Greek in so far as the vic-
tim was actually killed, by stoning or being cast into
the sea. But the pre-slaughter ritual of cosseting and
dressing-up, including his adornment with a leaf-
crown, resonates with Strabo’s account of the hap-
less prisoner-of-war victims quoted above. His
description of sacrificial blood-letting provides a
link with a British ritual murder ritual recorded by
Tacitus who, in the context of the Roman destruc-
tion of the sacred grove on Anglesey in AD 60,
alludes to the horrors to be seen in the holy wood:
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F I G .  1 0 : Reconstructed stone statue of a seated war-
deity or chieftain, his hand resting on a shaven severed
head (perhaps symbolic of conquest); from a shrine at
Entremont in southern France. 3rd-2nd century BC. 
© Author (after Benoit 1981).
It was their religion to drench their altars in the
blood of prisoners and consult their gods by 
means of human entrails. 
(Tacitus Annals XIV: 30-31; trans. Grant 1956: 317)
Tacitus does not make it clear as to whether the
British victims were war-captives, rather than crimi-
nals or those guilty of sacrilege. We must be mindful,
too, that – even if the blood and innards decorating
the island shrine did belong to defeated combatants,
they may have been killed on the battlefield and
their bodies then used in victory-rituals.
So it appears that, in European antiquity, capture
and imprisonment were charged with multiple layers
of meaning. The abruptness of transition between
high and low status, the paradox of high native rank
and low captured rank and the link between prison-
ers-of-war and sacrifice may all be identified in the
ancient literature. The expediency of executing
troublesome enemies is juxtaposed with notions of
vengeance, catharsis and the selection of scapegoats:
lesser or foreign persons could be legitimate sacri-
fices to the gods of the victorious homeland. The
treatment of hair is especially fascinating, for hair
and interference with hair possess sophisticated
metaphoric intricacies associated with belonging,
exclusion, gender, denial of identity and shame. Hair
is a liminal bodily substance, growing from within
but appearing outside the confines of the body; it is
physically painless to cut it but doing so severs links
with the past and changes the persona of its owner.
Its continued growth beyond death perhaps gave
hair a magical, supernatural quality which some-
times had to be disempowered in the intended
humiliation of a victim.  
Heads and arms: decapitation, 
trophy-taking, and insult
When they have decided to fight a battle, it is to Mars that they
usually dedicate the spoils they hope to win: and if they are
successful, they sacrifice the captured animals and collect all 
the rest of the spoils in one place. Among many of the tribes it
is possible to see piles of these objects on consecrated ground. 
It is most unusual for anyone to dare to go against the
religious law and hide his booty at home, or remove any of the
objects that have been placed on such piles. The punishment
laid down for that crime is death by the most terrible torture’
(Caesar de Bello Gallico VI: 17; trans. Wiseman and Wiseman
1980: 123)     
The final section of my paper looks at post-battle rit-
uals involving the treatment of things belonging to
the vanquished, including weapons and the severed
heads of the fallen. All these items may be broadly
categorised as ‘trophies’, symbols of triumph and of
insult to the enemy. Caesar’s comment (above) is
important for it stresses the connection between
trophy-taking and religion in late Iron Age Gaul.
Furthermore, we have Plutarch’s description (above)
of Vercingetorix’s behaviour when surrendering,
namely the Gaulish war-leader’s deliberation removal
of his martial accoutrements in front of Caesar, an
act that signified not only defeat but the relinquish-
ment of status. 
There is a solid body of archaeological evidence
for the practice of weapons-trophy taking in later
Iron Age Europe, both in the form of iconography
and material culture. The so-called ‘war monument’
in the sanctuary of Athene Nikephoros at Pergamum
was set up in the early 2nd century BC to commem-
orate the victory of the Attalid kingdom over the
marauding Galatians (Szabó 1991: 335). The monu-
ment is carved with mountains of captured Gaulish
weapons, the trophies of war and is a poignant, per-
manent reminder of the defeated. This kind of highly-
visible statement can be identified on public iconog-
raphy in many parts of the Graeco-Roman world. The
triumphal arches of the 1st century BC at Orange and
Carpentras in southern France exemplify this tradi-
tion; they show images of battle-scenes, conquered
Gaulish prisoners and piles of weapons captured from
the enemy (Wiseman and Wiseman 1980: 197). 
The northern European Iron Age has produced a
rich array of ‘sacrificed’ weapons. Particularly evoca-
tive are the boat-offerings, and here I will cite two
Danish finds: the Hjortspring and Nydam boats. Both
vessels were deliberately sunk in peat-bogs, the former
in the 3rd century BC, the latter six centuries later.
Each boat was heaped up with weapons and armour,
some of it ritually broken, some showing battle-
wear (Randsborg 1995; Gebu˝hr 2001). The Nydam
boat was probably never used but fashioned espe-
cially for sacrifice in acts of planned deposition. It is
presumed that the the battle-scarred weapons were
booty taken from the enemy, though the victorious
might also have sacrificed their arms. Its purposeful
destruction finds resonance in a text written by the
Roman writer Orosius in the 5th century AD, com-
menting on a Germanic victory-custom apparently
driven by notions of ritual closure or riddance:
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The enemies who had stormed both camps and had gained
an enormous booty destroyed, as a result of an unknown and
unusual oath, everything that had fallen into their hands:
garments were torn and trodden into the mire, gold and silver were 
thrown into the river, armour was smashed, the decorative
horse equipment destroyed, the horses themselves were drowned
in the whirling current, the people strung up on trees with ropes
around their necks so that the victors retained no booty of any
sort and the defeated experienced no mercy.
(Orosius Historiae adversum Paganos V: 16, 1-7, 
after Gebu˝hr 2001: 10).
There is a group of ‘war sanctuaries’ in northern
Gaul belonging to the middle and later Iron Age,
whose investigation has revealed a complex kaleido-
scope of ritual including animal sacrifice and trophy-
offerings that took the form both of enemy weapon-
collection and display of dead battle-prisoners. At
both Gournay-sur-Aronde (Oise) and Ribemont-sur-
Ancre (Somme), literally thousands of weapons were
heaped up within the sacred precincts, many of them
deliberately destroyed or damaged first (Cadoux
1984; Brunaux 1996: 69-77; Brunaux et al. 1985;
Brunaux 1991: 364-65; Smith 2000: 152-63). The
weapons appear to have come from several different
regions of Gaul and Germany, suggesting that they
belonged to outsiders. The ritual breakage of war-gear
(Fig. 11) is often interpreted as an act of sacred vio-
lence, associated with the severance of martial offer-
ings from earthworld and their transference to the
otherworld (Bradley 1990; Green 2001: 50-51). But
it may make sense to turn the argument on its head
and suggest that such destructive action may be part
of ‘insult’ ritual, a gesture of contempt towards the
enemy whose swords and shields have been captured,
and a message of triumph to the gods of victory to
whom the spoils of successful warfare were dedicated.
Recent re-examination of the bronze carnyx from
Deskford in Scotland (Fig. 12) shows that it was ritu-
ally ‘decapitated’ before being deposited as an offering
in a peat-bog (Hunter 2001: 77-108), perhaps as an
act of contempt for an enemy object. It is certainly
possible to point to modern analogies, wherein the
arms of vanquished enemies are ceremonially broken
in front of them to signify their utter humiliation
and subjugation: this occurred after the Second
World War, when the Japanese Emperor surrendered
to the Americans in 1945 (Leaver, pers. comm.).
Gournay and Ribemont have provided graphic
evidence for the treatment of human bodies in a
ritualised context but which may again depict con-
tempt: the regional diversity of the weapons suggests
that the bodies subjected to ritual treatment – if the
erstwhile owners of these arms – were war-captives.
The great ‘ossuaries’ or bone-houses at the corners
of the sacred enclosure at Ribemont were constructed
from the limb-bones of about 1000 robust men in
the prime of their fighting lives. The deposition of
the long-bones was the end-product of a complex
procedure, including decapitation and removal of
the heads from the sanctuary, and dismemberment
of the bodies while the flesh was still on the bones;
more sinisterly, there is evidence from cutmarks that
the bodies were suspended (perhaps upside-down)
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F I G .  1 1 : Part of a group of six ritually-damaged copper-
alloy model spears, from a Romano-British sanctuary at
Woodeaton, Oxfordshire, central-southern England. 
© † Betty Naggar.
F I G .  1 2 : Ritually-decapitated copper-alloy boar-head
mouth of a carnyx, from a watery deposit at Deskford,
Scotland. © Paul Jenkins.
prior to (or for purposes of) their butchery (Cadoux
1984; Smith 2000: 152-63; Brunaux 2000: 14-18). If
this were true (and the interpretation has been chal-
lenged, notably by Chris Knüsel of the University of
Bradford: pers. comm.), then such inversion accords
with other evidence cited in this paper, namely the
late Iron Age inverted body at South Cadbury in
Britain, the Bronze Age rock-figures at Hamn in
Sweden and prisoners in Peruvian Moche ceramic
imagery. We should remember, too, the hung bodies
at Fesques (see above). 
The human bone-assemblages at Ribemont’s sister-
shrine of Gournay exhibit a rather different pattern
of ritual behaviour, particularly in so far as here sev-
ered heads were retained and displayed hanging
from the entrance to the sanctuary. As at Ribemont,
the bodies were mainly those of young adult men
but there is evidence that three women were also
present (Brunaux 1996: 69-77; Brunaux et al. 1985),
reminding us that prisoners-of-war consisted not
only of combatant males. The inclusion of women
and children in the prisoner-of-war record is well-
illustrated by examination of 14th century North
American Plains Indian warfare. Zimmerman (1997:
84) has drawn attention to osteological remains of
the ‘Crow Creek Massacre’ in South Dakota, which
included those of fertile-age women, clearly selected
as prisoners for their reproductive capacity.
In suggesting that the human heads at Gournay
were those of defeated battle-victims, such practice
accords with a convincing body of evidence for the
collection of enemy trophy-heads in Iron Age and
Roman Europe within a ritual context (see Fig. 10).
Many Graeco-Roman writers allude to head-taking
among the Gauls (for example Diodorus Siculus V:
29, 4; Livy X: 26). Livy even describes how the Boii of
Cisalpine Gaul cut off the head of the Roman gen-
eral Postumus in 216 BC and bore it off, with other
spoils of war, to ‘the most hallowed of their temples’
(Livy XXIII: 24). There is some specific archaeologi-
cal testimony to support such practice, notably at
southern Gaulish shrines, such as Roquepertuse and
Entremont, where the battle-scarred heads of young
men were fixed in niches. Sculpture from these loca
sancta depicts severed heads (Fig. 13), sometimes
hung from the saddles of war-horses (Benoit 1969:
pl. XXII), the latter an image repeated in Celtiberian
imagery (Fig. 14) (Green 2001: fig. 39, col. pl. 14).
What is more, elsewhere in Gaul there are images of
warriors brandishing severed heads: an Iron Age
potsherd from Aulnat in the Auvergne bears such a
depiction (Green 2001: 99, fig. 37), and Gallic coins
– from Alesia (Fig. 15) (Rapin 1991: 322; Green 2001:
98, fig. 38), for instance – show similar representa-
tions. Trophy head-taking was by no means con-
fined to Iron Age Europe: several panels on Trajan’s
Column depict Roman soldiers bearing aloft the
decapitated heads of Dacian prisoners, including
that of king Decebalus himself, as offerings to the
emperor (Le Bohec 1994: figs. 51, 109; Settis et al.
1988: pl. 28). The act of taking enemy heads com-
bines ritual, aggression, violence, triumph and con-
tempt (Fig. 16).
The foregoing discussion reveals a persistent pat-
tern of trophy-taking behaviour in barbarian Iron
Age Europe, from Gaul to Denmark, in which the
weapons of the defeated were either displayed as
testimony to victory or were ceremonially destroyed
in flamboyant performances of riddance or closure.
The bodies of the captured, too, were sometimes
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F I G .  1 3 : Stone frieze depicting alternating horses and severed human heads; from the Iron Age oppidum at Nages,
southern France. 3rd-2nd century BC. © Paul Jenkins.
similarly treated and, in some communities, partic-
ular emphasis was placed on the significance of the
human head. Such trophies were, perhaps, valued
both for themselves, because of the perceived sacred
symbolism of the head, and because they presented
highly dramatic evidence of their owners’ shame.
Conclusion
This enquiry has focused upon patterns of ritualised
behaviour associated with war, defeat and imprison-
ment as presented in ancient literature, iconogra-
phy and material culture. Questions of high and low
status, the abrupt transition from one to the other,
issues of insult, contempt, fear and triumph have
been explored, together with the imagery associated
with foreignness, exclusion, dishonour, loss of iden-
tity, restraint, submission, ownership and sacrifice.
In investigating the symbolism of submission with-
in the context of conflict (Fig. 17), it has been use-
ful to make comparisons between ancient and mod-
ern societies and, in antiquity, between communi-
ties in temperate Europe, Egypt and even as far away
as Peru, for it is clearly possible to identify ways of
presenting subjugation that recur over time and
space, and familiarity with one society’s ‘currency’
of meaning may well inform our understanding of
another’s practices. A good example is the gang-chain,
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F I G .  1 4 : Late Iron Age Celtiberian copper-alloy fibula
in the form of a horseman with a severed human head
beneath the horse’s mouth; Numancia, northern Spain. 
© Paul Jenkins.
F I G .  1 5 : Late Iron Age coin depicting a Gallic warrior
holding a severed human head in each hand; from
Alesia, Burgundy, Central France. © Anne Leaver.
F I G .  1 6 : Skull of young adult man showing signs 
of trauma; from a grain storage pit at Danebury. 
© The Danebury Trust.
a form of detention and restraint that is loaded with
both practical and metaphoric significance; the
wrought-iron gang-chains found in ritual contexts in
late Iron Age Gaul and Britain gain resonance from
an appreciation of the way such – essentially similar
– chains were used within the 19th century French
penal system. 
In the same way, it is possible to make meaning-
ful linkages between the contemptuous treatment of
prisoners’ hair in contexts as disparate as Roman
Dacia, Pharaonic Egypt, the Peruvian Moche and the
Taliban under American guard in 2002. Indeed, the
ancient societies studied here present an uneasy
similarity with the present. This paper has touched
upon many uncomfortable aspects of conflict all
too familiar to us: genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass
deportation, retaliation, physical abuse, public and
ritualised humiliation are all attested in the texts,
archaeology and imagery relating to warfare, con-
quest and capture in the European Iron Age and
beyond.
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Ever since the first fossil remains of australo-
pithecines were discovered, we humans have specu-
lated whether certain lesions on bones are evidence
of aggression between individuals throughout the
stages of our evolution. A few holes in the skull of an
Australopithecus africanus from South Africa were
initially interpreted as evidence of violence commit-
ted by other australopithecines. Some of our oldest
ancestors were therefore seen as ‘killer-apes’. Later on
however, Bob Brain, a distinguished South African
professor of anatomy, suggested that the holes
matched puncture-holes made by the canines of a
leopard. Our ancestors were therefore no longer con-
sidered to be aggressive killers, but vulnerable victims
of the many roaming wild carnivores (Brain 1972).
Similarly, our view of aggression among the
Neanderthals has gone through several stages of
interpretation which mostly reflect the changing
political and philosophical ways of thinking. At
times, especially during periods of unrest and battle,
the Neanderthals were seen and illustrated as
aggressive creatures, whereas in other periods, i.e.,
the 1960s, they were mainly seen as peaceful, harm-
less ‘hippie-like’ individuals (Trinkaus and Shipman
1992). Our own perception of our ‘natural instincts’
changes: in war they are used as an excuse for man’s
cruelty to man. These fluctuations in perception run
parallel to the endless discussions on how nature
and culture influence human behaviour and their
levels of aggression. There are many ways of studying
patterns of human aggression and violence and wars
of the past. One way is to study the remains of bones;
but once again the interpretation of lesions on
bones is crucial when drawing decisive conclusions.
Human burials
Mass graves or individual graves situated outside a
cemetery may indicate an unusual preceding event.
If the remaining skeletal material is well preserved
lesions, fractures and abnormalities of the bones
may reveal the nature of the event. However, the
discovery of a mass grave does not necessarily mean
that a war was waged in the vicinity. It is well known
that victims of various epidemics, such as plague,
cholera etc. were buried in mass graves as well. Such
graves contain a majority of the remains of children
and old people, whereas young individuals, who
supposedly have the strongest immune systems,
had a better chance of recovery. The demographic
pattern in a mass grave may therefore reflect that
part of a population succumbed to a disease which
does not necessarily leave any visible traces on the
bones of a skeleton.
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Rebellion, Combat, and Massacre: 
A Medieval Mass Grave at Sandbjerg 
near Næstved in Denmark 
P I A  B E N N I K E  /21
Mass graves are found all over the world, and can
be traced to all periods in the history of mankind.
Two Mesolithic skull-pits discovered at Ofnet in
Germany contained the remains of c. 32 individuals:
5 males, 10 females and 17 sub-adults. Because of the
unusual and rather strange arrangement of the skulls,
the pits were named the ‘skull-nests’. Many of the
skull fragments exhibit a variety of lesions, and the
find is thought to be related to a massacre (Frayer
1997). Collective megalith graves in Denmark have
been dated to the Neolithic periods and represent a
different kind of mass grave. In contrast to mass
graves from later periods, collective megalith graves
from the Middle and Late Neolithic were functional
over a long period of time. They could contain over
100 individuals, and the number of injuries seen
on the remaining bones is rarely unusually high
(Bennike 1985a).
The remains of several humans have been discov-
ered in several Danish bogs. The bones are mainly
from the Early Neolithic and the Iron Age. It is still
unknown whether these individuals ended their
days in the bogs as votive offerings, as punishment
for committed crimes or because they were enemies
(Bennike 1985b). In a few cases, a number of injuries
are visible on the skeletal remains (Sellevold et al.
1984).
A Viking Age cemetery with c. 132 inhumation
graves was excavated at Trelleborg. One mass grave
contained the remains of 12 individuals buried next
to each other, suggesting that they were buried at
the same time. The skeletons lay on their backs point-
ing East-West, and the majority was male. There
were almost no traces of injuries on the bones, but
that might be attributed to the fact that the latter
were poorly preserved. The dental status was reported
as ‘very good’ and might be related to the low aver-
age age of the individuals and/or favourable living
conditions. The author of the report therefore sug-
gested that the individuals may have been a group
of elite soldiers (Christophersen 1941).
So far, no mass graves have been found in
Denmark containing victims of the plague epi-
demics that swept the country in the mid-14th cen-
tury and again later. However, 56 skeletons were
found in a single burial plot connected to a building
in Copenhagen used to house plague victims in
1711. Surprisingly, all the children (23%), males and
females were buried in coffins, instead of having
been pushed into the grave in a panic. Isolated bones
of several hundred victims of a cholera epidemic
which hit Copenhagen during the 19th century
(Bonderup 1994) have been excavated and are now
stored at the Laboratory of Biological Anthropology
in Copenhagen.
Considering the number of battles and wars that
were fought in Europe throughout the past, only a
few mass graves have been discovered and excavated.
Many may still be intact, but it is also possible that
victims were left on the battlefields to wild animals,
weathering and post mortem decay, destroying the
bone structure itself. This is what happened to bones
discovered in Aljubarrota, Portugal which were dated
to 1385 AD. Almost all that was left of the skeletal
remains of at least 400 individuals was fragmented
shafts of long bones (Cunha and Silva 1997). A
recent study of 38 skeletons of victims of the battle
of Towton in North Yorkshire in 1461 AD (Fiorato,
Boylston and Knüsel 2000) suggests that some of the
more than 28,000 men who are believed to have
died during this particular combat suffered the same
fate. The battle of Towton was part of the Wars of
the Roses (1455-1487 AD), a civil uprising during
the fight for the throne. The skeletal remains of the
38 individuals were found in a mass grave and the
bones had a total of 113 skull injuries, an average of
3 per individual, of which 73 were sharp, 28 blunt
and 12 puncture wounds. In addition, 43 postcranial
injuries were found.  
Until 2001, three mass graves (with the skeletal
remains of c. 1,200 individuals) at the site of Visby
in Gotland, Sweden, were the only ones to have
been excavated in Scandinavia. During the battle of
Visby in 1361, a large part of Gotland’s male popu-
lation succumbed to the Danish King Valdemar
Atterdag’s army. The skeletons of the 1,200 men were
disposed of in three large mass graves, which are the
largest medieval graves in Europe ever to be subjected
to anthropological study – by Ingelmark in Bengt
Thordemann’s book published in 1939. The many
skeletons lay in random positions except for in one
of the graves, where the uppermost twenty skeletons
lay parallel to one another with their heads to the
west as prescribed by medieval tradition.
In 2001, an area of 7m2 revealed the skeletal
remains of c. 60 individuals divided into three pits
with different categories of bone deposits 1) com-
plete skeletons, 2) whole limbs and 3) disarticulated
bones. The remains were probably gathered some
time after the battle and buried in three different
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pits according to their stage of decomposition. The
excavated area is believed to be only a smaller part
of a much larger area containing one or more further
mass graves which have not been excavated. The
majority of the 60 skeletons were males, 20-30 years
of age with an average height of c. 170 cm. Whereas
the skulls and skull fragments had 86 cut lesions (an
average of 1.6 cuts per skull) only a few (11) such
lesions were found on the postcranial bones. The
skeletal remains are believed to belong to the victims
of ‘The Battle of Good Friday’ which took place in
Uppsala, Sweden, in 1520 AD. According to a pre-
liminary report presented as a poster (Kjellström
2002) the battle was fought between the Danish King
Christian’s troops and rebels loyal to Sten Sture, the
Swedish national administrator. 
The mass grave from Sandbjerget 
in Næstved
It seems only natural to compare the finds from pre-
viously excavated mass graves with a newly detected
one in the so-called Sandbjerget (‘Sand Hill’) in the
town of Næstved in Denmark. Three C-14 dates show
that the grave is from around 1300 to 1350 AD. An
anthropological study of the skeletal material found
at this site is the subject of this article. Sandbjerget is
a 41 m high ridge in Næstved, on Southern Zealand.
After the town was established during the Iron Age
(c. 1,500 years ago) the ridge functioned as a wind-
break for the town, as grazing ground for cattle and
as a source of sand for pottery, for floors and as foun-
dations for cobble-stoned streets. After a preliminary
excavation in summer 1994, it became clear that the
hill also functioned as a burial site including a mass
grave. Records from the old archives revealed that
several graves had been observed in the 19th century.
One grave contained a clay vessel which was dated
to around 1,000 AD. Another grave contained three
skeletons, one of which had its skull placed between
the thighbones. This was customary when burying
criminals. Written sources described that one grave
was different from the others as it contained the
skeletons of at least 30 individuals and that many
of those had fatal injuries. It was reported that a
spearhead was found among the many bones.
Unfortunately, the remains of all the graves have
been lost, including the bones (Hansen 1995; 1996).
The excavation of the new mass grave, an area of
12 m2, took place during the winter 1994. An
anthropologist (the author) and a museum conser-
vator assisted the excavating archaeologists. With
the little time granted for the excavation, an efficient
collaboration between various specialists proved to
be of great value in terms of paving the way for the
subsequent anthropological studies of the skeletons.
It became clear that every single bone had to be
marked and removed separately. As there was no
time to make drawings, the problem was solved by
extensive use of the stereo-photogrammetry tech-
nique to document the exact position of the skele-
tons in relation to one another. Each bone was num-
bered on photographic enlargements and registered
with accompanying remarks on its position and on
the skeleton it belonged to. The mass grave appeared
to be 1.5 m deep and four layers were produced using
the computerised facilities. This method allowed
the bones belonging to the individual skeletons to
be identified and collected together in boxes later. 
Correlating sections of the key diagram of all the
skeletons to the number of excavated skulls revealed
that the latter were more or less evenly distributed
throughout the mass grave. As previously mentioned,
there was no clear pattern with regard to the orien-
tation of the bodies. Although some bodies lay more
or less parallel to the edges of the grave, the heads
were not placed in any particular direction. The pref-
erence for an orientation of the head to the west,
north-west or south-west (22 cases) compared with
an orientation to the east, north-east or south-east
(16 cases), seems not to be significant. 
It is impossible to reconstruct the manner in
which the grave was filled, but the 18 m3 space avail-
able (assuming that the grave was 1.5 m deep)
would have left very little room between the
corpses. Had they been pushed in, one might have
expected to find more of them lying on their back,
their abdomen, or on their sides, parallel to the
edges of the grave. If they were thrown into the
grave by the arms and legs, they would certainly
land in random positions. The survey diagram illus-
trates that the skeletons were found in all orienta-
tions and positions, with a few parallel to the edges
of the grave suggesting that both scenarios are prob-
ably correct (Fig. 1).
The bodies were thrown or pushed into the c.
12 m2 and 1.5 m deep grave without any regard for
the customs usually adhered to in burial procedures
during the Middle Ages. Their heads pointed in all
directions; their arms were not positioned systemat-
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ically according to tradition. The task of disposing of
the naked, lifeless bodies, with numerous fatal skull
injuries and faces disfigured beyond recognition by
swords and axes (Figs. 2 and 3), must indeed have
been an abhorrent one. Exceptionally few belongings
were found among the bones: three small rivets, three
buckles, two of iron and one of bronze. This suggests
that the victims were stripped of everything before
burial, coins in the pockets, belts and clothes with
buttons. This was, however, the custom of war during
the Middle Ages. All possessions and weaponry
belonged to the victor. The skeletons in the Sandbjerg
grave in Næstved may well be the remains of victims
of a rebellion or battle (Hansen 1995; 1996).
During the Middle Ages, corpses were traditionally
buried in consecrated soil lying on their backs with
the head pointing west. Their arms were positioned
in various ways, e.g. stretched alongside the body, or
bent at different angles with the hands placed some-
where between the level of the hips and breastbone.
The position of the arms was to a certain extent
related to the different medieval periods. The hands
often rested high up on the chest during the late
Middle Ages, while they were positioned lower down
during the earliest periods (Kieffer-Olsen 1993). Gifts
and possessions were rarely buried with the deceased.
Very few medieval skeletons have been found in
other than the customary burial position, for example
with their head pointing to the East. Such deviations
may have been purely accidental or an expression of
revenge or punishment for a social misdemeanour,
so that when the deceased was resurrected he/she
would not be facing the rising sun (equivalent to
Christ). To be buried in unconsecrated soil, as was
the case for five decapitated men and one woman
(Bennike and Hansen 2001), who were found in the
garden of Næstved Town Hall, was probably a more
severe punishment. Numerous sharp cuts are seen
on these skeletons as proof of decapitation. Two of
the decapitated individuals were laid out with their
heads pointing towards the west – either accidentally
or as a gesture of respect – even though they were
buried in unconsecrated soil. They were C-14 dated
to 1300-1350 AD, and are more or less contempora-
308 . W A R F A R E ,  R I T U A L S ,  A N D  M A S S  G R A V E S
F I G .  1 : A. The layout of the skeletons in the uppermost of the four photographed grave-layers. Skeleton no. 16 (Fig. 2)
was found with its mouth open and arm stretched out sideways. Skeleton no. 5 (Fig. 7) lay perpendicular to no. 16.
Skeleton no. 4 (Fig. 5) is barely discernable. Drawing: Per Poulsen. B. Drawings compiled from photographs of the skele-
tons in each of the four layers of the mass grave using special photogrammetric technique. The characteristic medieval
practice of laying out a corpse in a supine position with its head pointing west was clearly violated in this case. Drawing:
The National Museum and Næstved Museum. 
➣
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neous with the skeletons in the Sandbjerg mass
grave in Næstved.
Deviations from normal burial habits, be they
medieval or present day, are therefore an expression of
extraordinary circumstances, e.g., a misdemeanour,
a murder, a battle or massacre. Breach of tradition
occurred primarily when one wanted to dispose of
a body quickly, without any particular gesture of
respect or visible evidence of ceremony. No atten-
tion was paid to positioning the body correctly. This
is clearly illustrated in the large Sandbjerg mass
grave in Næstved. However, deviations from normal
medieval burial habits also occurred under other
circumstances, for instance when many individuals
died simultaneously, thus disrupting the social struc-
ture. Survivors would not have had the strength to
carry out burials according to normal procedures.
Moreover, owing to the dangers of contamination
and since it was not known how viruses and bacteria
spread at the time, the smell of death would be
reason enough to bury the dead within twenty-four
hours. Much later, in 1853, when Copenhagen was
struck by a cholera epidemic (Bonderup 1994), the
victims were buried in mass graves.
The number of victims
The anthropological examination of the single
bones and bone fragments, some of which had more
or less disintegrated, led to the conclusion that c.
sixty individuals had been buried in the mass grave.
This estimation was based on the number of bones
listed in Table 1.
The sixty preserved right femurs and 60 right
ulnae would seem to indicate that there were at least
sixty individuals in the grave. However, one cannot
exclude the fact that a few of these bones may acci-
dentally have been registered twice due to their frag-
mentation. The registration of the sixty skulls/skull
fragments was much more complicated, rendering it
impossible to use the skulls as the sole indicator of
the number of individuals; several separately regis-
tered skull fragments may have belonged to a single
individual.
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F I G .  2 : Skeleton no. 16 with numerous injuries to the
back of the skull. The face with open jaws seems to reflect
agony and despair. Photographer: Jens Olsen.
F I G .  3 : Skeleton no. 31 with both sides of the chin cut
off. Photographer: Jens Olsen.
Gender
Sex determination of a skeleton is based on a num-
ber of criteria, such as the larger, heavier bones and
muscle attachments of the adult male. Moreover,
the shape of several bones, for example the skull and
pelvis, is also an indication of whether the skeleton
is male or female. Unfortunately, many of the exca-
vated pelvic bones and other fragile and spongious
parts of the skeleton, which are included in gender-
determination criteria, had disintegrated. But the
remaining intact pelvic bones were those of adult
males. Three had certain female characteristics, but
other preserved parts of the respective skeletons
exhibited prominent male characteristics. Gender-
determination is rarely 100% accurate (5-10% uncer-
tainty is not uncommon). This concurs with the fact
that a few bones, including skull bones, among the
Sandbjerg skeletons had female characteristics, even
though the rest of the respective skeleton was dis-
tinctly that of an adult male.
There was no indication that any of the skeletons
in the mass grave were female. The same conclusion
was reached after the examination of the skeletons
found in the three mass graves at Visby on Gotland
(1361 AD).
Age
The age at death is determined according to a num-
ber of age-related characteristics on various parts of
the skeleton. The extensive disintegration of many
of the pertinent bones, for example the pelvis and
ribs, precluded the use of some of the most depend-
able criteria for determining the age of the Sandbjerg
skeletons. In most cases, the degree to which the
sutures of the skull had ossified was definable. This
criterion, however, only serves as a rough estimate
of an individual’s age: child or young, middle-aged
and old adult. The estimated age is then compared
to the average dental attrition of the first two molars,
which was registered systematically (Smith 1991).
Table 2 lists dental attrition values as the sum of the
two molars’ degree of attrition, whereas the age
groups are derived from a number of other studies
(Brothwell 1981, and others). This comparison gives
rise to a slight discrepancy between the numbers of
individuals in the various age groups based on the
observed dental attrition, and those based on the
degree of ossification of the cranial sutures; but in
both cases the two youngest age groups (i.e., indi-
viduals under 30 years of age) add up to 57% of the
total number of skeletons. 
In a previous study of medieval male skeletons
(Bennike 1985b) the age distribution based on the
same criteria produced a similar slight discrepancy
in the number of individuals; but 49% belonged to
the two youngest age groups, while 41% and 10%
were delegated to the older and oldest age groups,
respectively. Thus, the age distribution of the male
skeletons from Sandbjerg does not vary significantly
from what is found among males in an ordinary
medieval graveyard. Contrary to the age distribution
in contemporary armies, and to what one might
have expected in a medieval ‘army’, the victims in
the Sandbjerg grave were not all young males. 
When dental attrition is used as a criterion for age
determination, it is essential to have some knowl-
edge of the overall attrition pattern in the given
population. The difference between attrition of the
first molar (which erupts around the age of 6) and
the second (which erupts around the age of 12)
in very young individuals is part of the pattern.
Dental attrition was much more severe in various
age groups during the Middle Ages in Denmark as
compared to the same age groups in the modern
population. It was even more severe in prehistoric
periods.
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Table 1: Number of bones
R L R+L
Femur 60 55 115
Tibia 55 56 111
Humerus 59 50 109
Ulna 60 49 109
Radius 56 48 104
Foot/parts of 57 45 102
Pelvis 51 51 102
Fibula 34 39 73
Hand/parts of 40 33 73
Patella 33 35 68
Clavicula 23 18 41
Spine/parts of 44
Ribs/parts of 42
Lower jaw 56
Upper jaw 53
Skull 58
Skull/lower jaw 56
Skull/skull fragments 66
The epiphyses (ends) of the long bones in three
skeletons had not yet ossified, indicating that they
were the remains of very young individuals. Judging
from the size of the bones, these young persons
were between 16 and 18 years old when they died.
Several age-related changes on a skeleton are also
among the criteria used to determine the age at
death. These include osteoarthritis and degenera-
tion of the jaws, both of which are rarely seen in
young individuals. There were relatively few cases or
traces of osteoarthritis of the hip, wrist or elbow
among the skeletal remains. The scarcity of remains
of very young individuals and the scarce evidence of
osteoarthritis confirm the pattern of age distribu-
tion as established by the degree of dental attrition
and ossification of the cranial sutures; there were
very few individuals in the youngest and oldest age
groups. The majority of the victims were between
18-20 and 50-60 years old when they died, most of
them young adults.
Stature
It was impossible to measure the height of each
individual in situ because of their position in the
grave and the degree of preservation, fragmentation
and disintegration. Instead, stature of adults was
measured according to a method developed by
Trotter and Gleser (1952) by which the length of
the thighbone (femur) is used to calculate the total
height of the individual. This method is not totally
accurate as it does not take individual body propor-
tions into account. The average length of the thigh-
bone (47.5 cm) and the calculated average height of
the victims in the Sandbjerg grave (175.7 cm) are
listed in Table 3, together with the respective values
derived from other studies of skeletons from various
periods in Denmark. 
In comparison, the average height of the victims
from Visby on Gotland – calculated according to the
same method as the Sandbjerg skeletons – was 170.4
cm. The Næstved victims were 5 cm taller. The dif-
ference in height may be explained by the fact that
the majority of men from the Visby graves are pre-
sumed to represent local farmers, whereas the
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Table 2: Age distribution
Age groups Attrition Degree Dental attrition Cranial sutures
Juvenis  (< 18/20 yr.) 5 – 6 3 (6%) 6 (13%)
Adultus  (18/20-25/30 yr.) 7 – 10 27 (51%) 20 (44%)
Ad/maturus  (25/30-40/50 yr.) 11 – 14 17 (32%) 16 (36%)
Senilis  (> 40/50 yr.) 15 – 16 6 (11%) 3 (7%)
Adult  (unspec.) (> 18/20 yr.) 5 15
Table 3: Height (men)
Period No. Femur (cm) Height (cm)
Sandbjerget, Næstved 1300 49 47.5 175.7
Tirup, Jutland* 1100 – 1300 82 47.0 174.6
St. Jørgen, Odense* 1250 – 1450 152 47.2 175.0
Council hall garden, Næstved 1300 4 46.0 172.3
St. Peder’s graveyard, Næstved 1100 – 1800 13 44.5 168.8
St. Mikkel, Århus* 1000 – 1529 58 47.4 175.5
Calculated according to Trotter and Gleser 1952
*Boldsen 1993
Næstved skeletons may either represent a more pro-
fessional group of ‘soldiers’ selected among the taller
men, or individuals from a higher social class who
grew up under more favorable conditions than their
average contemporary farmer counterparts. However,
a femur length of 47.5 cm (Table 3) is not entirely
unusual in skeletal material from the Middle Ages,
although they certainly were among the tallest. The
distinct difference in height between the Visby and
Næstved skeletons may represent geographical and
even genetic differences expressed in two different
populations.
Not all the Næstved skeletons were exceptionally
tall. The plotted lengths of the femurs form a curve
with a normal distribution. The longest femur meas-
ured 53 cm, which represents a height of 188.5 cm.
The shortest femur measured 42.5 cm which corre-
sponds to a total height of 164.1 cm. 
Dentition
An examination of the dentition revealed that a few
of the Sandbjerg victims suffered from a number of
dental diseases which must have caused them con-
siderable pain. Tooth-loss can either be calculated as
the percentage of individuals who have lost teeth
relative to the total number of individuals, or as the
percentage of lost teeth relative to the total number
of teeth per individual. Teeth are registered as ‘lost’
when the alveolae in the jaw have closed complete-
ly and been absorbed, which happens over time.
There was relatively little tooth-loss among the
Næstved skeletons. Only 9% of the skulls had lost
one tooth or more. By comparison, a general study
of medieval populations in Denmark concluded
that the loss of teeth per skull was 26% (Bennike
1985b). The percentage of tooth-loss in relation to
the total number of teeth was 0.6% among the
Sandbjerg skeletons, whereas in the 1985 study it
was 2% (Table 4).
The number of cases of caries is calculated in much
the same way as the number of lost teeth. Fifteen out
of fifty-eight Næstved individuals had one or more
teeth with caries – 26% as compared to 28% in ‘other
medieval populations’ (Table 4). The frequency of
cases of caries per tooth in relation to the total number
of registered teeth is 2%, which is somewhat lower
than the 4% found in ‘other medieval populations’.
However, the latter includes both male and female
skeletons, except for tooth-loss per total number of
teeth (Table 4). In the comparative group, the inci-
dence of dental disease was higher among females
than among males; this fact may distort the com-
parison between the two groups to a certain degree.
The relatively good dental condition among the
Næstved victims could be linked to the fact that
there were more young individuals than in the com-
parative group, although the difference is relatively
small. The incidence of parodontal disease with
exposed dental roots was low, which is confirmed
by the low incidence of tooth-loss. There was little
evidence of hypoplasia of the enamel, which is char-
acteristic of crises such as diseases and/or malnu-
trition suffered during childhood and adolescence.
This might be seen as an indication of relatively
favorable conditions during the individuals’ early
years of life. 
Lesions
One of the main objectives of the anthropological
study was to determine the events that led to the
presumably simultaneous death of so many men. As
the mass grave is dated to the 1300s, the many
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Table 4: Tooth-loss and caries pr. individual pr. total number of teeth
Tooth-loss pr. individual pr. total number of teeth
Sandbjerget, Næstved (5/58) 9 % (8/1379) 1 %
Other medieval pop.* (29/111 m/f) 26 % (35/1541 m) 2 %
Caries
Sandbjerget, Næstved (15/58) 26 % (28/1371) 2 %
Other medieval pop.* (30/109) 28 % (85/2283 m/f) 4 %
*Bennike 1985b
deaths might possibly be attributed to the so-called
‘Black Death’ plague epidemic, which broke out in
the middle of the 14th century. However, this expla-
nation can be rejected partly because there are no
remains of women and children among the victims
and partly because the skeletons bear evidence of
innumerable and massive lethal injuries and lesions
(Fig. 4).
Skeletons rarely reveal the cause of death; not
even in the case of bubonic and lung plague. Most
diseases affect the organs and soft tissues, which
deteriorate soon after death and leave no visible
traces on the skeleton.
Any evidence of healing processes of lesions on
bones may indicate that the victim survived for
more than 2-3 weeks. In contrast, lesions with sharp,
unhealed edges without any cell reaction indicate
that the victim either died immediately or very
shortly after the wound was inflicted. The Sandbjerg
skeletons provide innumerable examples of the lat-
ter. This raises a number of questions with regard to
the number, shape and position of the lesions on
the skeletons, to the weapons that were used to
inflict the injuries, and to the context in which the
weapons were used.
Unfortunately, most of the skulls were crushed by
the pressure of the soil and should therefore have
been examined minutely in situ. The lack of time
forced us to settle for the second best solution: the
museum conservator encased the best-preserved
skulls in plaster during the excavation. These speci-
mens were later taken to the Laboratory of Biological
Anthropology where they were ‘unwrapped’, cleaned,
and studied by the author under more favourable
conditions.
The disintegration of bone tissue and the pres-
sure-induced crushing of the bones made it difficult
to identify many of the lesions accurately. Moreover,
lesions inflicted by blunt weapons, such as clubs, are
more difficult to identify than the sharp cuts or
slashes seen on many of the fragmented skulls. The
same is true for lesions inflicted by arrows or spears.
The only lesions that could be identified accurately
and registered were those that left sharp and/or
smooth edges on well preserved bones, e.g., wounds
inflicted by swords and axes. There were no arrows,
spearheads or parts of other weapons lodged in the
bones or the soil.
Far from all the lesions on other parts of the
skeletons could be accurately identified because of
extensive damage to the bones. For example, the ribs
and spines had disintegrated to a large extent, as
had the pelvic bones and shoulder blades. As previ-
ously stated, the soft tissues deteriorate very soon
after death, and lesions on them leave no traces on
the bones. 
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F I G .  4 : Skull (excavation no. 955) with a very deep,
sharp-edged lesion on the left parietal bone. The blow
came from above and was undoubtedly fatal.
Photographer: Jens Olsen. 
Table 5: Cranial lesions
R L R/L
Forehead 11 12 23
Nasal bone 2
Facial bones 5 8 13
Lower jaw 18 17 35
Temporal bone 3 9 12
Parietal bone 13 15 28
Occipital bone 3 6 9
Total 53 67 122
Front: (Forehead, nasal and facial bones, lower jaw)  56
Side: (Temporal and parietal bones, forehead, lower jaw)  50
Back: (Occipital and posterior part of parietal)  16
In spite of the many limitations, it is quite
remarkable that hundred and twenty-two lesions on
the skulls could be identified accurately (Table 5);
but it must be kept in mind that these only amount
to a small minority of the actual number of injuries
that must have been inflicted on the Sandbjerg vic-
tims. Most of the skulls, in fact over 90% of them,
bear evidence of more than one lesion (Fig. 5). One
skull has a total of nine lesions! The few skulls that
do not seem to exhibit any visible traces of lesions
may indeed have been injured as well; the evidence
may have been lost through deterioration of the
bone tissue around the affected areas. On average,
each skull bore a little more than two lesions.
Figure 6 illustrates the position of the numerous
lesions on a skull model. Only nine are situated on
the occipital bone, with three on the right and nine
on the left temporal bones, respectively. Roughly
half the lesions are situated on the front of the skull,
the facial bones and the mandible. They are almost
evenly distributed on the left and right side in con-
trast to those on the right and left temporal bones.
Skulls excavated at Visby (Ingelmark 1939) and at
Æbelholt Monastery (Møller-Christensen 1982)
exhibit decidedly more injuries on the left side than
on the right. It was therefore rather surprising not to
find the same pattern on the skulls from Sandbjerg.
The higher frequency of left-sided lesions on the
Visby skulls, (69%) as compared to the right-sided
lesions, and a majority of left-sided lesions on the
Æbelholt Monastery skulls have been explained by
the fact that, in face-to-face combat, a right-handed
enemy would inflict most injuries on the left side of
the adversary’s skull. Right-handedness was as com-
mon as it is today, which is reflected in the fact that
the vast majority of medieval skeletons have slightly
heavier bones on the right side of the skeleton than
on the left (Steele 2000). 
The usually distinct left-/right-sided pattern is so
vague on the Sandbjerg skeletons that it is ques-
tionable whether the combatants actually fought
face-to-face. If the Sandbjerg victims were attacked
by surprise, one would expect to find relatively more
injuries to the back of the head. On the contrary,
the number of injuries to the front of the skull/face
is rather high, and would probably have been higher
if the fragile facial bones had been as well preserved
as the more robust cranial vault. It was also unusual
to find that sixteen individuals (30%) had been
struck in the teeth, which break in characteristic
patterns when struck with sharp weapons. In many
cases the fracture continued into the adjacent part
of the jaw (Fig. 7).
The postcranial bones exhibited sixty-three visi-
ble lesions (Fig. 8), which were more or less evenly
distributed on the bones of the left and right sides.
Most of them are seen on the larger, best-preserved
bones, namely the bones of the arms and legs,
although many of the absent, more fragile bones
could have exhibited many lesions as well. There
was no obvious difference in the number of injuries
on the bones of the upper and lower extremities.
The distribution, gravity and number of injuries
and lesions on the foreheads, faces and jawbones
give rise to a number of questions. Did the warriors
wear helmets to protect the back of their heads? Did
they wear visors? Does the lack of a left-/right-sided
pattern in the distribution of the injuries and the
many lesions on the skulls mean that the warriors
were also attacked after they had been fatally wound-
ed and lay defenceless with their helmets removed?
This still does not explain why there are almost
twice as many lesions on the skulls than on the rest
of bones, unless the body was protected by armour.
Were the attackers on horse-back so that their blows
mainly struck the men on the head? Is it conceiv-
able that the victims were driven into the grave and
attacked from above? There are endless possible
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F I G .  5 : Skeleton no. 4 with four almost parallel slashes
on the cranial vault. The injuries were inflicted with a
sharp weapon e.g. a sword or ax, and look like the result
of a massacre. Photographer: Jens Olsen.
explanations, some of which would appear to be
more credible than others. If these were profession-
al soldiers they could well have carried armour
including helmets, etc.
The patterns of injuries on the skeletal remains
from the battles of Towton (Fiorata et al. 2000) and
Uppsala (Kjellström 2002) seem to be rather similar
to the distribution of lesions on the skulls from
Sandbjerget. There are few differences between the
number of injuries on the right and left sides, a large
number of sharp injuries scattered on the cranial
vault and fewer on the facial bones. In general, there
seem to be fewer injuries on the postcranial bones
than on the skull. The victims are believed to have
been professional soldiers. The study of the skeletal
material from Towton concludes that the battle
must have been large, multifaceted and brutal and
fought with very efficient weapons of war (Fiorato et
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F I G .  6 : The injuries are more or less evenly distributed on the left and right sides of the skull model, but there are
many on the facial bones. Drawing: Pia Bennike, photographer: K. Stub-Christensen.
al. 2000). The same seems to be true for the skeletal
remains of the Good Friday battle at Uppsala in
1540 (Kjellström 2002). Our interpretation of the
fate of the Sandbjerg skeletons suggests that the
men buried in the mass grave were victims of pro-
fessional warriors with efficient weapons. There is
little to go by with regard to whether they were pro-
fessional fighters themselves. The fact that they all
had relatively few postcranial injuries may indicate
that they wore some kind of protection (which the
victims of the battle of Visby who were mainly local
farmers had not). Furthermore, the Sandbjerg vic-
tims were rather healthy individuals as reflected by
the few pathological bone changes and good dental
conditions. Finally, the evidence of several hand
injuries may indicate that they did fight before they
were killed, which means that they may have been
professional fighters like those from Towton and the
Good Friday battle at Uppsala. 
There have been discussions on why the skull
injuries seem to be so numerous in the various
skeletal samples from mass graves, because helmets
were known and used for protection at the time. It
has therefore been suggested that some of the skull
lesions may have been inflicted after the enemy was
deadly wounded and the helmet removed, but it
cannot be proven. More detailed studies of the
single lesions are necessary in order to elucidate this
question. 
Conclusion 
The anthropological study of the Næstved skeletons
revealed that around sixty male individuals were
buried in the large mass grave at the Sandbjerg. A
couple of skeletons were not yet fully developed and
had only slightly worn teeth, indicating that they
were the remains of very young men. There were also
316 . W A R F A R E ,  R I T U A L S ,  A N D  M A S S  G R A V E S
F I G .  7 :  A violent blow with a sharp weapon displaced
the right upper row of teeth inwards, and split two of the
teeth on skeleton no. 5. Photographer: Jens Olsen.
F I G .  8 : The distribution of the 63 lesions on the post-
cranial bones. There is no significant difference between
the number of injuries on the left and right sides or on 
the bones of the arms and legs. Drawing: Pia Bennike. 
a few skeletons of individuals who were well over fifty
years of age. Their teeth were very worn, and several
had developed osteoarthritis of the joints. However,
most of the victims were between the ages of 18 and
50; the majority was between 18 and 30 years old at
the time of death. This might indicate that we are
dealing with a group of professional soldiers. 
There were undoubtedly many more than the
hundred and twenty-two registered skull injuries. The
number of lesions on each skull varied, and only a
few skulls were devoid of any injury. One skull
exhibited nine severe wounds, but on average each
skull had two. There were sixty-three distinguish-
able lesions on the postcranial bones; each skeleton
had an average of three lesions. The lesions were
more or less equally distributed on the left and right
sides of the skeletons and were most easily identi-
fied on the best-preserved bones, namely the bones
of the arms and legs. The number of injuries on the
bones of the extremities was evenly distributed
between the arm and leg bones.
Generally speaking, the wounds were evenly dis-
tributed on the left and right sides of the cranial
bones except for those inflicted on the temporal
bones. Three were found on the right and nine on
the left temporal bones, respectively. The overall
pattern is rather inconsistent with what has been
described in other studies of similar cranial lesions.
Skulls from the battle of Visby on Gotland in 1361
and from the medieval Æbelholt Monastery have a
distinct majority of injuries on the left side of the
head, indicating that the blows were dealt by right-
handed adversaries. The lack of such a pattern on
the Næstved skulls could be indicative of the fact
that this particular battle was not fought face-to-
face, or that the victims wore protective helmets.
Other forms of battle and/or protective amour should
therefore be considered in the case of the Næstved
skeletons. The pattern found at the Sandbjerg
might, however, suggest that in this case swords
were wielded in a cutting-fashion from right to left
and back again.
The calculated average height of these men was
175.7 cm, which is considerably more than the aver-
age 170.4 cm for the skeletons found in the three mass
graves at Visby. This might support the notion that
the Sandbjerg victims were part of a small army of
professional soldiers. However, the average height of
the Sandbjerg victims correlates well with that of
other skeletal finds from the Middle Ages in Denmark.
The dental condition among the Næstved skele-
tons was relatively good, with a lower frequency of
tooth-loss and caries than that found among other
Danish medieval skeletal remains. This seems to cor-
relate well with the idea that those buried in the
mass grave were relatively young healthy men
employed in an army.
Three C-14 dates corrected for the reservoir effect
show that the mass grave most probably dates back
to 1300-1350 AD, during the civil war in Denmark
which began after the death of King Valdemar Sejr
in 1241 and lasted until Valdemar Atterdag re-estab-
lished peace in the country around 1367.
Two historical sets of events took place around
the time the mass grave was established and the 60
men died. The first seems to have taken place a little
earlier than indicated by the C-14 dating. Three
battles were fought between the Danish Royal army
and groups of Danish or German noblemen. Wars
were expensive and the country was poor. Money
was borrowed from noblemen who gradually
became more powerful; sometimes too powerful for
the king’s liking.
From 1288 to 1293, noblemen under the leader-
ship of Marsk Stig Andersen Hvide and their
Norwegian counterparts waged wars along the
Danish coasts in revenge for having been outlawed
for their involvement in the murder of a Danish king.
Their war of revenge in 1289 is well documented in
written sources. They terrorised and plundered
many of the cities close to the west coast of Zealand.
Næstved was one of the largest and wealthiest towns
at the time (Hansen 1995). The town was definitely
worth attacking, but whether it was worth dying for
is another question. Outlaws were always buried in
unconsecrated soil, which correlates well with the
situation of the Sandbjerg mass grave.
The second historical event took place in 1344
when King Valdemar Atterdag besieged the
Holsteiners’ fortifications in Næstved and conquered
the fort the following year. The mass grave may
either have been established by the surviving
Holsteiners after the siege in 1344 or by Valdemar
Atterdag’s people after the conquest in 1345. The
victors may have cleaned up the battlefield, collect-
ed all military equipment and personal belongings
before disposing of the corpses in the mass grave.
Møller-Christensen (1955) excavated a leprosy ceme-
tery with 700 individuals in Næstved, and studied the
skeletal remains in great detail. It is interesting to
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note that none of the victims in the mass grave or in
any of the other ‘ordinary’ cemeteries exhibited any
evidence of having had the disease, in spite of the
fact that the cemeteries are all from the same period.
A kinship-study would very likely establish
whether the victims came from the local area or
were foreigners. The skeletal material from several
excavations at this particular site may provide a suf-
ficient sample for such a future study. An additional
study may include occupation and activity related
bone changes. Such a study has recently shown
interesting results based on the bones of the skele-
ton crew of King Henry VIII’s Great Ship, the Mary
Rose (Stirland 2000).
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Introduction
In the Early Nordic European Bronze Age, almost
4000 years ago, people began, more scrupulously
than before, to make artefacts specifically designed
for warfare. These artefacts were weapons forged in
metal, shaped for use in close combat. Swords, dag-
gers, axes and spears became important personal pos-
sessions and depositing them in burials and hoards
reinforced their symbolic meaning. Despite this
fact, archaeologists have traditionally believed the
Bronze Age to be a peaceful and prosperous period
in our prehistory. One may ask why large invest-
ments of energy were put into the weapons if these
weapons were not used at all. Did the Bronze Age
people live in harmony only driven by the desire to
secure agricultural wealth and religious prestige?
As mentioned above, 150 years of research has
presented us with the view that the Early and Middle
Bronze Age (Montelius’ period II-III) was a time of
prosperity and peace and weapons were made for
symbolic use hence ignoring the potential of bronze
weaponry in war. Or as Øystein K. Johansen put it in
his latest work from 2000: 
Researchers as a whole agree that the Bronze Age appears to
have been a quiet and calm period. We cannot detect any
major changes in people’s living conditions during the Bronze
Age. Neither violent events, nor migrations or anything simi-
lar can be detected in the material (Johansen 2000: 144, my
translation)
I do not claim that this is altogether wrong.
However, my point is that the skeletal material tells
us stories about a less peaceful and easy life. Kristian
Kristiansen’s recent work supports such a more
nuanced view. He argues that the inability to recog-
nise warfare in prehistoric societies can be blamed
on the academic traditions developed after World
War II. Warfare in the past did not fit well with the
idea of building a modern welfare society (post-war)
and archaeologists were therefore more focused 
on rituals and religion (Kristiansen 1999b: 175).
Additionally, his studies of wear patterns on swords
should be taken as strong indications of violent
encounters.
In connection with writing my thesis at the
University of Bergen, I have analysed extensive
Norwegian skeletal material dated to the Middle
Bronze Age. The focus has been on an assemblage of
skeletons with trauma at Sund, Inderøy in Nord-
Trøndelag, comparing these with the results of an
analysis of skeletons from burials, notably cairns,
from the same geographical area – at Toldnes. The
results of these examinations are presented in this
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paper and brought together with Kristiansen’s
analyses of swords. Ethnographic examples will serve
as analytical tools in approaching Middle Bronze
Age warfare in Norway.
This article will thus focus upon the organisation
and perception of warfare in Bronze Age society in
Central Norway (Nord-Trøndelag), in particular
based on the evidence collected from human skele-
tal material.
Violence as structuring principle
Violence, or rather the prospect of violent acts, can
clearly be seen as having a structuring effect on socie-
ty as it is part of definition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and
acts as ‘moral glue’ to unite a society. Schröder and
Schmidt (2001) looks at violence as 
not necessarily confined to situations of inter group conflict
but as something related to individual subjectivity, something
that structures people’s everyday lives, even in the absence of
an actual state of war. (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 1)
Violence can, in some cases, even be perceived as a
ritual activity in itself, and hence as a normal part of
everyday life. The Apache tribe of North America
exemplifies nicely the connection between vio-
lence/war and rituals. An ethnographic description
of Western Apache society, during the nineteenth
century, distinguishes between two kinds of warfare.
On the one hand there were raiding parties, which
had the explicit goal of obtaining material goods,
notably food. On the other hand were the revenge
parties that set out to wage war on a specific enemy
group in response to the death of a relative. War was
a ritual practice charged with religious meaning and
an important element in upholding culturally defined
moral values. War expeditions, under strict ritual
regulations, formed part of the rites of passage of
boys becoming men. These male rites were strongly
connected to the puberty rites performed for, and
by, the girls. Organised violence was considered just
as important as resource procurement and various
household activities reflected in the girls’ rites of
passage, as both were believed to be vital in securing
the survival of society.
Thus, war would have both collective and indi-
vidual sides to it. The collective side would be to take
revenge, to demonstrate power, and to fulfil social
responsibilities. The individual side would be to
obtain personal gratification, material wealth and
social prestige (Schröder 2001: 146-49).
The Cheyenne tribe, also in North America, is a
classic example of the importance of alliances and
warrior societies. The Cheyenne had a military organ-
isation based on military/warrior societies, which
cut across normal kinship relations. Each warrior
society was named, had an internal organisation,
and consisted of men of all ages, who joined volun-
tarily and became members for life. The formal
organisation was only operational during the sum-
mer months, so for the rest of the year the warriors
would live in scattered camps with their own kin.
The Cheyenne war chiefs were the officers of the
military societies, each of which had two headmen
and two ‘servants’. The war chief was elected for life
but would normally appoint a younger man as chief
if he were no longer fit to lead himself. His ‘mem-
bership’ would still be valid – securing the personal
status – but he would be free of any responsibilities.
In cases where the war chief died, all the members
of the warrior society would come together to elect
a new chief. A war chief could not be tribal chief at
the same time. This ensured that military and social
power were never in the hands of a single person
(Llewellyn and Adamson Hoebel 1942: 99-102).
In modern day society the evidence of violence as
a structuring principle can be found on all levels –
from the domestic to state. On a state level, the pos-
sibility of war helps defining ‘us’ as a group against
‘others’ or the ‘enemy’. Hence the military, which
would be redundant without the prospect of war, is
a powerful marker in the creation of national or
ethnic identity (Fyllingen 2002a: 58).
I would like to advocate the following view on
violence and war: violent acts are hardly ever ran-
dom but express some sort of relationship to the
opposing part. Violence is never completely without
meaning to the actor and is never an isolated act; it
is part of a historical process and a part of defining
a group’s ideology, and can actually be seen as a
meaningful action when associated with ritualised
operations like sacrifice, hunting and war (Schröder
and Schmidt 2001: 1-14). It becomes ritualised pre-
cisely because it crosses the boundaries between life
and death (Blok 2000: 24-29).
War is a state of confrontation in which the pos-
sibility of violent encounters is always present. This
means that people do not necessarily get physically
hurt on an everyday basis, but the threat will always
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be present, and is not gender specific. The decision
to go to war will not be unanimously reached, but
will be made – even in the most egalitarian societies
– by those holding power. Still, the entire society will
profit from (the cultural meaning of) war as it con-
tributes to legitimating power, and possibly create
material goods for the victors (Schröder and Schmidt
2001: 1-14). Individuals are creative forces in society,
with a ‘free will’, but still (self-evidently) structured
by norms and laws in society. A person always has a
choice and will make this choice based on personal
and social needs (both culturally defined), in other
words, what will benefit the ego both biologically
and socially (Fyllingen 2002a: 59).
My attempt to connect violence and rituals, as
described above, is based on Schröder and Schmidt
2001. Violence is considered not necessarily as an act
but as an idea. Violence is meaningful action with a
ritualised operation (Blok 2000: 24-29). Violence is
not a ritual in itself, but the ritual lies in taking part
in actions of violence, notably war. It is the concept
of violence, manifested in warfare or raiding, which
is structuring. This means that the act of violence, e.g.
war, does not structure society but the idea of ‘us’
and ‘them’ (mentioned above), the fear of attack and
collective memory (history) – all contributing to the
decision of going to war – does. Within a social set-
ting this would imply that personal status is obtained
through participation in a ritualised action. A social
setting will also contribute to social status on the
individual and collective levels. The status of the
individual could be described as that of a ‘war hero’
who carries both the physical evidence of war, i.e.
physical disabilities, scars etc, as well as personal
attributes like a sword or other insignia. On a collec-
tive level, personal status is substantiated through
burial or, as we will see, rejected through the lack
of such.
As I will show below, such ‘war heroes’ – or those
of special status if you will – may be detected in
skeletal material through the physical evidence of old
and new violent trauma inflicted by metal weapons
and in burials through the weapons themselves.
Archaeological evidence 
of violence and battle
Evidence of combat and violence in Middle Bronze
Age may be found in three specific fields: I) Weapons
were made for the first time specifically for hurting
humans, as they had little or no value in hunting;
II) Many rock art motifs from Norway and Sweden,
for example, depict armed males – with axes or
swords – in addition to scenes of ‘fighting’, i.e. sev-
eral individuals with weapons and individuals in
boats with arms (mostly axes); III) Skeletal material
shows both healed and fresh evidence of violent
trauma (Harding 2000: 271, 275; Fyllingen 2002a;
2002b; 2002c). K. Kristiansen (1983) has analysed
sword types from the Early Bronze Age in Denmark
in order to establish whether or not all swords were
used in battle and if so, how they connected to spe-
cific groups within society. He found that the major-
ity of swords had been damaged and had patterns of
sharpening that indicated long-term use. During
period II (1500-1300 BC), the position of the sharp-
ening shows that stabbing must have played an
important role (during battle). In period III (1300-
1100 BC), by contrast, the entire blade (not only the
point) tends to be heavily sharpened. This suggests
that the swords were now also used for cutting. In
both periods, the luxurious metal hilted swords show
few traces of wear and damage compared to other
types of swords, most particularly the flange-hilted
swords, which quite evidently were made for use in
battle. Kristiansen believes the differences between
the metal hilted swords and the flange-hilted swords
to be the result of social relations. The metal hilted
sword belonged to the chief, and primarily embodied
symbolic meanings and social functions; these
swords actually occur in the wealthiest graves. The
flange-hilted swords used in battles would, by com-
parison, have belonged to a class of warriors, even if
the chiefs and the warriors belonged to the same
social sphere. Kristiansen consider this to corre-
spond to the difference between the political- ritual
and the military kind of power. The two kinds of
power helped to maintain a warrior tradition and to
enhance the high esteem of leading families
(Kristiansen 1983).
At Toldnes, one of the areas in question, two
swords have been recovered – one metal hilted and
one flange-hilted – both belonging to period II/III
(Gaustad 1965: 12-14; Rygh 1906: illustrations).
The interpretation of combat scenes on rock carv-
ings in Scandinavia will not be discussed in length
here, since this subject clearly deserves thorough
attention. I will limit myself to making the reader
aware of the fact that many rock carving scenes, pri-
marily from Southeast Norway and Bohuslän, depict
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people engaging in fighting. They seem to be male
figures carrying swords, or wielding axes ready to
strike, and often the figures appear as groups in boats.
Also, boats seem to have played an important part
in rock art, which may reflect their importance as a
medium of transportation, for example in raiding or
warfare. It should be mentioned that such human
figures do not appear on rock carvings from
Trøndelag, the area of study. Boat carvings, on the
other hand, are rather abundant in the area.
As for the evidence of violence on human skele-
tons, this will be discussed below. 
Archaeological evidence of violent trauma
Archaeological artifacts like weapons highlight the
threat of violence, but not its outcome. Investigation
of injury and mortality patterns may help assess the
environmental and social influences on behaviour
(Larsen 1997: 109-19) as the location of the injury
on the body provides information on how the vio-
lence was inflicted. Ethnographic evidence suggests
that in some instances the intention was only to
maim the opponent while other sources, i.e. from
the Middle Ages, shows that one struck to kill. The
latter can be seen on skeletons where some of the
(lethal) injuries were inflicted after the victim was on
the ground or fleeing from the scene, for instance
lesions on the right posterior of the cranium or to
the back. A large number of cranial injuries (from
the Stone to the Middle Ages) suggests face-to-face
battle with lesions on the left side indicating a right-
handed attacker, but could also be implying that
helmets were not worn for protection. Additionally,
lesions to the arms are most often defense injuries
while injuries in the abdominal area indicate that
the person was not using a shield at the time of
impact (Larsen 1997: 157ff).
Pia Bennike (1985) has examined all skeletal mate-
rial from Danish prehistoric and medieval periods.
When it comes to violent trauma, she found that
adult, often middle aged, men are the victims and
that most attacks have been with the intention to
kill, as most lesions are found in the chest area. A
few people also seem to have been executed. When
looking at the prehistoric skeletal material and the
bog corpses together, it seems that the common
methods of execution have been decapitation, stran-
gulation and cutting of the throat – only the first
being detectable in skeletons and seemingly quite
‘common’ in the Iron Age. In cases where the
weapon is still present in the body, it is most often
an arrow. Other injuries are consistent with warfare
as the large number of trepanations also indicates
(Bennike1985: 104-19).
Scenarios like the ones described above can assist
the archaeologist on the road to ‘discovering’ social
patterns in prehistory. In theory, injury patterns can
provide us with clues to how an incident took place.
They will tell us whether people engaged in face-to-
face battle, distance battle – e.g. shot in the back –
or if the person in question was executed. Old injury
patterns, i.e. healed lesions, are indications of past
conflict, and combined with fresh lesions may lead
us on the track of an ongoing violent conflict. Also,
the lesion in itself can provide information on
which type of weapon inflicted the injury. In other
words, were the flange-hilted swords in Kristiansen’s
study used on human flesh?
A case study from Norway
In 2000 I carried out osteological analysis of nine
Early and Middle Bronze Age sites – eight cairns and
one mass grave – which comprised between thirty-
five and forty individuals. The osteological reference
books consulted, and the methods of analysis used,
are Brothwell 1981; Larsen 1997; Mays 1998; Ortner
and Putschar 1981; Roberts and Manchester 1995;
Sneppen, Bünger and Hvid 1998; Trotter and Gleser
1958; Trotter 1970 and Ubelaker 1989.
The main material was a mass grave/burial pit
from Sund, Inderøy, and a large burial site at Toldnes,
Sparbu, in the county of Nord-Trøndelag. As there
is no reference material of Norwegian human bones,
I decided to analyse five other cairns from Nordland
County in the north to Østfold County in the
southeast. All the skeletons are from inhumation1
burials and have been dated to the period 1800-1100
BC based either on 14C analyses and/or burial goods
or burial type.
Toldnes/Holan is an area between two farms with
at least twenty-two burial cairns dated to the Bronze
Age.2 Excavations were carried out between 1879
and 1905 by the eminent archaeologist Karl Rygh.
His descriptions are very thorough and tell us about
twenty-two cairns containing some forty stone-cists,
bronze burial goods (twenty-one artifacts) and at
least fifteen preserved inhumations. By Norwegian
standards Toldnes/Holan is our richest Bronze Age
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burial site. There are two swords from the site, one
metal hilted from Toldnes (Cairn I, T.2204) and one
flange-hilted from Holan (Cairn XIII, T.7501) – both
period II-III. Neither was found with the presented
skeletal remains.
Unfortunately, at the time of excavation, skele-
tons were not valued for their information and only
the burials with well-preserved skulls were taken to
the museum. Today, seven individuals – six adults
and one child – can be identified as belonging to three
different cairns, all from the area of the Toldnes farm.
Of the six adults – three female and three male –
pathological conditions could be detected in three.
Toldnes I – is a female (T.1267/A.I.3772)3 aged
25-50 with rickets in the ulna (Fig. 1). The skeleton
is from Cairn II (Rygh’s number) and she was buried
with a bronze dagger (T.1265) and a bronze celt
(socketed axe) (T.1266).4
Toldnes II – Male (T.2408/A.I.3729) aged 35, 173
cm tall. He has rickets in the right tibia. This male
was buried with a female, aged 25-35, and a child
under the age of 5. There were no artifacts in the
grave.
Toldnes III – Male aged 25-35, 185 cm tall. The
tendon at the right radial tuberosity has been sev-
ered – possibly at a very early age – resulting in the
tuberosity being turned inwards. Abnormally marked
blood vessels on the lower extremities – especially
the femur – are indications of a cardiovascular con-
dition.
Generally the bones from Toldnes are well pre-
served. None of the individuals shows any degener-
ative changes to the skeleton or any evidence of vio-
lent trauma (Fyllingen 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; Rygh
1906).
Sund (T.18863/A.I.5186) is situated on a long,
small strip of land 12 km southwest of Toldnes. In
1967 large concentrations of inhumed human and
animal bones were found on gravel deposit in con-
nection with commercial exploitation of the gravel.
The bones lay on top of the gravel, right below the
topsoil, covering an area of 10-15 m, and could be
divided into six mixed concentrations. Northwest of
the skeletons there was a coal pit, possibly a hearth,
and a ditch was visible as a semi circle in the gravel.
None of the structures could be directly connected
to the skeletons. Radiocarbon dating pointed towards
the middle part of the Bronze Age – 1500-1100 BC.
The only recovered artifact was a bone needle
belonging to the Late Neolithic/Middle Bronze Age.
Within the piles of human bones were also bones
from rodents, a small ruminant, horse and mam-
mals. Nothing in the find makes it stand out as an
obvious burial. The excavators did not agree on how
to interpret the find, and have suggested it being
either a destroyed burial or remnants of a house. So
far, no Bronze Age burial has been recorded in the
vicinity (Farbregd, Marstrander and Torgersen
1974).
Due to the fragmentary nature of the material,
identification of individuals was extremely difficult
and sexing only possible in four cases. I operate with
a minimum number of twenty-two, but the real
number is considered to be higher. 50% of the indi-
viduals were children under the age of 15 – some-
what uncommon in Bronze Age burials. 54% of the
adults show evidence of both healed and fresh
trauma, which is what I will concentrate on here. In
addition there were several cases of degenerative
changes – arthritis and spondylosis (63%) – and evi-
dence of osteochondritis dissecans, cribra orbitalia
and enamel hypoplasia in the children (10%).
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F I G .  1 : Toldnes I (A.I. 3772). Female, age 25-50, with 
rickets in the ulna. Notice the severe curving of the bone.
Sund I – This is an individual between 17 and 25
years; sexing was not possible. There is a 2-3 cm long
cut to the temporal bone. The cut has healed, but the
edges have not fused. The cut is shallow and would
not have been a serious injury. The lesion was prob-
ably inflicted with a metal blade.
Sund II – This is an older adult, probably over 35-
40 years; sexing was not possible. One lumbar ver-
tebra shows a small calcification of the body due to
either a slipped disc or a small piece of broken bone.
This must not be confused with Spondylosis. The
left ulna has degenerative changes (lipping) proxi-
mally – at the elbow joint – a (secondary) result of
the trauma to the humerus. The left humerus has a
1-1.5 cm long cut between the medial epicondyle and
the trochlea. The cut is healed, but not fused, and
must have severed several muscles, hence the arthri-
tis (Fig. 2). This injury is a defense injury, inflicted
by a metal blade, which would have occurred as the
person protected him/herself from an attack by rais-
ing the arm towards the attacker. The reason why
the damage was not more severe can be put down to
the blow either not being very well carried out or
going through a shield, or other means of protection,
before connecting with the arm.
Sund III – This is also an older adult; sexing not
possible. The individual has a healed fracture of a
metacarpal.
Sund IV – Adult individual over the age of 25;
sexing was not possible. One thoracic vertebra with
a 1,5 cm long, 1-2 mm deep cut across the anterior
side of the vertebral body. The cut has one deep and
one shallow end. There are no signs of healing (Fig.
3). The injury was inflicted by a metal blade, possi-
bly a sword, which had been thrust through the
abdomen and into the spinal column.
Sund V – This is an old adult between the ages of
45 and 60; sexing was not possible. There is evidence
of a healed lesion, possibly a fracture, at the distal
end of the right radius resulting in deformation of
the styloid process and arthritis of the wrist.
Sund VI – An adult (over 25 years) female with
three parallel cuts going across the shaft of the first
foot phalanx. No signs of healing. The cuts were
made with a sharp blade, and it appears as if some-
one tried to cut off the big toe.
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F I G .  2 : Sund II (A.I. 5186). Older adult with healed
cut to the left humerus between the medial epicondyle
and the throchlea. View of distal portion of the humerus
and proximal portion of the ulna.
F I G .  3 : Sund IV (A.I. 5186). Adult individual with a
cut going across the anterior part of a thoracic vertebra.
The cut shows no signs of healing and would have been
fatal.
➞
➞
Sund VII – Adult (over 25 years) male. The neck
of the left femur has a 1.5 cm long cut across the
anterior surface that appears to be peri-mortem. At
the fovea capitis there are two triangular lesions. The
lesions show no healing and appear to have been
made with a pointed object. The angle of the wound
shows that the stab must have been inflicted from
the front, through the lower abdomen/pelvic region.
This wound is very likely to have been the cause of
death (Fig. 4). The left ilium has a healed, but not
fused, fracture at the auricular surface. The os sacrum
has a fracture of the 2-3 first vertebrae posterior and
seems to have been completely dislocated. The frac-
ture is healed, but L5 has fused with sacrum and there
is only one joint between L4 and L5 on the left side
(Fig. 5). The supraspinal ligament has calcified, so the
trauma would have taken place several years prior to
death. This kind of severe fracture cannot be caused
by falling, but is a consequence of the person being
hit or kicked in the lower back. This sort of injury
could very well be inflicted by a stone axe or club.
There was also a fragment of a thoracic vertebra
with the left transverse process broken off almost
completely. A small piece must still have been intact,
but has broken off post-mortem. A healed, but not
fused, fracture of the upper part of the left lamina,
probably partially disconnected the spinous process.
The superior articular process has a new facet formed
laterally. The superior costal demifacet is pushed dis-
tally as a result of the rib not being in its place. The
new facet is larger and more pronounced (Fyllingen
2002a). 
Ritual and violence 
– an alternative social structure
After going through the skeletal evidence and now
comparing this to the archaeological finds and the
theories presented I believe that there seem to have
been two strata among the Bronze Age people – one
of them being the Warriors. I will now explain why
this conclusion is plausible.
Malnutrition, starvation, dental attrition, cribra
orbitalia, rickets and 13C results all point towards a
diet based on farm products and meat. This is sur-
prising as these people lived by the sea and close to
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F I G .  4 : Sund VII (A.I. 5186). Adult male with deep
impressions in the head and neck of the left femur. The
lesions were probably inflicted by a triangular shaped
metal blade and show no signs of healing. This is possibly
a fatal wound as it probaly severed a major artery in the
groin area.
F I G .  5 : Sund VII (A.I. 5186). Adult male with healed
crush injury to the os sacrum. Notice the calcified liga-
ment. Posterior view.
➞
➞
an abundant source of food. Could this be related to
religious practice? It is possible that a food taboo
existed among the elite preventing them from con-
suming fish. Another angle is that when agriculture
replaced hunting/fishing as the main means of sub-
sistence religious changes also took place. Agriculture
is often accompanied by fertility rites in order to
secure the crops and make the animals breed. Social
innovations could have been dominant enough to
replace the existing way of life over time. A histori-
cally known example from Iceland describes how
knowledge gets lost over time due to the social impli-
cations of farming and strong links to the ancestor’s
(ideal) way of living:
K. Hastrup (1995) uses historical sources to describe
events taking place between AD 1400 and 1800. On
Iceland a clear social division existed between farm-
ers and fishermen. Farming was controlled by strict
laws and was also connected to the ways of life in
the ‘old land’ – the homeland of the first settlers.
After the Plague the population decreased by 40%
and in order to get farming started again, the govern-
ment passed laws designed to make fishing a less
attractive occupation. The result was that during the
next 200 years Iceland suffered from a collective loss
of skills, and the failure to exploit the potential of
fishing entailed increasing material poverty. The
powerful self-image was found in the Sagas repre-
senting traditional values rendered the Icelandic
people helpless when it came to creating their own
history (Hastrup 1995: 108-18).
Kristiansen (1987) has shown how swords are only
found in elite burials, with certain types of swords
showing evidence of battle. A sword in itself is a
huge investment and a strong symbol as we can see
for example in the rock art. It also appears to have
been a personal object as it followed the person in
the grave and is not part of the (collective) hoards.
Kristiansen has presented a different ritual symbol-
ism represented by the metal hilted sword and the
flange-hilted sword as traces of use can barely be
detected on the metal hilted swords while the flange-
hilted show extensive use. Both are found in chiefly
burials, on occasion accompanied by ‘ritual’ war axes
(i.e. axes not intended for practical use), and are
thought to represent two strata among the elite.
In his paper from 1999 he develops this idea fur-
ther. Through the burial goods, head gear, dress code
and rock art he finds evidence of both a ritual chief
and a warrior chief – twin rulers. These two chiefs
ruled side by side and were responsible for the polit-
ical and ritual power in society. In some instances
they might have been buried next to each other, evi-
dent in two cists as primary burials, but normally
they were buried individually under a ‘chiefly’ bar-
row (Kristiansen 1999a: 540-49).
I would like to look more closely at the chiefly
systems presented by Kristiansen (1983; 1987; 1999a;
1999b) and Harding (2000) as I find them very use-
ful in understanding and interpreting Sund and its
relationship to the burials at Toldnes.
The well-known term ‘chiefdom’, used by the
archaeologists presented in this paper, derives from
the systems of social organisation developed by E.R.
Service based on ethnographic investigations and
published in 1971. He divided social organisation
into an evolutionary system starting with the Band,
followed by the Tribe, the Chiefdom and finally the
State. The chiefdom is a kinship based hierarchical
system governed by a chief and with an economic
system based on redistribution. As the chief is the
person in power he (as most chiefdoms are believed
to be patriarchal) is responsible for distributing food
and material goods among his people. Only one man
occupies the office and the position is inherited.
Chiefdoms will always be riddled with conflict as
the chief will have to fight other groups in order to
maintain the territory of the chiefdom and secure
the flow of goods and possibly also women (according
to Service) as one tends to practice exogamy, marry-
ing outside the clan, in order to keep up political
relations. Having connections to other chiefdoms
through marriage is a good way to maintain peace
but also to secure a loyal alliance in the case of war.
Religious practice will include ancestors and has a
function in establishing social statuses among the
living as genealogies become important. The ritual
leaders in the chiefdom will consist of a priesthood
that governs society together with the chief. The
religious and the secular leader will often descend
from the same family, or may even be one and the
same person, securing political and religious power
within a single family/clan (Service 1971: 145-68).
I suggest that the people at both Toldnes and
Sund belonged to elite groups. By elite I am referring
to groups in society with a strong social position,
both ritually and military, controlling large areas of
land and resources – independent of access to bronze
as this might not have been as vital in Norway as it
was further south. As there are only 12 km between
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the two places they might even belong to the same
clan. Settlements have not been located, but it is
possible that the population in this area originated
from the same settlement.
The skeletal material proves that ‘everyone’
shows signs of malnutrition continuously through
life.5 Hence there is no difference between each indi-
vidual when it comes to distribution of food, or
which types of food were consumed. A difference
only becomes apparent when we look at the inflicted
violent trauma, as no lesions have been detected on
the bodies from the cairns.6 This could be important
for two reasons: 1) It may tell us who the Toldnes
people were, and 2) It may tell us why the individu-
als at Sund were targeted.
These questions can be answered by comparing
new and old injuries of a violent nature. Judging
from the injuries on the Sund population and the
manner in which the bodies are treated, I believe
that the Sund people belonged to a warrior segment
in the local area of Inderøy/Sparbu. As some of the
injuries are old, at least 5-10 years, the occurrences
of violence had been repeated. Of course we do not
have enough bodies from Toldnes to exclude them
totally as participants in warfare; the presence of
both a metal and a flange-hilted sword in the burial
cairns and the absence of trauma make the interpre-
tation ambiguous.
Still, taking both Kristiansen’s articles from 1987
and 1999 into consideration together with ethno-
graphic description of both the Apache and the
Cheyenne, I suggest a possible division between the
ritual leader and the war leader in the Nord-
Trøndelag Middle Bronze Age society. The evidence
of violent attacks is present and as both sword types
are also found there should, according to Kristiansen,
be a specialisation of social responsibilities.
The result of trade and war
The theory of how bronze was obtained is based on
a system of trade, redistribution and possibly reci-
procity. This is dependent on an economic surplus,
as one needs goods to trade. Long-term starvation is
hardly consistent with an economic surplus, so maybe
we need to look at alternatives for how this metal
was obtained. I do not exclude trade as the source of
the bronze found in Central Norway, but only want
to suggest an alternative view based on the osteo-
logical analyses of health, nutrition and trauma.
It is obvious that bronze was a material of high
value both economically and symbolically, so we can
imagine that owning it and being able to deposit it
in burials and hoards would add to the status of an
individual or a family. With the bronze being such
an important social communicator, people would
have gone to great lengths to secure the supply.
I have suggested, based on Harding (2000) and
Kristiansen (1983; 1987; 1999a; 1999b), that the elite
had a ‘professional’ military system with its own
warrior society. The reasons for going to war or raid-
ing are many. It could be a strictly personal motive
– a revenge party – or a raid setting out to obtain
goods. During a raid it would be in the group’s best
interest to try to avoid violent encounters by getting
in and out fast. On the other hand, violence would
be important during war, as one attempts to hurt the
opponent and return as victors. The warrior group
would have been respected for its ability to secure a
flow of bronze and protect society, and their statuses
were probably different from, but just as important
as, those of the religious leaders.
It is not possible to distinguish between warfare
and raiding in the archaeological material (presented
here), hence I tend to alternate between the two
terms. The way I use the terms here is that raiding
was used to obtain material goods, while warfare
was more of a political act. Raiding would probably
also mean that one set out with a smaller group of
warriors than one would during war. Raiding and
warfare could have been used to obtain bronze
directly or to secure the flow of bronze by making
sure alliances were maintained and trade routes safe.
The warrior society at Sund would have had a
special position. The ability of a warrior to walk the
fine line between life and death – and protecting
society – would have resulted in achieved status
according to the accomplishments of the individual
warrior. Alliances would have existed between soci-
eties, through negotiation and possibly marriage,
securing the military force of the local communities.
The presence of violent conflict, either immediate
or as a possibility, would structure society, as it kept
people together and ensured the status and power of
the elite. As seen in the ethnographic examples, the
violent encounters could have had ritual implica-
tions that added to personal status and to the idea
of an esoteric section in society. Old injuries would
have been carried with pride, as symbols of noble
deeds in the past. ‘War heroes’ carrying their sword,
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the strongest symbol of power, must have had a
calming effect in the every day struggle for exis-
tence, as one knew crops, cattle and people would
be protected. As a result the violent and deadly out-
come of war also symbolised life and survival.
War and punishment 
– the desecration of war heroes
In order to understand the actions behind the Sund
society it might prove useful to look at historical
sources.
In contrast to physical death, social death might not be irrev-
ocable, but the dead person could be symbolically resurrected
as a praised martyr. Therefore, in the exercise of political power,
also the social-symbolical killing of the dead may become of
utmost importance. (Aijmer 2000: 5)
The implication of this is that moral violation could
be pursued into death by not allowing funerals to
take place, or by desecration of the body. Post-
mortem beheading was used as an extra punishment
for criminals or to ensure that the dead did not
return. In Christianity, retrieval of all the body parts
and burial in sacred ground was of utmost impor-
tance in order to secure the passing into Heaven.
During the Crusades it was not unusual to cut up
the corpse so it would be physically easier to bring
the dead home. Also, amputated body parts like
hands and feet were often kept and can be found
next to the dead in burials or kept somewhere else
as a relic. Hence the actual body was important for
(later) rituals in connection with the social death of
a person (Aijmer 2000; Bennike 1985; Kaliff 1997;
Larsen 1997 among others).
When going through the photographs and draw-
ings from the excavation at Sund it is possible to
notice a pattern within the disarticulated remains. It
seems that skulls were placed on top of the bone
pile, which could be interpreted as a desecration of
the dead, stripping them of their status. This kind of
behavior is to be expected when new groups take over
a territory as it sends a message to the remaining pop-
ulation – the family members of the desecrated dead. 
If Bronze Age burials in cairns were symbols of
personal status and group power, failing to recognise
this status would be a display of contempt. In this, a
double ritual meaning may be recognised. First, the
warriors at Sund were not granted respect in accor-
dance to the status they would have achieved through
participation in ritual activity, i.e. war, during life.
Second, the victors would themselves be taking part
in ritual activities through this desecration, conse-
quently enhancing their own personal status. 
It is safe to say that something out of the ordinary
happened at Sund around 1300 BC. Through the
skeletal remains of a people long gone, we have been
granted a peek at the realities people had to face. A
population comprised of two to three families – pos-
sibly a farmstead – was massacred and left on display
in the most disrespectful manner. Ongoing conflicts
finally took their toll and, with this mass homicide,
marked the end of a local era. 
N O T E S
1 At this time it has not been possible to retrieve or
analyse cremations from the BA.
2 There is reason to believe this number to be too small.
The cairns are constructed in the same manner as other
cairns in Norway and South Scandinavia from the same
period, with one or several dry wall cists at the bottom 
of the cairn which was built from boulders mixed with
gravel. None of the cairns was covered by soil. Cremated
burials were secondary deposits and thought to belong 
to the Late Bronze Age or Early Iron Age.
3 T= museum-number for the Museum of Trondheim,
NTNU, Norway. A.I. = anatomical identification number
given by the Anatomical Institute, U. of Oslo, Norway. 
4 It is not common to find axes in Middle Bronze Age buri-
als, but they are known from Late Bronze Age Russia
(Mälardal type). Additionally, two other axes have been
found in the burials at Toldnes and a fourth was found
close to the cairns and described as a stray find.
5 This includes cairn burials from Nordland, Trøndelag and
Vestfold. See Fyllingen 2002a.
6 This is evident for all cairn burials in the study (see note
5 above).
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Postgraduate research by the author at Oxford
University into Bronze Age warfare (published for the
most part in Osgood 1998 and Osgood and Monks
with Toms 2000) conducted a detailed examination
of published palaeopathological reports from Late
Bronze Age sites of Britain and North Europe in the
hope of finding evidence for combat wounds. Perhaps
unsurprisingly there were precious few examples;
human remains from this period are quite scarce, and
those displaying trauma as a result of fighting an
even smaller sub-set. One site, however, intrigued me.
Not only did it reveal the best evidence for warfare
in the British Bronze Age, but there also lay the pos-
sibility that more information could be recovered.
This site was Tormarton, a rural location in the west
of England which had yielded the skeletons of two
men with ancient weapons injuries. An excavation
proposal was established and funding was raised
through the University, BBC television, and the
British Academy. The aim of this proposal was to
establish a context for the human bodies and to try
to provide a cogent argument as to the framework of
combat in this period, and whether or not they did
indeed relate to warfare.
The discovery of the site
In 1968 a gas pipeline was cut into the Jurassic
Limestone in West Littleton Down, Tormarton, South
Gloucestershire. What was uncovered remains one
of the most intriguing Bronze Age discoveries in the
British Isles.
Local farmer Dick Knight had been following the
progress of the pipeline with his family, keeping a
careful lookout for archaeological finds. His watch-
fulness was rewarded by the finding of a number of
human remains in the disturbed soil east of Wallsend
Lane (ST 76737667). Initially thought to be the bones
of two individuals dumped without ceremony into
a ditch or pit, later palaeopathological work revealed
that at least three individuals, all young males, were
represented. The remains were studied and then
placed at Bristol City Museum where they are now
on display.
What made this archaeological discovery so signif-
icant was the presence of dramatic weapons injuries
suffered by the unfortunate victims. The oldest indi-
vidual, a man in his mid-late 30s in age and c. 1.75-
1.76 ms in height, had twice been speared from
behind – a lozenge shaped hole perforated one side
of the pelvis (Figs. 1 and 2). 
Another of the men had suffered wounds that are
shocking to anyone who sees them. He too had been
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The Dead of Tormarton: 
Bronze Age Combat Victims?
R I C H A R D  O S G O O D /23
As bronze may be much beautified
By lying in the dark damp soil,
So men who fade in dust of warfare fade
Fairer, and sorrow blooms their soul.
(Wilfred Owen)
stabbed in the pelvis – the bronze spear had been
thrust in and twisted so that it broke off, remaining
within the bone (Fig. 3). He had been speared, again
from behind, with force great enough to pierce the
lumbar vertebrae and sever the spinal cord – an act
that would immediately have rendered him paral-
ysed. As with the wound to his pelvis, this spear also
broke off (Fig. 4). A circular perforation in the left
side of his skull was inflicted at the same time or
soon after – perhaps representing the ‘coup-de-grace’
of the encounter (Fig. 5).
This latter spear seemed to be of a type found in
the Middle Bronze Age and, according to Dr Peter
Northover of Oxford University, of an alloy of
metals that had perhaps originated in Austria or
Switzerland (Northover, forthcoming) – with loops
on the side of the spearhead that would have been
used to haft it to the spear shaft. To back up this the-
ory, a sample of bone from the leg of the person that
had suffered the spine and head wound was sent for
radiocarbon analysis, a date of 2970 + 30 BP (around
c. 1315 -1045 BC) was obtained (Sample number
OxA-13092). This fits well with a date at the end of
the Middle Bronze Age in the British Isles (Fig. 6).
A brief report on the finds was made in the
Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucester Archaeo-
logical Society. This report mentioned that not all of
the skeletal material had been recovered (Knight et
al. 1972: 14) and thus small-scale excavations were
undertaken by the author from 1998-2000 to estab-
lish whether further remains were indeed present,
and exactly what the circumstances of their deposi-
tion were.
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F I G .  1 :  The Skeleton of the
victim that suffered wounds to 
the head, spine and pelvis 
(photograph by Ian Cartwright).
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F I G .  2 : Both sides of the pelvis wound suffered by the oldest victim (photograph by Ian Cartwright).
F I G .  3 : A Middle Bronze Age spearhead, still embedded
in the pelvis of its victim (photograph by Ian Cartwright).
F I G .  4 : A Middle Bronze Age side-looped spearhead
pierced through the lumbar vertebrae (photograph by Ian
Cartwright).
Initial investigation
Preliminary work took place in 1998 with the per-
mission of the farmer, Mr George Gent. Field-walk-
ing in the region only revealed a couple of flint
flakes and quite a large quantity of clay pigeon was
present. Other studies were thus undertaken - this
included both a magnetometer and also a resistivity
survey. The resistivity survey results were confused
and revealed little whilst the magnetometer survey
simply showed the line of the gas pipe. The signal
from this pipeline was so strong that no other
archaeological features were discernible. Some dis-
tance from the line of the gas pipe, further magne-
tometer work by Stratrascan revealed the presence
of a large linear feature, ending, more or less, by the
gas pipe itself.
Aerial photographs of the field in which the site
is present clearly show the line of the gas pipe,
whilst a series of prehistoric field systems are locat-
ed in the vicinity along with several features possi-
bly representing trackways.
The excavations
A week of excavation with a small team took place
in August 1999, and a further week in 2000. Under
the supervision of representatives of Transco (the
firm responsible for gas pipelines in the UK), grid
squares were mechanically stripped of topsoil by
JCB to reveal the line of the pipe. Extensions were
made in either direction (E and W) along the pipe to
reveal any archaeological features. The initial clear-
ing revealed the top of the linear feature present in
the magnetometer survey, running, roughly, North-
South. Further cuttings across this feature were
made in 2000.
The context
The only archaeological feature in all of the trenches
of 1999-2000, proved to be a large V-shaped ditch
(Fig. 7). This was truncated by the gas pipeline and
lay exactly on the grid reference of the previous dis-
coveries. Quite steep-sided, c. 3.1 ms wide and c. 1.4
ms deep, this feature had, in part, been deliberately
filled with limestone slabs. The cuttings were all of
similar fill cycles either side of the pipeline. Three
cuttings to the south of the ditch had no archaeo-
logical artefacts and were fully excavated by hand to
define the profile and fill of the ditch. 
The cutting immediately to the north of the
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F I G .  5 : The ‘coup de grace’ wound to the left side of
the skull (photograph by Ian Cartwright).
F I G .  6 : The bronze spear from the lumbar vertebrae
(length 49 mm) (drawn by Ann Linge).
pipeline (Cutting 2) was machine excavated to the
level of the limestone rubble (Layer 6) and then the
ditch was excavated by hand. The next layer (Layer
7) contained large quantities of human bone, much
of which was in a fairly poor condition; not as well
preserved as the bone recovered in 1968. Excavation
proved difficult as the sticky soil matrix adhered to
the bone making successful cleaning tricky. Fragments
of human skull were present alongside vertebrae,
jaws and limb-bones.
A trench across the northern terminal of the
ditch, several metres from the finds of bone in 1968
and 1999, was cut in 2000. The terminal was cut
through solid bedrock but contained no material
whatsoever – which might suggest a lack of nearby
settlement sites.
All of the human bone from the excavations was
added to the material found in 1968 and sent to a
palaeopathologist for analysis. Dr Joy Langston of
Newcastle University concluded that there were now
at least four and probably five individuals in the ditch
(Langston, forthcoming). The identifiable remains
were all male and their ages ranged from around 11
years of age to the late 30s. As we have seen, two of
the males display savage wounds and it seems likely
that, as this was a single-phase episode of violence,
the others in the ditch also suffered a similar fate
though their end left no visible trace on their skele-
ton. The adult with the spear in his spine was in his
early – mid 20s in age at the time of the attack, and
was the tallest in the group at 178 cm (5ft 11”).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the bones showed
traces of ‘Schmorl’s Nodes’, indicating that these
males had had a physical lifestyle – possibly farming. 
We had thus established that there were probably
five young male victims that had been killed with
spears in one bloody encounter and that their bodies
thrown into the bottom of a ditch.
The environment
Snails are very particular about their habitat, as a
result of this the specialist can often determine the
environment of an archaeological site at a particular
time. Several samples was taken in the 1999 and
2000 excavation seasons for the recovery of mol-
luscs and these were processed by hand at the
University Museum, Oxford (Robinson, forthcoming).
By analysing the molluscs, Dr Mark Robinson has
discovered that the bodies at Tormarton were thrown
into the ditch which was cut through recently
cleared woodland; species such as Acicula fusca were
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F I G .  7 : The V-shaped linear ditch at Tormarton into which the bodies were thrown (photograph by Ian Cartwright).
recovered and this genus requires a relatively old,
undisturbed woodland habitat. The ditch had not
been left open for very long when it was filled in.
Substantial numbers of carnivorous molluscs –
Oxychilus cellarius – were also present – these had fed
on the brains of the human victims that lay in the
ditch, a phenomenon often occurring in bodies held
in the chamber tombs of the Neolithic in the British
Isles (Robinson, pers. comm.).
The British Middle Bronze Age was a time of much
change in terms of agricultural practice. Spelt wheat
was increasingly grown, in some regions replacing
emmer wheat as the staple crop. Field systems too
are increasingly common in the agricultural record,
most famously with the ‘reaves’ system on Dartmoor
(Fleming 1988), and those present on the aerial
photographs of Tormarton may reflect this. Indeed,
many such prehistoric field systems are located in
close proximity to lengths of linear ditch – perhaps
the latter demarcated territories, which enclosed
parcels of land, probably illustrating a pressure for
good agricultural land. Thus it might appear strange
that no plant remains were found in any of the
samples taken from the excavation, but this may be
explainable if the ditch was a) only open for a short
period of time or b) there was in fact no major agri-
culture close to the ditch. The fact that the molluscs
reflect a mainly woodland fauna may suggest the
second option to be correct.
The significance of the site
The finds made in 1968 and the excavations of 1999
and 2000 established a number of important facts
about the site of Tormarton:
• At least four, and probably five, human individuals
were killed with spears and then cast into a large
V-shaped linear ditch.
• The bodies were thrown in without ceremony.
• The burials were covered in a single phase by cast-
ing in large limestone slabs – perhaps slighting
defences in the process.
• The ditch had been cut in a landscape of recently
cleared woodland.
• The condition of the bones in the ditch had dete-
riorated significantly in the last 30 years.
• This is the best skeletal evidence for Bronze Age
combat in the British Isles.
As concluded in the report of 1972, the bodies were
buried without ceremony. Dumped into a linear
ditch, they were then covered with large limestone
slabs which were, on excavation, seen to be sur-
rounded by voids. These slabs perhaps represent the
upcast material excavated initially to create the ditch,
and used subsequently as an internal bank. One pos-
sibility is that the ditch is part of a demarcated tract
of land, an element of the later Bronze Age divisions
of landscape, which was attacked. The ditch was
around 70 ms in length and thus perhaps not a huge
physical obstacle in the landscape, especially by com-
parison with some of the major Bronze Age linear
ditches of Wessex (see Bradley et al. 1994; Cunliffe
and Poole 2000) notwithstanding the fact that some
elements of the Bronze Age have disappeared.
However, it was probably a fairly important state-
ment of intent, of a claim for territory. 
If the covering material over the bodies was part
of a bank inside the ditch, then this might indicate
that the victims were those that dug the ditch and
laid claims to the land. As the feature was slighted in
covering the bodies, this would be an act one prob-
ably wouldn’t have undertaken if one had invested
large amounts of effort and energy in digging it.
One might also be witnessing a deliberate attempt
to deprive the victims of an afterlife – their method
of burial differing conspicuously from the norm.
As a connoisseur of Bronze Age funerary rites, Mike
Parker Pearson (Parker Pearson 1999), said to me –
their deposition certainly doesn’t smack of the actions
of grieving relatives!
In some ways it is this linear ditch or boundary
which is of central importance even in later periods.
Increasingly, the study of these features is being
deemed important with the work of Barry Cunliffe
at Windy Dido in Hampshire (Cunliffe and Poole
2000) and Richard Bradley et al. (1994: 42, 60) on
Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire. The former found some
human remains of Iron Age date that had been
inserted into one of the Windy Dido Bronze Age linear
ditch segments, whilst Bradley also found Iron Age
human skeletal material placed deliberately close to
the terminal of a Bronze Age linear at Sidbury
Hillfort in Wiltshire (op. cit.). 
Pre-existing Bronze Age monuments were certain-
ly important to later societies and the insertion of
human remains within them as special deposits may
have been vital to these groups to claim ancestors.
As Richard Bradley states, 
If we were to correlate this (deposition of bone) sequence with
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what is known about the linear ditches, it would suggest that
they originally acted in rather the same way as earthworks
around settlements and hillforts. Human identities may have
been dispersed among the bone deposits associated with both
kinds of boundary. (Bradley 2000: 150-51)
Perhaps the situation at Middle Farm in Dorset is a
similar one – here human remains were placed close
to the terminal of a (roughly) North-South running
Middle Bronze Age linear ditch. At Middle Farm, the
bodies may have been ‘trussed’ as they were deposit-
ed (Smith et al. 1997: 78, 157). The three (possibly
four) human burials had not been put into a proper
grave, but rather had been deliberately laid near the
floor of the ditch and sealed in. Were they used to
dedicate the founding of the ditch in much the same
way as one might expect a local dignitary to lay the
foundation stones of a community building in the
current era? 
The fact remains, however, that the Tormarton
bodies were Middle Bronze Age, and were placed in
a Bronze Age ditch. Tormarton and Middle Farm
were contemporary, and in both cases the bodies
were deposited without ceremony. At Tormarton, the
boundary is central to events. It may well have been
one element of the landscape clearance of the period
– connected to pressure for land and resources and
the emergence of new group identities. Intriguingly,
the presence of a boundary continued to be impor-
tant here. Tormarton lies on the current Wiltshire/-
South Gloucestershire border and was also on the
territorial edges of the Kingdoms of Wessex and
Mercia in the Anglo-Saxon period. Tormarton itself
means ‘high point on the boundary’, neighbouring
Marshfield ‘field on the Marches (borders)’, and
Rodmarton/Didmarton have similar poignancy.
Although not suggesting that these names be con-
nected to Bronze Age boundaries, there is never-
theless a rather neat indication of the continued
importance of boundaries in the region’s past.
This situation is not unique in Britain by any
means. The recent work of the Oxford Archaeology
Unit in Ashton Keynes on the current Wiltshire/-
Gloucestershire border revealed an extensive align-
ment of Middle and Late Bronze Age pits with some
special deposition of human skeletal material. These
ran directly along the current county and parish
boundaries, boundaries that were certainly already
in place in the Domesday book of AD 1086. Rather
than a genuine physical barrier, this pit alignment
was a symbolic border close to prehistoric field
systems. As the Tormarton ditch was only c. 70 ms in
length, and thus perhaps no real barrier, the paral-
lels seem quite strong.
In addition (moving from micro to macro) the
general location of the ditch in the landscape is also
significant. It is one of a number of elements which
are present along the scarp of the Cotswolds. There
is quite a steep drop down into South Gloucestershire
(as anyone who has driven along the M4 motorway
to Bristol can testify) and a series of Iron Age ‘hill-
forts’ are sited across the length of the drop; Sodbury
and Horton Camps for example. These are both
within 7 km of Tormarton and thus the linear ditch
with the war victims was sited in a region of rich
agricultural land which also lay by a very real natural
physical boundary.
A further possibility is that the cutting of the
ditch was part of a ritual activity and the bodies rep-
resent victims of some type of votive practice, per-
haps in the same style as the many bodies at Velim
in Bohemia (Harding 1999: 158). Prehistoric linear
ditches are often known to have special deposits
close to or in their terminals so this might fit. The
clear lack of ceremony in the manner of the deposi-
tion of the bodies speaks against this interpretation
and there are no accompanying deposits, unless one
counts the embedded spears themselves. Besides,
many of the ritualised mass graves from the Bronze
Age in east central Europe are likely to be war-related. 
The bodies had been speared from behind whether
on the ground or not. They may have been humili-
ated as part of their death as shown by the spearing
of the buttocks of the oldest male. Whatever is the
case, it is clear that they were killed in a savage
encounter leading one to feel that there is at least
some validity to the famous claim of the English
philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, that early life was
‘nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 1651: ch. 13).
Some of the skeletal material appeared to be more
disarticulated than others. Were some of the body
parts exposed by the ditch as a warning to others –
in much the same way that the heads of traitors
were displayed in the Medieval period? Were parts
scattered around by scavengers prior to the ditch
being filled? These are questions that must remain
unanswered at this point in time, especially given
that there are no other known Middle Bronze Age
elements within this landscape, apart, perhaps, from
the field systems mentioned above (though an Early
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Bronze Age round-barrow is situated on a slight rise
to the north).
Site parallels
Within the Middle and Late Bronze Age of the
British Isles skeletons are rare, individuals with
weapons injuries rarer still. Only one other later
Bronze Age skeleton with wounds exists in Britain,
from Dorchester on Thames in Oxfordshire, and
this is far from complete. This pelvis of this body
had been pierced by, and retained, the blade of a
spearhead – in this case a triangular-bladed basal-
looped spearhead. An accelerator date was obtained
for this body from the Oxford University AMS labo-
ratory. The date was 2900 ± 40 bp (1260-990 BC) –
firmly in the Late Bronze Age of the British Isles (Lab
Reference: OxA-6883 –20.5).
There are examples of other bodies of Middle
Bronze Age date that show evidence for combat
trauma on the mainland of Europe. Perhaps most
dramatic is the mass grave at Wassenaar in the
Netherlands. Here some of the twelve bodies were
seen to have suffered blade wounds and projectile
injuries; in one case, a flint arrowhead remained
lodged in the ribcage of a victim (Louwe Kooijmans
1993: 15-16). The mass grave at Sund in Norway is
a contemporaneous example of a mass grave with
several injured individuals. In this case the trauma
seems also to be clearly war-related (Fyllingen chap-
ter 22). The communal stone cist at Over Vindinge,
near Præstø in Denmark, c. 1600-1500 BC, provides
similar evidence even if the mode of burial accords
better with normal funerary practice. One of the
skeletons, a mature male, had been speared from
behind. The tip of the spearhead, of Valsømagle
type, was still embedded in the pelvis, and the
anthropological examination showed that he had
lived for a while with the wound (Bennike 1985;
Vandkilde 2000). 
Further notable Middle Bronze Age examples come
from grave 122 at Hernádkak in Hungary where, in
similar fashion to Dorchester and Tormarton, a
spear (more or less complete) transfixed the pelvis of
a male individual. This is particularly interesting as
this came from an established cemetery site, which
provided grave goods, including boar’s tusks, for a
number of the other individuals interred (Bóna
1975: 150). A further Tumulus Culture example is
that of Klings in Germany, which also revealed a
projectile wound; in this case a bronze arrowhead
embedded in a vertebra (Feustel 1958: 8).
One should perhaps sound a note of caution at
this point in relation to equating all bodies with
spears embedded as necessarily being combat victims.
The work of Ian Stead on the Iron Age cemeteries of
East Yorkshire is important in emphasising that the
completion of social death may sometimes have
required post-death violence. The sites of Rudstone
and Garton Slack both had several graves in which
the interred body had been pierced by several spear-
heads, Stead’s interpretation was that this had hap-
pened whilst the body lay in the grave. One grave at
Garton Slack (GS10) had fourteen spearheads, six
having been driven into the corpse after death. GS7
had eleven spearheads, five transfixing the body
(Stead 1991). Certainly there seems to have been an
element of deliberate ‘ritual’ killing of an already
deceased individual, perhaps comparable to the
destruction of shields (South Cadbury – see Coles et
al. 1999), swords (Flag Fen – see Pryor 1991: 114), and
Phalerae (Melksham – see Osgood 1995) we find in
Late Bronze Age Britain. The context in these par-
ticular cases clearly indicates something else than
warfare as the reason for the injuries. 
Conclusions
This was a paper on the site of Tormarton, which
has been interpreted in terms of warfare in the
Middle Bronze Age. The site has yielded the bodies
of men killed in combat over 3000 years ago. It is
my belief that combat of this period was undertak-
en by relatively small war bands, raiding sites and
prestige goods en route to their destination (Osgood
1998). One possibility is that these men were the
remnants of a defeated raiding party and thus in
that sense a Bronze Age equivalent to the deposit of
the Hjortspring boat (Randsborg 1995). However, as
the linear ditch was filled after their demise this
seems something that a victorious group that has
defended the site was unlikely to do.
The finds at Tormarton also illustrate an important
fact about the uses of bronze spears. It has some-
times been assumed that the smaller spears were
used for throwing and larger variants for stabbing
(in lance form). The fact that the Tormarton spears
were both small and had been used for stabbing
refutes such a claim. One would have used one’s
weapon in whatever mode was successful for killing
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– if that meant using a small spear to stab at close
range, so be it. I have looked at all the Bronze Age
spears in the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford and the
only fact one can really glean is that the longer
spearheads tend to be the heavier ones! 
Spears of all shapes and sizes would be thrown or
thrust depending on the use that the encounter
demanded, and the physical abilities of the user.
Spears seem to have been the killing weapon of
choice in the Middle Bronze – perforations both on
human skeletons and also items of protection such
as shields seemingly bearing this out. According to
Dr Peter Northover of the Department of Materials
of Oxford University, the smaller blades of Middle
Bronze Age side-looped spearheads were not cold-
hardened but cast in high-tin bronze to increase
hardness (Osgood 1998: 116). 
Defensive equipment would also have been avail-
able to the Middle Bronze Age Warrior in Britain;
broadly contemporary leather and wooden shields
have been recovered from Ireland and it is possible
that helmets, greaves and breastplates were worn
(see Osgood and Monks with Toms 2000: 25-30). No
evidence for such protection was recovered from the
bodies at Tormarton, though it is likely that accou-
trements of the dead would have been removed
before deposition; this was no ceremonial burial with
grave goods. Furthermore, any organic elements
would have rotted away.
The Tormarton victims remain the only tangible
example of British Middle Bronze Age violence and
are amongst the best examples for Bronze Age war-
fare in northern Europe. They represent an example
of a skirmish with at least four (and probably five)
males being killed. We will, of course never know
exactly how many people were involved in the
encounter but can postulate that the bodies repre-
sent a failed attempt to make a territorial claim by
the digging of a large boundary ditch. This claim was
refuted in the most final of manners; with the killing
of those that had made it. 
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The dawn of the Bronze Age in south-western
Slovakia can be ascribed to the Nitra culture, a cul-
tural group believed to have immigrated into the
Nitra and Vah basins through the Moravian Gate
from Little Poland and western Ukraine. During the
end of the Eneolithic the inhabitants of the river
valleys in south-western Slovakia comprised of peo-
ples belonging to the Bell Beaker, Corded Ware and
Nagyrev cultures. According to Anton Tocˇik (1963)
and Jozef Bátora (1991), the expansion of these cul-
tural groups was now halted and pushed back by the
newcomers who were thought to be more aggressive
than their neighbours, thus explaining their quick
spread in the area. The Nitra group was charac-
terised by introducing not only a new burial custom
but also a new copper industry, thus denominating
a cultural sphere that would define the onset of the
Bronze Age in the region and in neighbouring areas.
The possibility cannot be dismissed that the concep-
tion of the Nitra culture is that of a culture intimi-
dating its neighbours through continuous warfare,
and in which affiliation to the culture was distin-
guished through social practice expressed especially
in burial customs and the trade of certain prestige
goods.
Although different in many aspects, the Nitra cul-
ture has to a large extent a similar material culture to
the Eneolithic cultures in the area – especially the
Bell Beaker culture – making it highly probable that
the people in the Nitra river valley were to a great
extent of the same population rather than members
of an incursion. From an overall view the Nitra culture
appears to be a unified cultural complex but when
looking closer it is apparent that there are signifi-
cant variations in the way this culture was expressed
and how it incorporated traditions from neighbour-
ing regions. These fluctuations vary throughout the
different phases and geographical regions and can
be considered as inherent phenomena deriving from
contacts with other tribes in neighbouring geograph-
ical regions.
The Nitra culture is highly interesting when it
comes to the study of warfare. Although it covers a
small geographic area, extensive research has been
conducted in recent decades that cast new light on
the subject. The major burial sites are well docu-
mented and several osteological analyses have been
made giving valuable insights in the nature of vio-
lence. Tocˇik (1963; 1979) and Bátora (1991) have pre-
sented overviews of the culture giving detailed
information on settlement structure, burial customs
and social organisation. Recently, Bátora (1999a) also
presented an outline of warfare in the Early Bronze
Age in Slovakia mainly discussing the role of war in
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the Nitra and Úne˘tice cultures. His article is the first
attempt at placing warfare as an important feature in
the development of Early Bronze Age cultures.
With these sources it is possible to give an outline
of the cultural complex and most important of all to
see how warfare was a defining character for this
cultural group when it came to expansion – to
acquire new resources – and retaining control over
the flow of prestige goods.
Settlement structure
The Nitra culture was located within rather clear
boundaries in Slovakia and Moravia. Although many
new sites have been found in the last two decades
(cp. Bátora 1991) the extension of the culture has
not changed much since Tocˇik (1963) presented his
overview. Remains from the Nitra culture can be
found between the Zˇitava river in south-western
Slovakia and the Morava River in eastern Moravia.
To the south the area is limited by the Little Danube
and to the north by the beginning of the central
Slovakian highlands near the cities of Topol’cˇany
and Trencˇin (see Fig. 1) (cp. Tocˇik 1963; 1979; Bátora
1991; Furmánek et al. 1999). This region can in turn
be divided into three major areas; (1) the Nitra Basin,
(2) the Váh Basin in Slovakia, and (3) the Rusava
and Olsˇava valleys in Moravia.
Of these areas, the Nitra Basin is the most impor-
tant with many large burial sites such as Brancˇ, Nitra-
Cˇermánˇ, Jelsˇovce, Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce and My´tna
Nova Vés. Cemeteries from this region usually com-
prise of 300-500 graves. Most burial sites in this area
lay on small terraces close to the river. Only a few
were located on sand and loess dunes. Although
traces of settlements are scarce, the fact that many
contemporary burial sites lay close to each other
suggest that settlements must have been close to the
cemeteries.
The Nitra Basin is divided geographically into
two regions with a southern lowland – the Lower
Nitra Basin – and a northern hill-land – the Middle
Nitra Basin. The border between these two regions
can be set at the highest point of the town of Nitra
where the lowland changes into a landscape of
rolling hills. This division not only marks different
geographical areas, but also social ones. Considering
burial customs, there are distinct differences between
burial sites from these regions concerning the sacri-
fice of animals at the occasion of a funeral. In the
northern part sheep and goats prevail, whereas cat-
tle are found in the south (Bátora 1991).
The Váh Basin covers the western extension of
the Nitra culture. Unlike the area round the Nitra
River burial sites are rare, and most finds derive from
scattered locations with few remains. In fact, many
finds have been made at locations strongly influ-
enced by Bell Beaker cultures. In some cases we are
dealing with single burials from the Nitra culture at
Bell Beaker cemeteries (e.g. Tocˇik 1963). It should be
questioned whether we are dealing with two differ-
ent cultures at all in this area since they are so hard
to tell apart. It is due to this that the western fron-
tier of the Nitra culture is difficult to define. This is
also the case when it comes to the Úne˘tice culture
in this area. How the Nitra and Úne˘tice cultures
interacted with each other is still much debated (cp.
Novotná 1999; Vladár and Romsauer 1999).
Important burial sites are Abrahám and Vel’ky´
Grob – medium sized with less than 200 interred
individuals at each site. As with the Nitra Basin there
are few defined settlements in this area, but many
finds and remains of small burial sites on loess and
sand dunes show that settlements were scattered
over a larger area and that they were fairly small. In
the northern part of this region there are a few settle-
ments on hill-tops, but these are exceptions to the
normal distribution of settlements in the Nitra cul-
ture mainly in valleys.
In eastern Moravia the river Morava runs through
two smaller river valleys in a highland area near
Krome˘rˇízˇ where the third extension of the Nitra cul-
ture is located. Although there is only a small num-
ber of finds in this area the cemetery at Holesˇov is
an important one with its several hundred graves
and high frequency of weapons (Ondrácˇek 1972;
Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985). It was located on the
flood plain, which is rather uncommon for this cul-
tural group.
The location of settlements was by no means at
random, but followed a very strict pattern. There are
clear connections between topographic setting, soil
type and the size of cemeteries (Bátora 1991). The
largest burial sites are located on river or brook ter-
races with black soil, suggesting that prime agricul-
tural land was sought after. Not surprisingly these
sites were inhabited for long periods. Brancˇ was esti-
mated to have been in use for 120 years and Vy´capy-
Opatovce for 150 years. Sites situated on black soil
are mainly located in the Middle Nitra Basin, but
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can also be found in the Váh Basin (Vel’ky´ Grob,
Abrahám), Moravia (Holesˇov) and the Lower Zˇitava
Basin although they are few in numbers. Second in
popularity to black soil was the alluvium found in
the lower basins of the Nitra, Váh and Zˇitava rivers.
The least preferred soil type was brown soil, found
mainly in the middle and northern part of the Váh
Basin region. Occasional settlements on brown soil
are found also in the Middle Nitra Basin, which is
rather surprising. 
The people of the Nitra culture preferred to live
on fertile black soil in river valleys. The reason that
some of their settlements were found elsewhere
must be considered in a chronological perspective.
The Nitra culture can be divided into three chrono-
logical phases. (1) An early phase that is distin-
guished by being influenced by Chlopice-Veselé,
Kosihy-Cˇaka groups and Corded Ware Culture. This
is followed by (2) the classic phase in which the
Nitra culture developed a distinct material culture.
Later in this phase, the Úne˘tician tradition from
Moravia begins to influence Nitra material culture.
(3) The late phase, or Nitra-Úne˘tice phase, marks a
transition into an Úne˘tice-influenced society in
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F I G .  1 A : Geographical distribu-
tion of the Nitra group in Moravia
and Slovakia (After Tocˇik 1963,
Furmánek et al. 1999 and Stuchlík
2001. B. Comparative chronology
of the Early Bronze Age in the
study region (after Bátora 2000).
which stone, bone and copper artefacts are entirely
replaced by their counterparts in bronze (Tocˇik and
Vladár 1971).
The oldest settlements are located in the Middle
Nitra Basin, which was inhabited by the Cˇaka group
during the Eneolithic Period (Pavúk 1981). During
the classic phase settlements spread into the Lower
Nitra Basin, and it is here that we find the earliest
Úne˘tician settlements from the Hurbanovo group at
the end of the younger phase (Dusˇek 1969; Vladár
and Romsauer 1999). Contemporary with the earliest
settlements along the river Nitra are also some settle-
ments in the Váh Basin. Although these appear to
derive from settlements of the Chlopice-Veselé group
the Nitra Culture does not properly populate this
area until at the end of the classic phase (Pavúk
1981; Vladár and Romsauer 1999). The same is valid
for the Nitra settlements in Moravia that are dated
to the classic and late phase (Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela
1985). Bátora (1991) shows that settlements on ter-
races prevail in the early and classic phases and
were gradually replaced by settlements on dunes
that became predominant during the Nitra-Úne˘tice
period. Settlements on hill-tops appear with the
emergence of the Úne˘tice culture.
Economy
Pastoralism and arable farming were the basis of the
economy. In the previous period of the Chlopice–
Veselé group the main economic activity was stock
breeding with small and mobile settlements (Pavúk
1981; Bátora 1991). In the Nitra culture the deploy-
ment on black soil enabled an extensive use of cul-
tivated cereals, and although this can only be attest-
ed by a few finds of stone sickles, cereals must have
been important in supporting a large population
along the river Nitra. Breeding of cattle, pigs and
sheep and goats was also essential. This is suggested
by several burial sites where animal sacrifice formed
part of the funeral ceremony. Ribs of cattle in graves
are frequent at Brancˇ (Vladár 1973) and at Holesˇov
(Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985). At the latter site skulls
of cattle accompanied the dead body. At Vy´capy-
Opatovce, Jelsˇovce and My´tna Nová Ves sheep and
goats prevailed as cattle were lacking (Bátora 1990;
1991; 1999b; 1999c). This difference in stock breed-
ing indicates that cattle were preferred in the low-
lands whilst sheep and goats belonged to the hill-
and highland regions.
Alongside domesticated livestock the hunting of
wild boar, roe deer and red deer was important. It is
not clear to what extent they were hunted to pro-
vide meat and hide, as the domesticated animals
must have met requirements in this respect.
However, it is striking that many prestige goods in
the Nitra culture were manufactured from raw mate-
rial provided through the hunting of wild animals
(cp. Tocˇik 1963; Bátora 1991). Antler beads were vital
in the manufacture of large and conspicuous neck-
laces. More than 25,000 beads of antler have been
recovered in Slovakia, and they occur primarily in
the cemeteries of the Nitra Basin and only rarely at
sites outside this region. Even the shells from gath-
ering shellfish were used in prestigious necklaces.
The tusks were taken from wild boars and worn by
warriors as ornaments. Since the wild boar’s is a fierce
and dangerous opponent only the bravest hunters
would have dared to hunt it. The sizes of the tusks,
with a mean measure of 15 cm, indicate that the
boars were of impressive size and no doubt a diffi-
cult foe to kill. Wearing wild boar’s tusks was proba-
bly considered an insignia of bravery and courage.
Prestige goods were numerous in the Nitra culture
and consisted mainly of female ornaments and, in
later phases, of metal weapons (see Fig. 2). Apart from
necklaces of antler and shell beads most prestige
goods were made of copper. In particular, spiral rod
necklaces, diadems, dress pins and ear- and arm-rings
in many different shapes predominate (Tocˇik 1963;
Bátora 1991). Different kinds of rings clearly domi-
nate. They are often willow-leaf shaped, but during
the classic phase a double-wire shape becomes com-
mon. The copper ornament industry is largely con-
servative in its design, keeping the inventory intact
throughout the period. The copper industry of the
Nitra culture stands out as a major source of inspi-
ration for the production of metalwork in the Early
Bronze Age of Central Europe. In the early phase the
copper industry is very simple. The willow-leaf indus-
try does not have the conspicuous mid-rib and the
wire industry is in its infancy with a simple design.
During the classic phase a diverse metal industry is
developed with a willow-leaf shape with mid-rib,
copper sheet tubes and spirals in addition to double-
wire trinkets. With the advent of the Úne˘tice culture
much of the metallurgy changes as bronze supersed-
ed copper. Old forms of prestige goods were no longer
circulated and were replaced by Úne˘tician objects,
mainly dress pins, smaller rings and bronze axes.
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F I G .  2 : Rich female grave at Brancˇ (grave 142) dating to the classic phase. 1. Faience beads. 2.-5. Necklace spacer-
plates of bone. 6. Bone awl. 7. Bone needle or dress pin. 8. Antler bead necklace. 9.-11. Cardium shells. 12. Copper
sheet tubes. 13.-18. Willow-leaf rings. Scale 1:1. (after Vladár 1973).
The single most valuable resource the Nitra cul-
ture had at its disposal was copper. Although it alone
cannot explain the development of this cultural
group, access to the metal gave an advantage over
neighbouring societies. The mountains of central
Slovakia are rich in copper and many sites have
been in use continuously from the Bronze Age until
the medieval period, such as Spania Dolina at
Banská Bystrica (Tocˇik and Vladár 1971). Although
the Nitra culture to a large extent occupied flat land-
scapes copper was not a scarce resource due to the
proximity of the copper-rich highland massif of
the Small Carpathians. This massif contains several
deposits of copper pyrites at sites such as Baba
Mountain, Pezinok-Cajla, Cˇerven y Kamenˇ and Selec
only to mention a few. The greatest amounts of
copper ore in south-western Slovakia are otherwise
found in the Sˇtiavnické Vrchy mountains (Bátora
1991). It is also relevant to mention that tin occurs
in the Tribecˇ mountains, though this metal did not
come into use until the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase.
Burial customs and funerary rituals
Since settlements are absent, our knowledge of the
social organisation of the Nitra culture comes entire-
ly from studies of burial sites. In comparison with
later Bronze Age cultures the Nitra culture exhibits
diverse and complex funeral practices. The com-
plexity of the burial customs has been discussed in
detail by Bátora (1990; 1991; 1999b; c), and he has
shown that in order to understand the social organ-
isation it is not only of importance to study the
grave goods, but also the arrangement of graves
within the cemetery and their construction. In fact,
the construction of the tomb sometimes reveal
more about the social position than the accompa-
nying grave goods.
Burial practice in the Nitra culture conformed to
a standard structure in which the graves have a sim-
ilar construction and the grave goods are deter-
mined by the sex and social position of the deceased.
The graves are usually oblong with sharp or round-
ed corners and the deceased was placed in a con-
tracted position on the side: males were placed on
their right side and females on their left side, both
facing south. All graves were inhumations and
organised into flat cemeteries with an oblong plan
extending usually in S-N/N-S direction. Three pat-
terns in the arrangement of the graves can be out-
lined, although the internal organisation of the
cemeteries is the same throughout the period. During
the early phase the graves were positioned in small
groups while during the classic phase the graves line
up into settled rows. In the late phase the graves are
placed in larger groups in a more scattered pattern
similar to the custom in the Úne˘tice culture (Bátora
1991; Tocˇik 1979).
Some graves deviate from the ordinary burial
practice, often regarding size and construction of
the tomb. These particular tombs reflect social dif-
ferentiation within society, inasmuch as they were
reserved for warriors and the social elite. They differ
from other graves in the following features to a
greater or lesser extent:
1. Space – large burial chamber
2. Special position of the body
a. skeleton extended on its back
b. displacement of body
3. Construction of the grave pit
a. wooden chamber or wood lining
b. stone lining
c. prepared walls
d. red ochre
4. Construction above the grave pit
a. death house – with either (1) post holes 
at the corners or (2) oblong ditch
b. burial mound – with either (1) concentric 
ditch or (2) without ditch
Many features of the burial customs were new to the
region and have more in common with funerary
practices in eastern and Danubian central Europe.
This may indicate that the people of the Nitra cul-
ture had recently moved into the region (Tocˇik 1963).
A major change to the funerary practice was the ori-
entation of the body to a W-E, E-W direction with
men and women placed on opposite sides – a gen-
der differentiated position, which is uncommon
within the Úne˘tice culture but common in the Early
Bronze Age and Bell Beaker periods of Danubian
central Europe. The use of washed walls in grave pits,
red ochre and wooden crypts originates in the east,
but disappears during the late phase to give way to
the more informal burial rites of the Úne˘tice culture.
Death houses, however, occur at sites in Austria,
Germany, Moravia and Poland from the Úne˘tice
period through to the Urnfield period (Bátora
1999c).
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F I G .  3 : Brancˇ. Family groups (below) and warrior burials (above) from the Nitra culture. 
Considering the spatial arrangement of the graves,
their construction and wealth in grave goods, it is
possible to distinguish three social categories, each
including men, women and children, by elaborating
on the discussion of Bátora (1991). At the top of the
social ladder stood high-ranking warriors and their
families with ostentatious tombs rich in grave goods.
Below them were commoners who made up the
majority of the population and whose graves were
less elaborate, although not poor in grave goods.
Women are frequent in this category, which also
includes the remaining warriors. At the bottom of
the society were those who had no grave goods or just
a few items. Men and children are overrepresented
in the buried population. The division between the
last two categories does not necessarily indicate two
separate social levels. Female grave goods should be
seen as an investment in wealth displayed at the
funeral. Male grave goods by contrast consisted main-
ly of raw material for manufacturing tools except if
they were provided with ornaments such as copper
rings and beads. In other words, while burial cus-
toms ordained grave goods for women, men were
not likely to be buried with anything special – apart
from their personal belongings. As a general rule
women and girls were of higher rank within their
social class. It is remarkable that girls often have
larger tombs than boys, as seen at Brancˇ (see Fig. 3),
which adds to the impression that they were pro-
vided with more grave goods, and thus in some sense
were more important. As I discuss below, women
and children are often interred near a high-ranking
warrior, which can be taken to indicate that they
too had an important position in the social system.
Warriors and their social organisation
From the various burial sites it is clear that warriors
conformed to a hierarchical structure, which in
death entitled them to an extraordinary burial and
specific grave goods. Burials from Brancˇ and My´tna
Nova Ves indicate that we are dealing with two
classes of warriors – high-ranking warriors, or chief-
tains, as opposed to common warriors (figs. 4-5). They
are recognisable through differentiation in grave
goods and the construction of the tomb. Common
warriors are buried in ordinary graves with weapons
and perhaps ornaments of bone or copper. High-
ranking warriors often have several weapons and an
array of ornaments and pots, including amphorae.
The tomb itself often possesses specific features, as
mentioned above, such as a wooden lining, and was
sometimes covered by a mound or a death house.
The position of graves at burial sites is also an indi-
cation of social status. At Brancˇ, warriors related to
a chieftain have different war gear and grave con-
structions to other warriors, although both groups
can be classified as belonging to the commoners. 
Equipment
All warriors in the Nitra culture were equipped in a
similar way, their paraphernalia consisting of an
array of weapons, tools and ornaments (Figs. 6-9;
Brancˇ: Fig. 10). Amongst the arms, equipment for
archery predominates with arrowheads, bracers and
an occasional fragment of a bow. The warrior also
carried other arms such as daggers, knives and axes.
Archery was dominant in the early and classic phase,
whereas daggers and knives were preferred during
the transition to the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase. Axes are
few in number and belong to the late phase. Their
appearance, together with bladed weapons, is a result
of influences from the burial customs of the Úne˘tice
culture. Tools connected to warriors were whet-
stones used to sharpen daggers and knives. Stone
raw material in male graves cannot be considered as
warrior equipment since it is difficult to assess its
application, although it might have been used to
manufacture arrowheads. Ornaments belonging to
the insignia of a warrior are boar’s tusks, bone discs,
ornamented bone tubes and belt fittings of copper.
These ornaments belong to the early and classic
phases, and can be found in contemporary Eneolithic
cultures in the region and in the Mierzanowice and
Kosˇ’any cultures (Bátora 1999c). With the exception
of copper belt fittings, these ornaments disappear
during the late phase and do not seem to have been
replaced by other artefacts. 
Boar’s tusks occur at many burial sites and their
use spread well beyond south-western Slovakia. They
often have drilled holes at the proximal end and in
some cases also at the distal tip and their position in
graves near the chest or head indicate that they were
worn either as an ornament on the body or as a hair
decoration. A warrior usually wore between one and
three boar’s tusks, but some had as many as eight
(Brancˇ, grave 104). Perhaps the number of tusks
symbolised social rank amongst warriors.
The bone disc, with its many drilled holes, was
usually found at the back of the head suggesting
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that it formed part of the warrior’s hairstyle. These
discs are mainly found at sites in the Nitra Basin
(My´tna Nová Ves, Brancˇ and Nitra-Cˇermánˇ) and only
on one occasion in the Váh Basin (Vel’ky´ Grob), and
have their origin in the Mierzanowice and Kosˇ’tany
cultures, dating them to the early and classic phases
of the Nitra culture (Bátora 1999c, cp. Chropovsky´
1960).
Ornamented bone tubes have been found at a
number of sites (Aleksˇince, Brancˇ, Cˇerny´ Brod,
Jelsˇovce, My´tna Nová Ves, Nitra-Cˇermánˇ, Sˇal’a I and
Tvrdosˇovce), and their use is debated. Bátora (1991;
1999c) suggests that they were some kind of whistle
used by hunters, but they could also have been a
case for an awl or a pin, or simply an ornament for
dress or body. They are made of the tibia from a sheep
or the humerus from large birds and are associated
with high-ranking warriors. Similar bone tubes are
frequent in Little Poland and eastern Slovakia at this
time, but not elsewhere (Bátora 1999c).
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F I G .  4 : Death house with burial of high-ranking warrior (My´tna Nová Ves grave 262). 1. Plan of grave. 2.
Reconstructed grave: a. horizontal and b. vertical view. (after Bátora 1991).
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F I G .  5 : 1. Warrior from high-ranking family. 2. Common warrior. (after Vladár 1973).
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F I G .  6 : Archery equipment. 1.-3. Short heart-shaped arrowheads. 4.-5. Oblong
triangular arrowheads. 6. Wristguard. 1-5 from Holesˇov grave 310, 6 from Holesˇov
grave 290. Scale 1:1. (after Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985).
F I G .  7 .  Material symbols of warriorhood. 1. Ornamented bone tube (My´tna Nová Ves grave 262). 2. Bone disc (Brancˇ
grave 179). 3. Belt fittings (Brancˇ grave 31). 4. Boar’s tusks (Brancˇ grave 74). Scale 1:1. (after Vladár 1973; Bátora 1991). 
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F I G .  8 : Daggers and knives. 
1. Willow-leaf dagger (Brancˇ grave 55). 
2. Miniature dagger (Brancˇ grave 6). 
3. Abrahám type of dagger (Abrahám). 
4. Sˇal’a-Vecˇa type of dagger (Sˇal’a-Vecˇa grave 65/51). 
5. Nitra-Cˇermánˇ grave 69). 
6. Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce type of dagger (Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce
grave 310). 
7. Brancˇ type of dagger (Brancˇ grave 31). 
8. Copper dagger with rounded grip tongue (Trnava area).
9. Sˇal’a-Vecˇa type of dagger (Sˇaal’a-Vecˇa grave 5). 
10. Bone dagger (Brancˇ grave 247). 
11. Willow-leaf knife (Brancˇ grave 178). Scale 1.-9.: 1:5.
10.-11.: 1:1. (after Vladár 1973; 1974). 
Social structure and burial practice
In order to apprehend the social organisation of
warriors and their importance within the society I
have chosen the cemetery of Brancˇ as a case study.
Being one of the largest burial sites from the Nitra
culture and located in the very heartland of the Nitra
Basin, as well as being well documented (Hanulík
1970; Vladár 1973; Shennan 1975), makes it an ideal
object of study. The cemetery at Brancˇ was in use
throughout the Early Bronze Age – from the classic
Nitra phase to the Úne˘tice-Mad’arovce horizon. It is
difficult to draw any clear chronological boundaries
amongst the graves. 
I have divided the Nitra culture part of the ceme-
tery into nine sections (Fig. 3) based on chronology
and spatial relationships. These are only rough divi-
sions since some groups overlap and have unclear
boundaries: groups D, E, F, and G. The earliest graves
at Brancˇ are dated to the early classic phase. The
cemetery seems to have been abandoned some time
during the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase, but was resurrected
again further to the north during the Mad’arovce
phase. Groups A, B C, D and E cover the classic phase,
whereas the late phase consists of groups F, G, H and
L (The graves from the Mad'arovce phase are not
considered in this discussion).
The cemetery extends in a south-north direction
in both a chronological and spatial sense. Later graves
respected existing ones, as no tombs cut into each
other. This indicates that graves were marked above
the ground and were visible for a very long time.
When the later Mad’arovce cemetery was estab-
lished it was located at some distance from the pri-
mary burial site indicating that the old graves were
still marked. This phenomenon has also been
observed at Vy´capy-Opatovce and Jelsˇovce (Tocik
1979; Bátora 1991). In comparison it should be
mentioned that at My´tna Nová Ves the graves from
the Úne˘tice period are placed directly over the burial
site from the Nitra culture, cutting into older tombs
(Bátora 1991). There are reasons to believe that
small mounds or house-like constructions, to mark
the tombs of warriors, covered some of the graves at
Brancˇ (Vládar 1973) (Fig. 11).
Out of the 237 graves from the Nitra culture, 40
(17%) tombs belonged to warriors (Fig. 10). Including
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F I G .  9 : Axes. 1. Antler axe (Brancˇ grave 85). 2. Polished stone axe (Holesˇov grave 68). 3. Polished stone axe (Brancˇ
grave 222). 4. Symmetrical hammer axe (My´tna Nová Ves grave 262). Scale 1.-3.: 1:1, 4.: 1:1. (after Vladár 1973;
Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985; Bátora 1991).
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F I G .  1 0 : List of graves with warrior equipment at the Nitra culture cemetery of Brancˇ.
a double grave, the total number of warrior burials
was 41. Not surprisingly, 81% of them were men,
while children make up 15% and women 5%.
Children and women with warrior’s gear are thus not
uncommon. Warrior equipment in children’s graves
at Brancˇ comprises only knives, and this should
indicate that these children were expected to
become warriors when they reached adolescence.
Why some women were buried as warriors is unclear.
A female warrior is also known at My´tna Nová Ves
(grave 177), who has been buried with several arrow-
heads (Bátora 1991). At Brancˇ two women received
a boar’s tusk each.
These may perhaps be interpreted as an honour
given to the dead person as part of the funerary rit-
ual, rather than an ornament the women wore in
life. Women with warrior equipment are known from
other contemporary cultures. In the Mierzanowice
culture some women had arrowheads as grave goods
and in Kosˇ’tany-related cultures some were buried
with daggers (Bátora 1991). Nevertheless, we should
not be unfamiliar with the possibility that some
women might have been warriors. 
The organisation of warriors in the Nitra culture
may follow some sort of kinship structure. Family
groups can be claimed to exist at Brancˇ. They are
not clearly discernable in the early stage (group A),
but more so in the later phases (cp. groups B – I).
The possible family groups can be outlined with
help of the warrior graves: each family’s warriors
were equipped in distinguished ways. Group A was
apparently shared by two larger families, or clans,
dividing the burial area into a western and an east-
ern section. The graves of the sections appear dis-
tinct, and the warriors’ gear changes over time, but
is confined to a specific pattern for its own group.
This is evident in the western part where graves usu-
ally contain boar’s tusks whereas these artefacts are
conspicuously rare in the eastern part. Within the
western part a further division can be made: burials
in the south-western part have boar’s tusks and
weapons are almost absent, whereas burials in the
western central part have knives and daggers, while
the graves to the north-west have arrowheads
together with boar’s tusks. In the south-eastern part
there are graves with boar’s tusks, arrowheads, knives
and daggers. A distinction between the two parts is
also found in the manner in which the tombs were
constructed (Fig. 11). The other groups were not
divided by different families, as the warrior tombs
are situated in the centre of each group. Graves with
boar’s tusks predominate in the far western part of
the cemetery (groups B, C, D) and knives and dagger
marks graves to the east (groups E, F, G). It is inter-
esting that axes are found only in groups C and D.
From the weaponry in the graves we can recon-
struct three categories of warriors: (a) an archer, (b) an
archer with a close-range weapon and (c) a warrior
with a close-range weapon only. At Brancˇ the archer
type of warrior is dominant. The archer’s attributes
– arrowheads, boar’s tusks and bracers – are found
amongst those belonging to the common warriors
buried at the western part of the cemetery. This war-
rior type is confined to these attributes until the
transition to the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase, only adding
an occasional knife or axe to the outfit. The distinc-
tion between warriors of type (a) and (b) is mainly a
chronological division, although both kinds are
contemporary during the end of the classic phase. 
Warriors armed only with daggers or knives are
different from the archers. They are mainly found in
the eastern part of the cemetery amongst high-rank-
ing warriors, and it is remarkable that they change
their outfit from a Nitra style one with bow and
arrow, to a style closer to Úne˘tice practice: the fact
that these warriors distinguished themselves by car-
rying daggers earlier than the rest of the warriors
indicates that they considered themselves as part of
an elite, perhaps with connections to an Úne˘tician
elite outside the region. The Úne˘tice culture influ-
enced the Nitra culture more and more, and the
Úne˘tician connection may have been utilised by the
local elite to obtain control of the flow of prestige
goods. The foreign impulses in new rites and mate-
rial things appear to have been used locally by the
elite to promote and maintain rank and status.
Within each family group the warriors were often
buried side by side in pairs or in groups of three in
which the tombs often contain the same kinds of
grave goods, whilst the construction of the tomb
might vary. The warrior graves are located in the
middle of the family groups surrounded by women
and children. Girls were placed nearer the warrior's
tomb than boys. Most striking are the two girls
(graves 98, 94) buried together with a male warrior
(grave 88) under the same mound in group E. At
Brancˇ, children’s graves are particularly frequent in
the eastern part of the cemetery near the so-called
death house (grave 31) and the tomb with a con-
centric ditch (grave 62). The same pattern has been
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observed at My´tna Nová Ves (Bátora 1991). This
practice marks the importance of these two groups
in the society, considering they are strongly associ-
ated with high-ranking warriors. A chieftain’s base
of power may well have been conveyed through
the number of women and children related to him.
Although high-ranking male warriors appear to have
been individuals of power the wealth of the com-
munity was mostly on the women’s side. Possibly
inheritance passed through a matrilineal system,
requiring chieftains to acquire women in order to
enforce and expand their authority.
The basic division between elite and common
warriors can usually be determined by the position
and construction of the tomb as well as the grave
goods. At Brancˇ there are three tombs (graves 31,
88, 62) belonging to elite warriors. They are all posi-
tioned in the eastern half of the cemetery and mark
the centre of a family group. Most remarkable is grave
31, with a construction of a death house above the
grave pit. This kind of construction is rare and occur
elsewhere only at My´tna Nová Ves (graves 206, 262,
305, 509, 513) and Moravská Nová Ves (grave 19)
(Bátora 1999c; see Fig. 4). In Jelsˇovce a similar con-
struction has been observed (grave 444). Here an
elite warrior was buried in a grave surrounded by an
oblong slot with traces of timbers – suggesting a form
of wooden construction above the ground (Bátora
1990). The tomb construction was the same at all
these sites. A large pit was lined with wood, which
sometimes also covered the opening, creating a
wooden crypt for the dead person. Wooden posts
were erected at the corners of the pit supporting a
roof – or in the case of Jelsˇovce a construction of logs
dovetailed at the corners. Inside the death house,
and above the grave, a large amphora was placed as
a funeral offering. Since the area in the immediate
vicinity of the death houses lacked graves, these
tombs must have been accessed regularly, perhaps
to carry out certain rituals or offering gifts to the
ancestor. Warriors in these graves were often given
many grave goods. At Brancˇ the grave contained a
356 . W A R F A R E ,  R I T U A L S ,  A N D  M A S S  G R A V E S
F I G .  1 1 : Map showing the location of special-constructed tombs from Brancˇ in the Nitra culture period.
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F I G .  1 2 : Grave goods from elite warrior’s grave at My´tna Nová Ves (grave 262): 1. -16. flint arrowheads. 17.-21. Bear’s
claws. 22.-23. Stone raw material. 24. Boar’s tusk? 25. Double copper wire ring. 26.-27. Amphorae. 28. Symmetrical
hammer axe. 29. Bone awl. 30.-31. Part of composite bow? 32. Bone needle or dress pin. (after Bátora 1991).
knife, belt fittings, boar’s tusks and a bone disc. The
death houses at My´tna Nová Ves contained similar
grave goods. The most spectacular was grave 262
with its many arrowheads, a stone axe, a fragment
of a bow, a boar’s tusk, pots and bear claws from the
funerary shroud (Fig. 12).
The death houses belong to the early and classic
part of the Nitra culture and resemble chamber
graves in Ukraine and Russia. The custom of build-
ing death houses was adopted by the Úne˘tice cul-
ture from which it spread further west during the
Middle Bronze Age (Bátora 1999c). In the Nitra cul-
ture grave mounds with a concentric ditch replaced
them during the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase. The mounds
have less conspicuous constructions, but the tradi-
tion of placing an amphora or pots on top of the
grave continued, and the tombs often exhibit rich
grave goods, such as the dagger in grave 88 at Brancˇ.
The third chieftain’s tomb (grave 62) had been plun-
dered, but pieces of belt fittings indicate an origi-
nally rich outfit.
There are other tomb constructions worth men-
tioning when considering the warriors of the Nitra
culture. These are graves with washed walls, wood-
lining – without a construction above ground – or
sprinkled with red ochre. These constructions were
widespread throughout Nitra culture burial sites and
have their origin in the Kost’any culture (Bátora
1990; 1991). At Brancˇ these graves are mainly found
among the warriors at the eastern side of the ceme-
tery. Considering that these graves are located with-
in a family group that distinguished themselves
by hosting the cemetery’s warrior elite it seems as if
the practice of painting the grave sides with a wash,
using red ochre and lining graves in wood was a
privilege restricted to a high-ranking family and
their kin. It is also striking that the use of these dif-
ferent constructional elements was evenly distrib-
uted over time, as if only a certain individual of each
generation was entitled to be buried in this particu-
lar fashion.
It must be noted that it is unclear to what extent
constructions above ground were used. The mounds
at Brancˇ were observed only because of ceramic
vessels put on top of the grave inside the barrow. A
closer look at the cemetery reveals that mounds must
have been more frequent than originally acknowl-
edged. It is striking how graves with wood lining,
washed walls or red ochre are located in similar areas
to mound–covered tombs: they are placed some
distance away from the nearest graves. This might
indicate that barrows also covered these graves. 
A further interesting phenomenon is the occur-
rence of paired tombs, such as graves 191, 192 and
182, 178. Why warriors were buried in pairs, or in
groups of three, is difficult to answer unequivocally.
One reason could be that warriors were customarily
buried that way – probably covered by a common
mound – to present partnerships in war in life and
death. It should be mentioned that double graves
with warriors are known from Brancˇ (grave 233)
and My´tna Nová Ves (grave 29) (Vladár 1973;
Bátora 1991). 
Cenotaphs
To receive a proper burial was crucial for warriors, in
particular for those of high rank. Proximity to the
newly dead and the ancestors was evidently impor-
tant to the community’s ritual and social life: warrior
graves clearly had a central role as being the hub of
a larger family group. The social significance of war-
rior tombs is emphasised by the phenomenon of
cenotaphs in the Nitra culture (Fig. 13-14). From the
early and classic phases there are in total six ceno-
taphs equipped with the outfit of an elite warrior.
They are all from My´tna Nová Ves (graves 116, 117,
308, 458) and occur in the vicinity of the five death
houses. Apart from grave 458 with a wooden burial
chamber, these tombs might be classified as belong-
ing to common warriors as they were of standard
construction. However, the occurrence of pots, either
in the grave or on top of it, shows that they belonged
to elite warriors. Thus they were kinsmen to the
chieftains in the death houses in the same way as
those buried in the eastern part of Brancˇ. 
The same pattern is observable among cenotaphs
dating to the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase, but here two
features become distinct. First, animal parts replace
the absent human being. Second, founder's gear is
placed in many graves. These new features may well
derive from the Úne˘tice culture in which cenotaphs
are well known. Of special interest is grave 6 from
My´tna Nová Ves where the body of a sheep or goat
was buried (Bátora 1999b). It lay on its right side
with the face to the south as if it were a man. The
grave goods were placed near the head and a copper
dagger was stuck between the cervical vertebrae. A
similar tomb was found at Brancˇ (grave 4), dating to
the beginning of the Mad’arovce culture, with pig
bones and bronze rings (Vladár 1973).
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Site Grave Position Description Reference
Early Phase
My´tna Nova Ves 116 E Double Coned vessel, boar tusk, radiolarite arrowhead, Bátora 1999b
2 radiolarite flakes, bone awl
My´tna Nova Ves 117 E Double Coned vessel, quartz arrowhead Bátora 1999b
My´tna Nova Ves 308 C Willow-leaf copper knife, silex arrowhead, bracer, Bátora 1999b
ceramic vessel
My´tna Nova Ves 458 C Double Coned vessel, wooden burial chamber Bátora 1999b
Tvrdosˇovce 23 ? Ceramic vessel, copper arm-ring, copper burled ring, Tocˇík 1979
2 copper belt fittings, 13 small copper tubes, copper ring, 
copper knife, antler bead necklace
Nitra-Úne˘tice Phase
Matúsˇkovo 50 S 2 boar tusks, 4 end-pieces to bellows, 3 slabs of sandstone, Tocˇík 1979
ceramic cup, fragments of ceramic vessel
My´tna Nova Ves 6 W-E Body of sheep (Ovis ammon f. aries) or goat Bátora 1999b
(Capra ibex f. hircus), copper dagger, copper awl, 
Cyprus pin, copper ear-ring, Double Coned vessel,
radiolarite arrowhead
My´tna Nova Ves 201 E Ceramic vessel: Kegelhalsgefäss Bátora 1999b
Velky´ Grob 50 NNW Ceramic vessel, body of a calf (Bos taurus) Chropovsky´ 1960
Velky´ Grob 51 N Ceramic vessel Chropovsky´ 1960
Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce 23 ? 2 horse teeth (Equus caballus) Tocˇík 1979
F I G .  1 3 : Plundered graves from the Nitra culture at Brancˇ.
F I G .  1 4 : List of cenotaphs from the Nitra (and Úne˘tice) culture. E = eastern part, W = western part, C = central part,
N = northern part, S = southern part.
It is difficult to discuss Nitra culture cenotaphs in
general terms, since the majority of them are from
the cemetery of My´tna Nová Ves. However, they do
give some valuable information about the character
of warfare related to this site. The fact that ceno-
taphs always belong to warriors suggests that they
have their origin in armed conflict where the body of
a fallen warrior companion was never retrieved. In
this sense it is interesting that such a fate only befell
elite warriors. Skeletal trauma from the same ceme-
tery, as I will show below, suggests that elite warriors
were subject to immense aggression. These warriors
often had several severe cranial fractures, whereas
the postcranial skeleton showed surprisingly few
signs of injury. Many of the skull fractures must have
left the victim mortally wounded, and the warrior
was even hit repeatedly while on the ground. If not
recovered by his companions the warrior would
have fallen into the hands of the enemy and thus
never returned to kin and community.
Grave robbing
Another feature linked to warfare is the massive
occurrence of plundered graves. Grave robberies are
known from the early phase of the Nitra culture at
Brancˇ, My´tna Nová Ves and Tvrdosˇovce (Vladár 1973;
Tocˇik 1979; Bátora 1991), but the majority of robbed
graves date to the late phase of the Nitra culture,
and this increase in plundered graves may be due to
influence from the Úne˘tice culture. Whereas plun-
dered graves are exceptions in the Nitra culture they
are almost the norm in the Úne˘tice culture, at least
on the larger burial sites in Austria and Moravia (cp.
Neugebauer 1991). The proportional variation in
this practice is illustrated at Jelsˇovce where 64 out of
103 graves from the Úne˘tice period were plundered,
whereas only a few graves were touched during the
Nitra period (Bátora 1991).
The practice of grave robbing follows the same
pattern throughout the Early Bronze Age but the
reasons for it, and the effect on society, probably
differed. Grave robbing seems to have been widely
accepted by people during the Úne˘tice period as it
does not affect the burial practice much. However, it
is still unknown whether cemeteries were plundered
during a single session, or if they were plundered
over a longer period of time. The bones in plundered
graves were usually scattered, both inside and out-
side the pit, and therefore the grave cannot have
been opened until several months after the burial.
The main reason for plundering graves may have
been to obtain metal objects, mainly daggers, but
taking body parts, such as skulls, was also on the
agenda. 
The plundered graves at Brancˇ are of special
interest as they can be related to warfare. In this
cemetery 11% of the graves have been subjected to
looting, and they are mainly located at the northern
rim of group F and at the southern fringes of group
A (Fig. 13). A few also occur in the other groups,
notably groups H and L. Tombs of both men and
women were affected, and there are no indications
that warrior graves were the main focus, even if it
must be noted that some of the robbed male graves
could have been warrior tombs. Warriors in group G
and F merely received a dagger or a knife as an indi-
cation of status – if these objects were stolen from
graves in the northern part the latter would escape
categorisation as warrior graves. Grave 56 in group
D probably housed a warrior – although no grave
goods attest it – since this man had three healed cra-
nial fractures showing that he had been in close
combat several times and survived the encounters.
In some warrior graves (graves 74, 173, 192) the
looters did not care for arrowheads or boar’s tusks,
which enable us to identify the dead as warriors.
There are two indications that plundered graves
in Brancˇ were the result of troubled times. First, it
should be remembered that people in the Nitra cul-
ture paid great respect to their dead. Looting a grave
must have been an act of desecration – a method used
to insult and bring harm to an enemy. Second, the
cemetery fell into disuse during the Nitra-Úne˘tice
phase inasmuch as the youngest burial groups, H
and I, only contain very few burials. The cemetery is
then not in regular use until the Mad’arovce period,
when the new graves are established further to the
north. With these two factors in mind the conclu-
sion is that in the late phase the Brancˇ community
were involved in a conflict, which they lost. This
resulted in a population decrease in the region, and
the conquered group were subsequently humiliated
by having their burial site plundered by the victors.
Weaponry
Weaponry in the Nitra culture is rather diverse in
character and only copper daggers can be said to be
clearly characteristic. Weapons have no or little unity
in style, and most weapons are the same as those
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found in the preceding Eneolithic cultures in Central
Europe, notably the Corded Ware and Bell Beaker
cultures. This is especially valid for the axes, ham-
mers or hammer-axes, which are found only occa-
sionally. All weapons are from burials (ritual hoard-
ing has not been recorded for the Nitra culture).
The weapon classes are represented as follows.
Long-range weapons consisted of bow and arrow only.
There are no indications of javelins, slingshots or
throwing axes. Close combat weapons covered axes,
hammers and axe-hammers. Pole arms, such as spears
or lances, are absent on all sites with the exception
Holesˇov (grave 174) – here the tip of a lance head was
recovered (Ondrácek and Sˇebela 1985). Close quarter
fighting weapons consisted of daggers and knives.
Long-range projectiles and weapons for close quar-
ter fighting dominate the weaponry. This contrasts
markedly with the recorded trauma on skeletons,
which show that close combat weapons caused the
majority of wounds (see below). This apparent para-
dox is important in order to understand the sym-
bolic meaning and display of weapons and their
relationship to the deceased in death and in life. 
The occurrence of weapons in graves varies sig-
nificantly between different burial sites and thus
does not follow a consistent pattern throughout the
entire society. This does not mean that weaponry
cannot be used for chronology, or as evidence of
social structure and organisation. As for chronology,
as in the case of Brancˇ, different kinds of weapons
were put into the graves at different times, but these
preferences are not necessarily the same at a neigh-
bouring burial site. Only daggers have proved to be
useful in establishing a useful chronology as Vladár
has shown (1974). Other weapons are not suitable,
either because their form does not change, as for
arrowheads and knives, or because they occur rarely
and in small numbers, as notably the case with axes
and hammers.
As social markers, weaponry separated not only
warriors from other men and women, but also func-
tioned as an internal marker within the warrior
group in terms of their relationship to different fam-
ilies. This is, however, at its clearest when it comes
to arrangement of the grave and its furnishing, as
shown above. Various preferences in regard to the
display of weapons in the graves probably reflect the
ideological attitude of the deceased’s family more
than the kind of weaponry each warrior carried on
war raids.
Arrowheads and archery equipment
Arrowheads are by far the most common kind of
weaponry. In south western Slovakia 220 arrowheads
have been recorded from the Nitra culture (Bátora
1999a). This number should be considered as low
taking the entire culture area in account and half of
the arrowheads have actually been located at My´tna
Nová Ves. Also, in Holesˇov, in eastern Moravia, 132
arrowheads were recorded from the graves. Fairly
large cemeteries such as Brancˇ had only 35 arrow-
heads (Fig. 10) and many of the others have still
fewer or none. The significance of this will be dis-
cussed below.
The majority of the arrowheads are made of
lithic material – with radiolarian rocks and linmo-
quartzite predominant, but a few were made of bone
or antler (Bátora 1991; 1999a). The arrowheads made
of stone can be divided into two groups – (1) short
heart-shaped arrowheads and (2) oblong triangular
(Fig. 6). Both these forms probably stem from the
preceding Eneolithic cultures in the region; there
are no indications that they are the invention of the
older or later Nitra culture phase. Their shape is like-
ly to be closely related to their function (cp. Vladár
1973): all projectile points were produced in a simi-
lar manner, with saw-teeth edges projecting into
wings at the base to form barbs. They are of eminent
craftsmanship and designed to be highly aerody-
namic. When hitting the target the edges were
intended to cause blood loss and the barbs to pre-
vent the arrow falling out or, in the case of human
enemies, to be difficult to pull out without causing
yet more blood loss. Unlike the arrowheads of bronze
and iron from the middle and later Bronze Age
(cp. Eckhardt 1996) it is not possible to distinguish
between projectile points designed for either hunt-
ing or war in the Nitra culture. Both were functional
for either intention. 
Other indications of archery are bracers and bows.
Bracers were strapped onto the wrist of the hand
holding the bow in order to prevent the bowstring
from snapping back at the underarm. All Nitra bracers
are made of fine-grained sandstone, although many
might be expected to have been made of leather as
was the case in later times. Bracers are scarce in
Slovakia and only a few have been found (Brancˇ,
My´tna Nová Ves) (Bátora 1991). Many are instead
found in eastern Moravia and especially at Holesˇov
(Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985). Together with the many
arrowheads from this region the bracers suggest that
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archery was here highly favoured by warriors and
was an important item in warfare strategies.
Bows may be attested by one fragment from
My´tna Nová Ves (grave 262). It consists of a thin
antler rod measuring half a metre. It has rounded
ends and a rectangular cross-section with one broad
side arced, and similar items (termed ‘spatulae’)
actually occur at contemporary sites in England,
Germany and Poland. Bátora (1991) interprets them
as a device for retouching stone tools, but they all
have a similar shape and length to the antler strips
used in composite bows (cp. Eckhardt 1996). I would
therefore suggest that the antler object found with
the high-ranking warrior in My´tna Nová Ves formed
part of such a bow.
Axes, hammers and hammer-axes
Among close combat weapons we find a series of
blunt and edged weapons that can be labelled as
axes, hammers and hammer-axes (Fig. 9). This group
is not homogeneous either in form or depositional
type. They occur only seldom in graves, and none
can be regarded as specifically tied to the Nitra
culture. The origin of their form can be traced to the
Bell Beaker, Corded Ware and Chlopice-Veselé cul-
tures (Bátora 1991). Axes, hammers and hammer-
axes were almost exclusively made of stone, but
there are exceptions such as axes of bone in Brancˇ
(grave 85) (Vladár 1973) and Holesˇov (graves 46,
141, 381) (Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985), and a bronze
axe from the early Úne˘tice culture in Velky´ Grob
(grave 8) (Chropovsky´ 1960).
Bátora has divided hammer-axes into three types:
1. small heart-shaped (Cˇerny Brod, grave 65), 2. with
a facetted butt (Brezová pod Bradlom, Komjatice)
and 3. with an asymmetric body and a pointed butt
(My´tna Nová Ves, grave 262). Hammers are repre-
sented in Cˇachtice, grave 1. This is a grooved ham-
mer of a type known to have been used for grinding
copper ore. Hammer picks occur in Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce
(Bátora 1991) and Holesˇov (grave 141) (Ondracˇek
and Sˇebela 1985). Polished axes of different sorts
occur at Brancˇ (grave 222), Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce (grave
231), My´tna Nová Ves (grave 260) (Bátora 1991),
Holesˇov (grave 68, 261) (Ondracˇek and Sˇebela 1985)
and Jelsˇovce (Bátora 1986).
The division of these close combat weapons into
three groups might be somewhat deceptive inas-
much as it derives from the study of their form
rather than their use. To be kept in mind is their
function in battle: trauma on skeletons show that
both the edge and neck of these weapons were used,
hence they can all be considered as having been
handled as hammer-axes where both the sharp edge
and the blunt neck were used. This same point is
valid for the bronze axe with pointed neck from
Vel’ky´ Grob (grave 8) (cp. Chropovsky´ 1960).
Hammers, axes and hammer axes are, as men-
tioned, also likely to be greatly under-represented at
the cemeteries. It is certainly worth noting once
more that although the majority of trauma has been
caused by this kind of weapon, they were not asso-
ciated with warriors to any great extent. Less than
one percent of the graves at Brancˇ and My´tna Nová
Ves displayed axes or hammer-axes hence showing
that their symbolic association with war and war-
riorhood is rather weak. The axes from Brancˇ do,
however, show an interesting pattern. They all occur
in the western part of the cemetery, each within 
a group of graves of their own – groups C and D
respectively, which date to the classic/late phase.
Whilst contemporary graves at the same site contain
daggers and knives as the main weaponry for war-
riors, the warriors of groups C and D were equipped
with axes and bows. This strongly suggests that the
presentation of various kinds of weaponry in graves
was a matter of social identity – expressed by differ-
ent families through the burial custom.
Daggers
The dagger is a common weapon in the earliest
Bronze Age (Fig. 8). In south-western Slovakia there
are approximately 40 daggers from this period (Bátora
1999a), and all are made of copper with the excep-
tion of a bone dagger from Brancˇ (grave 247)(Vladár
1973). Daggers made of bronze do not appear until
the beginning of the Úneˇtice culture.
No other weapon in the earliest Bronze Age shows
such a variety of forms as the copper dagger. It was
developed from the willow-leaf shaped knife (see
below), and it is a matter of debate whether this so-
called knife is in reality more a heavily worn dagger
(cp. Vladár 1974). Nevertheless, one important dif-
ference between daggers and knives in the Early
Bronze Age is the particular technique of joining
hilt and blade. Daggers have a grip tongue, with the
hilt fastened by rivets onto the blade, whereas knives
have a tang. 
The willow-leaf shaped dagger has its origin in
the Chlopice-Veselé culture and occurs at Brancˇ,
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Nitra-Cˇermánˇ and Holesˇov (Vladár 1974). The trian-
gular dagger was probably developed in the Nitra
and the Kost’any cultures. The different types and
subtypes tend to occur at particular burial sites, sug-
gesting several local metal industries in which cop-
per objects rarely left their region of origin. The
chronology of daggers has been worked out by
Vladár (1974): the early phase is characterised by
two main types – 1. willow-leaf daggers and 2. tri-
angular copper daggers. In the later phase only tri-
angular copper daggers are present. Types and sub-
types of daggers dating to the early phase are: wil-
low-leaf dagger, miniature dagger, the Abrahám type,
the Sˇa’la-Vecˇa type, the Nitra type and the Vy´cˇapy-
Opatovce type. In the late phase we have the Brancˇ
type, the copper dagger with rounded grip tongue,
and the Sˇa’la-Vecˇa type.
The willow-leaf dagger is characterised by an
oblong or oval blade with a rounded tip. The dagger
is thicker at the centre of the blade creating a smooth
ridge laterally. Two rivet holes provided fastening
for a handle. This type is only found at Brancˇ (graves
55, 88) (Vladár 1974). None of these daggers have
decoration. It should be mentioned that a similar
blade exists from Tvrdosˇovce, which has been clas-
sified as a knife, although it has a grip tongue and is
slightly larger than most knives from this period
(Tocˇik 1963).
The triangular copper daggers exist in many vari-
eties depending on the cemetery in which they have
been found. Daggers of Abrahám and Sˇa’la-Vecˇa
types lie typologically close to the willow-leaf form,
but usually have three to five rivet holes on a slight-
ly rounded grip tongue. The blade is flat and has a
more triangular shape, and daggers of the two types
are undecorated. They occur at Abrahám (grave
62, 64), Brancˇ (grave 195), Cˇerny´ Brod (42, 65),
Tvrdosˇovce (grave 14/60) and Holesˇov (grave 50)
(Vladár 1974; Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985). Some are
even almost equilateral, either in miniature form, as
at Brancˇ (grave 6), Abrahám (grave 1) and Holesˇov
(grave 46), or in a larger form, as at Sˇa’la-Vecˇa (grave
51/65) (Vladár 1974; Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985).
The Kosihy-Cˇaka and Bell Beaker cultures south of
the Carpathians are the sources of influence for these
early triangular daggers in the Nitra culture. It is not
until the beginning of the Úne˘tice culture that this
kind of dagger becomes common in Central Europe.
In the early phase there are also blades with
incised decoration, such as the Nitra type, where the
decoration consists of grooves and/or thin incised
lines alongside the cutting edges forming a triangle.
Some daggers also have a smaller triangular pattern
at the centre of the blade. The blade is flat and has
a slightly rounded grip tongue with five rivet holes.
This type has been found in Nitra-Cˇermánˇ (grave
69), Sˇal’a-Dusikárenˇ (grave 7), Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce
(grave 187), Tvrdosˇovce (grave 48/60) and Sˇa’la-
Vecˇa (graves 29/65, 54/65) (Vladár 1974).
Daggers of the Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce type differ from
other triangular blades by having an oval cross-sec-
tion instead of being completely flat. It has also a
rounded grip tongue with three rivet holes. It is
found at Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce (grave 310) and Nitra-
Cermánˇ (grave 52) (Vladár 1974).
Many of the daggers in the later phase are devel-
opments of earlier forms. Copper daggers with round-
ed grip tongue are similar to the Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce
type, but have four rivet holes. One specimen has
been found at Brancˇ (grave 264) (Vladár 1974).
Similar to the Nitra type are daggers belonging to
the Sˇa’la-Vecˇa type that are placed at the very end
of the Nitra culture sequence. These blades have a
rounded grip tongue with three rivet holes, and their
decoration differs from the Nitra type by having an
incised shaded V-pattern at the proximal end of the
blade. They occur at Sˇa’la-Vecˇa (graves 5, 6/64),
Vel’ky´ Grob (grave 7), Abrahám (grave 142) and
Holesˇov (grave 83) (Vladár 1974; Ondrácˇek and
Sˇebela (1985). Chropovsky´ (1960) has interpreted the
blade from Vel’ky´ Grob as a halberd, since the blade
was inserted obliquely into the hilt. This would be
one of the earliest finds of halberds in the Bronze
Age. They are otherwise considered to belong to the
Úne˘tice culture.
From Brancˇ (grave 182) there is a single blade
classified as the Brancˇ type 2 (Vladár 1974). With its
rather straight grip tongue with four rivets it clearly
does not resemble any other type of blade. The dag-
ger in question was most likely an import from the
region south of the Carpathians.
The role of daggers in warfare can be of course
debated, but there can be no doubt that they were
used. Many daggers, as well as knives, are heavily
worn and show signs of having been sharpened by
whetstones. Some even show damage at the blade’s
proximal end with broken tangs and torn rivet
holes.
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Knives
Before the appearance of daggers the copper blade
industry of the Nitra culture was characterised by
knives, which seem foreign to the region and bear no
resemblance to Eneolithic copper blades such as the
tanged copper daggers of the Bell Beaker culture (Tocˇik
1963). The Nitra culture knives are all willow-leaf-
shaped with a tang to fit into the organic hilt (Fig. 8).
In the early phase knives are flat, but in the classic
phase a mid-rib appears extending medially across the
blade’s dorsal side and giving the knife a triangular
cross-section (Bátora 1991). As mentioned above, dag-
gers were developed from knives, but while the latter
grew more triangular the former maintained the wil-
low-leaf shape throughout the period. Though dag-
gers to a large extent replace knives as prestige goods
the knife never really went out of use, as document-
ed by finds at Brancˇ (Vladár 1973). Knives have been
found at Brancˇ, Cˇerny´ Brod, Luzˇany, Tvrdosˇovce,
Jelsˇovce, My´tna Nová Ves and Holesˇov (Tocˇik 1963;
1979; Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985; Bátora 1991).
Spears and lances
Pole arms were not employed by warriors in the
Nitra culture to judge from the evidence at various
burial sites. However, the tip of a lance of copper
was found at Holesˇov (grave 174). It was placed in
the hands of the dead. Its origin is uncertain, but
may belong to the early Úne˘tice culture in Moravia
(Ondrácˇek and Sˇebela 1985).
Trauma1
Traumatic traces on skeletons from normal burials
(Figs. 14-18), due to intentional violence, are com-
mon in the Nitra culture. The presence, frequency
and style of the fractures indicate that clashes
between groups were the grim reality of ongoing
war. From the many osteological analyses conduct-
ed it is possible to reconstruct the nature of violent
encounters and to outline the strategy behind the
skirmish as well as fighting techniques. Numerous
skeletons from many of the larger burial sites have
been examined (cp. Furmánek 1997; Stloukal 1985;
Bátora 1999a; Jakab 1999), and so far there are 22
cases of cranial fractures, 12 fractures on arms and 3
on legs (Bátora 1991) (Figs. 15-16). Skeletal trauma
occurs predominantly on male skeletons (21) fol-
lowed by women (10) and children (5). The majority
of traumata were hack, slash and crush injuries to
the left side of the body, mainly on the skull. The
nature of the wounds and their position on the body
indicate that they were the result of a clash between
armed persons. Fractures such as depressions on
skulls, broken clavicles and arm bones might have
been caused by accidents not relating to warfare, but
they are fewer than those arguably resulting from
the confrontation of close combat. It should be
noted that some bodies show signs of post-mortem
trauma (Fig. 17): these are mutilations where parts
of the body have been butchered. The reason for
this is unknown but is surely connected to rituals
performed at the time of burial (and hardly as sug-
gested by Bátora (1991) and Chropovsky´ (1960) a
result of vampire slaying).
Blows to the head encompass the widest variety
in terms of battle wounds and battle techniques.
There are basically three kinds of skull fractures from
the Early Bronze Age: 1. hack and slash wounds. 2.
crush injuries and 3. depressions (Fig. 18). Hack and
slash wounds are characterised by a broken bone
wall with a hole that takes its shape from the weapon.
The impact of the weapon has usually flaked the
bone, due to the stroke itself or due to the weapon
being pulled out. Such wounds are often fatal inas-
much as the flaking of the bone, including the
splints, have caused immense blood loss and/or
severe brain damage. The man from grave 206 from
My´tna Nová Ves has a clear hack fracture on the left
frontal bone with severe flaking on the inside of the
skull (Jakab 1999). In contrast, injuries from crush-
ing blows are characterised by broken and at the
same time shattered bone, and the bone wall is not
necessarily broken. Such fractures may not be fatal
unless they are extensive. A large crush fracture
shattered the zeugmatic and temporal bones of the
head’s left side on the male skull from grave 262 at
My´tna Nová Ves (Jakab 1999). The last category of
cranial injuries consists of small rounded depres-
sions. Unless these wounds are clearly visible they
are easily overlooked. They are either results of minor
crushing blows failing to break the bone or a result
of well-healed fractures. In this latter case the frac-
ture might only be visible as a small hollow in the
skull and could easily be ignored, especially if the
skeleton is not well preserved.
Judging from the appearance of cranial fractures
they are either round- or quadrilateral, long and
narrow with marked edges. The latter suggests that
they were caused by blunt or heavy weapons with a
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Site Grave Sex Age Description Reference
Abrahám 95 M Maturus I Fracture on left os frontalis (1) Bátora 1999a
Abrahám 100 ? ? Trepanation (1) Bátora 1999a
Brancˇ 55 M ? Fracture over left orbita in os frontale (Healed) (1) Bátora 1999a
Brancˇ 56 M Maturus Three fractures on right os parietale (Healed) (1-3) Vyhnánek and
Hanulík 1971
Two fractures on right os frontale (Healed) (1-2)
Brancˇ 86 M ? Fracture on left os parietale (Healed) (1) Bátora 1999a
Cermán 44 M Adult Trepanation on the left os parietale (Healed) (1) Bátora 2002
Matúsˇkovo 10 c Infans III Impression on the left os parietale (1) Bátora 1999a
My´tna Nová Ves 29 (A) M Adultus II Round fractures on the left side of os parietale (1) Bátora 1999a
29 (B) M Maturus I Round fractures on the left side of os parietale (1) Bátora 1999a
My´tna Nová Ves 39 c Infans III Sharp and oblong fracture on os parietale (1) Bátora 1999a
My´tna Nová Ves 132 M Adultus I Impression on the right side of os frontale (1) Bátora 1999a
My´tna Nová Ves 206 M Adultus I Round fractures on the left side of os parietale (1) Jakab 1999
My´tna Nová Ves 226 M Senilis Three irregular cranial fractures (1-3) Bátora 1991
My´tna Nová Ves 262 M Adultus I Fracture on proximal ulna (Healed) (1) Jakab 1999
Large oval opening on os frontale (1)
Small fracture on the left side of os frontale (1)
Two small concentric openings on left os parietale (1)
Fracture on left os temporale and os zygomaticum (1)
My´tna Nová Ves 305 M Adultus I Fractures on the left side of the mandible (1) Jakab 1999
Four broken costae – two on each side (1-2)
Fracture on radius and ulna (1)
Fractures on the right scapula (1-2)
My´tna Nová Ves 319 F Maturus I Fracture on right os parietale near the sutura sagittale (1) Bátora 1990
Trepanation on os parietale (-)
My´tna Nová Ves 509 M Adultus I Fracture on left os parietale (1) Jakab 1999
Fractures on os temporale and os zygomaticum (1)
Fracture on os occipitale (1)
Fracture on right os parietale (1)
My´tna Nová Ves 513 M Adultus I Fracture on distal humerus and proximal ulna (1) Jakab 1999
Prˇíkazy ? M Maturus Round fracture on the leftside of os parietale (1) Bátora 1999a
Prˇíkazy ? M Senilis? Three fractures from blunt weapon on the craniums Bátora 1999a
left side (1-3)
Senkvice ? ? ? Fracture on the left side of the cranium (1) Bátora 1991
Blunt and sharp force trauma. Nitra group.
F I G .  1 5 : List of hack, slash and crush fractures on skeletons in normal burials of the Nitra (and Úneˇtice) culture
(cases known to the author).
Site Grave Sex Age Description Reference
Veselé 12 F ? Silex arrowhead in vertebrae Budinsky´-Kricˇka 1965
Jelsˇovce 436 M Maturus I Silex arrowhead in a rib on the chest’s left side Bátora 1999a
My´tna Nova Ves 325 M Maturus I Silex arrowhead in cervical vertebra Bátora 1999a
F I G .  1 6 : Trauma from stab-wounds noted on skeletons in normal burials of the Nitra (and Úneˇtice) culture (cases
known to the author).
crude edge, such as stone clubs or axes. This seems a
paradox since these kinds of weapons are rare in
graves of the Nitra culture. In fact, the popularity of
knives, daggers and archers equipment stands in
contrast to the absence of injuries from these
weapons among the cranial fractures.
The second largest area of injuries is the arm,
especially the left elbow and left lower arm. These
fractures are similar to each other, with either a
blow to the elbow that fractures the distal humerus
and proximal ulna or a strike to the lower arm that
breaks the ulna and radius into two. This kind of
injury may well be connected to attempts to parry
an incoming blow to the head. Although a broken
arm would make the person an easy target, many
such parry injuries have healed showing that the
victim survived the incident. The same can be said
for leg injuries, which are rather few in number and
add little to the understanding of organised violence.
Although one could expect the opposite, injuries
to the torso are almost absent. Such trauma consists
of broken ribs and arrowheads shot into vertebrae
and ribs. I expect that the poor preservation of skele-
tons and maybe in some cases the ignorance of the
osteologist could be the main reason of the small
numbers of this kind of trauma. It has often been
mentioned that stabbing weapons, such as daggers
and arrows, would not leave any marks in the skele-
ton as they hit the chest. We would most likely be
able to observe traces on both ribs and vertebrae
from stabbing weapons if a careful search was con-
ducted. But admittedly, it remains difficult to sepa-
rate cut wounds from scratches and dents deriving
from taphonomic processes.
The distribution of trauma among the dead per-
sons allows a division by sex and age. Cranial frac-
tures occur mainly on mature male skeletons,
except at the cemetery of My´tna Nová Ves where
young male adults suffered most skull injuries (see
below). Males are, then, by far the group of individ-
uals most frequently engaged in warfare. Broken
arms are, however, rather frequent among women.
It is interesting that trauma owing to violence often
occurs on individuals we would expect not to be
active in warfare; that is older men and especially
women. The high frequency of skeletal trauma on
these persons may well show that they were less
able to defend themselves, either because they were
unarmed, or simply because they were not agile
enough to dodge an incoming attack.
It is important to point out that skeletal trauma
occurs throughout the Nitra phases but is most fre-
quent in the classic and late phases. According to
Bátora (1991; 1999a), most of the traumatic evidence
dates to the transition between these two phases,
and to the transition to the Úne˘tician period. When
looking at the occurrence of trauma in the Nitra cul-
ture one must recognise that each site had a distinct
traumatic history of its own although a general pat-
tern in the traumatic history can also be outlined for
the culture as a whole. These distinctions are impor-
tant in understanding the role of violence in the
community and its consequences. At Brancˇ it is sur-
prising that cranial fractures have actually healed
in each case to occur. The man in grave 56 is a case
in point with five healed fractures on the skull indi-
cating that he has participated in warfare several
times and survived the encounters. Healed fractures
may show that the agent escaped his antagonist
quickly. This is interesting since a blow to the head
normally turns the victim into an easy kill as he
staggers around or falls stunned to the ground.
Either the enemy did not have time to finish his vic-
tim off, or it was not their aim to do so.
The situation at My´tna Nová Ves is completely
different. Contrary to other burial sites trauma is
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Site Grave Sex Age Description Reference
Brancˇ 82 F ? Right leg chopped off Vládar 1973
Velkky´ Grob ? ? ? Mutilated Chropovsky´ 1960
Prˇíkazy ? M ? Decapitulated Bátora 1991
Mutilated bodies
F I G .  1 7 : Skeletons with evidence of mutilation from normal burials of the Nitra (and Úneˇtice) culture (cases known
to the author).
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F I G .  1 8 : Skeletal trauma found in normal burials of the Nitra (and Úneˇtice) culture. 1.-2. Round crush fracture 
on parietal bone (My´tna Nová Ves grave 29/84a). 3. Hack trauma on parietal bone (My´tna Nová Ves grave 39/84). 
4. Depression on parietal bone with trepanation attempt (My´tna Nová Ves grave 342/88). 5. Arrowhead stuck in rib 
bone (Jelsˇovce grave 436/85). 6. Fractured, but healed, tibia (Jelsˇovce grave 388) (after Bátora 1990; 1991).
1
3
5
2
4
6
most common among younger men and women.
Those being most prone to violence were the young
chieftains buried in death houses, and it is worth
noting that they also show traces of multiple frac-
tures, which is otherwise a rare phenomena. While
the men at Brancˇ survived a fight, the combatants at
My´tna Nová Ves were victims of intense and fatal
aggression. Multiple fractures on each skeleton show
that the victim was severely mauled by the antago-
nist, even if the fallen individuals must have died
instantly in some cases. Blows were often directed
towards the head, smashing the skull several times
while leaving the postcranial body alone (graves
226, 262, 509), but there is also one case in which
the whole body was injured, resulting in a smashed
shoulder blade and several broken ribs (grave 305).
That warriors of high rank were prime target for
assailants is not only evident from the evidence of
multiple traumas, but also by the occurrence of
cenotaphs for the same warrior class. The fact that
bodies were heavily molested on the battleground
and others were carried away by the enemy indi-
cates that it must have been essential to desecrate
the body of the fallen warrior as far as possible. The
death of an elite warrior must have been a severe
blow to a community, altering the balance of power
in the region, perhaps with consequences for rights
to land and women. To kill a warrior of high rank
was perhaps seen as especially courageous, granting
the killer special status.
Extensive and detailed osteological research in
skeletal trauma has been conducted on the remains
from warriors buried in the conspicuous death houses
at My´tna Nová Ves. The fractures on these skeletons
provide vital information on combat techniques
used by warriors in the Nitra culture as well as giving
hints on warfare strategy and its effects on the
people. None of the wounds show signs of healing,
except one ulna (grave 262). Only fractures on the
head were directly lethal, while other fractures
could have been healed. The traumatism of some of
these elite warrior burials are described in some
detail below:
Grave 206 – male, adultus I
On the left side of the forehead (os frontale) was an
oval fracture measuring 28 x 41 mm on the outside.
The fracture is cone-shaped with a triangular cut at
its bottom. On the inside of the skull the fracture is
larger, and a piece of the cranial vault has been
broken off, aggravating the wound. Pieces from the
triangular fracture were still present, showing an
elliptical splitting of the bone. The fracture was a
mortal wound due to the splitting effect of the bone
on the inside of the cranium.
Given its heavy impact on the cranium the frac-
ture must have been caused by a weapon with both
a crushing and stabbing effect, being cylindrical in
shape. Bátora (1999c) suggests a hammer-axe as the
cause, whereas Jakab (1999) claims it to have been a
spearhead. It seems most likely that an axe was used,
since a spear would not have such a crushing effect
on the cranium, unless it was very blunt from exten-
sive use. The fact that spearheads were more or less
unknown in this region at this time also tends to
make this implausible. The fracture was either caused
by the neck or with the pointed edge of the axe. A
very similar fracture occurs on a man from Prˇíkazy
in Moravia, and on skeletons from a mass grave in
Elben in Germany (Bátora 1999c).
Grave 262 – male, adultus I
This skeleton has the following fractures: 1. A healed
fracture on the elbow (proximal ulna). 2. An oval
opening measuring 39 x 74 mm between the left side
tuber frontale and the sagittal bones. The fracture
goes in an arc from the nasal root and goes along-
side the sagittal bones and turns through the tuber
frontale and down through the eye-socket. On the
outside the edge of the fracture is sharp, but rough
on the inside. This fracture, which smashed the face
of the warrior, was caused by the violent force of an
axe or club. Post-mortem change and taphonomy
made the fracture wider. 3. In the medial direction
from the fracture mentioned above there is a small-
er fracture measuring 6 x 9 mm. It is larger on the
inside of the cranium. 4-5. There are two openings
on the left parietal bone (os parietale) near the sutura
sagittalis. There might have been more, but the rest
of the skull is missing. Each fracture is round in
shape, measuring 12 x 13 mm, and the edges were
heavily corroded, making it difficult to assess what
kind of weapon that caused them. A sharp and
pointed weapon must have caused the puncture
fractures, since the fracture is not much larger on the
inside of the skull. 6-7. There are splintered fractures
on the left temporal bone (os temporale) near the
foramen magnum and on the processus frontalis on the
zygomatic bone (os zygomaticum).
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F I G .  1 9 A - B : Mass grave from Nizˇná Mysˇl’a in Slovakia (after Jakab, Olexa and Vladár 1999). Abnormal multiple
burials of men, women, and children are frequent in east central and south east Europe during the latest Early Bronze
Age, and osteological and forensic studies show that the skeletons often carry marks of violence (see Figs. 20-22).
Grave 305 – male, adultus I
This skeleton has following fractures: 1. The
mandible has a vertical fracture splitting the bone in
half. The fracture is sharp on the dorsal side, but on
the ventral side a splinter of bone has been broken
off. On the mandible’s left side the bone has been
splintered at the line dividing ramus and corpus,
showing a sharp fracture line. These fractures on the
mandible show that a powerful blow had been
struck on the left side, causing a direct fracture there
and an indirect fracture running through the bone
at the front teeth. A punch with a fist, or a club,
caused the blow. 2. The chest has four fractures on
the ribs (costae) – two on either side of the rib cage of
the same pair of ribs. 3. A fracture on the left lower
radius and ulna broke the bones into two. This kind
of fracture derives from a reflex action in an attempt
to parry an incoming blow. 4. The right shoulder
blade (scapula) has two fractures. One fracture
extends from the margo lateralis to the spina scapu-
lare measuring 41 mm and the other fracture extends
15 mm down from the margo cranialis. A sharp and
crushing weapon such as an axe or hammer-axe
caused the fractures.
Grave 509 – male, adultus I
Many cranial fractures were noted for this man, but
due to bad preservation parts of the right side and
the back of the head was missing. 1-2. A large frac-
ture (80 mm) on the left parietal bone (os parietale),
where a piece of the bone was chipped away, was
caused indirectly by two smaller direct fractures on
the left temporal bone and left sphenoid bone. One
of the blows hit the sutura squamosa and the other
the mastoid process. A blunt object caused the frac-
tures. 3. On the occipital bone a 47 mm long frac-
ture running to the back of the cranium is visible.
4. A fracture on the right side of the skull is barely
visible due to heavy fragmentation of the bone. Its
appearance cannot be assessed.
Grave 513 – male, adultus I
This skeleton has a fracture on the distal humerus
and proximal ulna. This is probably a parrying fracture
like those on the skeletons in graves 262 and 305.
Warfare and social change
Whether warfare characterised the population of the
Nitra culture from its earlier phase as Tocˇik (1963)
and Bátora (1991) stated is difficult to say, but war-
fare certainly grew in importance during the period.
Although several customs in the Nitra culture seem
to have had an east European origin this is not
enough to postulate a substantial migration into the
area. Rather the river Nitra enabled people in this
region to create a wealthy society. The river served
as a route of communication facilitating the distri-
bution of prestige goods and commodities between
the Hungarian plain and Little Poland. The fertile
soils of the river valleys and easy access to copper ore,
moreover, made population increases possible and a
larger accumulation of wealth than in the neigh-
bouring areas.
The presence of elite warriorhood and warfare in
society might explain the shift in settlement struc-
ture and economy that occurred during the Early
Bronze Age. Bátora (1999a) has studied the frequen-
cy of weapons and the frequency of skeletal trauma
and concluded that the bow and arrow together
with axes gave way to daggers during the course of
the Nitra culture. Trauma increased during the end
of the classic period, but declined slightly with the
advent of the Úne˘tice culture. 
It has been argued (Bátora 1991; 1999a) that the
greatest threat to the Nitra cultural group came from
neighbouring regions. The highest frequencies of
weaponry are found in Sˇa’la I, Tvrdosˇovce, Holesˇov
and My´tna Nová Ves, which are all situated on the
borders of the region occupied by the Nitra culture.
This should be compared to Vel’ky Grob, Brancˇ,
Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce and Jelsˇovce, where weapons are
relatively few. Little knowledge, however, exists con-
cerning the people living in directly neighbouring
regions at this time and we may also assume that war
was a driving force within the Nitra culture itself.
The frequency of warrior graves and weaponry sure-
ly indicates internal conflict between areas over the
control of resources rather than defence from exter-
nal forces. It must also be emphasised that the
occurrence of weapons alone does not give a valid
picture of the extent to which a population engaged
in bellicose activities. At Brancˇ some warrior graves
did not contain weapons, but there is a high fre-
quency of trauma, indicating that this population
waged war or defended themselves against attacks.
The high frequency of cenotaphs and grave robbery
adds to this picture of local societies in a state of war.
The political nature of warfare must surely also be
considered, such as the organisation of warriorhood
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and the relation between warriors and other social
identities in the society. 
Clear evidence of war appears in the classic phase,
and at the threshold to the Nitra-Úne˘tice phase.
During this period there is a settlement expansion
from a core area in the middle Nitra basin to the
regions in the south and into less fertile areas in the
south-west and north-west. This expansion coin-
cides with a marked increase in trauma on human
skeletons, with a change in weaponry, and with an
increase in the number of cenotaphs and plundered
graves. It seems as if a shift in both the economy
and social structure was connected to war-related
violence. 
A shift in power structure obviously happened
when the elite from the Nitra culture began to ally
with that of the Úne˘tice culture. One reason for
increased competition and hostilities may have been
the change towards an Úne˘tician way of living
among the elite. This included control of bronze
objects and their production and distribution. In the
classic Nitra phase there were not yet bronze arte-
facts in the burials, but it is evident that the social
elite changed their grave goods from the bow and
arrow to the dagger, which is a fashion seen in the
Úne˘tician regions of, for instance, Moravia and
Austria at this time. When bronze finally began to
appear in south-western Slovakia it is amongst this
elite that it is found.
Although the changes in power structures were
connected to external contacts, the main dynamics
of change are located within Nitra society itself. As
outlined above, this society rested upon three foun-
dations – as regards settlement organisation and
economy: 1. Domestic production and control of
arable land. 2. Control of copper production. 3.
Control of the manufacture and distribution of pres-
tige goods, notably in metal. The evidence from the
cemeteries of Brancˇ, Jelsˇovce and My´tna Nová Ves
suggests a ranked or stratified society in which cer-
tain family groups had obtained dominant positions
entitling them to rich grave goods and elaborate
tombs. These high-ranking families may have been
in control over both land and the distribution of
prestige goods. The settlement expansion described
above may furthermore be interpreted as an attempt
to enlarge the subsistence base through the incor-
poration of neighbouring villages. The strategy for
this might of course have varied, but acquisition of
women would have been an easy way of legitimating
the take-over. The fact that women and girls often
had rich grave goods (Shennan 1975) and were
often buried near high-ranking warriors suggests
that society’s wealth was often invested in females.
Women might have inherited land, or be entitled to
wealth and power, which could be taken over when
kidnapped women were married into the hostile
group. Abduction of women could simply be the
means to enhance the preconditions of biological
reproduction. However, to completely depopulate a
conquered area was not desirable – many burial sites
were in use for a very long time. The conquering
party may well have forced the subjugated group to
pay tribute to them, and this tribute could have
been in the form of food, prestige goods and/or
women. The relationship between the dominant
and dominated groups may perhaps be visible in the
presence or absence of an ‘upper class’, including
warriors, on the burial sites. Such a relationship of
dominance-subordination may be expressed in the
northern part of the Nitra basin where My´tna Nová
Ves has many high-ranking graves and a high fre-
quency of weapons, whereas Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce, a few
kilometres away, has no elaborate tombs and very
few weapons. A similar pattern is visible in the Vah
basin, but here the Úne˘tician burial custom with its
absence of weaponry may be a source of error.
As pointed out above, the expansion of the Nitra
culture occurred in a southern and a western direc-
tion towards the Úne˘tician region of Moravia and
Lower Austria. Whether there was any expansion
eastward is difficult to say, but there are surprisingly
few finds east of the river Nitra. Although it might
be difficult to talk about major economic and polit-
ical centres in the early Nitra phase, some sites – such
as Nitra, My´tna Nová Ves and Holesˇov – were settled
early and grew rapidly in size. With the advent of
the classic phase it is possible to discern sites that
held an important position – to judge from the
wealth invested in grave rituals, the number of war-
riors interred and the building of elaborate tombs
for the elite. In the north, Holesˇov in Moravia and
My´tna Nová Ves in Slovakia are situated close to
copper ore sources. In the middle Nitra basin there
is Jelsˇovce, and further south Brancˇ, where wealth
may have been built on access to trade and arable
land. Towards the end of the classic phase the struc-
ture of the economic and political core regions
changes. Vy´cˇapy-Opatovce apparently fell under the
hegemony of My´tna Nová Ves, and it is possible that
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people from this site even exercised some authority
over those living at Jelsˇovce. Although Jelsˇovce held
an important position earlier on, its greatest days
were in the Úne˘tice and Mad’arovce periods. The
burial sites at Nitra and Brancˇ indicate that these
sites lost authority to sites in the south and west
such as Tvrdosˇovce and Sˇal’a. In Moravia, Holesˇov
strengthened its power by expanding along the river
Morava. 
When it comes to war strategies, two radically dif-
ferent phenomena can be discerned from the burial
sites of the Nitra culture. On the one hand there are
sites with a high frequency of weaponry as well as
an increasing number of individuals who had suf-
fered deadly violence. On the other hand there are
a number of sites where weapons are relatively few
and where the frequency of trauma is high, but not
of a deadly nature. My´tna Nová Ves belongs to the
former category and Brancˇ to the latter. The evi-
dence of trauma from Brancˇ indicates that killing
an enemy was not the primary aim in war. Rather,
raiding and ambushing must have been the under-
lying strategy when cattle were stolen or women
abducted. Skirmishes between warriors alone might
also have been on the agenda, but the many injuries
to women and older men suggest that settlements
were attacked rather than a battle being fought
between warriors on a battle field away from home.
Since the bow and arrow were the most common
weaponry it is easy to conclude that war was waged
mainly at a distance and that close combat rarely
took place, but as emphasised repeatedly above, the
majority of all traumatic injuries are caused by
weapons such as axes and clubs. These were used in
order to close in on the enemy, but were never
accepted as a proper weapon to be displayed in burial
ritual. The warrior of the Nitra culture was present-
ed as a hunter in death and not as a close combat
fighter. The violent encounters might be understood
as mostly sporadic incidents initiated by daring
individuals during a fight rather than the united
attack of a whole group. This might be the answer
to the question of why so many individuals sur-
vived close combat. The attacker would be on unsafe
ground while launching the close combat and given
little time to finish the attack before the foe’s friends
came to the rescue. Although this war strategy does
not appear as a lethal one overall, there were periods
when people were driven away from their home
area by force, as possibly apparent from the burials
at Brancˇ. War was indeed a power struggle even if
not always deadly.
At Holesˇov and My´tna Nová Ves the many
weapons indicate that warriors were here important
to an extent not recognised elsewhere in this cul-
tural group. The prominence of warriors and the
many traces of deadly wounds are reason to believe
that the reality of war was different in the northern
part of the Nitra culture. Overall, war tactics in the
north must have been similar to the ones in the
southern part of the Nitra culture region. Raids and
ambushes by archers were the norm even here, but
it seems as if the struggles between high-ranking
individuals were more violent and that rivalry over
land and resources was very common. It is striking
that high-ranking warriors have multiple peri-
mortem wounds and that this trend coincides with
the emergence of cenotaphs. As mentioned above,
killing a high-ranking warrior may have enhanced
the prestige of the successful warrior considerably.
The northern part of the Nitra culture was, with its
access to copper ore, an important area, also to non-
residential groups, which may have been among the
attackers. It is not surprising that the burial sites here
are both large and wealthy and in general testify to
the overriding political and economic significance
of this region.
Epilogue: a forensic study of war-related 
ritual killings in the Early Bronze Age
In the Úne˘tice phase all these power struggles seem
to have been settled, and the boundaries were
strengthened by the construction of fortified sites in
both the middle and southern Nitra basin as well as
in the highland regions between the Vah and Morava
rivers (cp. Fig. 23). These fortified sites came to dom-
inate the political climate until the Middle Bronze
Age (Novotna 1999). At some of these sites – as well
as at some of the very similar sites that were con-
structed all over eastern central Europe at this time
– there are mass graves containing individuals of dif-
ferent age and sex (Figs. 20-22) with various degrees
of trauma and mutilations (cp. Rittershofer 1997).
This certainly testifies to ritual forms of killing and
indirectly to a general climate of violence and war,
which is also evident from other sources. This pecu-
liar ritual custom is briefly described below through
two forensic studies of skeletal remains from
Kettlasbrunn in the north-eastern part of Lower
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Austria and Nizˇna Mysˇl’a in eastern Slovakia. Both
mass burials are dated to the later Early Bronze Age
and occur under similar circumstances in storage
pits on settlements.
These studies are central because they underline
not only the pathological aspect of the skeletal
remains, but also the ritual behaviour behind the
peculiar find complexes and more indirectly their
socio-political background in war and warfare. As
such, they provide us with tools for approaching
burials of the same unusual kind elsewhere in this
region and period. These case studies are exceptional
inasmuch as the use of forensic methodology during
excavation and examination of the bodies managed
to reveal vital information about the peri- and post-
mortem changes to the buried bodies that is usually
lost or ignored. These case studies serve as an indi-
cation that burials in settlement and storage pits
must have had a special status, very different from
the status and feelings presented in the ordinary
burials described above and that these ritual killings
in some way were connected to the practice of
warfare. 
Kettlasbrunn
The pit was located near some house constructions
on an open settlement and can be dated to the Early
Bronze Age – most likely the late Úne˘tice or Veˇterˇov
culture. The storage pit contained one child (age
and sex unknown) and three adults: one male (41-
50 years) and two females (25-35 and 31-40 years).
The individuals were placed in two pairs with a
thick layer of soil in between. The child and the
mature woman were near the bottom of the pit,
whereas the mature man and younger woman were
close to the pit surface. Apart from a small bone
needle and a canine tooth on the child’s body no
artefacts were found together with the skeletons,
although some pottery sherds were in the filling of
the pit (Winkler and Schweder 1991: 79).
The bodies of the child and mature woman were
in an almost complete state of disarticulation as
only a few bones, notably cranial and torso parts,
were in their anatomically correct position. Both
skeletons showed traces of weathering, i.e. they had
been exposed to the taphonomic effect of wind, sun
and rain. This had bleached and made some of the
bones brittle. Also, gnaw marks from rodents were
numerous on the skeletons. Thus the disarticula-
tion, traces of weathering and the gnaw marks show
that the bodies had been exposed for an extended
period before they were covered with soil. This indi-
cates that the pit must have remained open until
the next burial took place (ibid.: 89f). 
Before the second burial occurred the remains of
the first one was covered with a thick layer of soil.
The mature man and the younger woman were then
buried and their taphonomic history is similar to
those earlier described. The man was apparently
buried more quickly than the woman, as his body
only showed a minor degree of disarticulation and
no notable effect of weathering. Thus his body had
been covered soon after his death. Yet his disarticu-
lated ribs show that the body had been exposed,
albeit for a shorter time. 
The skeleton of the younger woman shows almost
complete disarticulation and the bones were weath-
ered and in poor condition. This is in complete con-
trast to the male whose bones were well preserved.
Whether the woman had been buried at the same
time as the man is difficult to say with certainty, and
it can only be stated that her body was uncovered
for a longer period and subjected to severe tapho-
nomic factors (ibid.: 90).
So far it can be stated that the multiple burial at
Kettlasbrunn is not an ordinary burial as the bodies
had been buried in a storage pit at different moments
and the different bodies had only been partially
covered in the meanwhile. Thus, we are here observ-
ing a burial that apparently has little in common
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AUSTRIA CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA
Age groups Lower Austria Bohemia Moravia
Children (0-15 yrs) 36,6% 48,3% 41,8% 52,9%
Juveniles and young adults (15-25) 14,6% 3,4% 11,1% 9,8%
Adults (20-60+) 48,8% 48,3% 47,1% 37,3%
F I G .  2 0 : Age distribution in a sample of mass graves or abnormal graves.
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with the ordinary mortuary practice of the Early
Bronze Age. Thus, it is important to take a closer
look at the circumstances around the burial in
Kettlasbrunn in order to place it within a relevant
mortuary paradigm. Investigation of the causes of
death for the interred individuals revealed that at
least the mature man and woman had died under
violent circumstances. The cause of death for the
child and younger woman have not been possible
to determine as their bodies were too fragmented. 
It is of note that both the mature man and woman
display similar injuries: puncture fractures on the
upper part of the torso and sharp-force fractures to
the base of the neck (ibid.: 94). The puncture frac-
tures on the left shoulder blade of the female show
that she has been stabbed twice through her heart
with a sharp implement. This had been done with
such force that the ribs behind the shoulder blade
had been splintered. Also the male had had a stake
hammered through his chest. It had entered from
the front and punctured his heart and even dam-
aged the vertebrae behind it, fracturing the left
shoulder blade as well. The puncture fractures present
on both individuals imply that a sharpened bone
tool was used. Sharp-force trauma to the base of the
neck, where the axis and foramen magnum connect,
implies that a sharp tool, presumably a knife, had
been thrust into the brain. For the woman there are
no further indications that she had been subject to
peri-mortem violence. The peri-mortem trauma his-
tory for the man on the other hand reveals some
interesting notions. To begin with, the hands were
tied behind his back at the time of his death. He had
fractures on the right shoulder blade and vertebral
column deriving from at least two slashes with a
sharp instrument, probably a knife. The position of
these injuries together with the trauma to the chest
shows that his hands were behind his back at these
moments (ibid.: 94).
Furthermore, the man had been engaged in vio-
lent action shortly before his death. The lower jaw
was fractured and splintered as a result of blunt-force
trauma. A sharp-force trauma to his left thigh near
the pelvis and cut marks on the ribs near the breast-
bone were also observed. None of these wounds
show signs of healing, which means that they were
caused shortly before his death. 
It is clear that the perpetrators were particularly
aggressive towards the mature male in comparison
to their other victims. The apparent different treat-
ment of the man, with hints of warfare, raises the
question of the social status these victims had in
life. Are we dealing with war captives, social out-
casts, slaves or perhaps criminals?
The osteological analysis implies that both the
older male and the female belonged to the upper
echelons of society since their skeletons show little
pathological change for their age. It would be expect-
ed that the skeletons of both the man and woman
should show some indications of stress relating to
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F I G .  2 1 : List of abnormal burials from Early Bronze Age settlements (cases known to the author). 
malnutrition, infections and physical strain as these
were common in this period (cp. Teschler-Nicola and
Gerold 2001). However, the slender female skeleton
bears no witness of hard labour and her teeth indi-
cate good health with no signs of malnutrition.
Apparently she had led a healthy life from child-
hood onwards. Her joints and vertebras were hardly
worn (Winkler and Schweder 1991: 94). 
The male has seemingly a similar background
within the upper parts of society. His large muscular
attachments suggest a heavy build and although he
had suffered from a mild form of arthritis since his
youth his skeleton show little indication of being
subject to stress. Thus, this was not someone who
had partaken in heavy labour, although his build
implies he had been involved in significant amounts
of physical activity. Winkler and Schweder (ibid.: 95)
suggest that this man was either a warrior or at least
someone who had led an adventurous life. Healed
fractures imply that he had been in violent conflicts
several times earlier in his life. Fractures on both his
arms and hands are similar to those of a boxer and
the healed lesion on his nasal bones shows that he
was once struck in the face with a sharp object. 
In summary, the significant feature in Kettlasbrunn
is the repetitive behaviour in the burials, killings
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F I G .  2 2 : List of trauma and pathological change in skeletons from Early Bronze Age settlements (cases known to the
author).
and choice of victims, which can be interpreted as
some kind of ritual practice. The similar pattern of
peri-mortem fractures for the mature man and
woman implies killings in a ritualistic manner – a
conduct governed by certain regulations and repro-
duced over time. In addition, the implications of
the social rank of the deceased and his assumed
warrior identity point to a ritual practice embedded
in an overall socio-political structure.
Nizˇna Mysˇl’a 
To further strengthen the discussion of the violent
and ritual aspects of burials in storage pits I would
like to draw attention to a multiple burial in Nizˇna
Mysˇl’a (Fig. 19) in eastern Slovakia from the early
Otomani culture (Jakab et al. 1999).
Five individuals were recorded in the burial: one
adolescent male (14-18 years old), two adult females
(19-24 and 30-40 years old) and one child (sex and
age unknown). They were located in the centre of
the pit within distinct layers indicating subsequent
interments over a period of time.
The burial was located on a fortified site on the
outskirts of a settlement area and close to an older
cemetery (ibid.: 91). The hourglass shape of the pit
suggests that it had been used as a storage pit prior
to its use as a burial ground. It had been filled with
soil and settlement refuse in subsequent phases, and
there were at least nine distinct layers. The compo-
sition of the layers suggests three major phases: a
phase of primary use with skeletal remains, a closing
ritual phase, and a waste disposal phase. All human
remains were located in the five successive layers in
the lower half of the pit and each body was in a sep-
arate layer. The pit was then ‘sealed’ with a thick
layer of soil without any vestiges of cultural activi-
ties. The upper part of the pit was afterwards used
for waste disposal – slowly filled over an extended
period. This final major phase appears not to be
connected to the two preceding phases.
Within the burial phases animal bones, pottery
sherds, clamshells, polished stones and clay weights
accompanied the human bodies. The arrangement
of these items appears to be intentional, in compar-
ison to the other layers without human remains
where they are intermixed. It is noteworthy that in
the layers with the female bodies these items lie
near the sides of the pit whereas in the layer with
the adolescent man they have been heaped on top
of him. Also, it seems as if the composition of ani-
mal bones is different in each layer. The small child
near the bottom of the pit lies close to some horse
bones and there are bones of bird and cow near the
female bodies (ibid.: 113-177). 
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Above the accumulation of the human bodies
there was a thick layer of loess soil. It contained no
remains of settlement refuse, and therefore it appears
as if this soil layer was intended to cover and seal off
the burials (ibid.: 94). Thus this can be regarded as a
closing phase for the funerary activities connected
with the pit. After the burials were sealed the remain-
der of the pit was apparently used as a waste dump
as the succeeding two layers were filled with settle-
ment refuse and charcoal in a haphazard manner.
There are also indications of re-cutting in the top
layers, an activity not recorded for the lower levels
of the pit. 
The five individuals were buried in a fashion
deviating from conventional burials in cemeteries.
Forensic analysis suggests that four of them had been
subject to a ritual killing and the fifth had appar-
ently been boiled prior to the burial. It could also be
concluded that they were buried during at least four
events, and that the bodies had decomposed between
these events. From these four events, together with
the major three phases of the filling of the pit, it is
possible to draw an outline of a ritual cycle.
Near the bottom of the pit close to the northern
side the right parietal bone from a smaller child was
found. No other skeletal remains from this individ-
ual was located in this layer and the preservation of
this bone and the rest of the human remains in the
pit indicate that this cranial fragment had been
buried in isolation. Odd as it may seem, the rest of
this child was actually discovered with the topmost
burial. The bone surfaces of the cranial fragments
from this child are different from the skeletal remains
of the other individuals and resembles bone material
subject to thermal changes. It has therefore been
suggested that the skull of the child had been boiled
before it was buried (ibid.: 106). 
Close to this child, the body of a younger woman
was found. She was lying on her left side with slight-
ly bend legs close to the north-eastern wall. Whereas
her legs and pelvis rested on their sides the upper
parts of the body had been turned to the right
towards the base of the pit. The chest was lying
against the floor level with the bent left arm beneath
it with the palm pressed against the chest. The right
arm projected slightly from the body with the hand
near the skull. The skull had been turned sideways
to the left so that the face looked over the left shoul-
der and the mandible touched the cervical verte-
brae. This position of the body is by no means a
natural one. Judging especially by the way the skull
had been twisted it is apparent that the upper part
of the woman's body had been deliberately turned
to the ground by forcing the head to the left. The
slight projection of the right shoulder blade and
arm towards the head and the left shoulder towards
the feet can also be taken as indicators that the body
had been turned peri-mortem and not post-mortem.
A smaller fracture on the left cheek appears to have
been caused during the peri-mortem treatment
(ibid.: 111).
In the succeeding layer above the young woman
an adult woman was located near the centre of the
pit. She was placed on her right side and like the
younger woman the torso and skull had been
turned towards the pit base. Her arms were bent and
pressed to the chest and the legs were flexed and
crossed.
Directly above the adult woman was the body of
an older child. It was placed on the stomach in a
stretched position. The right leg was outstretched
along the axis of the body whereas the left leg was
heavily bent beneath it. Similarly the left arm was
pressed alongside the side of the body and the right
one bent and projected out from the body. Oddly
enough, the palm of the right hand was turned
towards the top of the pit instead of towards the
base as would be expected. The mandible was to the
left side of the body, whereas the first cervical verte-
bra and the calvarium were missing. These parts
were, however, located some distance away and were
apparently disturbed soon after burial. The skull
rested on the right side. The position of the legs,
arms and skull leads to the conclusion that the child
had its skull forced to the side just like the rest of the
individuals in the pit. 
Concerning the disturbance of the head, no cut
marks are visible on either the skull or axis.
Considering that the rest of the body is in an
anatomically correct position, this suggests that the
movement of the axis and calvarium can be
explained as a natural consequence of the tapho-
nomic processes (ibid.: 97f, 107). The nature of the
ritual killing might explain this disarticulation. 
In the last burial layer there was the burial of an
adolescent man placed crouching in a kneeling
position at the centre of the pit, and the remaining
elements of the boiled child skull, part of which
was found at the bottom of the pit some 80-90 cen-
timetres lower down. The scattered cranial parts of
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the child were located at the western edge of the pit.
All bones were disarticulated and no postcranial
body parts of this individual were found. The well-
preserved skeleton of the man indicates that if the
rest of the body of the child had been buried it would
have been found. Thus there are strong indications
that this was not the case. Concerning the adolescent
man, his limbs had been pressed tightly beneath his
torso as if he had been bound (ibid.: 113). He rested
on the pit fill on his knees and hands, and his head
had been turned to the right. It should be mentioned
that the adolescent man has a healed depressed frac-
ture on the brow (ibid.: 106).
Similarly to the multiple burial in Kettlasbrunn
there are several interesting ritual aspects, both
concurrent and coeval: especially the selection of
the buried individuals, their peri- and post-mortem
treatment and the apparent demarcation of the
beginning and end of a ritual cycle. With the excep-
tion of the small child, who is only represented by
cranial fragments, all the individuals have apparently
been disposed of in a similar fashion, and they had
obviously been alive when placed in the pit. The
forcefully wrung heads suggest that they were killed
by having their throats slit (ibid.: 113-17, 223). Both
women had apparently been placed sitting in the pit
judging by the position of their legs. They were then
forced down on one side so that their chest touched
the ground. The perpetrator must have pressed his or
her body against the victim and by twisting the
head further to the side, so that the body became
forced around its own axis, the victims body was
locked in the grip of the perpetrator. This may also
be the case with the child who was placed on the
stomach. As I see it, the perpetrator, standing to the
left, turned the child’s body towards the ground and
blocked the movement of the child's left arm and
leg with his or her body. As a response to the forced
movement, or perhaps as an attempt to free itself,
the child’s free limbs stretched out. Jakab et al. sug-
gest that the child’s left arm and leg were tied
together, which might also be possible (ibid.: 115). It
can also be assumed that the adolescent man was
killed after he was placed in the pit. Not only was
his head turned sideways like the others, his palms
were pressed to the ground as if he was stabilising
his kneeling body or trying to push away from the
ground (ibid.: 113). 
Estimating the time span between the first and
last burial is difficult. Considering that the bodies
are located in different layers it can at least be
assumed that some time had passed between each
killing. Since there is no evidence of weathering, as
at Kettlasbrunn, I assume that each body was cov-
ered with soil soon after each instance of killing. It
is of note that the older child had apparently been
placed on a thicker bed of organic matter, such as
hay or shrubbery, as its body has sunk and collapsed
during decomposition, leading to the disarticulation
of the skull, right foot and left hand (ibid.: 97ff,
113ff). Also, the surface beneath the older child was
trodden down, indicating that the bodies from the
earlier interments had decomposed. The situation is
similar for the adolescent man. When he was placed
in the pit the body of the older child must have
been more or less decomposed as there are no signs
that the man’s body had been displaced due to
decomposition of the layers beneath him. 
Females and children seem to be preferred when
it comes to the killings at Nizˇna Mysˇl’a. To determine
a possible social status in life for these individuals
has proven to be difficult and is not discussed by
Jakab et al. (1999). There are no notable pathologi-
cal changes on the skeletons that would indicate a
distinct social class as was the case with the individ-
uals in Kettlasbrunn. The smaller child might be an
exception, as it is recorded that its skull is abnor-
mally large (ibid.: 123). Concerning the ritual treat-
ment of their disposal and objects accompanying
them the deceased can be divided into three distinct
groups. The first group consists of the small child.
As I have mentioned, its thermal treatment and
burial are clearly distinct from the rest of the bodies.
It is also of note that it was lying close to some horse
bones (ibid.: 115). The second group is made up of
the two women and the older child – who might be
a girl (ibid.: 122). These are all disposed of in a simi-
lar manner, as mentioned above, and the accompa-
nying animal bones, clamshells and pot sherds are
placed near the sides of the pit. The third, and last,
group is that of the man who had been tightly tied
and was partially covered in animal bones. In sum,
it appears as if the ritual conduct and the stage in
which each individual was killed were influenced by
the sex of the victim.
If a body had time to decompose between each
burial the pit might have been in use for some
months, or perhaps a year. It is important to bear in
mind the notion that the beginning and end of the
ritual activities in the pit was marked through the
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burial of the fragments of the smaller child’s boiled
skull at the bottom of the pit and later in conjunc-
tion with the last burial of the adolescent man. As
there are no signs of disturbance between the layers
it must be assumed that these skull fragments were
buried on purpose. Thus, those who carried out the
ritual had kept the remaining skull pieces and were
waiting for the cycle of ritual killings to be completed
before the last fragments could be interred. When
this was done the lower levels of the pit were sealed,
preventing later access. 
The significance and meaning of all these details
of ritual action of course need a wider analysis than
can be given here. Evidence from the rituals of nor-
mal burials needs to be incorporated too, and the tie
between the abnormal burials of ritual killings and
the fortified settlements needs to be explored further.
The widespread appearance of hill-top settlements
with defence systems around this time cannot be a
coincidence. The interpretation must therefore take
account of the generally war-like and socially dis-
ruptive context of the latest Early Bronze Age at the
transition to the Middle Bronze Age in eastern and
south eastern central Europe c. 1700-1500 BC. 
N O T E
1 I have not been able to examine the skeletons myself, but
have relied on already conducted research. These are not
as detailed as could have been wished for – Jakab’s detailed
analysis (1999) being an exception in order to ascertain
the exact nature of a fracture, such as the relationship
between multiple fractures being the result of one or sev-
eral blows, or the effects of taphonomic processes after
burial. Due to this, the exact number of fractures resulting
from different encounters cannot be established and I
have therefore chosen to indicate both the lowest and
highest possible number of fractures. However, this state
of affairs merely has a minor negative effect on the under-
standing of the nature of injuries. Moreover, it should be
noted that Bátora’s compilations (1991 and 1999a) con-
tain somewhat inconsistent information about the trau-
ma found on Nitra culture skeletons. This is of course
unfortunate, and I have not been able to consult unpub-
lished osteological reports. The published material, how-
ever, verifies a rather high frequency of trauma. 
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Warfare involves the use of violence to achieve one’s goals by forcing other peo-
ple to submit; it is ‘politics by other means’ (von Clausewitz 1989). Violence is
thus a resource for controlling people. However, both violence and warfare are
greatly enmeshed with meaning, just as all other forms of human action. To
enter into war normally requires a cause and motivation, but apart from this
basic premise variety abounds. The meaning of war can be tied to religious con-
viction or to a struggle for resources; it can be presented as morally justified and
unavoidable or as a way to obtain glory and honour (cp. Warburton chapter 4).
In one way or other the goals and motivations for warfare are embedded in a
discourse that has currency at the time of action. I use the notion of discourse
somewhat loosely – well aware of its complex intellectual history – to refer to all
forms of meaning-giving activity as well as the products of that activity (in the
form of documents and material culture). Subscribing to a Foucauldian perspec-
tive (cp. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982), I see these meaning-giving activities as
embedded in power relations while simultaneously engendering the subjectivi-
ties that define these relations. Warfare creates a context of acute contest for
power that affects people’s subjectivities and identities while coping with the
situation. By identities I mean more or less stable ascriptions of social position,
which are established in negotiations and sometimes contestations between
those who subscribe to the identity and others who ascribe it to them (cp.
Jenkins 1996; Otto and Driessen 2000; Vandkilde chapter 26). 
Warfare can generate war-specific identities in many different ways. In societies
that do not have specialists for conducting war, men (as is mostly the case) may
prepare themselves for war through special rituals, thus becoming temporary
warriors able to kill. Harrison (1993) describes how this happened in a Melanesian
society living on the banks of the Sepik River in Papua New Guinea. The Avatip
did not conceive of humans as inherently violent and their men had to undergo
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special rituals and war magic in order to dissociate them from their normal iden-
tities, which would lead them to extend sociality to most people. Harrison describes
warfare as a central resource for creating identities. Because Avatip people could
in principle extend their peaceful exchange relationships without any limit and
were even morally obliged to do so, warfare helped them to define and create more
bounded units. The violence used to kill people was thus a necessary ingredient
for establishing local communities with claims to land and other resources. In
the following quotation Harrison sums up this point of view pointedly: 
In Melanesia it is not so much groups that make war, but war that makes groups. That is to say,
war is part of the way in which groups having claims or interests in resources assert their exis-
tence and identities in the first place. It is through conflict that these groups separate them-
selves out from each other and constitute themselves as distinct entities capable of competing
for resources. (ibid: 18)
Another scholar who has emphasised the role of violence and warfare in the cre-
ation of identities is Anton Blok (2000). According to Blok, lack of difference
between existing groups threatens their identity and thus, in a way, their exis-
tence. This may lead to explosive situations and the use sometimes of extreme
violence, as was the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Blok finds the-
oretical inspiration in Freud’s notion of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’
and especially in Bourdieu’s thesis that social identity is based on difference and
that difference is asserted against those who are closest. Clearly, the violence in
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda has done much to emphasise ethnic dis-
tinctions between groups that are very similar and therefore violence can be
seen as an important resource for marking identities. Whether Blok is right in
positing a structural relationship between levels of difference and levels of vio-
lence, is much more debatable however. 
Two of the contributions in this section deal with the situation of former
Yugoslavia and therefore there will be an opportunity to return to this region in
more detail. All contributions address some different aspect of the relation
between discourse and identity, namely the role of material culture, of narra-
tives, of agency, of the practice of everyday-life, and of researchers. I will deal
with them in the order of appearance.
Material discourse and the discovery of warrior identities
As an archaeologist Helle Vandkilde (chapter 26) is primarily interested in how
a discourse about warriorhood can be inferred from the material finds from past
societies. Concretely she considers these remains as part of a material discourse
that reflects central aspects of the past society, which can be read and interpreted
by the archaeologist. Before starting her reading Vandkilde develops a model
that should help her to interpret the material signs. Her main focus of interest
is on the development of warrior identities and warrior institutions in Copper
Age Europe. Warriorhood is one among many possible identities and the ques-
tion is when it can be clearly identified in the archaeological record. Aspects of
this identity will be expressed somehow in objects that are related to certain
people; in particular, weapon finds in graves. Vandkilde argues that warrior
identities imply warfare but not necessarily warrior organisations. The ethno-
graphic record of Amazonia and Highlands New Guinea provide many examples
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of societies in which warfare is prevalent but where warrior organisations are
absent. All men are potential warriors in the case of war and return to other roles
and identities when the war is over. 
Warrior organisations probably have their basis in male clubs or brother-
hoods, which can be found in many societies. So-called warrior bands specialise
in violence and war, which provide them with legitimacy, identity and sustenance
(through war spoils and booty). They are often tightly knit together because of the
long-term reciprocity relations between their members, especially the war leaders
and their followers. Access to warrior bands can be regulated in different ways,
namely through age, through personal qualities and status, or through rank. Once
warrior roles are organised in special institutions, they carry a certain weight and
can therefore have an impact on the way a society develops and changes. This
appears to happen especially under conditions of external pressure and crisis,
which give warrior organisations a clear function and related power within society. 
Looking at the material discourse that has been uncovered by archaeologists,
Vandkilde concludes that war was unmistakably an aspect of northern and
central European societies from the 6th to the 4th millennium BC. Some
skeletons reveal war-related traumata and some settlements were fortified. It is,
however, not possible to identify institutionalised warrior identities on the basis
of the objects found in burial sites; often tools that also functioned as weapons.
The situation changes substantially with the Corded Ware culture that began
around the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC and spread over large parts of
central and northern Europe around 2800 BC. Taking Bohemia as a case study
Vandkilde demonstrates that these societies were organised along the cross-cut-
ting principles of gender and rank. Men and women of high rank can be iden-
tified by the number and nature of objects found in their graves, while age
appears to be of little importance. High ranking men carry battle-axes or mace-
heads, which most likely signify their warrior status. This development contin-
ues in the Bell beaker culture (from c. 2500 BC), which shows greater internal
variation among the warriors. Warriorhood had clearly established itself in
Europe as an organising aspect of society.
Narratives and the persistence of warrior identities
Sanimir Resic (chapter 27), in contrast to Vandkilde, does not look at material
discourse but instead at the rich historical record of warrior tales. From the four
thousand year old Sumerian epic Gilgamesh, via the Homerian Iliad, the medieval
French Chansons de Geste up to present day Hollywood films like the Terminator,
warrior values have been sung and celebrated across time and space. Resic recog-
nises warriorhood as a universal value of manhood, at least in recorded history,
and participation in war and battle as a common rite de passage marking the
transition from boy to (real) man. Warrior values have wide appeal across cul-
tures and are often identified with manliness: honour, loyalty, duty, obedience,
endurance, strength, sexual potency, courage and camaraderie. These values are
clearly an enforcing ideological basis for military institutions such as warrior
bands and armies and their maintenance and fostering may well be connected
with warrior organisations.
Resic recognises that there are temporary depressions in the popularity of
warrior values, such as after the wars of religion in the 16th and 17th century,
but that these values have had an enormous resilience throughout history.
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Following the French revolution, the transition from professional armies to
citizen armies with a strong commitment to nation and cause had a strength-
ening effect on the celebration of warriorhood. Also the 20th century provides
many examples of the exaltation of military virtues and manhood, with a sinis-
ter climax in fascism in its various forms. Resic observes that warrior values
played an important role in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. More generally, the
modern soldier has become more of a mechanical cyborg with all the new war
technology, but in spite of the increasing number of women soldiers, warrior
identities are still predominantly masculine. 
Resic’s long list of examples certainly makes the point that warrior values
have been a pervasive part of Western history, but I think that we should inves-
tigate the fluctuation and variation of these values more consistently. Warfare,
the celebrated ‘baptism of fire’ making true men, may also – and often does –
lead to disillusionment and a reassessment of values. It is necessary to find out
which forces promote the maintenance of a war-celebrating discourse. Hereby it
is certainly not enough to refer to the universal cravings of young men for
adventure, thrill, fame and power, as Resic does. It is probably correct that
young men are most susceptible to the myths of warriorhood, but it requires
more than groups of adventure seeking youngsters to sustain and reproduce
these myths. Therefore a focus on discourse is required, that takes into account
the multiple interests and power groups that gain from military discourse and
the subjectivities it produces.
Discourse and agency
Stef Jansen (chapter 28) focuses on the situation in five villages in the Krajina,
which are now part of the Republic of Croatia. Before the war four of the five
villages were predominantly Serbian and the fifth predominantly Croatian. At
first the Croatian inhabitants were driven away or killed; then, later on, all Serbs
had to flee and their houses were looted and burned. At present a number of the
Serbs have returned to be among a population consisting otherwise of returned,
relocated and refugee Croats. Jansen investigates the dominant discourse among
the Croatian population, that of exclusive nationalism. Croatia is considered as
the – in principle, exclusive – national homeland of all Croats, quite unlike the
pre-war multi-ethnic situation. The most current explanations for the rise of
exclusive nationalism refer to two causes, often in combination. The acerbity of
the ethnic nationalism is linked to the suppressed traumas of World War II
massacres that had occurred in the region. In addition, political propaganda and
media manipulation is seen as causing the spreading and embracement of
nationalist ideas and sentiments. Jansen is not quite satisfied with these expla-
nations, which he finds too deterministic as they pay insufficient attention to
the agency of the people involved.
Looking for agency does not mean that the situation has to be understood
from a perspective of resistance. Jansen discovers very little resistance in the
sense of Scott (1990). Most people appear to accept and evoke the dominant
discourse, which they reproduce in the form of catchwords and phrases – ‘story
lines’ as Hajer (1995) calls them. A focus on agency thus replaces the question of
determinism with the question of conformism. Why do most people underwrite
the dominant discourse, even though in a reduced, imprecise and ambiguous
way? According to Jansen we have to understand this against the background of
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the overwhelming experience of powerlessness vis-à-vis the powers-that-be,
called politika or politics. Ordinary people experienced a deep cleavage between
their everyday lives and the places where things were decided for them. By evok-
ing the authoritative discourse of nationalism, they attempted to reassert some
autonomy for their personal narratives and to exert some level of (discursive)
control over their own lives and experiences. As the authoritative discourse was
only partly embraced through reduced story lines, and weakened by telling
silences, vagueness, and sarcastic resignation, people distanced themselves from
responsibility for nationalist ideas at the same time as they tried to be empow-
ered by them. This conformism thus provided some comfort in difficult and
uncomfortable times, without taking into account the discomfort it caused for
others, namely the Serbian returnees. 
Jansen’s analysis gives us insight into the complex ways a dominant discourse
is reproduced and sustained by actors, who have ambivalent feelings and
ambiguous experiences. Torsten Kolind (chapter 29) also looks at this relation-
ship but among another group in the former Yugoslavia and with a somewhat
different conclusion.
Discourse and the practice of everyday life
Stolac is a little town in Bosnia Herzegovina, which was predominantly Muslim
before the war. During the war the Muslim inhabitants were expelled by Croat
militia and all their monuments, mosques and public buildings destroyed. After
the war the Muslim population, supported by the international community, has
started to return to what is, in fact, a community that is sharply divided along
ethnic lines. Therefore at first sight the case of Stolac confirms Blok’s and others’
(Malkki 1998) argument that violence creates or reinforces identities between
people, who in other ways are very similar. Torsten Kolind (chapter 29) has, how-
ever, two fundamental objections to this argument based on his interpretation of
events in Bosnia Herzegovina. In the first place the argument appears to confound
cause and effect. A sharp ethnic division is unmistakably an effect of the war and
violence used, but it is too farfetched to see diminishing differences as the cause
of war. Kolind seeks the explanation rather in power-seeking nationalistic politi-
cians, who developed ethnic cleansing as their explicit aim and strategy. I agree
that power politics should be a central aspect of an explanation, but on the other
hand the ideas of ethnic nationalism and separation obviously struck a cord among
a wider group of the population; otherwise it would have been impossible to
motivate so many to go into war. Once violence is used, it forces all the others to
make a choice, also those who do not wish to do so, because war has the tenden-
cy to create two over-determining identities: a person is either an ally or an enemy.
Kolind’s second argument against Blok’s thesis is based on his detailed inves-
tigations into forms of identification among Bosnian Muslims in Stolac. Contrary
to expectation, ethnic identification did not play a major role in Muslim every-
day life; rather, it was the case that ethnic and nationalist references were mostly
avoided. In their explanations of events and depictions of their own situation
people would refer to feelings of local patriotism, to inter-ethnic tolerance, or to
the opposition between Europe and the Balkans. They would sometimes also
adopt the identity of victims, with clear ethnic undertones, but Kolind argues
that, on the whole, local identifications did not support the dominant discourse
of ethnic nationalism. He interprets this phenomenon as a kind of counter-
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discourse against the dominant nationalist discourse, and as rooted in the
necessities of everyday life. After the destruction or ‘unmaking’ of their life-
world, caused by the war, people had to build up a new existence. The Muslims
who had returned to Stolac could simply not afford to harbour strong feelings
of ethnic hatred, because they had to live with the consequences of such antag-
onistic feelings. In order to remake their world, which had to be based on some
form of coexistence with the Croats, they countered the dominant nationalist
discourse by drawing on other discourses that downplayed or ignored ethnic dif-
ferences and emphasised tolerance. 
Local discourse and the role of anthropologists and archaeologists
The last contribution in this section turns our attention to the often unintended
role that researchers play in the local politics of identity. The scene is Guatemala
after the protracted civil war from the early 1960s to the end of 1996. Staffan
Löfving (chapter 30) argues that the violence of the war has politicised and
essentialised cultural differences. Guatemalan national identity became estab-
lished at the expense of the oppression of a dispossessed majority, the Maya
Indians. As an effect of the civil war the Pan-Mayan movement has a strong
need to establish a distinct, vital and continuous Mayan identity. In this process
anthropologists and archaeologists are both resource persons and potential
enemies. Anthropologists who criticise the essentialising use of culture by indige-
nous movements, are seen as the true colonialists of the era of globalisation,
because they counter local attempts to construct an identity based on continu-
ous (even if invented) traditions (cp. Kolig 2005). The same applies to archaeol-
ogists who, rather than confirming a view of a peaceful Mayan past, focus on
internal violence, sacrifice, blood symbolism, and the ultimate collapse of
Mayan society. Where the assertion of cultural continuity is a political resource
for Mayan activists today, the investigation of historical collapse and breaking
points could possibly weaken such identity claims.
According to Löfving two different notions of the past are to be found in con-
temporary Guatemalan praxis. In the first place there is the past as lived expe-
rience, ritually commemorated in everyday practice and marked by the presence
of the dead in the local community and the presence of geographical reminders
of past events in the local landscape. This notion of the past is disrupted by the
widespread forced migration that has removed people from their historical
reminders and the graves of their ancestors. The other notion is the new ideol-
ogy of continuous Mayan culture, which is partly defined by outsiders and the
Maya movement. This is an invented tradition – to a large extent based on the
work of foreign and local researchers – which is perceived as lost and in need of
revitalisation. Löfving concludes that political disruption and cultural continu-
ity do not exclude each other, but often go hand in hand. Foreign researchers
have a duty to be sensitive to local uses of their knowledge and to engage
actively in repatriating their research results. 
Conclusion
The chapters in this section all demonstrate how violence and warfare intersect
with local identities, discourses, and institutional arrangements. Violence, which
is the main instrument of warfare, inscribes itself sharply in personal and com-
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munal experience. Therefore it functions as a clear sign or marker of difference.
Theoreticians like Harrison and Blok have underlined the potential of warfare to
draw lines and create or reinforce separate identities. But after a war people have
to live with these social boundaries, which are often in the way of other possible
identities and social interaction. Kolind and Jansen demonstrate how people in
their daily lives negotiate a dominant discourse created in a war situation. They
may evoke the discourse while simultaneously distancing themselves from it, as
Jansen observes among the Croats of the Krajina. Or, as shown by Kolind con-
cerning the Muslims of Stolac, they may obstruct the dominant discourse by
referring to alternative ways of understanding the world and marking identities. 
If warfare is an important part of the life of communities, warrior identities
may be institutionalised in the form of specialised roles and organisations.
Vandkilde demonstrates that this happened in Europe in the later Neolithic
and the Early Bronze Age from around the 3rd millennium BC. From the 2nd
millennium onwards Resic shows the existence of a continuous theme of cele-
bration of warrior identities in narratives of the Western world. Even though
there are fluctuations, this continuing theme demonstrates the overwhelming
militarisation of our societies, as military organisations together with their
providers and users (weapon producers, governments) are the main bearers of
warrior values and myths. Researchers have an important role to contextualise
these values and myths, just as their knowledge is an indispensable resource for
the construction of identities by local political movements, as Löfving shows.
Therefore, to analyse the power relations based in and expressed by discourses
and identities of warfare, unavoidably implies reflections on the position of the
researcher.
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This study1 assesses the importance of warriorhood
in the Copper Age of central Europe, particularly
focusing on the Corded Ware culture of the early
3rd millennium BC. A central question is whether
warrior institutions existed, and if they did, what
their social significance and position was in societies
of the past. While we cannot assume that warriors
have always been present in all societies, the ethno-
historical evidence allows us to say that – when they
are present – warriors organise in a limited number of
ways. The point of departure for this archaeological
study is therefore a non-comprehensive sociologi-
cal analysis of warriors that highlights the issues of
identification and institutionalisation, an approach
that is necessary in order to provide a tool that can
enter into a dialogue with archaeological data.
Introductory notes
The warrior is a symbolic figure of power and a spe-
cialised user of physical violence. Warfare can be
understood as violent social action and war as a sit-
uation of recurring warfare: in a study of warriors the
phenomena of warfare and war are not out of focus;
on the contrary warriors and warfare are interde-
pendent phenomena. It is on the other hand quite
clear that the presence or absence of warrior repre-
sentations in the archaeological record cannot be
used as a direct measure of war or peace in the past
(cp. Robb 1997). 
Why warriors?
Yet why spend time and energy on warriors in pre-
history? There are several interconnected reasons for
this: First of all, warriorhood is worth studying in
any context because of its association with power,
dominance, coercion, violence and bloodshed. When
warriorhood becomes institutionalised it may even
become a dominant field of power in society and
hence a factor of oppression. In addition, when
institutionalised, warriorhood might have a certain
potential for producing, or contributing to, social
change. It is also an identity interwoven with ideol-
ogy, thus attracting opposite meanings of beauty and
ugliness, gallantry and brutality, and bravery and
cruelty. Furthermore, warriorhood needs an archae-
ological review because it has played, and still plays,
a part in the discourse of large-scale cultural change
within the discipline, having evoked scenes of fiercely
armed male warriors on horseback conquering new
land and of warrior aristocrats divided into war lead-
ers and retinues of chiefly warriors. The question
whether such a stereotypical picture can be sustained
underlies much of the discussion in this article. The
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final reason is directly connected to our late-modern
world: warriors, warfare and war, whether we like it
or not, brutally interfere with human societies almost
everywhere, and archaeology has an obligation to
participate in the current debate within this field.
There is no doubt that warriors require further study,
more generally and in specific prehistoric settings. 
Warriors and the archaeological sources2
The fundamental question arises whether and
how warriors and their institutions can be identified
in a fragmented archaeological setting with a silent
discourse. The answer is in the affirmative – espe-
cially when the archaeological sources are optimal.
Even associations of warriors are arguably identifi-
able, and this may be because social institutions are
in general durable social structures (Giddens 1984)
and therefore materially distinct.
Warriorhood is manifested in a variety of ways in
archaeological ‘texts’, sometimes distinctly, some-
times vaguely, sometimes only in one domain, and
sometimes in several domains. This inconsistency is
not straightforward to explain since it is influenced by
the variable state of the sources as well as embedded
in past social practice – i.e., a particular relationship
between action infused by ideology and stricter
norms of ‘how things should be done’. Complete or
partial absence of the presentation of warriors in the
funerary domain does not necessarily imply that
warriors did not exist or were of no great concern.
Instead of being placed with the bodies of the
deceased, weapons were sometimes offered as gifts
to the gods in sacred places, and such weapon offer-
ings in hoards are arguably statements relating to
warfare, either metonymically or metaphorically.
Hence, they hint at the existence of warriors even if
these are not fully displayed in the burial domain.
Conversely, sometimes the importance of warriors
might have been exaggerated in burials, but in my
opinion displaying the identity of the deceased as a
warrior, especially if on a massive scale, is bound to
have a distinct bearing on the practices of the living
society. 
In an interpretive enterprise it is certainly best to
use as many different sources as possible, but the
sources can be one-sided and narrow in their scope.
The Corded Ware culture is a case in point inasmuch
as cemeteries constitute more or less the only access
to knowledge of social practices. The Urnfield culture
can be listed as a deviating case with a narrow
source situation: rich weaponry was placed ritually
in sacred places, cremation burials only vaguely state
the social identities of the deceased, and only the
very top of the elite sometimes received monumental
burials with presentations of (symbolic) warrior-
hood. The material culture of the Late Bronze Age
nevertheless altogether indicates that warriors existed
and quite likely organised formally in specific insti-
tutions. The burial sphere needs an additional com-
ment because it is a central source of historical data
on warriorhood.
Funerals and funerary monuments are indeed
suitable means to question, confirm or legitimise
existing relations of social power. Weapons in buri-
als are a material extension of the dead body and are
thus linked to the collective social identities of the
deceased and probably also to his or her person-
hood. Personal equipment in burials can be under-
stood in at least two different ways. First, as a direct
metonymic statement of the lived identity of the
deceased; the warrior may not be interred with full
equipment but instead only those parts of the equip-
ment that have a certain symbolic meaning. Second,
as a symbolic metaphorical statement with a less
direct bearing on the lived identities (cp. Whitley
1995). If, for example, a small, exclusive group of
mature males are interred with rich weaponry, this
is likely to reflect ‘symbolic warriorhood’ in the sense
of one or more of the following possibilities: a former
warrior identity, heroic status or ambition, political
authority or high social rank. Likewise, weapons
accompanying small children and young adolescents
are unlikely to be actual signs of practiced warrior-
hood, but should rather be understood as metaphors
originating in warrior values. Combinations of the
two types of statements can of course occur. 
The presence of specific weapons with certain
males in Corded Ware and Bell Beaker burials cer-
tainly suggests that warriorhood formed an impor-
tant part of social practice over wide areas of Europe
during the 3rd millennium BC. Maceheads and
battle-axes of the Corded Ware culture can only be
interpreted as weapons for war, directly or on the
symbolic level. The equipment and flint and copper
daggers of the Bell Beaker and Early Bronze Age
archer might have had uses outside the domain of
war, notably hunting. But since these weapons are
highly specialised and furthermore replace each
other chronologically, their connection to warfare
seems unmistakable. Prior to the 3rd millennium BC
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evidence of warriors is more sporadic and also dif-
ficult to interpret, especially because the shape of
potential weapons allows several functions. As early
as the middle of the 6th millennium BC, concur-
rently with the beginnings of agriculture, there is
nevertheless evidence of war encounters: here and
there cases of skeletal trauma, fortifications, and
implements with a potential for war. This makes it
likely that some form of warrior identity existed even
then, but signs of institutionalisation are scarce. A
possible conclusion is that warrior institutions
emerged massively only after c. 2800 BC along with
the spread of Corded Ware culture, and that this
event had a lasting impact on subsequent social
practices in the Bronze Age and the early Iron Age,
where the warrior continued to be a key figure.
Theorising warriors
A ready-made theory of warriors, which can be
directly adopted, does not exist, but can be provided
by making use of current theories about action,
structure, discourse, and especially identity. In addi-
tion, ethnographic descriptions are helpful in pro-
viding clues to a classification of warrior institutions.
Warriorhood is, in short, a potentially powerful
collective identity founded in war-related action and
communicated through material, spoken and written
discourse. Warriors must arguably be studied – not
in isolation and not as a purely male habitat – but
in relation to other social identities of age, gender,
hierarchy, and even profession and ethnicity.
Warriorhood is thus relational and interactive by
nature; it is dependent on a variety of overlapping
and disparate social identities and their interactions.
Warriors, like any other kind of social actor, affect
their context by participating in it, and they are
themselves altered in the process. Warriors then
contribute to the reproduction and transformation
of society. The following sections will take a close
look at the sociology of warriorhood in order to
enable a better understanding of the presentation of
warriors in various prehistoric settings. 
The examination of social identity in archaeology
is a road paved with danger because it is about classi-
fying people and because it is easy to mistake our
categories for theirs. It is nevertheless almost unavoid-
able to study social identity since social identifica-
tion is basic to human social life in the three domains
of day-to-day activities, the life cycle of individuals,
and the durée of institutions (cp. Giddens 1984).
And inasmuch as the analytical-theoretical tools we
employ are ours, not theirs, it is hardly realistic to
completely escape our world and its pre-understand-
ings. One step towards obtaining an insider view of
culture and society is doubtless to avoid absolutist
and static understandings of the other. 
Warriorhood as identification
Social identities – often negotiable and intermingled
– are quite central to the societal project, and war-
riors indeed find their place as agents and identity
within particular social contexts. Warriorhood as a
means of social identification is the theme of this
section. 
Fredrik Barth argues for a relational and change-
able understanding of social identity in his classic
introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969)
and Richard Jenkins does so more explicitly in his
book Social Identity (1996), which owes much to
Barth’s dynamic approach to ethnicity in anthro-
pology. Barth defines the nature of social identity –
and here I am merely translating his notions about
ethnic identity into social identity in general – as
inherently double because it simultaneously con-
cerns people’s identification of themselves and how
other people classify them. He also emphasises that
the need to mark identity increases with growing
intercultural interaction, that material culture
marks identity in the sense that social agents select
what they believe is significant, and, finally, that in
order to wholly understand social identity we must
study the processes and practices that create it
(Barth 1969: 3ff). 
Social identity is in other words produced and
reproduced by human actions and discourse, and
the human body is the medium through which iden-
tification is enacted and signified. Even if change-
ability is inherent to all social identities, this is more
valid for some identities than others. Among those
most resistant to change are the primary identities
of selfhood, humanness and gender, and in some
cases ethnicity (Jenkins 1996: 21). Social identity is,
in short, the systematic presentation and constitution
of relations of differences and similarities between
individuals, between collectives and between indi-
viduals and collectives (ibid.). Social identity is a
process, something you are or become (ibid.). Social
identity exists within and cuts across categories of
gender, age, status, rank, profession and ethnicity.
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Drawing on Marx, a distinction can be made between
a collective identity, which is merely recognised
internally – as a group for itself (für sich), and a col-
lective identity, which is also identified externally
by other people – as a group in itself (an sich) (cp.
Jenkins 1996: 22f). 
Being a warrior qualifies as an identity created
and recreated through the duration of activities that
altogether make up warfare. Being a warrior is then
founded in warlike actions against the other, but it
is also an identity which relies on non-coercive
interaction among a particular group of people.
Signification through various modes of discourse is
logically included in the construction of warrior-
hood, not least the material mode. In general, war-
fare and related social activities constitute a frame-
work within which social identities are formed,
among these warrior identities. All agents take their
social identity from certain networks of interactions.
This is likewise true of warriors who position them-
selves in the power games of a field, be it a marginal
or a dominant one. The warrior identity is also more
or less enabled and constrained by social structure
including the spectrum of other social identities;
being a warrior is – like any other social identity –
individually felt and collectively shared. The dis-
tinction between warriors as a group for itself and a
group in itself is archaeologically important seeing
that the first model offers a possible explanation in
archaeological cases where traces of warriorhood are
inconsistent. 
The collective trait is essential since one cannot
conduct war alone. Individualism is, following
Clastres (1994: 186ff), simultaneously obligatory to
the warrior since the warrior’s desire is to increase
personal glory. Being a soldier is similarly an identity
with collective and individual traits, but the former
is clearly more dominant than the latter. The war-
rior is a double being who has apparently opposite
qualities such as chivalry and brutality, high esteem
and cruelty. Related to this doubleness is the fact
that the warrior is a boundary crosser who bestows
violence and war upon outsiders and through
these very acts seeks glory and fame from society.
Internally, we can envision warriors as players dis-
tributed across a playing field with co-players and
counter-players comprising other warriors and other
social identities. Positioning in the internal game,
however, depends on the outcome of external affairs.
Externally, the warrior operates individually within
the collective frame of companions in a flow of
actions and interactions ending up with violent
confrontations with the other.
Warriorhood is relational and interactive by
nature in that it is dependent on negotiation with a
variety of overlapping and disparate social identities
and primary parameters in identification. More
precisely, warriorhood is a secondary identity which
combines other social identities, especially those
based on the parameters of age and gender, but it
may interfere, overlap or coincide with ethnic or
cultural identity and with identities of class, typically
elitism. It may, moreover, be perceived as a profes-
sion. Internally, a continual process of distinction
also takes place – if it is not already formalised –
separating mainstream warriors from successful and
renowned warriors, and ordinary warriors from war
chieftains. Warriorhood may – expressed in terms of
practice and time – exist in three social dimensions
of action (Giddens 1984) that can coincide: Firstly,
warriorhood may be acted out in the daily routine
activities of certain individuals (durée; reversible
time). Secondly, warriorhood may be a phase in the
life cycle of certain individuals (irreversible time).
Thirdly, warriorhood can be organised as an insti-
tution (reversible time). Warrior institutions, which
are particularly durative in character, will receive
particular attention in the next section.
In conclusion, warriorhood is a negotiated differ-
ence that needs to be confirmed and maintained,
and a dynamic process of self-definition and defini-
tion by others typically occurs. The dynamic com-
ponent is rooted in the fact that warrior identities
can be tightly or loosely knit, and the recruitment of
warriors can be open or closed. It is also a relational
difference, since warrior identities can crosscut, feed
on, and interact with other identities, depending on
the specific social context. Warriors gain their iden-
tities from the action, interaction and discourses in
specific power networks, but only when integral to
a dominant social field is warriorhood likely to be
converted into a coercive power aimed at controlling
other sections of society. The institutional aspect will
receive further attention below.
‘Männerbünde’ and institutionalised warriorhood
On the field of battle it is a disgrace to the chief to be surpassed
in valour by his companions, to the companions not to come
up to the valour of their chief. As for leaving a battle alive
after your chief has fallen, that means lifelong infamy and
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shame. To defend and protect him, to put down one’s own
acts of heroism to his credit – that is what they really mean by
‘allegience’. The chiefs fight for victory, the companions for
their chiefs. Many noble youths, if the land of their birth is
stagnating in a protracted peace, deliberately seek out other
tribes, where some war is afoot. The Germans have no taste
for peace; renown is easier won among perils, and you cannot
maintain a large body of companions except by violence and
war. The companions are prodigal in their demands on the
generocity of their chiefs.....Such open-handedness must have
war and plunder to feed it. (Tacitus 1948: 112-13) 
This quote from Tacitus’ ‘Germania’, AD 97-98, in
many ways captures the essence of warrior organisa-
tions: they nourish themselves on violence and war
and the relationship between the companions of
warriors is one of interdependency. Probably all war-
rior institutions contain elements of ‘Gefolgschaft’,
defined as a long-term relationship of reciprocity
between the members, especially the war leader and
the followers (Bazelman 1999). The followers are
loyal to their chief as long as he behaves honourably
in battle and is generous when the spoils of plunders
are distributed. Such a relationship has often been
interpreted in purely economic terms, but should
obviously also include an entire cosmos of morals
and ethics, as made vivid by Tacitus’ description of
the phenomenon, by Homer’s epics, and not least
by the Anglo-Saxon poem of Beowulf (ibid.; Heaney
1999). A special tone of camaraderie often charac-
terises the discourse in a warrior band, but can
obviously become more an ideal of equality than a
reflection of the real conditions of action. This is, for
instance, the case in the aristocratic warrior bands of
Homer’s Iliad. Specific eating and drinking rituals –
especially the ritual consumption of alcohol – are
quite often reported on in historical and ethnograph-
ic sources as the glue that unites a warrior group by
symbolising solidarity and particular paths of loyalty. 
However, it should be stated from the onset that
warriorhood as a specific individualistic social iden-
tity is not necessarily institutionalised. Non-institu-
tionalised warriorhood exists, for example, in some
bellicose tribal societies in Amazonia and Highland
New Guinea. Warriorhood here occurs inseparably
from being male and is not framed by institutions of
war. War bands are organised ad hoc without for-
malised rules of behaviour, membership and leader-
ship. In other words, war bands only exist for short
periods of time – for instance, when necessitated
by a raid against a neighbouring group (Redmond
1994: 3ff). 
Warriorhood can, by contrast, in a number of
empirical cases, and in accordance with Tacitus, be
classified as what Richard Jenkins labels an organi-
sation: organisations are task-oriented collectivities
‘constituted as networks of differentiated member-
ship positions which bestow specifically individual
identities upon their incumbents’ (Jenkins 1996: 25).
In addition to certain norms and rules of behaviour,
such organisations include procedures for recruiting
their members (ibid.). Likewise, the duality of struc-
ture and action inherent to an institution will occur in
the three intersecting domains of domination, legit-
imation and signification (cp. Giddens 1984: 29ff):
what is going on inside an institutionalised field
will, one way or the other, necessarily be categorised
as loaded with power; it will have to be legitimised
ritually and socially, and it will be signified through
different forms of discourse. Organisations are dura-
tive social constructs, as emphasised by Giddens’
phrase ‘longue durée of institutions’, and therefore
likely to be visible archaeologically. Institutions sim-
ply make the social identities they create and main-
tain much more durable and thus materially visible.
The organisational aspect of warriorhood will be
inspected more closely in this section. The focus is
upon the warrior institution – in many ways a poten-
tial unit of power: a club that excludes other com-
munity members but with obligations towards them
and society as such. Such associations are always
exclusionist in character in that membership is con-
ditioned typically by parameters such as gender, age,
status, and sometimes class. Warrior bands belong
historically among a larger group of male clubs, so-
called Männerbünde. Their formation relies on success
in establishing a group of followers through person-
al qualities, manipulation and social indebtedness,
whereas the internal structure and mode of repro-
duction can vary quite a lot. 
Jenkins’ description of organisations fits the
male clubs found throughout history. The term
‘fraternal interest group’ is often encountered in
the ethnographic literature, where it is used synony-
mously with male clubs, male societies, fraternities,
male associations, secret societies, male segregation
practices, sex-segregated fraternities, and so forth.
A fraternal interest group is sometimes understood
literally as tightly knit groups of male kin, ‘brothers
by blood’ (see Paige and Paige 1981: 55; Harrison
W A R R I O R S  A N D  W A R R I O R  I N S T I T U T I O N S  I N  C O P P E R  A G E  E U R O P E . 397
1996). Mostly, however, male clubs refer to a sym-
bolic kind of brotherhood that can cut across kin-
ship ties, and herein lies their importance from the
perspective of social change. They typically override
the importance of descent groups and segmentary
and clan structures of tribes, while emphasising the
significance of solidarity and alliance among a group
of unrelated men (cp. Bohle 1990: 288; Lipp 1990:
31). A male club forms a radically different type of
organisation inside a segmentary society organised
according to kinship relations and in which it often
has some well-defined obligations, notably in the
ritual domain. Langness (1974) has emphasised four
purposes of male clubs: male bonding through secre-
cy and cult, power over biological reproduction and
women, warfare, and the maintenance of political
dominance. This is a generalising and absolutist view.
Male clubs, for example, are not quite analogous to
warrior clubs, and the women may not be, or feel,
dominated. Warrior clubs are institutionalised war
bands, which are interest groups with a warlike aim.
In ethnohistorical settings, warrior clubs are mostly
a male affair, but some have been known to include
women. A few cases of female war clubs are, in fact,
known, hence reminding us that there can be no
prescribed logic attributing war and warriors solely
to males (cp. Browne 1995). Institutions comprising
only males sometimes have their female counter-
parts: female clubs, if less noticeable, are likewise
widespread in time and space.
More or less exclusive men’s clubs, encompassed
by the German term Männerbünde, nevertheless exist
in many societies, sometimes with a strong martial
strain (Mallory 1989: 110f; Ehrenreich 1997: 117ff).
Male clubs occur all over the world in a wide variety
of societies, including our own world, and they are
also common in societies known from historical
sources. According to Bruce Knauft (1991: 403), so-
called middle-range or complex prestate societies
are more disposed to have fraternal interest groups
than simpler societies. At the other end of the scale,
state societies – including dissolving national states
– have them, as recently demonstrated in Lebanon,
the Balkans and elsewhere in our turbulent world.
Even cultural subgroups in Western Europe are apt
to form them. Other authors have emphasised that
male associations found in ethnographic studies
tend to concur with patrilocal residence, patrilineal
descent, and stable valuable economic resources
(Paige and Paige 1981). An origin in matrilineal soci-
eties has also been suggested (Lipp 1990), the idea
being to unite the males to form a qualified opposi-
tion to the inherently strong position of women in
these societies.
Male clubs cannot be considered as synonymous
with military purposes. A warrior band can usually
be classified as a male club, but by no means all
Männerbünde are of a warlike or otherwise violent
nature. In a cross-cultural and comparative perspec-
tive there is no direct correspondence between the
occurrence of male interest groups on the one hand
and warfare and aggressive behaviour on the other.
However, they can indeed be described as associated
factors (Schweizer 1990). A multivariate factor
analysis processing selected data from 186 pre-indus-
trial societies around the world (‘World Cultures
Database’) demonstrates that male social groupings
occur separately from, but adjacent to, such phe-
nomena as high level of prestige based on warrior-
hood, warfare and plunder, and manly ideals of
aggressiveness (ibid: table 1). It is likely that a similar
overlap characterises male organisations in modern
Western societies where, for instance, groups of soc-
cer supporters possess an undercurrent of violence
fuelled by ideals of aggressiveness. 
Warrior bands may have several purposes, but their
central objective is military. The difference between
soldier and warrior has been explained above in
terms of the relationship between individuality and
collectivism. Among warriors individualistic behav-
iour is allowed and even encouraged, which is true
of soldiers to a lesser degree. Warriors organise in
warrior bands, while soldiers are organised in armies.
The difference between warrior band and army is
evident in the contrast between the individuality of
the Homeric aristocratic warrior bands and the later
hoplite army, which has a unified expression – quite
in harmony with the collective ideology of the early
city-state (Runciman 1999: 731ff). There may also
be a difference of scale, of course.
In his book The Evolution of War, Keith Otterbein
(1970: 19ff) distinguishes between military organisa-
tions with professional or non-professional agents.
Among fifty ethnographically studied societies only
four were completely without any kind of military
organisation. The remaining forty-six societies all
had military organisations divided almost equally
between those with and without professionals.
Twenty-four societies were without professionals.
Here all healthy adult males fought as the situation
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required, organising war parties or defence ad hoc.
Warfare was not considered a vocation as such, but
could on the other hand be an important means
of enhancing prestige. By comparison, twenty-two
societies had professionals such as warrior associa-
tions, standing armies or mercenaries, but they fre-
quently included non-professional warriors along-
side professionals. Otterbein states that a coinciding
relationship tends to exist between a high level of
political centralisation and the presence of a profes-
sional military organisation (op. cit.: 22, 75), thus
agreeing with Bruce Knauft (1991), who connects
fraternal interest groups with complex societies.
Warrior clubs are nevertheless quite common among
those tribal societies that do not normally count as
‘complex’ in their social organisation – such as the
tribes of the Great Plains. Mercenaries and standing
armies are ignored in the following, where the focus
is upon warrior institutions. 
A reading of ethnohistorical sources (notably
Otterbein 1970; Larick 1986; Völger and v. Welck
1990; Redmond 1994; Sanders 1999) suggests that
warrior institutions can be roughly classified on the
basis of their organising principles. In a basic sense
warrior institutions are a means to regulate access to
warriorhood generally or to supreme forms of war-
riorhood. Their main purpose is to wage war in the
sense of a continued flow of social actions ending up
with violence, but they usually carry out other func-
tions besides strictly war within the social and reli-
gious life of society. It is possible to separate three
different means of regulated access, all of them usu-
ally combined with gender: Age-based, status-based
and rank-based access to the warrior band. 
1. Warrior institutions in which access is regulated
through age:
Warriorhood is a phase in the life cycle of all male
individuals, who during their youth are organised in
particular warrior institutions. In other words, all
young males become warriors when they pass from
boyhood to adulthood. Warrior bands comprise
groups of young unmarried men who have under-
gone initiation together, and often divide into junior
and senior members. Age is thus also important in
structuring the interior of the warrior institution,
which however also comprises achieved, and there-
fore unstable, positions of, for instance, leadership. 
This form of warrior institution is well known,
notably among some North American tribes and in
East Africa among pastoral tribes. In the latter set-
ting three different age grades can usually be distin-
guished, namely, boys, warriors and elders with dif-
ferent responsibilities, roles and privileges in society.
Females also hold age-based statuses, which often
correspond to those carried by males. A male then
moves through the warrior age grade as a member of
a specific cohort together with male companions
born within a period of c. fifteen years. Warriorhood
marks the proudest period in a man’s life and is
actively created by and reflected in their weaponry,
hairstyle and dress. Age-based war bands are com-
petitive and carry great esteem, but they are not an
elite themselves; nor are they attached to any elite.
Political influence in age graded societies is usually
in the hands of older men (gerontocracy) whose
interest it is to keep the warrior bands occupied with
war raids and cattle herding and in this manner
keep them away from the social fields of settlement
and women. The material culture of the warriors is
used to create and manipulate social position inside
a cohort, between cohorts, and towards the outside
world of other ethnic groups against which war is
waged (cp. Larick 1986). 
2. Warrior institutions in which access is regulated
through personal qualities: 
Warriorhood is also in this case a phase in the life
cycle of most males, but membership in particular
warrior bands, as well as the position within them,
depends on personal qualities such as, notably, feroc-
ity and prowess in war. Successful warrior bands with
charismatic war leaders especially attract capable
young males to become members. The classic spirit
of mutual indebtedness, obligations and companion-
ship is strikingly described by Tacitus in the opening
quote, even if the social setting of Germania Libera
in this period had grown quite hierarchical with an
elite of warriors. The best examples, however, come
from ethnographically described non-hierarchical
societies in addition to modern warrior gangs operat-
ing in dissolving nation-states in, for example, ex-
Jugoslavia.
Most military societies of the Great North
American Plains belong in this category (Fig. 1).
Almost all of the approximately fifty tribes had
warrior bands with similar names, paraphernalia,
obligations, and organisational principles: dog socie-
ty, fox society, and so forth. The number of warrior
bands among the Cheyenne is known to have varied
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between four and six, and new bands were contin-
uously formed on the basis of old ones. All males of
a tribe usually belonged to a warrior association at
some point in their life, and it was wholly possible to
move from one association to another: warriors were
usually invited to become a member of a particular
warrior band, which was divided into war leader,
ordinary members, and so-called officers. Positions as
war leader and officers were not based on a right to
command but on severe moral obligations to manage
better than ordinary warriors. They were thus not
officers in the normal sense of the word, but were
obliged to stay put in a fight, if necessary to die as
the ultimate expression of bravery. There was a high
degree of competition inside and between warrior
bands, which were rarely formally ranked though
their reputation varied (cp. Wilderotter 1990). They
were not elitist by nature, nor were they the instru-
ment of an elite inasmuch as these societies were
not hierarchically structured.
This status-regulated type of warrior band corre-
sponds roughly to the early form of Gefolgschaft
among Germanic tribes described by Heiko Steuer
(1982: 58), Lotte Hedeager (1990: 184f), and Anne N.
Jørgensen (1999: 194ff). This type of companionship
has as a characteristic trait a high degree of mobility
on behalf of the members, who could choose to
leave the band if it was not successful enough. A
high degree of movement across geographic space is
quite clear from what Tacitus says (see opening
quote). It also lacked the firm and formalised rela-
tionship between lord and retinue of later medieval
times in which the retinue was, more or less, a small
private army owned by the war lord. The Germanic
warrior institution in its early form, however, devi-
ates from the warrior bands of the Plain Indians in
one important respect: even though war leaders had
to be elected by the people’s assembly, only males
from the aristocracy had access to warrior institu-
tions, which leads directly to a different type of
warrior institution. 
3. Warrior institutions in which access is regulated
through distinctions of rank: 
Active warriorhood is in this case a phase in the life
cycle of certain males who belong to the elite or who
seek to gain admittance to the elite through their
occupation as professional warriors. Under circum-
stances of institutionalised social hierarchy, warrior
institutions recruit their members mainly from the
aristocracy. The military organisation of society is
thus monopolised by an elite who dominate precise-
ly through military sources of power (warrior elite),
using the military to back up other sources of power
(cp. Mann 1986). High-ranking males will tend to
be warriors by birth even if this identity for the
youngest and eldest is on a symbolic level. The
warrior identity then tends to be formally inherited
rather than achieved, and the leadership of a warrior
institution is similarly a question of position in the
social hierarchy. Each war leader has at his command
a retinue of personal retainers who are dependent
on their leader for work, payment and weaponry.
The spoils of war are distributed according to certain
established rules and may for instance follow posi-
tions in the hierarchy. This is the case notably in
Homer’s Iliad. On a more moral level, however, ideals
of a balance between giving and taking may very
400 . W A R F A R E ,  D I S C O U R S E ,  A N D  I D E N T I T Y
F I G .  1 :  Dancing warrior of the dog society of the
Mandan tribe, North America c. 1832. Painting by Carl
Bodmer (after Lacroix 1990). 
well subsist and thus influence the social relation-
ship between war lord and followers. War leader and
ruler can be one and the same person, or the war
leader and associated companions can represent
the ruler. 
Chiefdoms with paramount chiefs, subchiefs and
chiefly followers, and aristocratic states with kings
and their knights all organise their warrior institu-
tions according to principles of rank; at the very least
access to warrior clubs depends on relations of class.
This is the dependent companionship with oath-
bound loyalty towards the war leader described by,
for instance, Heiko Steuer (1982) in the hierarchical
setting of the late Germanic and the later medieval
periods. Nevertheless, the classic spirit of reciprocity,
and hence of equality, between war leader and com-
panions may still pertain as an ideal to follow. This
is the sort of companionship described in Homer’s
epic with a permanent hierarchical command struc-
ture containing a complex system of dependencies
and fellowships, but accompanied by ideals of reci-
procity and equality among aristocrats, as reflected,
for example, in the often quoted suffix of King
Agamemnon as ‘first among equals’. A similar struc-
ture is communicated in the Linear B texts of Late
Bronze Age Greece with ‘wanax’ (king), ‘lawagetas’
(war leader), and the so-called ‘hequetai’ (followers)
(cp. Kilian 1988) and made material in the spatial
planning and adornment of the two great halls in the
Palace of Nestor at Pylos in Messenia (Davis and
Bennet 1999; see Vandkilde chapter 34). The early
Anglo-Saxon epic about the Swedish king Beowulf
in the 7th century AD reflects a very similar organi-
sation of war lords and warrior retinues (Bazelman
1999; cp. also Heaney 1999). Several mature Bronze
Age communities in central and northern Europe
could be understood within a similar frame. Similar
retinues are held by chiefs in chiefdoms such as
those of the Maori, Fiji, Hawaii, Grand Chaco, Cauca
Valley, etc. and by kings in warrior states, such as
the Zulu and Dahomian kingdoms in Africa and the
Samurai-organised ancient state of Japan. The
Abipón in the Grand Chaco of South America (Fig.
2) had specific warrior institutions solely consisting
of horse-mounted aristocratic warriors, who howev-
er avoided hierarchical divisions among themselves
and who used drinking rituals to symbolise and
strengthen the unity of the warrior institution
(Lacroix 1990). The Aztec sun warriors were similarly
recruited among the aristocracy and organised in
warrior institutions with at least two different status
classes with different privileges and obligations
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F I G .  2 : Members of the
Abipón aristocratic warrior
institution, Grand Chaco,
South America. They could
be easily distinguished by
their feather headdresses,
their specific dress, weaponry
and drinking horns (after
Lacroix 1990).
(Dyckerhoff 1990). Leadership and loyalty paid to a
specific leader are, however, better observed in other
cases such as chiefdoms and states in West Africa.
Here the traditional age graded warrior institutions
often became the tools of ambitious and successful
war leaders, who were even given the right to mobilise
certain age groups as followers (Tymowski 1981).
The presence of institutionalised warriorhood will
automatically strengthen the position of warfare and
warriorhood in society, which depends on organised
violence, or the threat of such, for its maintenance
internally and expansion externally. This is most
particularly true within hierarchical settings. The
need to legitimise and signify interactions and iden-
tities of war and rank will increase and they might
therefore be carried – more symbolically – into other
fields of social practice. In consequence, the material
world will probably show increased visibility of
weaponry in one or more social domains. This might
arguably be what we see in later European prehisto-
ry where Neolithic and Bronze Age societies choose
to present, or partly misrepresent, warrior identities
and war in contexts of interaction not directly related
to violent confrontation with the other: weaponry
in the funerary domain and/or in the sacrificial
domain could be understood as indirect evidence of
warrior institutions being legitimised and signified
materially in rituals. Warrior representations in buri-
als tally well with this idea as do the conspicuous
sacrificial offerings of weapons in wetlands during
the European Bronze Age, notably emphasising the
possibility that some of them may be the end points
of actions directly related to warfare. It should at
the same time be taken into account that bellicose
rhetoric can misrepresent a social reality that also
includes peace. The degree of actual war fluctuates
quite a lot even in societies commonly categorised
as being in a permanent state of war (Helbling 1996).
This means that the disaster and horror of war are
interrupted by situations and periods of peace. 
What makes warrior clubs especially fascinating
to study is their often-presumed association with
social change. The idea is not new. Early in the 20th
century Richard Lowie (1962[1927]) presented the
hypothesis that military associations of the Plain
Indians were central to the origin of the state due to
their high standards of order and organisation, an
idea already implicit in the concept of ‘militärische
Demokratie’ launched earlier by Friedrich Engels
(1977[1891]). The law and order of these warrior
institutions (Fig. 3) certainly stood in some contrast
to the otherwise decentralised societies of which
they formed a part. One might say that originally
these military clubs constituted well-defined but
rather marginally placed social fields, and certainly
not in themselves power fields with strong leader-
ship and central functions in society. 
However, an altered situation with increasing
power in the hands of the warrior associations could
be observed when the Plain tribes came under
increasing pressure from the colonial state appara-
tus in terms of war, conquest, genocide, disease and
socio-economic crisis. These indigenous societies cer-
tainly underwent social change in the direction of
hierarchy, but never became state societies of their
own. Rather they became incorporated into an exis-
tent state administration and more or less annihi-
lated. A similar process of internal change triggered
by external pressure can be outlined in northern
Europe under the expansive politics of the Roman
Empire. But here the outcome was entirely different
in that warrior institutions – alongside attempts to
emulate the Roman state administration – certainly
played a leading role in state formation processes
among indigenous Germanic tribes. This is suggested
among others by Heiko Steuer (chapter 16). The for-
mation of an expansive Zulu state is an appropriate
analogue. The great warrior king Shaka organised
his state and army on the basis of age grade warrior
institutions, which became regiments with their
own individual names and leaders, in this case also
with colonial state administrations lurking in the
background (Wilderotter 1990). A very similar devel-
opment can be observed in the Grand Chaco, where
decentralised and rather egalitarian matrilocal soci-
eties in the 16th and 17th centuries transformed
into a hierarchical warrior society with chiefly
families, aristocracy, commoners and slaves (Lacroix
1990). Adoption of horses and fierce resistance
against the Spanish colonisation were key points in
this transformation (ibid.), but it is evident that dur-
ing the process warrior institutions became central
sources of social power in contrast to the marginal
position they had previously. The above examples
seem to show that the potential for change inherent
to warrior organisations can (only?) be activated
under conditions of external pressure and crisis.
Warrior institutions can then come within the reach
of a dominant field or themselves become a power
field; power understood as domination and coercion
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can consequently be activated and aimed at control-
ling the activities of fellow agents in society. 
In summary, this section has described warrior
institutions from the point of view of sociology and
on the basis of data derived from ethnohistory.
Warrior institutions belong historically among a
larger group of male clubs. Warfare is not an
unequivocal feature of the huge number of male
clubs known from around the world, but relevant
data show that it is a linked feature. Warrior institu-
tions are in fact clubs with a warlike purpose most-
ly with male members, and there seems to be sup-
port for the hypothesis that warrior institutions in
themselves carry a potential for social change, which
can be activated under circumstances of external
pressure and crisis. Warrior institutions divide
roughly into three related categories on the basis of
whether the main criterion of access is age, status
or rank, all of them typically integrating elements of
Gefolgschaft in the sense of a long-term-relationship
of reciprocity between leaders and followers in
terms of economy and ethics. Such a relationship of
parity can, however, in hierarchical settings become
more an ideal to strive for rather than strict social
reality. This is notably evident in the primus inter
pares ideology in Homer’s epic, which stands out
against the real world of a strictly hierarchical society.
Sociologically, warrior institutions are durable social
fields and therefore likely to be discernable archaeo-
logically, especially in the three dimensions of power
enactment (social organisation), legitimation (in
rituals) and signification (material discourse). It can
be argued that warriorhood and war, particularly in
contexts of hierarchy and inequality, will tend to
expand on a symbolical level into other sections of
society. 
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F I G .  3 : A warrior band of hostile Chiricahua Apaches in Mexico, c. 1886 (after Barrett 1974). War and warrior 
institutions had then become the very essence of Apache society. In the phrasing of Pierre Clastres, the general warlike
situation of ‘primitive society’ had transformed into actual permanent war (1994: 186). The Chiricahua Apache tribe
under the war leader Geronimo (to the right) exemplifies such a chaotic situation of societal change with warfare and
warriors as key variables. 
Searching for early warriors
Warriorhood is an evasive identity in northern and
central Europe in the 6th to the 4th millennia BC.
Burial customs are not usually sex-differentiated in
the clear manner of later burials (Häusler 1994), and
this may have some bearing on how gender was per-
ceived of in the living societies. Many of the tools
have warlike potentials, such as transverse arrow-
heads and polished flat axe blades of flint or stone,
but specific weapons, made unequivocally with the
purpose of waging war, are harder to distinguish.
Stone shaft hole axes of the latest Linear Pottery
culture and succeeding Middle Neolithic cultures,
including the Funnel-necked Beaker culture, could
have been used in war or may have symbolised war-
riorhood. Sometimes these axes are, in fact, elegantly
shaped and made of spectacular varieties of stone;
hence recalling later battle-axes of the 3rd millen-
nium Corded Ware culture (Zapotocky´ 1991: 68ff).
In John Chapman’s vocabulary (1999: 107-10), most
axes of this period are tool-weapons and some are
weapon-tools, thus designating their double use
potential with emphasis on the first or the second
function. However, it is a difficult matter to associate
these finely polished stone axes with specific persons,
or groups of persons, especially in the earlier period. 
The presence of such axes, and a range of other
tools, with a potential in the waging of war should
nevertheless be seen on the background of evidence
of war-related traumata and fortifications of settle-
ments (e.g., Thorpe 2000 and this volume chapter 10;
Wahl and König 1987; Vencl 1999; also Chapman
1999; Makkay 2000; Jensen 2001: 225, 230, 232f,
446, 448f). Taken together, this suggests that in the
6th to the 4th millennia BC warfare did indeed form
part of social practice and thus played a role in the
reproduction of society. How can this picture be
interpreted in terms of warriors?
Warriorhood is a social identity which is created
through the social processes of war and which is
nourished on warfare as social action. The evidence,
diffuse as it is, might then support the conclusion
that warriorhood existed in the 6th to the 4th mil-
lennia, but generally not as a specific social identity;
a group for itself and in itself. The best analogies for
such a non-institutionalised warriorhood might be
found among tribes in Amazonia and Highland New
Guinea, where warriorhood – as mentioned above –
is an inseparable part of being male and is not
framed by institutions of war. War bands in the 6th
to the 4th millennia could thus have been organised
ad hoc without formalised rules of behaviour, mem-
bership and leadership. They therefore mainly exist-
ed to defend the settlement and to prepare and con-
duct war raids against neighbouring groups, ceasing
to exist the moment these activities were concluded. 
Whether warriorhood in this period was generally
as closely associated with the presentation of mas-
culinity as in the ethnographic cases is difficult to
say, but at least it is not unlikely. In the later 5th
and the 4th millennia, especially in eastern central
Europe and in the Balkans, the specific association
between male gender and weaponry emerges more
consistently. There are even cases, prior to and
around 4000 BC, which suggest that some form of
institutionalised warriorhood may have existed here
and there (if not everywhere). The social patterns
that appear seem to point forward in time to the 3rd
millennium BC and therefore deserve attention. 
Age grades at Tiszapolgar-Basatanya 
John Chapman (1999: 124ff) has convincingly
argued for a state of increased warfare in the mature
Copper Age societies of eastern and central Europe,
c. 4600-3700 BC, focusing on a range of new poten-
tial weapons and exotic materials, first and foremost
copper. Heavy shaft hole axes and adzes in copper,
antler and polished stone, pressure-flaked bifacial
arrowheads of flint or obsidian, and long dagger
blades of copper, flint or boar’s tusk should in par-
ticular be mentioned since their potential for war is
rather apparent; hence the name weapon-tools. Their
massive presence suggests that war was a recognised
form of social action in these societies even if they
do not tell of the frequency of war encounters.
Settlement organisation is not of much help here
since little is known. 
In the mature Copper Age cemeteries of the
Balkans, as well as in associated cultures of eastern
central Europe, there is generally a clear association
between male gender and these weapon-tools (cp.
Zapotocky´ 1991). In some cases the association
between male gender, weaponry and high-rank/wealth
is obvious, as at the cemetery of Varna I, which is
strategically situated where the Danube joins the
Black Sea in Bulgaria (Chapman 1999: 126f with
further references). In particular at Varna, high-rank-
ing maleness seems to draw on prowess in warfare
and the acquisition of exotic prestige goods. The
unusually large number of cenotaphs with weaponry
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at this site suggests that a considerable part of the
males did not return from war raids and/or travels
into foreign territory. The material thus generally
hints at the existence of warrior identities, but were
they institutionalised?
In the Tiszapolgar and Bodrogkeresztur periods
on the Hungarian Plain the burial custom is differ-
entiated along gender lines as regards the precise
orientation of the crouched position of the deceased
as well as the accompanying objects. Particularly
striking is the fairly strictly sex-differentiated burial
custom, usually with males crouched to the right
and females crouched to the left. Distinctly sex-dif-
ferentiated burial customs are otherwise rare this
early, appearing massively only in the 3rd millen-
nium BC with the Corded Ware culture (Häusler
1994). This seems to reflect gender-specific attitudes
to social life, and it is noteworthy that weapon-tools
are only found in male burials. 
The cemetery of Tiszapolgar-Basatanya (Bognár-
Kutzián 1963) on the Hungarian Plain provides evi-
dence of association between weaponry and specific
persons. Basatanya is one of the best-known burial
sites of the Copper Age Tiszapolgar-Bodrogkeresztur
culture on the Hungarian Plain, and useful details
have been made available about the gender, age and
patterns of disease and trauma of the skeletons
(ibid.). Fifty-seven skeletons have been anthropolog-
ically determined in the earlier Tiszpolgar phase and
seventy-nine skeletons in the later Bodrogkeresztur
phase. At Basatanya age and gender are in fact clear-
ly mediated through the number and types of cop-
per ornaments, but even vertical social status is
communicated in the burials. Details in dress and
equipment mediate a gendered life course with sig-
nificant age groups among both sexes. Joanna Sofaer-
Derevenski (2000: 392-95) states that at c. five years
of age the children at Basatanya became gendered.
In the early stage of the cemetery females under-
went significant life-course changes at the age of
twelve and forty, whereas males underwent similar
changes at fifteen and again at eighteen-twenty years
of age, and at c. twenty-five, thirty-five and fifty
years of age. In the later phase of the cemetery
twenty years of age is a significant stage for both
sexes. Moreover, for males thirty years of age is a
significant turning point (ibid.). 
I have especially examined the distribution of
weaponry and trauma at the cemetery (Fig. 4A-B).
Trauma is a rather common phenomenon, which
must be war-related, and mostly male skeletons
show signs of violence, either healed wounds or pos-
sibly in some cases the cause of death. Likewise, the
position of flint points on the skeleton, for instance
among the ribs, is taken to indicate a violent death
(cp. Bognár-Kutzián 1963: 392ff). Small pieces of
flakes are common in these burials, but flint knives
longer than seven centimetres are normally restrict-
ed to males. Whilst females in rare cases carry a flint
knife, they are almost never accompanied by other
types of weapon-tools. We can thus assume that it
was males who first and foremost engaged in affairs
of war, and warriors must be searched for in this
group. 
A sample of burials containing all adult male
burials, in addition to male child burials with
weaponry, was therefore selected for further
inquiries, in total sixty-four burials (Fig. 4A-B). The
age-regulated pattern found by Joanna Sofeer-
Derevenski (ibid.) finds support in the distribution
of weapon-tools. Long flint knives signify adult male-
hood from c. sixteen years of age; only two boys
carry such knives, and they are somewhat unusual
in that they both seem to have died as victims of
violence. It is characteristic that flint-knives tend
to become longer when the man gets older: most
knives longer than ten centimetres occur among
older men. 
In the early phase of the cemetery males do not,
however, become genuine weapon carriers until they
are around twenty-five years of age, usually signified
by a boar’s tusk knife, in rarer cases by a shaft hole
axe. But it is especially mature and wealthy males
who carry shaft hole axes and arrowheads (Fig. 5).
This pattern changes somewhat in the later phase,
but an age-regulated social structure is maintained.
The age of thirty-five is the stage in a man’s life
which is signified by weaponry such as copper dag-
gers, shaft hole axes and arrowheads. Again, a group
of mature males around forty to sixty years of age is
particularly spectacular as regards wealth and
weaponry. Traumata cannot be argued to relate to
any particular group of males; all ages seem inflicted
and the trauma seemingly concurring with mature
individuals might well have been acquired at a
young age. Wealth, notably in copper, increases with
age, but with twenty-five to thirty-five years of age
as an approximate turning point when some of the
weapon-carrying males emerge as the wealthiest in
the male community. 
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Were all males at Basatanya warriors? No doubt
warriorhood was a potentiality for all adult males in
this community in both phases, as indicated by the
presence of long flint knives with individuals of six-
teen to sixty-five years of age. The fact that all other
kinds of weaponry cluster with males above twenty-
five years of age in the first phase and thirty-five in
the second phase might be directly interpreted to
indicate that these were the practicing warriors. This
solution, however, becomes problematic as regards
the wealthy and weapon-carrying elderly males.
Socially and materially they relate to other identities
of age and gender presented at Basatanya, but they
obviously share some features of identification in
terms of their weaponry, wealth and mature age.
The weapon-tools are likely to have had a bearing
on the lived identities of these men. Their age, how-
ever, suggests that even though they were arguably
presented as warriors by the surviving relatives, this
identity must mainly have been on a symbolic level;
hence the weapon-tools were metaphors of warrior-
hood and signs of wealth and power rather than a
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Hammer axes, Arrowheads Boar’s
Grave maceheads, of stone Copper Flint/obsidian tusk
no. Date Age Trauma or axe blades or bone dagger blade > 7 cms knife Copper Remarks
077 ECA 07 Lesions on  X X buried like
skull, pelvis an adult man
040 ECA 09-10 Flint blade X 
cause of death? (under ribs)
065 ECA 16-18
079 ECA 16-18
050 ECA 18-19 X
042 ECA 18-19 X
061 ECA 18-20 dog
010 ECA 18-22 XX
080 ECA 20-22
023 ECA 24-29 Healed fracture XXXX XX X
on right femur
052 ECA 25 Death by blade  X X X dog
across cervical
vertebrae?
036 ECA 25 X
056 ECA 25-30 Death by lesion
on the skull?
030 ECA 25-30
Death by lesions X dog
053 ECA 25-30 on skull and arm 
035 ECA 30-35 Death by spine XXX X + 2 children
fracture, first
lumbar vertebrae?
038 ECA 35 XX
013 ECA 35 X XX + child
028 ECA 35-40 X X
045 ECA/MCA 35-40 X X
060 ECA 50-55 X X X
039 ECA 50-55 XX X
012 ECA 55-60 XX XX X X XX
068 ECA 55-60 Death by X
violence?
067 ECA 60 Death by X X X dog
violence?
014 ECA 60 X X
005 ECA 65-70 X
F I G .  4 A : The Copper Age cemetery of Tiszapolgar-Basatanya in Hungary, Tiszapolgar phase. Table showing burials
with individuals who had received weaponry; mostly grown-up males but also two boys (data after Bognár-Kutzián 1963).
direct metonymic statement of the identity of the
deceased in the period immediately preceding death.
Earlier in life these men may have been warriors, but
at the time of death they were hardly warriors sensu
strictu; more like headmen, men of worth and influence.
Impressive copper axes and adze-axes formed an
important part of this social setting of the mature
Copper Age. Copper shaft hole axes are sometimes
deposited in burials, always those of men: like their
stone counterparts they are usually placed in front
of the face with the shaft placed in the hands of the
deceased man, underlining fierceness. The extremely
wealthy and tall man buried nearby at Tiszawalk-
Kenderföld with his copper axe and various other
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Hammer axes, Arrowheads Boar’s
Grave maceheads, of stone Copper Flint/obsidian tusk
no. Date Age Trauma or axe blades or bone dagger blade > 7 cms knife Copper Remarks
074 MCA 18-20 X X
146 MCA 18-20 X
091 MCA 18-20
102 MCA 18-20 X
133 MCA 18-20 X
122 MCA 19-20 Death by violence? X
125 MCA 20-23
139 MCA 22-24
156 MCA 25 X
106 MCA 25-40 X
128 MCA 28-30 Skull lesion X
143 MCA 28-30 + woman
119 MCA 30-35
149 MCA 30-35 X
105 MCA 35 X X XX XX
098 MCA 35 X X
044 MCA 35 X X X
135 MCA 35-40
151 MCA 35-40 X
137 MCA 35-40
037 MCA 40 X XXXX X X
099 MCA 40-45 X X
152 MCA 40-45 X
114 MCA 40-45
071 MCA 45-50 Only the skull X X X
was buried
140 MCA 45-50 Healed skull lesion
145 MCA 50 Skull lesion X
101 MCA 50-55 Healed skull lesion X woman and 
child
072 MCA 50-55
092 MCA 50-55 Skull lesion (lump) X X
083 MCA 50-55 Lesion on first X X
vertebrae
below skull
001 MCA 50-55 X X
003 MCA 54-59
129 MCA 55-60 X X X
117 MCA 60-65 X X X
132 MCA Full- X
grown
141 MCA Full- X X
grown
F I G .  4 B : The Copper Age cemetery of Tiszapolgar-Basatanya in Hungary, Bodrogkeresztur phase. Table showing buri-
als with individuals who had received weaponry; all grown-up males (data after Bognár-Kutzián 1963).
weapon-tools (Fig. 6) even lacked his left hand at
the time of burial (Patay 1978: 21) and could thus
hardly count as a practicing warrior. It seems though
that such large copper weapons were also deposited
in sacrificial hoards (cp. Todorova 1981; Patay 1984),
an alternative ritual sphere. Weapon-tools were thus
not only consumed in the funerary domain, but
also offered as gifts to the gods, perhaps as the end
point of a flow of war-like actions. 
Of course, it is possible to interpret the scenario
at Basatanya as indicating that warriorhood was
not tied to specific groups of persons, hence not
institutionalised. Alternatively, the recurring signs
of warfare all over eastern and central Europe in the
Climax Copper Age, the specific social pattern of
age cycles and the weapon-tools as tokens of power
carried by mature males (gerontocracy?) at Basatanya,
in addition to the custom of consuming valuable
weaponry in a ritual domain other than burials,
might better fit the hypothesis that age-regulated
warrior institutions existed. Perhaps warrior bands
consisted of young unmarried males between the age
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F I G .  5 : Grave 52 at Tiszapolgar-Bastanya. Young
man, twenty-five years of age with weaponry; one of 
the youngest to have obtained a hammer axe (after
Bognár-Kutzián 1963).
F I G .  6 : Rich male burial with copper weapon-axe
from the Copper Age cemetery of Tiszavalk-Kenderföld 
in Hungary (after Patay 1978).
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of sixteen/eighteen and twenty-five/thirty-five who
were initiated together: this would be the age when
they obtained the right to carry a long flint knife.
Among males, mature persons doubtless attempted
to control wealth, even if they were hardly in a
position to control the war bands. They had gained
the right to carry symbols of war as a result of their
earlier life as warriors, probably reinforced by their
personal qualities as community leaders and entre-
preneurs. The latter would be in accordance with
ethnographically analogous communities with age
graded warrior institutions and with the strict gen-
der-differentiated and age-regulated social structure
presented at Basatanya, as well as with the fact that
weapons accompanied males, not females. 
Warriors at Brezsch Kujawski-Oslonki?
From the point of view of warrior identities, the
contemporaneous Lengyel culture in the region of
Brezsch Kujawski in central Poland is also worthy of
note. The archaeological material is however less
clearly readable inasmuch as the age pattern is
unknown and information of trauma is not avail-
able. Burials as well as settlements are known from
a number of investigated sites with well-preserved
archaeological remains dating to the period 4500-
4000 BC. Oslonki is a recently excavated site with
thirty trapezoidal longhouses and more than eighty
graves (Bogucki 1996; Bogucki and Grygiel 1997). At
some point in time a ditched and palisaded enclo-
sure was established to fortify the peninsula on which
the houses were located. This suggests that warfare
formed part of social practice. In general, houses are
organised in single farmsteads and small hamlets,
each with a limited number of households (ibid.)
and each with a small group of attached burials. 
The burial custom at Brezsch Kujawski and
Oslonki was strictly sex-differentiated – unusual for
the time as noted above: males were buried crouched
to the right, whereas women were buried crouched
to the left. Approximately twenty percent of the
males carried t-shaped antler axes (Zapotocky´ 1991),
always in the same position, held in the hand and
placed in front of face and body (Fig. 7). Bone points
are also found with males: one grave contained an
archer with five bone arrow points in a quiver worn
at his back. Flint knives occur only with males. A
corresponding group of females had dress fineries
in exotic materials, notably belts of shell beads.
Copper trinkets occur with both sexes, but especial-
ly with females (cp. ibid.). Of particular note is a
female grave with an extraordinary amount of cop-
per, among the earliest metal in northern central
Europe, including a copper diadem. All burials at
Oslonki were gender-differentiated in the orienta-
tion of the body, but less well-equipped burials than
those mentioned above commonly occur. Like at
Tiszapolagar-Basatanya gender was distinctly signi-
fied in burials, but vertical distinctions also seem to
have existed singling out a particular group of
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F I G .  7 : Male right-
hocker burial with 
T-shaped antler axe
placed in front of the
face (A) and female
left-hocker burial with
ornaments at Brezsch
Kujawski in Poland
(B)(after Bogucki 1996). 0 0,5 m
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agents with the males carrying specific antler axes
and the females dressed in their copper fineries. The
deposited copper trinkets and the gender-differenti-
ated burial custom at Brezsch Kujawski-Oslonki sug-
gest a tie with the Chalcolithic cultures of the
Carpathian Basin; networks of exchange probably
linked the two places. 
However, were the males with antler axes at
Brezsch Kujawski-Oslonki warriors? This central ques-
tion cannot be answered at present, but the social
pattern nevertheless recalls the situation described
above for Tiszapolagar-Basatanya and also shows
similarities to later Corded Ware practices. The antler
axes could have had other uses besides war, and
details such as the age distribution of the skeletons
are not available. On the other hand, the number of
axe-carrying men in the dead population is fairly
large. They may well have to be identified as a group,
and were in all likelihood also recognised as such;
some sort of male bonding among a peer group is a
possibility. Elitist warrior conduct and stereotyped
gender differentiation were not to arrive massively on
the European scene until more than a thousand years
later with the Corded Ware cultures, then coinciding
with a metallurgical revival. The right-crouched males
with their antler axes in front of their face at Brezsch
Kujawski are strikingly similar to a peer group of
male burials of the Bohemian Corded Ware culture. 
Corded Ware warriorhood
The first really convincing warriors in Europe north
of the Alps were presented in a strikingly stereotyped
manner in the funerary rituals of many communi-
ties at the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC. In
death the warrior was accompanied by a slender battle-
axe, or macehead, of stone; evidently as much a
symbol of warriorhood as a weapon in itself. Deborah
Olausson (1998) has made the important point that
the battle-axes should not be understood as prestige
goods, since they are not specialist products ordered
by a patron and used in exchange activities. Rather
they are ‘do-it-yourself’ objects, which did not require
a great deal of expertise. Furthermore, they either
occur in burials or are deposited singly on special
locations (usually wetlands) as a ritual offering, and
this indicates that they are very personal objects
(ibid.). In Bohemia the battle-axes are tied intimately
to specific males (see below), and this pattern may
perhaps have a more general relevance. The key
importance of this weapon for the social identity of
the deceased is emphasised by its position in the
grave. The head of the axe is usually placed in front
of the face of the male, who holds the end of the
haft in his hands. The war-axe often goes along with
a cord-decorated drinking beaker of pottery and in
some cases an amphora, suggesting that warriors
participated in communal drinking rituals. This idea
of a relationship between male bonding, consump-
tion of alcohol, and ornamented beakers in the Later
Neolithic and the Copper Age has notably been
launched by Andrew Sherratt in a series of articles
(e.g., 1981; 1984; 1994a; 1994b).
Corded Ware funerary customs as evidenced over
much of central Europe were extremely standard-
ised (Fig. 8, lower). Differences of gender were in
particular emphasised through the orientation of
the body and the side on which it was placed and
through particular gendered objects. Deviations from
a stereotyped basic pattern occur, but rarely. Each
deceased member of the community was usually
inhumed in a single grave, which was often covered
by a small earthen mound. Double burials of two per-
sons, male and female, sometimes occur the bodies
lying in gender-specific positions with the feet
touching. The position of the body is always bipolar
as well as side-specific with gender as the structuring
principle. Males were usually buried crouched to the
right with their head facing the west, whilst females
lie crouched to the left with their head facing the
east. Common to both sexes are the flexed position
of ‘hocker’ and the face looking towards the south
(cp. Häusler 1994; Wiermann 1998; Turek and Cerny´
2001). Part of the material equipment is also gender
specific. Jugs, shells, teeth and copper spirals tend to
occur only in left-hocker burials, whereas battle-axes,
maceheads, flat axeheads, bone daggers, chisels, bone
dress pins and boar tusks are found mostly in right-
hocker burials. It certainly looks like binary gender
oppositions, but there are more dimensions to it.
The amazing spread of Corded Ware culture around
2800 BC over large parts of central and northern
Europe has traditionally been thought to contain
such social and material novelties as warriors, male
dominance, and horse riding in addition to the overt
presentation of individual potency, the ritual con-
sumption of alcohol, innovations in copper metal-
lurgy, and pastoralism (cp. Treherne 1995; Sherratt
1994b). One problem with the persuasive trilogy of
horse, masculinity and battle-axe is that horses are
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still not well documented in central and northern
Europe at this time. Nor does the archaeological evi-
dence support a state of male dominance in Corded
Ware society, this idea being linked to our own
world. Warriors nevertheless did exist and in all like-
lihood occupied important positions in society even
if the traditional picture has to be nuanced and the
evidence substantiated. Social divisions along gen-
der lines definitely became of central importance
over vast areas, and at least in some regions warriors
and high-ranking females came to form a sort of
elite, as we shall see. That the overt presentation
of individual potency and wealth now became pos-
sible for the first time, as argued by Paul Treherne
(1995), is probably too simple a view since collec-
tive identities were as important as ever; they mere-
ly became structured differently than previously.
In some regions pollen analyses suggest that every-
day life became temporarily more mobile and the
importance of cattle seems to have increased (e.g.,
Ethelberg et al. 2000), but evidence of pastoralism is
generally scanty. It is true though that copper met-
allurgy was again integrated in society after a con-
spicuous absence in the preceding centuries, and
the idea that beakers were used for the ritual con-
sumption of alcohol gains at least some validity
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F I G .  8 : Corded Ware
and Bell Beaker burial
rites. Above: Bell Beaker.
Below: Corded Ware.
Right: male. Left: female
(after Turek and Cerny´
2001).
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through the remains of a sort of honey-sweetened
beer at the bottom of the bell-shaped beaker from
Ashgrove, Fife in Scotland (Dickson 1978; Andrew
Sherratt, pers. comm.). 
The social and material uniformity often claimed
to have existed in Corded Ware Europe should
probably be understood as a macro-regional fashion
movement containing material and social novelties
which received a differential reception regionally
and locally – not unlike modern global culture. I will
not enter the discussion of whether it was primarily
internal cultural construction or intruding ethnic
groups, but merely state that a dialogue between local
practices and foreign novelties must have played a
vital part and that European societies were trans-
formed in the process, some more radically than
others. The new material similarities over vast parts
of northern and central Europe in particular adhere
to a series of particular objects buried with the dead.
Digging into deeper levels of material culture reveals
local and regional peculiarities and deviations from
the overall pattern. It has, furthermore, proven
impossible, or at least complicated, to pinpoint the
place of origin of the Corded Ware culture.
Interpretations of the Corded Ware culture often
have to rely widely on the evidence of cemeteries,
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F I G .  9 :  Corded Ware left-hocker burial with composite bow and copper diadem. Female?
(after Czebreszuk and Szmyt 1998).
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since settlements from this period are still not
well known even if the situation in this respect is
improving (e.g., Simonson 1986; Nielsen 2000;
Turek and Peska 2001). The populations generally
seem to have organised their settlements in a scat-
tered pattern of small hamlets and single farms.
Likewise, pollen diagrams – especially from southern
Scandinavia – provide evidence of extensive land
clearings (Jensen 2001: 458ff). A wider representa-
tion of sources for Corded Ware society would be
preferable, but the particularly rigorous funerary
customs must be embedded in the social practices of
the living community, if still on an ideal level. The
deceased persons were for example hardly interred
with full equipment and with all personal belong-
ings, but merely with certain objects selected for
their specific symbolic meaning; thus my claim is
that these objects and their attached meanings were
linked to the lived identities of the deceased and to
the way they were categorised by their family and
especially the wider community. The groupings that
appear when examining and comparing the inter-
ments must thus have a direct bearing on Corded
Ware social structure. When warriors went to war
they may well have carried a range of other war
tools besides the battle-axe. It is for example possible
that wars were waged with bow and arrow as the
primary weapons (Fig. 9). Moreover, the women
might have worn dress fineries only on special occa-
sions. This is difficult to gain any precise knowledge
about, but what we can say is that certain social
identities existed, which were communicated in the
funerary custom. Some of these identities were prob-
ably institutionalised inasmuch as they reappear
over time-space.  
Case study
Bohemian Corded Ware burials are particularly well
examined and have therefore been chosen as a case
study. Corded Ware people buried their dead in small
cemeteries probably situated close to their settle-
ments on the slopes of the terraces of major rivers
and their tributaries (Turek and Peska 2001). In the
following examination of warriorhood, rank and
gender in the Bohemian Corded Ware culture I make
extensive use of statistics provided by Roland
Wiermann (1998; 2002), a data collection of around
two hundred burials from six cemeteries presented
in diagram form (Fig. 10). These data can be used to
reconstruct Corded Ware social structure, or more
precisely, they provide a picture of the dead popula-
tion. Wiermann has interpreted the social patterns
underlying the diagram in terms of a big-man socie-
ty of Melanesian type. Moreover, he sees traces of age
grades with analogues among east African pastoral-
ists. My interpretation, as presented below, differs
from Wiermann’s. What is immediately apparent to
my eye is that gender and rank were the two main
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F I G .  1 0 : Burial statistics for the Bohemian Corded Ware culture sorted according to age, gender and wealth (after
Wiermann 2002).
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principles along which this Corded Ware society
was organised. It is especially striking that gender,
and to a lesser degree rank, was interpreted and
mediated very rigidly by these people. Similarly, the
stereotype of mediated identities calls for particular
attention since it hints at rather inflexible under-
standings of some forms of social identity.
Fortunately, sixty burials had well-preserved
skeletons allowing for very reliable determinations
of biological age and sex (ibid.). They could therefore
be used as a control group. In addition, they demon-
strated with clarity that males were buried in right-
hocker position whilst females were buried in left-
hocker position. Few deviations from this pattern
exist. It is sometimes assumed that Corded Ware
burials represented only the upper echelon of the
population. This is perhaps possible, but the diagram
sampled by Wiermann could be interpreted differ-
ently. According to the physical anthropologist
Elizabeth Iregren (pers. comm.), the mortality pattern
is quite ‘normal’, suggesting that the sample may
represent some sort of complete society without
missing groups. It should be mentioned, though,
that the youngest individuals are underrepresented
due to the poor preservation of these skeletons.
There is, as one might expect, increased mortality
among young women in the childbearing age and
also among young men (adultus I), probably owing
to war-inflicted deaths. Data on trauma has not
been included in the analysis. However, it should
be noted that five males and one not-sexed individ-
ual at Vikletice had healed cranium fractures
(Buchvaldek and Koutecky´ 1970: 276). We can then
assume that warfare formed part of the actions that
created warrior identities.
With very few exceptions, biological sex corre-
sponds wholly to social gender as reflected by burial
position and types of grave goods. Gender is thus
underlined in the position of the body as well as in
the objects applied to the body. The gendered dif-
ference is probably the least negotiable in this socie-
ty, and males and females each constitute groups
that were clearly recognised as separate (in itself,
‘an sich’). Importantly, the sex-differentiated burial
position is maintained from earliest childhood to
very old age. Personal appearance becomes gendered
around the age of seven (infans II), or a little earlier,
as suggested by very young boys, six months to six
years old, buried with battle-axes or mace heads
(Turek and Cerny 2001: 609). Bodily appearance may
have become partly un-gendered late in life. The few
old persons present in the diagram are without par-
ticular gender-specific objects, but this could possibly
be due to a problem with source representativity, or
merely mean that these old people belonged to the
less privileged part of the population (see below). 
The strict gender differentiation is further reflected
in the physical appearance of the skeletons. Males
and females of the Corded Ware are very different
in stature as demonstrated recently by Jan Turek
and Viktor Cerny´ (2001), whereas such sexual dimor-
phism is less marked in the subsequent Bell Beaker
population. Such a marked discrepancy between male
and female skeletons is likely to originate in gender-
specific divisions of labour, but to infer patriarchy
and male dominance on this basis is too farfetched.
Personal equipment in these burials communicates
gender, but clearly also social status. 
Social rank is another important social parameter
in Bohemian Corded Ware communities. The dia-
gram distribution (cp. Fig. 10) suggests the existence
of two rank groups that ignore differences of gender:
1. High-status armed males and high-status more
peaceful looking females with dress fineries. 2. Low-
status unarmed males versus low-status females. The
first group has other objects besides the characteris-
tic cord-decorated pottery, especially in the personal
field of body decoration – i.e., dress and weaponry –
whereas the second group mostly has pottery. It is
thus significant that males and females on each
side of the diagram divide into two groups inde-
pendently of age: males with and without weapons
and females with and without dress accessories like
copper trinkets. The balance in wealth between males
and females within the high-ranking group was
established early in life, since the number of grave
goods is the same (cp. Turek and Cerny 2001: 608).
Rank thus very clearly crosscuts gender as an identity-
structuring factor. The social identities on the verti-
cal level also appear quite distinct materially; hence
we must assume that they were recognised as a group
by other agents. Society thus has two almost equal-
sized groups: a high-ranking group with particular
objects and a low-ranking group without. There is
more interaction within each rank group than
between them. Some sort of elite apparently existed.
This point is further illustrated in the cemetery of
Vikletice where individuals with particular objects
were buried close to each other within a particular
area, hence emphasising their common identity
414 . W A R F A R E ,  D I S C O U R S E ,  A N D  I D E N T I T Y
(Wiermann 2002: Abb. 2). Variability in the life cycles
of individuals is, by contrast, not distinctly mediated
in material culture – very unlike the situation at
Tiszapolgar-Basatanya. Social age is not communi-
cated through the number and type of personal
objects associated with the body, even if the forms
and size of pottery present in individual burials
seems more sensitive to the age of the deceased. 
Rank might well have been inherited rather than
being achieved through particular actions inasmuch
as the rank difference occurs from early childhood
almost to very old age. Formal rules of endogamy
may have structured this practice. It is equally pos-
sible to understand Corded Ware elite identity as
having been transferred across generations as a
particular kind of habitus, and endogamy may in
this case have been the result even if not formally
required. In any case the boundary between elite and
non-elite is marked by some objects and interrupted
by others. Vivid interaction seems to have taken
place: cord-decorated pottery unites the two groups,
thus showing that the whole community shared
identity on some cultural level. It seems likely that
the particular corded pottery style was associated
with a broader kind of group identity, which we
might call cultural identity or ethnicity.
Finally, it is noteworthy that inside each social
group of gender and rank there is little variation.
The number and classes of personal objects vary
only slightly from individual to individual within
the elite group. Again it is the number of pots that
varies the most, and it is possible that the quantity
of deposited corded pots relates to the social rank of
the deceased (see, for instance, Buchvaldek and
Koutecky´ 1970: grave 1963/110-111). We may never-
theless conclude that with regard to the internal
structure of the elite there were, at least ideally, few
differences of rank. Communal identities of rank,
gender and culture have been emphasised whereas
individualistic traits have been almost concealed. The
stereotype within each of these groups is absolutely
conspicuous, and beyond the ideology which was
surely an active factor in creating this typecast, this
may reveal to us a social structure which was more
restrictive than enabling when it became estab-
lished. Internal processes of rivalry and distinction,
which usually characterises the various social fields
of a society, seem in this case regulated by strict
social norms (also Turek and Cerny 2001). The same
rigorousness is valid for warriorhood.
High-ranking males carry battle-axes or mace-
heads, sometimes a flat axehead as well: the posi-
tion is classic with the haft in the hands and the
axehead or blade in front of the face (Fig. 11). The
elegantly shaped shaft hole axes and maceheads
obviously did not merely symbolise maleness as
opposed to femaleness since less than half the males
carried them. They surely signified a superior kind
of maleness, which included an identity as warrior.
Hunting is less likely inasmuch as the selected
weaponry clearly is war-related: it makes no sense to
hunt with a macehead or a battle-axe! These males
might be considered born members of a warrior
sodality with common drinking rituals. The drink-
ing beaker with cord impression or herring-bone
pattern actually occurs predominantly in male buri-
als (cp. Mallory 1989: 244; cp. Turek and Cerny´
2001: 605f). 
It follows from the above description of gender
and rank in Bohemian Corded Ware burials that
access to warriorhood was regulated through distinc-
tions of rank (and male gender). The third group of
the three aforementioned sociological types of war
bands thus fits best. The rank-based structure in the
Bohemian Corded Ware culture evidently contrasts
with the age-regulated structure at the much earlier,
copper age site of Tizsapolgar-Basatanya. All high-
ranking males were by definition warriors even if this
identity for the youngest and eldest must have been
on a symbolic level; the war-axe was in these cases
merely a metaphor for past or future warriorhood.
In other words, I suggest that the warrior band as an
active unit of war consisted of adult males from the
elitist group. The individualistic traits often apparent
among the members of such warrior clubs are not
presented, or did not exist, among the warrior bands
of the Bohemian Corded Ware culture. The Abipón
in the Grand Chaco of South America offers a good
analogy in this respect: warrior institutions of the
Abipón social elite avoided hierarchical divisions
among themselves and used drinking rituals to sym-
bolise equality and to strengthen solidarity (Lacroix
1990). It is common even in strictly hierarchical soci-
eties that the companionship in warrior bands main-
tains an ideology of equality, but these associations
of warriors were nevertheless a power source that
could be used to back-up other kinds of power
sources. In accordance with the rigid character of the
burial rites, ideology may well have formed a central
power source in Bohemian Corded Ware society and
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F I G .  1 1 :  Corded Ware warrior burial from the cemetery of Vikletice in Bohemia. Note the battle-axe in front of his
face and the corded beaker nearby (after Buchvaldek and Koutecky´ 1970).
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could if necessary be enforced through violence and
coercion. 
High-ranking females are buried with various
trinkets of amber, shell, bone or copper. Likewise,
age-regulated life cycles are not easily recognised, but
obviously womanhood must have had a symbolic
character among girls and women over forty to fifty
years of age. Quite possibly high-ranking females
also organised in social clubs. It is noticeable that
the group of high-ranking females is almost of the
same size as the group of high-ranking males. It cer-
tainly suggests some sort of common social ground,
and it would be difficult on this background to
argue for male dominance in Bohemian Corded
Ware society. There are no signs that women partic-
ipated actively in war raids but this does not mean
that they did not interfere in matters of war. 
Gender is a central feature of the Bohemian
Corded Ware culture and elsewhere in Corded Ware
Europe. The material equipment of high-ranking
males is strikingly similar over wide distances in
Europe – for example, between such remote regions
as southern Sweden and Bohemia (Knutsson 1995).
It is somewhat less striking as regards the personal
appearance of high-ranking females in that dress
accessories vary more. Even the interaction across
geographical space into foreign territory thus seems
gendered to a considerable degree, in addition to
being highly sensitive to social rank, as already
argued above. The description of the warrior as a
boundary-crosser may contribute to explaining the
macro-regional dispersal of material culture and
social conduct. 
In summary, it is fairly clear that specific objects
like copper spirals, shells and weaponry belonged to
a presumably privileged subgroup within society
consisting of males and females of all ages from
early childhood to a mature age. Privileged males,
irrespective of age, carried a battle-axe or a macehead
symbolising an identity as warrior, but high-ranking
males were fully matched by high-ranking females
in terms of particular objects. The specific corded
drinking beaker occurs mostly in burials of males,
probably implying associated drinking rituals. It
seems reasonable to assume that Corded Ware males
of high rank organised in warrior clubs with restrict-
ed access, the exclusiveness symbolised by specific
weapons and most likely a particular social conduct.
The burial custom is heavily ritualised, suggesting
that the society that performed these uniform rituals
was strictly structured, specifically along the lines of
gender and rank, and hence restricted rather than
enabled social action. 
The social pattern described above seems to carry
some relevance for Corded Ware communities in
other regions such as Switzerland, Austria, along the
upper Danube, Saxo-Thuringia, the Netherlands and
southern Scandinavia. However, skeletons are not
necessarily well preserved, and it is often difficult to
assess the social structure in any detail. Deviations
from the social pattern encountered in Bohemia
are probably not uncommon, but the cemetery at
Schafstädt, ldkr. Merseburg-Querfurt in the classic
Corded Ware area of Saxo-Thuringia, deviates sub-
stantially (Hummel 2000). A rather fluent gender
categorisation was found among sixty-three burials.
Here age seems to have been a decisive parameter in
the acquisition of social status. A closer look at
Schafstädt, however, also reveals that battle-axes or
maceheads are absent. Likewise, the number of sta-
tus-related trinkets is mediocre. Together this suggests
the absence of elite warriors and their female coun-
terparts at Schafstädt.
Conclusion: Bell Beakers and beyond 
The search for early warriors and their associations
ends here, but could obviously have ventured further
into the Copper Age and later settings in Europe
using the same or a similar method with elements
from different disciplines besides archaeology. By
way of conclusion, what follows is a few observa-
tions, and especially hypotheses, about warriorhood
in the succeeding Bell Beaker communities of cen-
tral Europe. This highlights the possibilities inherent
to a comparative procedure since there are similari-
ties as well as differences between practices in the
Corded Ware and the Bell Beaker communities,
which surely constitute guidelines for the interpreta-
tion. Like the Corded Ware community in Bohemia,
the subsequent Bell Beaker communities in central
Europe seem to have been ranked societies, and
warrior institutions arguably existed which recruited
their members mainly from an elite group. 
The Bell Beaker culture is another macro-regional
culture that appeared in large parts of Europe c. 2500
BC. Bell Beaker communities are also mostly known
from their burial rites, but the number of settle-
ments has been increasing over recent years. The
funerary practice is highly uniform though less so
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than in the Corded Ware culture. The dead body
was usually inhumed in a single grave and placed in
a small flat-grave cemetery. The body position is
likewise bipolar and side specific with gender as the
structuring principle (Fig. 8, upper). Males were
buried crouched to the left with their head facing
north, whilst females were resting crouched to the
right with their head facing south. It is remarkable
that the orientation and position of the body are the
opposite of what was practiced in the Corded Ware,
but nevertheless strictly sex-differentiated. Common
to both sexes are the flexed position of hocker and
the face looking towards the east. Part of the mate-
rial equipment is also gender specific. Males may be
buried with archers’ gear of pressure-flaked arrow-
heads (in a quiver), a bracer (wristguard) to protect
the hand from the backlash of the composite bow,
boar’s tusk, and sometimes a model of a bow, in
addition to a flat tanged copper dagger and a zone-
decorated bell-shaped beaker, probably for the ritual
consumption of alcohol. Females may possess a few
ornaments for hair, body or dress such as, notably,
v-perforated buttons of bone or amber for the fas-
tening of woollen costumes, a copper awl, and
sometimes a spiral-shaped trinket of copper, gold, or
electron. Gender distinctions are maintained from
earliest childhood to very old age. The Bell Beaker
gender pattern corresponds almost exactly to bio-
logical gender as ascertained through anthropologi-
cal examinations (Müller 2001). However, far from
all individuals were buried with weapons and dress
fineries (Fig. 12). 
The Bell Beaker material is not as sociologically
well investigated as that of the Corded Ware culture,
but it seems clear that social rank was decided at
birth rather than achieved later on. In the Bell
Beaker group of East Central Europe, it is possible to
outline a privileged group of males and females, with
weaponry and dress accessories, respectively, cover-
ing all ages and hence recalling the social pattern of
the Corded Ware culture. Thirty-five percent of male
burials contained weaponry, whereas only thirteen
percent of the female burials can be characterised as
wealthy with v-bored amber buttons and copper
awls. This seems to suggest that some sort of imbal-
ance existed between males and females in the elite
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F I G .  1 2 : Statistics showing the frequency of male and female Bell Beaker burials with particular objects 
(adapted from Müller 2001).
group; or perhaps a more distinct border between
warriors and ordinary males existed than between
privileged and ordinary females. Interestingly, the
male group of weapon bearers, whose members were
probably recruited to warrior associations, was more
differentiated internally with varying numbers and
classes of weapons. This feature of material variation
internal to the social identities of the Bell Beaker
culture is in contrast to the rigid stereotype of gen-
der and rank in the Corded Ware culture; it could
possibly relate to age-cycles, but this is a less well
known aspect. Alternatively, it could be internal
ranking and ongoing rivalry for power in an elite
group, precisely, it would seem, as in some Bronze
Age communities (Vandkilde 1999). This less rigid
pattern of actions in the ritual domain of funerals
must surely have a bearing on Bell Beaker social
structure and practice in general. 
The warrior has, in conclusion, appeared as a
specific social identity who stands in a variable rela-
tionship to the parameters of age, rank, gender and
culture – depending on the social context: warrior-
hood hardly remained the same over time, as indi-
cated by the Copper Age case studies. Variability as
well as certain recurring patterns take place over
time and space, and this stands in contrast to the
stereotypical ideologically loaded presentations of
the warrior figure in the archaeology of the 20th
century (Vandkilde 2003 and this volume chapter 5).
Likewise, warrior identity receives its sustenance
from war-related actions and interactions of ani-
mosity, rivalry and companionship. This should be
remembered when dealing with the presentation of
warrior ideals in the past and in the present. 
N O T E S
1 The birth of this study took place in a Dublin bookshop in
the early Spring of 1997. I was looking for new archaeo-
logical books, and more vaguely for a new research topic.
When the bookshelf dealing with prehistory did not con-
tain anything of immediate interest, I moved on to the
shelf on sociology and social anthropology. The first book
I picked from the shelf was a collection of articles by Pierre
Clastres: Archeology of Violence (translated into English from
French 1994). My first thought was, rather naively, that the
book had been misplaced! Slowly it dawned on me that the
author was the late French social anthropologist of struc-
turalist persuasion, and that ‘archeology’ was used in the
sociological sense; to uncover layer by layer of a social phe-
nomenon; in this case the elementary warlike structures of
primitive society. The book, by closer inspection, proved
to discuss warring tribes in the Americas: Tupi-Guarani,
Yanomami, Blackfoot, Apache, Algonquin, Iroquois, etc.
According to Clastres, warfare should simply be understood
as the dominant structure, indeed the essence, of tribal
society: warfare is omnipresent among tribes, and the very
factor that prevents their transformation to state. What
Clastres does is to reverse Thomas Hobbes (1991[1651])
famous dictum about the primitive being ‘bellum omnium
contra omnes’ by arguing that if the state is categorised as
the pacifier of that being, then war in primitive society is
war against the state; thus the phrase society against the
state (Clastres 1977; 1994; Bestard and Bidon-Chanal 1979:
225). My study of warriors is in many ways indebted to
Clastres work in that it became the genesis of a desire to
uncover the more bellicose aspects of human life in a distant
European past.
2 See also more generally my introduction to the section:
warfare, weaponry and material culture.
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These two powerful and seemingly timeless quota-
tions by Shakespeare and General Patton, separated
by more than three centuries, truly illustrate the
eternal summons to men, to participate when real
men are moulded. Thus, the warrior mentality is
deeply rooted in manhood. Moreover, the indoctri-
nating message in these quotations, which histori-
cally are very common both geographically and cul-
turally, and in all shapes and forms, constitute a
strong reminder to young men that surely nothing
in the world will make them pass the test of man-
hood like battle. To pass the so-called baptism of
fire, has, in other words, been equal to passing the
ultimate male rite de passage. Similarly, even to die
bravely in combat has historically in many cultures
promised the warrior-man eternal after-life, a place
in Elysium, the happy hunting grounds or Valhalla. 
Indeed, as the American Professor of War litera-
ture, Samuel Hynes, correctly underlines, even if mes-
sages such as the initial quotations by Shakespeare
and General Patton are less explicit in late 20th
century war narratives, the test of courage and man-
liness, especially for young men, has continued to
loom romantically ‘beyond everything else that life
is likely to offer them’ (Hynes 1997: 137). It is hard
not to agree with the English Professor of gender-
studies, Jonathan Mangan’s conclusion that the
Warrior as male hero has been a central and contin-
uous icon in human history (Mangan 1999: 1).
It is similarly hard not to agree with the American
historian Donald D.J. Mrozek when he argues that
the need for defence has exaggerated behavioural
differences between men and women, and thus
given military institutions a special importance in
preserving the distinctive sphere of male virtues.
The military and soldiering have traditionally been
linked to the ancient roles of hunter and defender,
and have also created a relatively easy space in
which to identify manliness (Mrozek 1987: 220).
This is, to the best of our knowledge, in the end a
gender construction. 
Thus, American 20th century recruiting slogans
like ‘The Marine Corps Builds Men’ and ‘Join the
Army and Feel Like a Man’ are just two examples
of military organisations taking advantage of this
tendency, or rather this powerful construction. And,
as the American Professor of Vietnam War literature,
Milton J. Bates, argues, these slogans in a way reveal
much of the masculine construction. After all, if the
military promise to ‘build men’, it also confirms
that ‘one is not born, but rather, becomes a man.’
To become a soldier is consequently to become a
man, and the pre-military man has not yet acquired
true masculinity (Bates 1996: 140-41). Overall, this
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We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile. This day shall gentle his condition: And gentle-
men of England, now abed shall think themselves accursed they were not here, And hold
their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks That fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day. 
King Henry V, Shakespeare (In: Ellis 1990: 7)
There’s one thing you men can say when it’s all over and you are home once more. 
You can thank God that twenty years from now when you’re sitting by the fireside with
your grandson on your knee, and he asks you what you did in the war, you won’t have
to shift him to the other knee, cough and say, ‘I shovelled crap in Louisiana’. 
General Patton in 1944 (In: Ellis 1990: 7)
chapter aims to explore, in a rather summary mode,
the longevity in the human value of warriorhood
despite the horrendous consequences of every war. 
Celebrations of warriorhood 
in prehistory and ethnography
Looking back on human history and civilisation, it
is literally filled with warrior-epics which corrobo-
rate the previous quotations by Shakespeare and
General Patton. Already four thousand years ago, the
first written warrior epic, the Sumerian Gilgamesh
(George 1999: passim) story set a standard for future
warrior stories and epics to follow. Homer’s Iliad and
Odyssey, written in the 8th century BC, had most
likely been inspired by Gilgamesh, and the Homeric
epics have made an impact on ideal warriorhood
which has been hard to challenge (Homer 1997: lv).
In the 11th century AD, in the oldest of the French
epic Chansons de Geste (songs of deeds), the Chanson
de Roland illustrates, through the Frankish Achilles,
Roland, the model of Christian chivalry. This model
was subsequently refined by Sir Thomas Malory in
Le Morte d´Arthur, written in the mid-15th century.
The striking thing is how Malory’s opus, which ele-
vates the warrior ideals and the chivalric codex to a
climax, was written by a failed and drunken knight
while he was in jail for inter alia rioting, looting and
pillaging a monastery, and raping women. In other
words, these stories of ideal warriorhood and man-
liness not infrequently hide the more common
derelictions performed by the warrior-man. 
Considering the various categories of warrior val-
ues we detect an overwhelming historical, cultural,
and geographical universality in praising these fea-
tures: honour, loyalty, duty, obedience, endurance,
strength, sexual potency, courage, and camaraderie,
the last best considered as the nucleus of the typical
Männerbund. Of greatest importance is that all of
these warrior values are traditionally also synony-
mous to manliness. Furthermore, in quite a few cul-
tures, sexual performance has been, and most often
still is, linked to some of the mentioned categories.
Among the Maori warriors of New Zealand the
word for bravery, ‘toa’, was synonymous with being
sexually aroused. For many so-called ‘tribal peoples’
and cultures of hunters and gatherers, an erect penis
symbolises aggressiveness and courage. Even in
many current societies we find links between geni-
tals, manliness, aggressiveness and courage, which
is adequately verified in the common expression to
have balls which means to be courageous. The lack
of them is synonymous with cowardice. Also,
metaphorically speaking, to kill an enemy is to
‘fuck’ him (Duerr 1998: 192-94).
At least since the ancient Egyptians, cowardice in
battle by warriors or their enemies has earned them
epithets of female genitalia to indicate that they are
‘weak’ men. This tendency, the synonymity between
the words woman and coward, has also diligently
been used by drill instructors in modern armies
while turning young men into soldiers. To this very
day in Sweden, the land of gender equality, school-
teachers grapple with the problem of young boys
disparagingly referring to weak boys and girls using
words for female genitalia or homosexuality. 
Long-term trends in the commemoration 
of warriorhood
By and large, what we see here is a very slow-to-
change mentality and a long-term trend. Or what
the French Annales-historian Fernand Braudel called
a longue durée. The warrior mentality has in other
words a rather timeless character. Even following
periods of seeming unpopularity, as after the brutal
wars of religion in the 16th and 17th centuries and
during the Enlightenment, warrior values have had
an extraordinary tendency to be resuscitated and
experience a renaissance. 
Returning to warrior values, it is hard to exagger-
ate their long-term popularity. And as I previously
mentioned, even after periods of lesser importance,
or rather an unpopularity of warriorhood, they show
a cyclical tendency to be celebrated as manly ideals
and virtues. Perhaps this is also a consequence of the
popularity that these values generally have among
human beings. For instance, both courage and
honour have an intimate relationship to human
sensibilities and virtues. Thus, in the Catholic faith
courage is still considered one of the cardinal virtues.
According to Plato, courage, together with justice,
wisdom and moderation, is one of the main virtues.
But, to Plato, the act of true courage is a wise courage,
it is an act which follows rational deliberation. It is
when a value, such as courage is abused, brutalised,
and vulgarised that it becomes a problem. After all,
atrocities committed by soldiers in the name of
warrior values are more common than not, which
Sir Thomas Malory perfectly exemplified.
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Masculinities of the 18th-19th centuries
To understand warriorhood and masculinity in our
own age we must pay some attention to the devel-
opment in warfare and the emergence of what the
historian George L. Mosse called the ‘Myth of the
War Experience’, in the late 18th and early 19th
century. Mosse turns to the French Revolution and
asks why men unprecedentedly and eagerly rushed
off en masse to face death in battle? In France in the
decades prior to the Revolution, the martial spirit
of the army, containing a mix of career officers, mer-
cenaries, and militiamen, was declining. So what
made young men, who would not ‘brave danger and
pain’ before the first citizen army was created in
1792 willing do so afterward (Mosse 1991: 4-16)? 
Around the mid-19th century, we also see a close
to universal bond between warrior values and con-
ventional notions of masculinity being revived. This
revival was a renewal of medievalism augmented not
least by Romanticism and Social Darwinist ideas,
which largely re-established the status of the warrior
in Western civilisation. The somewhat devalued
image of warriorhood and martial values of the 18th
century lost ground and was replaced by the age of
legends and heroes, Teutonic warrior cult, Arthurian
knighthood fantasies, warrior romances of Alexandre
Dumas and Walter Scott, and Wagnerian operas.
This is a paradoxical development in European his-
tory between 1815 and 1914: a relatively peaceful
century saw the creation of the probably strongest
warrior society the world had ever known. On the
eve of World War I, almost every able bodied
European man of military age had a soldier’s iden-
tity card and was prepared for military duty and
general mobilisation at any time (Resic 1999: 20).
Mosse suggests how a Myth of the War Experience
was built up during the Wars of the French
Revolution (1792-1799) and the German Wars of
Liberation against Napoleon (1813-1814) in order to
entice young men to war. There was within the
myth a re-emergence and widespread praise of war,
warrior values, and the warrior-man. Previous wars
had mainly been fought by mercenary armies with
little interest in the cause for which they fought.
The citizen-armies, initially composed of large num-
bers of volunteers, fought with a commitment to
their cause and nation. This new breed of soldiers
was fed with the myth, which created a nationalis-
tic glorification and romanticisation of war and a
celebration of the warrior-man that culminated
with the generation of 1914. But the myth gradual-
ly also worked as a way to make the realities of war
and battle easier to bear. The general evolution in
warfare in the 19th century had, through the indus-
trial revolution and total war, given new dimensions
to death in war. Battlefields had become deadlier
places than ever, so it called for much greater effort
in masking and transcending deaths in war.
The World Wars and warriorhood
World War I, according to Mosse, further strength-
ened the emphasis and focus of militant masculinity,
which also reached a climax in the search for a ‘new
man’ that started before the war. By the early 20th
century throughout the Western world, the ideal
was physical, aesthetic and moral. Physical strength
and courage was combined in the harmonious pro-
portions of the body and the purity of soul. Many
men belonging to the 1914 generation were moti-
vated to volunteer because of the ideal of manliness.
The soldier per se was praised as the true representa-
tive of the people, and admired for his physical and
moral strength, common sense, and matter-of-fact
courage (Mosse 1991: 222-23).
During World War II the idealised manly qualities
of World War I were again demanded of young men.
However, the fascist era had taken the concept even
further, where the man of the future, the ‘real man’,
besides being of fascist ideology, was truly soldierly,
courageous and full of willpower. This was strongly
connected to clean-cut appearance, hardiness, and
self-discipline. Even for men lacking the extremes of
the warrior ideal, this definition was imperative. In
both the Italian and German concept of the ‘new
man’, he was to emerge from the war and always be
linked to the war experience. Clearly the history of
militant masculinity reached a climax with fascism,
which itself was a product of the Great War, and to
all fascist regimes manliness was a vital national
symbol. The 19th century ideal of masculinity was
somewhat altered by the fascists to a glorification
and vulgarised image of the World War I experience.
Service and sacrifice for the nation was the true
manly goal. To the fascists, there was no difference
between a real man and a warrior, a warrior in love
with war and combat. 
In subsequent wars of the 20th century, accord-
ing to Mosse and the majority of the scholars of the
field, much of the powerful Myth of the War
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Experience and warrior ideals were largely rejected
and devalued. Supposedly the post-World War II era
has not added anything to encourage the Myth of
the War Experience. The vision of Armageddon con-
jured up in 1945, symbolically speaking after
Auschwitz and Hiroshima, has led to a ‘more realistic’
attitude, one without national sentiments and stories
of war as glorious. Martial enthusiasm and militant
masculinity has not been resurrected (Mosse 1991).
A highly esteemed historian like John Keegan even
maintains that in the United States by the 1960s
warrior values were extremely hard to impress upon
Americans (Keegan 1993: 49-50). After the two world
wars, Samuel Hynes argues, the romantic images of
war ‘fell out of fashion’ (Hynes 1997: 41).
Vietnam and the recreation 
of war mythology
As we approach the Vietnam War, this was clearly
not the case in the United States, as I have showed
in my book American Warriors in Vietnam: Warrior
Values and the Myth of the War Experience During the
Vietnam War, 1965-73 (1999). Studying combat sol-
diers’ letters and diaries, written during the troops’
active duty in Vietnam, which I subsequently com-
pared with veterans’ memoirs and interviews, it
appeared that this generation of American soldiers
had no lack of romantic masculine images of war
and warriorhood. 1945 had hardly been that com-
plete turning point in the United States. Rather, the
American combat soldiers’ conception of warrior
values confirmed the long-term celebration of war-
riorhood during the Vietnam War. Primarily the
early war phase volunteers showed us that the Myth
of the War Experience was hardly a thing of the past
in 1965. Indeed, the Vietnam War was no 1861, 1917
or 1941 and few of the 1960s’ generation as a whole
harboured a sense of crusade with regard to the war,
but we still find that extolling warrior values was an
important mechanism in this conflict. 
Obviously those who actually did volunteer and
who deliberately sought the male confirmation in
the fight, and not the draftees and those avoiding
military service and battle, are crucial to our under-
standing of the enchantment of warriorhood. The
volunteers from 1965-1968 rather wanted to experi-
ence ‘their’ Gettysburg and ‘their’ Normandy. They
wanted to repeat their fathers’ deeds of the so-called
Good War in the 1940s. 
Throughout my study I could see differences in
conception between those who had volunteered
and those who had been drafted, especially as the
war dragged on. This observation is not surprising:
on the contrary, it is almost expected. Indeed, vol-
unteers, in contrast to draftees, have traditionally
been the group of men most susceptible to the Myth
of the War Experience and in turn most inclined to
choose to walk the warrior’s path. It’s always the
young men who prove themselves susceptible to the
glory, thrills and values of warriorhood who confirm
the long-term trend of the worth of the warrior, war
and combat experience. Ultimately these young men
perpetuate the existence of the warrior in human
society.
Many a young man has initially entered war
believing in the worth of the warrior as a vital part in
the construction of ideal masculinity, while subse-
quently with experience realising the inconsistency
between ideal and the reality in war and battle. The
American combat soldiers who volunteered for the
Vietnam War were no exception to this. But as they
saw their pre-experience expectations of warrior-
hood being crushed in Vietnam and in the United
States, they now made an American exception. As
the war progressed and the national project was
shattered, much of the praising of warrior values
lost its power. Admittedly the complete Vietnam
experience has contributed greatly to further reveal-
ing the Myth of the War Experience, and has caused
large cracks in the ideal construction of manliness
in the guise of the warrior. But already during the
war, even among peace-activists, the Vietnamese
adversary’s warrior abilities were honoured, which
again proves the slow-to-change trend in praising
the warrior. The peace movement often turned out
be an against-the-war in Vietnam movement and
anti-American involvement rather than anti-war as
a general principle. 
The American warrior had in the end lost the war
to the opposite of his stereotype of manliness,
which clearly was a blow to the traditional domi-
nant image of masculinity. American men in gener-
al seemed to have experienced emasculation in large
part because of the Vietnam War. After all, it became
an experience of national trauma, which even some
active anti-war men of the generation expressed in
the aftermath. They had missed their opportunity to
partake in the traditional and mythical male
American experience, to have fought and won a war.
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In any case, the indications that American manhood
craved ‘remasculinisation’ during the post-Vietnam
era appear to find overwhelming corroboration
throughout American culture. Perhaps the most
obvious testimony to this is found in the Rambo
movies. In many veterans’ accounts, their emphasis
indicate that regardless of the outcome of the war,
they had actually at the time believed that they were
doing the manly thing by fighting. The veterans con-
tinuously played an important role in the project of
remasculinisation. From being scapegoats and carriers
of national shame and guilt, they slowly gained a
profound role as ‘spokespersons’ for the remasculin-
isation of American culture and society. 
As with the veterans of other conflicts, in many
ways the Vietnam veterans, especially those who
had volunteered early on, highlighted in their post-
war accounts that despite the legacy of the war, they
had done the manly thing. The tendency is compa-
rable to the World War I experience, and is seem-
ingly a universal trend among many veterans of
war; a trend that as time goes by gains further
momentum and strength. Perhaps the Vietnam vet-
erans are particularly interesting in the light of this
phenomenon, not least when juxtaposing the alter-
native masculinities that emerged during and since
the war with the previously so dominant manly
ideal in the form of the warrior. After all, the con-
struction of ideal manliness in the shape of the war-
rior had successfully been challenged during the
Vietnam War. Therefore in the final analysis, the
Vietnam veterans’ accounts are truly significant
messages. Many veterans endeavoured to separate
the bad Vietnam experience per se from the worth of
the masculine warrior values. Through this effort
of salvaging, they contribute to the reconfirmation
of the long-term belief in warring as a vital male
enterprise. 
Contemporary trends
An interesting tendency, which becomes apparent
when looking at the last two centuries, is how the
worth of warriorhood and warrior values are
strengthened during times when men either feel or
display a sense of crisis in manhood. This phenom-
enon is often and partly explained by women’s
stronger position in society and a society in trans-
formation. We find such a situation in the late 19th
and early 20th century in both Western Europe and
the United States, as well as in post-Vietnam
America. In other words, when men seem to see
their positions threatened, and experience a crisis in
male identification, there is an increase of longing
for the warrior. I believe that we currently have a
similar situation. 
Despite the obvious weakening of classical mili-
tarism in today’s Western countries, we hardly lack
military values and trends both from a domestic and
a global perspective. Perhaps the so-called ‘post-mil-
itary society’ has emerged from a continuing civilis-
ing process. But as numerous commentators have
underlined, new forms of warriors, wars and a still
fairly strong militarisation of the world, combined
with an extreme excitement and fascination with
the powers of military technology, render a far more
complicated, multiple, and versatile reality. We see a
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the
hands of autocratic regimes, traditional guerrillas in
Mexico or Kosovo applying the internet as a weapon,
the creation of the ‘post-modern guerrilla hero’, and
moves towards the creation of the cyborg warrior.
The latter would be a human integrated with a
machine, not unlike Arnold Schwarzenegger in the
Hollywood blockbuster Terminator. 
Even in the strongly masculine business/corpo-
rate world, not least in Japan and America, warrior
values both in language, metaphors and company
strategies has been transferred and adopted. Many
companies are structured along military lines, mim-
icking army hierarchy and authority. In general
there is a gradual and continual evolution of what
could be called techno-scientific post-modern war.
Correspondingly the horrible images broadcast to us
on TV from conflicts around the world offer few
romantic messages of war, but we get used to the
images and grow numb: the horrors and the familiar
patterns no longer shock us.
Admittedly, the warrior has in many ways gone
underground, but it is still easy to spot him in his
contemporary form. Take, for instance, middle class
professionals spending weekends in woods playing
war games with paint guns, family fathers re-enact-
ing famous historic battles, and youth and city gangs
organised as paramilitary units based on crude mili-
tary values. 
In 1991, there were an estimated 100,000 gang
members organised in 1,000 different gangs in Los
Angeles County alone, modelled as warrior societies
in which violence and killings are rites to manhood.
F R O M  G I L G A M E S H  T O  T E R M I N A T O R . 427
Gangs committed a third of all the homicides in Los
Angeles County (i.e., over 700 murders) that same
year (Gibson 1995: 305; Moore and Gillette 1991: 5).
One scholar even explains much of the daily vio-
lence inflicted by young men in Western societies as
simply another way to prove their manliness, and
street violence then serves as a surrogate for war
(Gerzon 1992: 174). On the whole, this is a rapidly
growing phenomenon in European cities as well, not
least among marginalised young men, often with an
immigrant background in large urban centres. This
is a development which not even ‘peaceful’ Sweden
has escaped. The 1999 Governmental Committee
for the Evaluation of the State of Contemporary
Swedish Democracy identified a troubling tendency
among young immigrant boys – hostility towards
Swedes in general, and the Swedish establishment in
particular. These young men see themselves as ‘war-
riors’ fighting against a society which has not been
able to integrate them into civil society. 
Throughout the Western world today we also see
Fascist movements re-emerging and mesmerising in
particular unemployed young men with messages of
violence. In the United States, paramilitary right-
wing extremists bombed the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City in 1995 with 168 innocent individ-
uals being killed. The responsible and convicted
bomber, Timothy McVeigh, had been decorated for
his service in the Army during the war in Kuwait
and dreamed of becoming a Green Beret, the ulti-
mate American warrior. There was also the recent
sinister tendency among armed schoolboys in
America to take out their anger by shooting fellow
students in pure massacres. In the shooting at
Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon, in
1998, the teenage killer was even equipped and
dressed for war. 
The American sociologist James W. Gibson points
to the disturbing emergence of a powerful paramili-
tary culture of war and warriors in the 1980s, which
he calls a ‘New War culture’. In the decades following
the Vietnam War millions of American men have
purchased combat weapons and begun to train for
wars. Most of these men missed out on the Vietnam
War and wish to prove their masculinity and right-
ful place in the long tradition and mythology of
aggressive American males. New indoor pistol-
shooting ranges have expanded, and men dressed in
camouflage clothes all over the United States are
playing survival games and paintball wars. The new
warrior hero as presented and portrayed by the New
War culture is a lone fighter or part of a small group
of elite warriors, and the warrior is presented as an
ideal identity for all men disregarding occupation.
Within the phenomenon of New War a number of
racist paramilitary groups appeared, which in the
wake of the failure of the Vietnam War consider the
white man’s world in grave jeopardy. These groups
of white supremacist New War warriors believe they
are morally permitted to do battle even beyond the
law (Gibson 1995: 8-9, 195-96, 268-69, 284, 294).
Looking at Hollywood, we have seen an increase
in the production of warrior nostalgia movies. The
13th Warrior, Gettysburg, Gladiator, Braveheart, We
Were Soldiers Once, even Saving Private Ryan, are only
a few examples. Interestingly enough, even if some
of these new films present an anti-war message,
many young men still manage to interpret and find
the promise of an exclusively male adventure
offered by warriorhood in these films. After seeing
Saving Private Ryan, while leaving the cinema in
Malmö Sweden, I listened to the reaction of young
men after this cinematographically powerful depic-
tion of the senseless carnage of modern battle. Not
surprisingly, most comments of the young men car-
ried the message that this film had the coolest and
best combat-scenes they had ever seen in a movie.
Similar comments followed the very powerful and
extremely tragic Gladiator.
Perhaps it is impossible to produce a really off-
putting war-movie, which truly manages to induce
anti-war feelings. After all, the eternal message
remains obvious, i.e., despite the horrors, disasters
and carnage of war and battle, the camaraderie
among brothers in arms is best found in war and
has no other true competition. This is a message to
which many young men are very susceptible. 
Revival of warriorhood and 
violent masculinities in the Balkans
Looking at the Balkans, warrior values linked to
manliness are hard to exaggerate. In fact, I am con-
vinced that in order to understand the wars in the
1990s the construction of ideal masculinity in the
Yugoslav successor states is absolutely necessary.
There is a most powerful machismo among many
men in this part of Europe. Moreover, in the nation-
al historiography, legends and myths of Southeast
Europe male heroes and warriors are found in
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abundance, just as the status of war-veterans and
heroes of World War II during socialist Yugoslavia is
hard to exaggerate. By and large, the complete
Yugoslav system was based on a profound celebra-
tion of military and warrior values. Likewise, the
region and beyond the old Vojna Krajina or
Militärgrenze between the Habsburg and Ottoman
empires, where much fighting in the 1990s took
place, has harboured a warrior masculine ideal for
centuries. It is a long-term trend and culture that had
its importance when turning the ignition-key for
war in 1991. In his research the Croatian historian
Ivo Zˇanic´ has convincingly established the impor-
tant historical and mythical Hajduk tradition linked
by guslars (bards) from the days of resistance vis-à-vis
the Ottomans up to the war in the 1990s (Zˇanic´ 1998).
Even in Sweden, the UN missions have been, and
still are, a perfect excuse for young Swedish men to
seek the male warrior adventure. Many young
Swedish UN peace-keepers repeatedly apply for
duties in the Balkans. Some UN veterans have done
three or four tours of duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and in Kosovo. This does not include the Swedish
mercenaries who fought in the war in the 90s. The
infamous neo-nazi and war criminal Jackie Arklöf
set a perfect and frightening example. After returning
from his mercenary ‘combat-tour’ fighting Muslims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he gunned down and
murdered two Swedish police officers. He is current-
ly serving a life-sentence in prison where he laments
the fact of not being able to live the life of the war-
rior (Hildebrandt 2000: 74-83).
There are also Croatian-Swedish war-veteran
clubs, where much of the war culture is recycled. A
Croatian war-veteran and the organiser of one such
veteran club, whom I interviewed in Sweden last
year, stressed that he had not volunteered for mili-
tary duty and combat, claiming to have been unwill-
ingly shanghaied from his town by the Croatian
Army. But while he was organising the veteran club
in Sweden, he made a distinction between those
who had been ‘ranjeni’ (wounded) and those who
had not been in combat. In other words, even this
forced draftee placed a specific honour on the fact
that he had been bloodied and ‘baptised’ in combat.
As we talked, while listening to the lamenting voice
of musician and war-veteran Thompson, the veteran
I interviewed pointed at another veteran and said:
‘You know, he was just a cook, he never had to
prove his manhood.’ 
Similarly, according to the interviews carried out
by the German scholar Natalija Basˇic´, many Serbian
veterans consider themselves ‘better men’ after
experiencing combat and due to their war-experi-
ence. To most of these veterans, Basˇic´ emphasises,
the combat experience in Croatia and BiH is regarded
as their male rite de passage (Basˇic´ 1999). The Serbian
ethnologist Ivan Cˇolovic´ has also showed how, for
instance, football hooligan organisations in Belgrade
were, before the outbreak of the war, in fact a train-
ing ground for vulgar and macho paramilitary
groups, which were later to be unleashed in Croatia
and Bosnia ( Cˇolovic´ 2000: 371-96). 
It seems logical to link much of this behaviour to
early education and schooling in Serbia. According
to the Serbian Sociologist Vesna Pesˇic´, throughout
their eight years of elementary school, children are
methodically socialised into worshiping warriorhood
and male heroes. As the students advance through
eight years of a belligerent syllabus, by the age of 14
they know perfectly well who the enemies are, and
that the brave die only once while the coward dies
a thousand times (Pesˇic´ 1994: 55-75).
Sport, violence, and manliness
Warrior values as part of manliness are also very
much alive in the world of sports and so-called mar-
tial arts. Perhaps nowhere are these values as con-
spicuously expressed as among athletes in contem-
porary society, and in popular imagination sports
still reflect what have been regarded as manly
virtues. Physical exercise in general has had a his-
toric importance to the construction of modern
masculinity. The Australian scholar R.W. Connell
calls attention to the development of team sports at
the end of the 19th century across the English-
speaking world as a heavily convention-bound arena.
As a test of masculinity, sports were even in some
cases developed as a deliberate political strategy. It
was a conscious construction and had a part in turn-
ing young schoolboys into tough men. Sports today,
as Chris H. Gray maintains, are in many ways closer
to ritual war than war. Mark Gerzon even considers
sports a rite of passage to manliness in a Western
world in the absence of war (Gray 1997: 106; Connell
1996: 30-37; Gerzon 1992: 173-74). 
Likewise, most spectators still express nationalism,
symbolically using facial war paint in the national
colors while demanding that the athletes deliver vic-
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tories in a warrior-like fashion. Similarly there is an
enormous increase in adventure sports, where young
men, and women, dare mountains, rivers, climates
etc. in order to test their courage. This has even turned
into a worldwide billion-dollar tourist industry. 
Female fierceness
Recently we have seen the advent of new structures
and attitudes, not least with the current debate about
the wisdom of creating ‘gender-blind’ combat units.
This phenomenon is interestingly enough a part of
the debate for ‘gender equality’ in the United States
and most Western countries, and is focused on
women in the Armed Forces as being frustrated by
not being allowed in combat units. Already in 1988
the U.S. Marine Corps opened its door to the ‘Basic
Warrior’s Training Course’ for women. By the late
1990s, 12% of both the U.S. and British Army were
women. Women soldiers cannot be shrugged off
simply as auxiliaries to fighting men in an age when
centuries-long military tradition and assumptions
about the roles of women and men are in a state of
change. 
This so-called feminisation of the military and
militarisation of the feminine have implications for
soldiers as well as the civilian world. In other words,
can soldiering be the ultimate seal of manhood if
women do it too? Will women still be routinely con-
sidered as the second sex if they can face the mental
and physical challenge of battle and, with so-called
male courage, sacrifice themselves for their country?
What will this ultimately mean for the predominant
image of manhood, since, as R.W. Connell correctly
maintains, masculinity is, no matter what, defined
as ‘not-femininity’ (Connell 1996: 70).
Indeed, in the 1991 Gulf War, the military gen-
der-structure displayed a somewhat new face. Over
34,000 women fought in this conflict, and eleven
were sent home in body-bags. We could see mothers
leaving husband and children for service in the war,
or soldiers getting pregnant and being sent home
from the War, or women troops being captured and
killed. One American female soldier in Saudi Arabia
maintained ‘There aren’t any men or women here,
just soldiers’ (Gray 1997: 175). However, the matter
is even more complex. Although the post-modern
soldier/warrior has become closer to the cyborg and
gender identity more blurred, military cyborgs are
still rather masculine (Gray 1997: 42-43, 175). 
Concluding remarks
The high-tech nature of contemporary warring and
soldiering, with its masculine predominance, has
transferred much of the traditional male emphasis
of physical force to the mechanical cyborg soldier
giving it a masculine high-tech dominance. This
‘new male’ version of the warrior is easier for women
to adopt. We have seen the advent of a soldier type
constructed as basically male, vaguely female and
vaguely mechanical, but as a whole a masculine
cyborg postmodern warrior. A terminator of whom,
unfortunately, we have not yet seen the last. 
R.W. Connell stresses that it should be ‘abun-
dantly clear’ that the history of masculinity is not
linear. (Connell 1996: 198) Accordingly, as we have
seen from the present study, not least in comparison
and in corroboration to other similar surveys, the
praising of warriorhood, its values and its ideals has
a historical cyclic tendency among men as a vital
part of the construction of masculinity. At times war
romantics and warriorhood are presented and appear
almost as being part of a human or male destiny.
Perhaps there is a true need for romantic images in
life, and perhaps we need to know, or at least
believe, that the world has some adventure to offer,
especially when we are young. Indeed the call to war
and warriorhood has always been powerful among
young men. During the Middle Ages the evidence
for this phenomenon is found in profusion as the
youths formed the spearhead of feudal aggression as
knights. It was a matter of honour and reward that
could be gained, but also a lust for adventure. From
the violent and aggressive knightly society to the
‘New War Culture’ in the USA, we still see a pre-
dominance of young men. It goes thus without say-
ing that historically and traditionally young men
seem to have craved adventure, thrill, fame, power
and respect, and it has most easily been provided
through warriorhood. Ultimately then, no matter
what reasons, constructions or factors, cultural, social,
or biological for that matter, young men have been
and continue to be those most susceptible to the
myths of war and warriorhood. 
After the setbacks of the masculine warrior ideals
due to the Vietnam experience, warriorhood has
reappeared and taken many new guises in contem-
porary society. Indeed as we could see above, there
is scarcely a lack of warrior nostalgia, aiming at re-
accommodating the spirit of the warrior. Even at the
beginning of a new millennium, the path of the
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warrior in many ways appears as a way to escape
boredom and the humdrum of everyday life, and
the world has hardly turned into a peaceful place
with no threatening conflicts on the horizon. Since
the 1980s we have also seen an enormous industry
skyrocketing in the United States of pulp fiction
literature, novels, warrior magazines, comic books,
military toys, and films which in one way or the
other praise the warrior. Likewise, the sale of mili-
tary weapons continues to grow. Hollywood, with
its movies reaching a worldwide audience, is earning
billions through its vulgar celebration of the warrior.
Furthermore, we have even seen lately a growing
tendency to let women into the world of the war-
rior. As I write both men and women in the guise of
the warrior are getting ready to see the Elephant,
i.e., meet their baptism of fire, in Iraq, and here we
go again. 
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Village snapshots: failed rendezvous 
after violent displacement
Depending upon one’s perspective, this article refers
to villages in ‘Krajina’ or villages in the ‘Formerly
Occupied Territories of the Republic of Croatia’.
What is certain is that they are located in an area
between a main Croatian transit road and the new
border with Bosnia Herzegovina. As an activist work-
ing with a dialogue project, I had access to people in
a set of five such villages within one municipality
of Croatia.1 Walking into the villages in the late
1990s, visitors would first of all be struck by the
contrast between Plavo, consisting entirely of newly
built houses, and Bijelo and its surrounding villages,
where the visible remains of material destruction
were still shocking. In the latter inhabitants had
only just begun to repair the ruins using the
UNHCR plastic sheeting common to all post-war
settings in the region. Not much economic activity
was taking place apart from a timber mill and some
subsistence agriculture, which was greatly impeded
by several minefields. Further landmarks included
a police station and a bar across the road from it
mainly frequented by the numerous police officers,
some remnants of destroyed Partisan monuments
and an enormous Croatian flag on the central cross-
roads.
The relatively few inhabitants of these villages in
the late 1990s were on the whole elderly and female.
One thing that could not strike the visitor upon
arrival would be signs of the national composition
of the population: differences in this domain were
neither visible nor audible. Diametrically opposed
narratives of the past claimed either a historical
Serbian or Croatian majority; but attempting to
avoid the terror of national mathematics, I would
argue that the area had been nationally mixed for
centuries, with smaller villages often including
large majorities of one or the other nationality.2
Unsurprisingly, the region’s recent history was sub-
ject to an intense struggle of representation. During
WWII, a key moment in all versions of local history,
the region was the scene of horrific violence, which
pitted Croatian fascist Ustasˇe against multi-ethnic
(but in this area mainly Serbian) communist-led
Partisans. Massacres and starvation left few, if any,
families intact, an enormous demographic and
political legacy that later determined a good part
of the power balance in Yugoslavia. Of the villages
in question, Bijelo had been the main centre with a
mixed but majority-Serbian population. Reflecting
participation in the Partisan army, there had been
a high degree of Party membership, with a similar
pattern as in the smaller and predominantly
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Serbian-inhabited villages of Sivo, Zeleno and
Crno. Plavo, mainly Croatian-inhabited, had been
known as a hard-core ‘Ustasˇe village’ and was there-
fore relatively deprived of state privileges.3
The villages in this study were at the heart of the
post-Yugoslav conflict during the final decade of the
twentieth century. In 1990, the Serbian nationalist
revival ignited by Slobodan Milosˇevic´ was countered
in Croatia, where the first post-communist elections
were won by the nationalist HDZ, led by Franjo
Tudjman. Local and ‘imported’ Serbian hardliners
engaged in provocations with the support of the
locally based Yugoslav Army (JNA) division, and in
previous ‘black sheep’ villages, such as Plavo, a wave
of Croatian national euphoria gave way to a climate
of revenge. The situation became extremely polarised
and paramilitary groups carried out acts of violence
against civilians on both sides. After the 1991 refer-
endum, facing Milosˇevic´-supported Serbian rebel-
lions against an alleged revival of Ustasˇa fascism,
Croatia declared its independence. In response,
‘Serbian Krajina’ seceded from Croatia and almost
all of its Croatian inhabitants were expelled in a col-
laborative operation by militant local Serbs, the JNA
and volunteer militias from Serbia. Plavo was com-
pletely destroyed and the few elderly Croats who
stayed put were killed. In the other villages, most
Serbs remained in place during the four-year ‘war
republic’ of Krajina and were joined by displaced
Serbs from throughout the rest of Croatia. The Oluja
offensive of August 1995 integrated the area into
the Republic of Croatia – this time all Serbian inhab-
itants fled and their abandoned houses were looted
and burned.
Hence, all villagers were displaced at some point
during the 1990s. The scale of material destruction
was enormous. A number of displaced Croats began
returning in 1996, while a slow trickle of refugee-
return commenced on the Serbian side in 1997,
albeit consisting almost exclusively of elderly ladies,
sometimes accompanied by their sick or disabled
husbands. Many pre-war inhabitants simply never
returned. Thus, when the fieldwork for this article
was carried out, the national composition had
changed dramatically as a result of war, refuge, relo-
cation and ethnic engineering. A ‘Yugoslav’ identity
was no longer viable and the former predominantly
Serbian-inhabited villages were now housing a mix-
ture of Serbian returnees, Croatian refugees from
Bosnia, relocated Croats from other areas, a few
‘mixed’ couples and some others. The destruction of
Yugoslav landmarks, exclusive economic policies and
state assistance, excessive symbolism and a strong,
aggressive, police presence left no doubt that this
was now Croatian territory.
Living conditions were harsh, particularly for
Serbian returnees, since their houses had not been
repaired; many lived off subsistence agriculture,
sometimes complemented by humanitarian aid.
Employment opportunities, which were scarce even
for Croats, were non-existent for Serbs. After Oluja,
most Croatian Plavo households, whose houses
Serbian forces had destroyed in 1991 and who had
been displaced to other parts of Croatia or abroad,
were granted a newly built house by the Croatian
state. Most of them had at least one member
employed or on a state pension. Only one of the
many Serbs that used to live in Plavo had returned
– he was married to a Croatian woman.
After a war that could be seen as a process of
programmed national un-mixing (Duijzings 2000:
37-64), communication between people of different
nationalities, most of whom had spent all their lives
as neighbours,4 was sparse, particularly in public.
Where contact did exist, verbal harassment and abuse
of Serbian returnees was common, particularly by
the police, and there were a few cases of arson and
rape. Those returnees, mostly elderly people, lived
in fear and poverty and complained of isolation.
Most of them emphatically distanced themselves
from the militants who had proclaimed Krajina a
separate Serbian republic in 1991. They saw their
return as sufficient proof of their desire to coexist
with Croats.
Most Croats refused to communicate with yester-
day’s enemies, and they were particularly angry about
what they saw as the Serbian refusal to acknowledge
what had happened. Pressure from the travelling
Catholic priest, from local authorities and the police,
from the mass media and from neighbours rendered
any dialogue undesirable. In the dominant nation-
alist discourse of the day, Croatia was the exclusive
national homeland of Croats. All others, it was
argued, should know their place – Serbs, in particular,
should not make any claims. The pattern of non-
communication was only rarely broken by a few
Croats, who said they understood the universal
human need to return to one’s birth place. A small
minority even transcended greeting formalities, by
helping out Serbian returnees with practical matters
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and sometimes socialising with them. For example,
Nela, a young Croatian refugee from Bosnia with
two small children, regularly had coffee with her
Serbian neighbour in Bijelo, for which other Croats
often criticised her. When I asked her about this she
defensively snapped that as far as she was concerned
it was the most normal thing in the world to have
coffee with one’s neighbours. She defiantly added
that those who had a problem with that could ‘go
and fuck themselves’.
Another example was Davor, who had returned
from Germany in 1991 to join the Croatian war
effort. By some twist of fate, although he was from
another part of Croatia, he ended up working in the
Zeleno timber mill and found a friend in Nikola, an
elderly Serb who lived nearby. It should be clear that
communicating and certainly socialising with Serbs
was the result of a conscious decision to break with
the collectively sanctioned pattern of segregation.
This may be one of the reasons why it was an easier
step for relative outsiders to take.5 Moreover, it was
possibly less risky for Davor to socialise with Serbs
because his war volunteer experience could counter
suspicions of his being soft on Serbs and gave him
the authority to be critical of the discourse of
national liberation that he, after all, had embodied
at the front.
Despite the presence of such exceptions, the pic-
ture arising from the above sketch is a bleak one,
particularly in conjunction with the absolute politi-
cal dominance of the nationalist HDZ in this region.
Of course it should be noted that, in the early 1990s,
this had been a solid and radical part of Serbian
Krajina, cleansed violently of its Croatian inhabi-
tants. For obvious reasons, during the research peri-
od in 1997-1998, Serbian returnees opted for a low
profile and hard-liners either did not return or kept
their heads down. This explains this study’s emphasis
on nationalism amongst Croatian villagers – a pat-
tern that I consider strictly temporal and circum-
stantial, not cultural.
Explaining post-Yugoslav nationalisms:
WWII trauma and media?
More than a decade after the start of the 1991-1995
post-Yugoslav wars, we are still in the process of
attempting to understand the roots of that conflict,
and, in particular, the appeal of the various nation-
alist discourses amongst broad segments of the
population. For the sake of argument, I ignore the
widespread racist-cum-culturalist approaches, which
lay the blame for nationalism’s success with atavistic
Balkan hatreds, both as pseudo-explanations and as
straw men for more critical analyses. Surely it is time
to redirect our attention to a range of less essential-
ist explanations that have been put forward. Many
of those tend to focus on suppressed traumas of
WWII massacres, particularly when addressing the
situation in the previously disputed areas of Croatia.
My research on post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism6
pointed out that local dissidents considered such
abundant reference to WWII traumas highly prob-
lematic. Firstly, ‘trauma-centred’ explanations for
the appeal of post-Yugoslav nationalisms were seen
as unwelcome because they reproduce nationalist
propaganda, since reformulations of these memories
of terror also played a central role in the nationalist
discourses that were instrumental in the build-up
to the war and in its continuation. Secondly, such
explanations prevent contextualisation of the actual
importance of those memories with regard to recent
events (see Jansen 2002).
A set of alternative explanations for the popular
support of nationalism, put forward by local and
foreign critics favour what we might call a con-
structivist perspective. They tend to attribute more
explanatory power to political propaganda and
media manipulation. Memories of WWII suffering,
it is argued here, were first and foremost instruments
in the hands of nationalist politicians and, when
assessing them, it is hard to draw the line between
indoctrination and trauma. Many valuable analyses
have combined those two perspectives, at times
emphasising the role of WWII legacies (Bowman
1994; Denich 1994; 2000; Hayden 1994), while at
other times highlighting the importance of media
manipulation by the nationalist regimes (Glenny
1992; Silber and Little 1995; Thompson 1994).
Strikingly, most approaches, whether journalistic,
political or academic, converge on seeking causes
for ordinary people’s adherence to nationalism in
collective, structural factors. I aim to draw the atten-
tion to a major problem arising from such a rather
one-dimensional emphasis on collective patterns of
thinking and/or behaviour: the lack of attention to
the agency of the people involved. Let me make clear
straightaway that I do not wish to underestimate
the importance of WWII traumas, based on the very
real horrors of that time. Similarly, the pernicious
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role of the mass media in the preparation and per-
petration of the post-Yugoslav violence is beyond
doubt. However, it seems all too easy to take their
determining influence simply as a given. While we
cannot dispute the existence of collective traumas of
WWII massacres, we have very little evidence of
their direct impact on events half a century later,
nor can we assume that this impact is uniform in
nature (see Jansen 1999; 2002). A similar argument
could be developed concerning media manipula-
tion. Certainly, some nationalist propaganda was
extremely successful in mobilising some people into
committing violence – but which messages, and which
people are we talking about here?
With regard to both WWII trauma and political
propaganda, we should take care to avoid the pitfalls
of determinism. Without accounting for the mecha-
nisms with which individuals in the post-Yugoslav
context related to the dominant nationalist dis-
courses communicated to them, we run the risk of
reducing them to helpless victims, toyed with by
structural factors and stripped of any form of
agency. The empirical material in this article allows
us to put these issues into critical perspective.
La vita é not so bella: agency and pessimism
But wait a minute. Of course we are dealing here with
a situation in which many people did feel exactly
that kind of powerlessness. For an outsider as well,
at first sight, evidence of human agency certainly
did seem rare. Therefore, overestimating either the
role of WWII traumas or the importance of propa-
ganda represented attractive options, given that they
were reflected in widespread local representations
of all-powerful regimes (whether good or bad) and
helpless ordinary people. However, I believe that,
ethnographically, such reductionist explanations,
even though firmly entrenched in popular use, are
only partially adequate at best. Moreover, ethically-
politically, through their disregard for individual
agency, they preclude questions of responsibility to
an uncomfortable extent and further marginalise
existing alternative narratives of past and present as
well as dissident routes of action, which had been
silenced in recent times.
So far, so anthropological: am I cruising towards
yet another conventional exercise in uncovering
agency and resistance in a context of apparent
homogeneity? I believe there is another twist to my
story. I would like to refrain from optimistically
infusing ‘resistance’ into a situation that I myself
considered depressing and hopeless, although I have
much respect for others who have done this to great
anthropological effect in other settings. The work of
Scott, in particular, is characterised by this tendency
to identify strains of oppositional behaviour in
contexts where one would not expect them (1985;
1990). Scott argues against Gramscian approaches
and claims that, in fact, subalterns are capable of
seeing through hegemonic projects. What’s more,
while they feign compliance, they rely on ‘hidden
transcripts’, collective alternative worldviews, which
underlie mundane acts of covert resistance.
I had gone into this research finding Scott’s ideas
very inspirational but, sadly, my activist work in
these Croatian post-war villages did not increase my
hopes for critical grassroots action. I found Scott’s
model simply too optimistic: while he might be
right that people are not simply passive recipients
of hegemonic nationalist discourses, this did not
automatically exclude their continued, enthusiastic
adherence to it. His followers could easily argue
that I did not look closely enough for examples of
covert acts of resistance, but I believe that the over-
whelming nationalist homogeneity in words and
deeds was more important to people’s lives, and
more in need of analysis, than possible examples of
hidden resistance to it. No thanks, then, no refer-
ences to films like Robert Benigni’s ‘La vita é bella’,
please. Rather than fuelling an interest in hetero-
geneity for heterogeneity’s sake, the research sharp-
ened my awareness of the ways in which individuals
actively engaged with ‘structures’ on the everyday
level. It made me wonder in which ways villagers
coped with, digested, used and even embraced trau-
ma and propaganda. Crucially, rather than searching
for anti-nationalist ‘hidden transcripts’, I became
interested in how they were involved in the (re)pro-
duction of nationalist homogeneity.
A key question in this text is: can such a largely
pessimistic conceptualisation of agency offer valu-
able material in order to bring to light individual
coping strategies in a context of relative powerless-
ness? Particularly, I analyse the role of strategic
essentialising in people’s positionings in relation to
dominant nationalist discourses (see Berdahl 1999:
208; Herzfeld 1996). Compatibility, or at least the
minimisation of incompatibility, between personal
and ‘large’ narratives then becomes an important
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issue. If people are seen as at least partly capable of
constructing everyday life formats which are not-
all-too-incompatible with the discourses that are de
rigueur at that moment, maybe this explains, to a
certain extent, the impressions of internal homo-
geneity and consensus that await many students of
post-Yugoslav nationalisms. People’s narratives con-
structed around a set of catchwords and phrases can
then be seen as mechanisms by which they position
themselves, consciously and unconsciously, in rela-
tion to dominant discourses in confusing times.
In what follows, I focus on some patterns perme-
ating the lives of the villagers. First I look at how they
constructed and reproduced a virtually absolute
dividing line between their everyday experiences and
the ‘politics’ of the moment, protecting themselves
against the dangers of the latter. Then, I analyse
some recurrent coping patterns involving subse-
quent linkages of personal narratives with authori-
tative discourses.
Powerlessness, silence, and self-protection
‘Big politics’ and ‘small people’
Let us start from this observation: even though it
was hard not to be shocked by the extreme character
of national exclusivism in these war-affected villages,
my strongest impression was not one of militant
nationalist hatred. The situation, it seemed to me,
was much more characterised by powerlessness,
conformism and confusion. The experience of war,
displacement and the political shifts on the state
level had given rise to lives constructed around a
defining break. The resulting confusion was rein-
forced by feelings of extreme powerlessness, since
most villagers experienced configurations of state,
war, nation and territory – in short: ‘politika’ (‘poli-
tics’) – as largely objectified and out of individual
control by ordinary people such as themselves. Let
us admit immediately that this was a realistic atti-
tude, both amongst ‘winners’ (here: Croats) and
‘losers’ (here: Serbs): in the past decade, many had
lost their homes, their loved ones, their property,
their jobs, and so on. No amount of academic
insights into the dialectic relationship between
agency and structure could change these people’s
experience that their lives had been eaten up by
‘higher powers’ beyond their control.
One of the most common interjections used in
conversations in the villages, regardless of the
nationality of the interlocutors, was an expression
of resignation: ‘e, sˇta cˇesˇ…’ (‘what can you do…’ or
‘well, what are you going to do about it…’). The
large majority of villagers, many of whom had per-
sonally survived horrific experiences, settled for a
rather phlegmatic approach. This testified to their
perseverance in hard times, but it also reflected res-
ignation. Experiences in the past served as an impor-
tant counterpoint, as people took shelter in under-
statements such as ‘it could have been a lot worse’,
often referring to memories of that war (WWII),
which relativised the horrors of this war, because,
‘back then, things were much harder than now’.
Thus, resignation functioned as a coping pattern.
Amongst Croats, evoking the authoritative dis-
course of the blessing of simply having one’s own
state, was often enough to imply that no action was
needed on the side of ‘small people’. With regard to
difficult living conditions and other problems, the
standard attitude amongst Croatian villagers was
one of widespread declared trust in the powers-
that-be. ‘The state will take care of all that,’ they
argued, ‘but we can’t expect results overnight’. This
phrase, reproduced by many Croatian villagers, lit-
erally reflected regime statements.7 The deafening
silences that surrounded it on all sides reflected a
cornerstone of the dominant nationalism: non-
engagement. Resignation helped people to get a grip
on the situation and enabled an avoidance of indi-
vidual responsibility and action. Serbian villagers, of
course, could not rely on an equivalent discourse of
trust, but their scarce references to life during the
previous Krajina period reflected a similar emphasis
on the gap between ‘ordinary people’ and ‘politics’.
Hence, underlying the differences between Croatian
and Serbian villagers, there was a sense of resigna-
tion to the absolute control of the powers-that-be,
whether expressed through declared trust in the
authorities (by Croats) or through the acceptance of
powerlessness (by Serbs).
These feelings of powerlessness were coupled
with a nearly complete absence of collective action.
Despite dire living circumstances, there was no sign
of protest and I witnessed no attempts to improve
the village situation in any way, except on the pri-
vate level. In fact, some Croatian villagers com-
plained of the lack of mutual help, pointing out how
people restricted their activities to their own family
and refused to engage in collective efforts. In terms
of communication between people of different
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nationalities, there was virtually none. Hence, indif-
ference was much more prevalent than militancy.
Obviously, we have to contrast this passivity with
the situation in the early 1990s when these villagers
had been in the frontline of their respective national
revivals. Then, people in his region had taken the
initiative and engaged in different forms of, some-
times violent, collective action. Now, the perception
that ruled amongst Croats was one of benevolent,
all-powerful state authorities and atomised – but not
conflicting – village families who were awaiting the
fruits of their sacrifices in the war. Their houses had
been rebuilt already and they waited in the certain-
ty that the rest would follow. Serbian returnees
expected nothing of the kind and simply survived
in silence. This dichotomous picture, suggesting
two monolithic national patterns, was only rarely
undermined. For example, there was significant
resentment amongst Croatian villagers towards
Croatian refugees from Bosnia, who were considered
‘primitive’ and said to engage in mafia-like prac-
tices. However, this did not express itself in any
practical way and never led to any rapprochement
between people of different nationalities.
Telling silences: the abdication of responsibility
In many ways, life in the villages was more striking
with regard to what it systematically ignored than
with regard to its actual content. The above-men-
tioned dominant refusal to communicate or other-
wise engage with national ‘Others’ was a case in
point, as was the reluctance to take social or political
action on any level. In narrative terms, telling
silences were crucial in the villagers’ stories.
Elsewhere I have analysed how war stories, both of
WWII and of 1991-1995, usually concentrated on
one period and one event only, without even men-
tioning the rest of the conflict (Jansen 2002). The
key for attributing selective silences was almost
always self-victimisation. In this discursive conflict,
two versions of war history were mutually exclusive,
whereas, sadly, there was plenty of evidence to sup-
port both of them. Such silence and the wider resist-
ance against contextualisation were accompanied
by a pervasive vagueness. Interestingly, people with
dissident practices and views were much less vague,
but almost everybody avoided going into details. It
was virtually impossible to collect a concrete, chrono-
logical account of any event. Vagueness set the
scene for sweeping accusations and served as an
instrument of self-protection, particularly in rela-
tion to more powerful people of one’s own nation-
ality. Throughout the post-Yugoslav states, the peri-
od after 1991 was often summarised as ‘sve ovo’ (‘all
this’) or ‘ovo sranje’ (‘this shit’). This had to do with
simplification and abbreviation, but it also reflected
a wider reluctance to specify.
These patterns of silence, vagueness and resigna-
tion allowed villagers to carve out a niche for them-
selves as part of an anonymous victimised mass,
void of responsibility for their current predicament.
Underlying the popular phrase, ‘there are reasons
for all this’ (‘sve ima to svoje’), which was never fur-
ther explained, there was the idea that, ‘we don’t
know the reasons and it is better not to ask’. In a
dangerous context of confusion, loss and despair,
digging deeper was considered a job for politicians
and, by not going into these issues, people also
avoided being entangled in them. Nevertheless, res-
ignation to ‘higher powers’ was often mirrored by
scepticism, initially less obvious to outsiders. Sarcasm
about the lack of control over one’s own fate was a
popular theme in pitch-black humour in many parts
of former Yugoslavia, and people liked telling anec-
dotes in which they themselves figured as schlemiel-
like losers (see Jansen 2000a; 2001).
Such sarcastic resignation supported ideas of self-
victimisation and the almost ontological dividing
line between everyday lives and ‘politics’ also
allowed abdication of personal responsibility. As
John Malkovich’s character argued emphatically in
the film Dangerous Liaisons: it was ‘Beyond Their
Control’. Hence, by postulating the existence of their
everyday lives as at least theoretically independent
from ‘higher powers’ many villagers also aimed to
protect themselves against the overwhelming influ-
ence of the latter. It is this aspect that I turn to now.
Linking subjectivity to ‘politics’
Evoking authoritative discourses
If most villagers considered ‘politics’ to be out of
their control, and reinforced this perception in their
everyday (in)action, did this mean they were resigned
to fatalism? Not completely, I would argue. My
research material indicates that, if people wished to
protect themselves against what they perceived as
the danger of ‘politics’, they also felt that some of
its aspects and some of its uses were not quite as
undesirable. They evoked authoritative discourses
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and created a picture whereby their everyday lives
were perhaps not reflective of ‘politics’, but at least
compatible or not-too-badly-out-of-tune with them.
In that way, they deployed large, complex and
powerful discursive practices in an attempt to assert
control over the present. Hence, through a twist of
strategy, it was precisely by postulating the separate-
ness of their everyday lives from ‘politics’ that vil-
lagers opened up the possibility of linking their sub-
jectivity to authoritative discourses of state and
nation, on their own initiative. We have to look, then,
at the ways in which people related to the dominant
nationalisms and to alternative discourses and how
they (re)structured their own practices for private
and/or public use.
If we consider the villagers’ attitudes as a set of
coping patterns with violence, loss, poverty, a nar-
rative break in the life story, powerlessness and con-
fusion, we are dealing here with contested construc-
tions of ontological security (Giddens 1991: 35-69;
see also Gillis 1994: 3). Making sense of experience,
they relied at least partly on pre-existing discursive
material, often of the more powerful and authorita-
tive kind (see Herzfeld 1985: 21). Moreover, given
the extreme context, they were continually expected
to position themselves in relation to ‘politics’ through
a process of ideological interpellation (Finlayson
1996). Usually they attempted to locate themselves
favourably in relation to the dominant nationalist
discourse – favourably, of course, in the eye of the
beholder.
This does not mean that they were merely inscrib-
ing themselves into powerful discourses, although
their choice was often extremely limited. Rather, I
suggest, it was a question of practical sanity; if your
everyday life was completely out of tune with all
‘politics’, you would not be able to function in a
public environment and you’d probably be consid-
ered mad or dangerous. Obviously, it is a question
whether this drive for compatibility was only for
public use, or whether there were benefits of incom-
patibility, but it should be clear that in the post-
Yugoslav context the need to reposition oneself in
relation to powerful discourses was acute. But how
did these repositionings take place? How did people
link their everyday lives to the ‘politics’ available?
And how did they attempt to position themselves
favourably in relation to powerful forces?
In a period of intense turmoil, narrative can
become a common tool to comprehend processes of
change, or to try to keep them in check.8 Moreover,
we have to take into account that the stories of the
villagers were to an extreme extent performative
utterances. The discourses enforced by powerful
institutions in the post-Yugoslav context were tied
together by a nationalist prism, but, importantly,
they were polysemic. Given this context, narrating
events, or choosing not to, particularly in terms of
nationality, was one of the few political acts accessible
to most people. In the villages at the heart of this
study, certain phrases referring to, or better, evoking
authoritative discourses, and sometimes literally
taken from those discourses, were continually repro-
duced in everyday life. Particularly when confronted
with outsiders, such as state officials, journalists, or
NGO workers, many narratives resorted to such evo-
cation (see McKenna 1996: 231-32).
Following Hajer, I use the concept of ‘story lines’
to clarify one way in which people can connect
their everyday life experience to the authoritative
discourses of ‘politics’. The term ‘story lines’ refers
to a ‘generative sort of narrative that allows actors
to draw upon various discursive categories to give
meaning to specific […] phenomena’ (1995: 56).
Crucially, story lines are characterised by a high
degree of multi-interpretability. This, suggests Hajer,
makes some sense of order in discursive praxis pos-
sible, because when an actor uses a certain story
line, it is automatically expected that the addressee
will respond within a similar framework. However,
as a result of the multi-interpretability this does not
mean consensus. Story lines, then, offer actors the
opportunity to talk and think about a topic without
having to grasp the whole problematic. By calling
on a story line, complexity and conditionality are
reduced and a certain implicit common ground is
presupposed – in the process, the authoritative dis-
course and the different kinds of power that are
associated with it are evoked, while a large degree of
vagueness is retained.
‘We have Croatia!’
Let us consider an example of a story line. A central
axis of Croatian nationalism was the sanctity of the
national state and this authoritative discourse was
continually reinforced through symbolism, policies,
propaganda, and so on. Nevertheless, the discourse
of nationalism was never (and could never be) spelled
out completely. Rather, it was condensed in phrases
such as ‘Imamo Hrvatsku!’ (‘We have Croatia!’), that
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were literally reproduced in many of the villagers’
accounts. In this way, it could be argued that power-
ful discourses of ‘politics’ controlled local everyday
lives. However, my study indicates that people also
actively used those lines in order to evoke the author-
ity of large and complex ‘politics’ and thereby to
assert control themselves. This could be in order to
justify certain behaviour or situations, to avoid reflec-
tion about certain issues, to deny responsibility, or
simply to survive and stay somehow practically sane
(sanity in the eye of the beholder, again).
A very straightforward goal of evoking powerful
discourses is to invest the speaker with authority. It
also sets the rules for conversation on a supposedly
‘generally accepted’ level without having to specify.
‘We have Croatia!’ was one of the most widely used
lines in this way. Sometimes, as in the case of thirty
year old Robert, former officer in the Bosnian
Croatian army, and now living in a Serbian-owned
house in Bijelo, this was broadened to a more gen-
eral alignment with the nationalist tenet of ‘one
nation, one state’: 
Everything will fall in place now that the Croatian people
have their own state and the Serbs have gone. The Serbs have
their own country. And the Muslims should be off to Turkey.
Again this provided justification for maintaining
control over the house Robert occupied9 and for a
refusal to return to his native Bosnia. However, more
frequently, the intrinsic superiority of having one’s
own state was expressed less specifically. The fact that
we deal with a very old population plays an impor-
tant role here. Many villagers were approaching
death; they reflected on their lives, assessed their
achievements and constructed evidence of continu-
ity. For many in those post-war conditions, success-
ful lives of their children or material achievements
were inaccessible as symptoms of this, but national-
ist discourses provided such evidence by using con-
cepts of birth, life and eternity. Croatian national-
ism, through the story line ‘We have Croatia!’,
offered a morbidly enlarged version of everything
the Croatian villagers lacked. Instead of saying ‘we
have nothing’, it said ‘we have Croatia’ (which is
everything we need and everything we always want-
ed). Instead of saying ‘we’ll die soon’, it said ‘Croatia
will live’ (and therefore we will too). And instead of
saying ‘we are lonely and abandoned’, it said ‘we are
together at last’ (with our own people).
National disambiguation
One of the most striking patterns in the evocations
of authoritative discourses through the use of story
lines was the way in which they rewrote the past
as a straightforward preface to the current situation.
Elsewhere, I have analysed this in detail (Jansen
2002) and some of the examples above illustrate this
process of retrospective disambiguation. Here, I
focus on a similar process of disambiguation of the
present,10 on patterns framed by the nationalist idiom
or in reaction to it, which were at the time particu-
larly prevalent amongst Croatian villagers. National
disambiguation was the key to the construction of a
social reality consisting only of discrete national
groups: us (all of us) and them (all of them).
Let us look at some examples. Related to the his-
torical cause of national liberation, Croatian vil-
lagers often evoked the powerful discourse of the
preferability and superiority of national homogene-
ity to explain their reluctance to engage with
Serbian returnees. They argued that everybody ‘hoc´e
biti svoj na svome’, a common phrase that says that
it is only normal that a nation ‘wants to be free in
its own land’.11 This was accompanied by the idea
that everybody always feels better amongst ‘his/her
people’. Nada and Jozo, an elderly couple from
Bosnia who fled to Croatia during the war and
resettled in a Serbian-owned house in Bijelo, stated:
Here things are good. We always felt that nostalgia for our
own state, for our own Croatia. We are glad to be amongst our
own people. It is better to be with one’s own.
Note that Nada and Jozo had lived in a highly
mixed area in Central Bosnia for the previous sixty
years of their lives – they had never spent a consid-
erable period of time in Croatia before. They dra-
matically reformulated their narrative of ‘home’ and
brought it in tune with the dominant nationalism.
Thus the terms ‘them’ and ‘us’ now referred to a
whole new family, village and state history and this
allowed justification of the fact that they refused to
leave the house they occupied and return to Bosnia.
On many occasions, Croatian villagers discussed
contemporary events in other places – but only
those that confirmed their perspective on the local
situation. For example, they referred to heavily
mediatised incidents in a distant Bosnian town in
order to evoke the idea that all Serbs create prob-
lems, and therefore to reassert the impossibility of
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co-existence with local Serbs. Josip, a sixty-odd year
old Croat in Plavo, explained his unwillingness to
engage with his Serbian neighbours in these terms:
Living together with them? Phooo, look what they are doing
to us in Derventa!
Again, in one narrative movement, the Serbs in far-
away Derventa and the local Serbs were equated as
an unambiguous ‘them’ – to be avoided at all cost.
More generally, there was a striking leaking of
diplomatic language into the everyday discourses
of many villagers, of whom the older ones were
often only semi-literate. Peace treaties and political
declarations provided useful story lines evoking the
authoritative world of international geopolitics and
people deployed them to retrospectively reclaim con-
trol over their everyday lives. In this way, a family
from Gradic´ in Bosnia stated that they had moved
to (a Serbian house in) Bijelo, because, ‘we didn’t
want to be a minority’. In doing so, they invoked a
reason of a diplomatic nature, rather than referring
to the fear, uncertainty and lack of opportunity that
probably lay at the root of their move (which took
place after the war). Similarly, when justifying their
reluctance to return to Bosnia, they argued:
We don’t want our children to go to school in Gradic´, where
they can’t study in their own language.
Both parents had always lived in Gradic´, previously
a mixed town in Bosnia, and they certainly had
never had any communication problems with their
Bosniac or Serb neighbours, who spoke the same
local dialect. However, they retrospectively applied
the current doctrine of discrete Bosniac, Serbian and
Croatian languages on a previously ambiguous situ-
ation. Times changed more dramatically than lan-
guage, and the evocation of the authoritative dis-
course of language rights allowed them to resist
being subjugated by another, possibly threatening
discourse, that of rights of property and return.
The persistence of ambiguity: 
coping patterns of the marginalised
Given the centrality of strategies of disambiguation,
the coping patterns of villagers in ambiguous posi-
tions deserve particular attention. We have already
seen some snippets of this, when I explained that a
very small minority of villagers consciously broke
with the collectively sanctioned pattern of segrega-
tion. Such dissident practices were legitimised in dif-
ferent ways, but, interestingly, they also often relied
on evocations of authority. One case in which one
mighty discourse was introduced in order to avoid
control by an alternative form of ‘politics’ was the
introduction of an extra ‘Other’. Some villagers, Serbs
and Croats, did occasionally engage with national
‘Others’ and thus resisted the dominant denuncia-
tion of the standard ‘Others’. When explaining this,
they then often introduced the presumed danger of
fundamentalism amongst ‘Muslims’, ‘Turks’ or
‘Mujahedini’, as the real problematic ‘Other’. In addi-
tion to this minor phenomenon, dissident practice
was usually justified with reference to non-national
logic. I shall quickly distinguish three such alterna-
tive approaches, often deployed in combination
with each other.
First of all, outsiders often strongly emphasised
individual responsibility and refused to make gener-
alisations about groups of people. Zoran, a Bosnian
Serb married to a local Croatian woman, insisted on
seeing ‘a person as a person’: he systematically used
the first person singular, rather than plural, and
often employed his own name when recounting
past events. Moreover, he almost always qualified
national labels: ‘some clever/crazy/stupid Croats’, or
‘some mad/open-minded/aggressive Serbs’, thereby
providing an explanation for his practice to engage
with some persons while steering clear from others,
regardless of nationality.
A second alternative was the idea that the stakes
of the post-Yugoslav conflict were not national but
civilisational: a struggle between civilisation and
primitivism. This was one of the underlying tenets
of a large part of the critique of nationalism in all
post-Yugoslav states. Rada, a fifty-year-old Serb who,
because of her political stance, was shunned by
Croats and Serbs alike, bewailed her victimisation
by what she saw as an essentially primitive reflex of
other villagers.
If they have something to tell me, if they want to discuss
something with me, let them tell me! Let us sit down at a table
and talk about it. I am always ready for that! But on the basis
of arguments! Not on the basis of the fact that I belong to the
Serbian nation! What kind of primitivism is that!
This attachment to values of ‘civilisation’ was often
related to a strongly developed belief in education.
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When condemning violence and hatred, Rada, one
of the few highly educated villagers, often referred
to others as ‘illiterates’, and explained how educated
people would never do such things. When I pointed
out that many of the politicians who had brought
the country to war were highly educated, she refor-
mulated that as a sharp accusation: an educated per-
son should know better, and therefore s/he should
act better. An educated person has no excuses for
not respecting the rules of civilisation, which ‘prim-
itives’ may not recognise.
A third widespread form of doubt in national dis-
ambiguation was a more empirical one, related to
the above-mentioned process of sceptic resignation.
Many villagers (of those present, obviously more
Serbs than Croats) foresaw that they would live
together again. ‘It is normal’, people would say, ‘After
“that war” we also lived together again.’ Others, like
Zoran, evoked the more general discourse of multi-
ethnicity as the rule, rather than as an exception.
All that business about dividing people on national grounds is
nonsense. There is no such thing as an ethnically clean village
or town, and certainly not state. Multi-ethnicity is inevitable
and completely normal.
Zoran, as I have mentioned before, was married to a
Croat and he was the only Serb to have returned to
Plavo. After half a decade of displacement, which
had forced his family in and out of different places
in Croatia and Bosnia, he now eked out a living of
subsistence agriculture. Throughout the 1970s-1980s
Zoran had been the village teacher, a Party member
who had perceived himself as a Yugoslav. After the
war, even amongst the now dominant hard-line
Croats he was still credited for his consistent fair-
ness in nationality issues in Yugoslav times. This,
however, had not prevented his family from being
the first one to be expelled, nor did it lead to any
social interaction or assistance upon his return,
except from his wife’s (Croatian) family.
Nationalism, structure, and agency: 
making room for pessimism
Positioning and legitimising violence
Let us now return to the issues of WWII trauma and
media manipulation. The material presented in this
study on the role of nationalism in people’s coping
strategies encourages us to question certain central
assumptions of prevalent approaches to the post-
Yugoslav nationalisms. I have argued above that
emphasising the role of individual agency in people’s
positionings in relation to dominant discourses
allows for a less deterministic sketch of the situation
in post-war Croatia than an approach which privi-
leges WWII traumas or media manipulation as almost
independent variables. In that sense, conformism,
rather than determinism, becomes a central notion.
And, to take this one step further: attributing some
level of personal engagement to those who did con-
form – and they were a large majority – also allows
us to begin to account for those who did not (see
Jansen 2000b).
In a brief text written during the post-Yugoslav
wars, Belgrade anthropologist Ivan C´olovic´ addresses
the issue of why war propaganda was so effective
(1994: 57-62). He suggests that the key lies in the
authority of the media, derived from their assumed
identity as the voice of the regime. And, in effect, in
a conversation with a villager in Bijelo, this was
illustrated literally, when the man pointed at the
television set every time he mentioned ‘the state’,
‘our leaders’ or ‘Tudjman’. In an unintended twist of
irony, he did not know that there was a colourful
children’s game show on. C´olovic´ argues that many
people, whenever asked for their opinions by some-
one from outside, tend to give the answer which
they assume is the nearest to the line of the current
centres of power of interest to them. People do not
believe that these outsiders want to know their
opinions at all – and usually they are probably right.
Why would they be asked? ‘This means’, says
C´olovic´, 
that many people see television and other media not as a
source of truthful information and convincing messages, but
as a bulletin board on which daily orders are shown. Or as
some kind of political traffic lights that tell you when you
have to turn right or left, or if you should go straight on or
simply wait until further notice. Otherwise, you are in danger
[…] of being punished, excluded from traffic, or simply run
over. (1994: 61)
Critics could argue that surely such an approach
fails to take into account the existence of hidden
transcripts, providing alternative visions of reality.
While such resistant interpretations might have
existed, and I hope they can play a significant role
in the future, in my view they did not affect collective
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life in the villages in any meaningful way during
my stay. Not only were the dominant nationalist
discourses communicated through the media repro-
duced widely, but sometimes media messages were
actively incorporated into personal narratives in
order to legitimise certain acts. An extreme example
was provided by Jozo and Nada, the elderly Bosnian
Croat couple in Bijelo, for whom the equivalence
between the Serbs who destroyed Vukovar televised
on the news and the local Serbs had provided justi-
fication for ethnic cleansing.
Back in Bosnia, in the very beginning, we watched television…
You must have seen it as well, how the Serbs were destroying
Vukovar.12 My God, it was horrible. They were burning and
looting and killing. So we arranged with the Muslims to chase
out our Serbs. Later, the Mujahedini turned against us. They
wanted a fundamentalist state. And they drove us out.
Note the curious synchronic equivalence through
disambiguation: in 1991 all of them, including our
Serbs, were criminals, so they had to be removed
preventively. The effect of propaganda through the
media, then, did not simply take the form of crude
manipulation; sometimes it functioned as a ‘traffic
light’ and sometimes it provided a legitimising back-
ground for acts of violence. This is how my analytical
focus has shifted from structure-based determinism
to agency-oriented conformism.
The (dis)comfort of conformism
Nationalism was omnipresent in the post-Yugoslav
context, amongst intellectual and political elites,
but also in the daily lives of most other people, cer-
tainly in the war-affected areas. Exclusivist acts were
rife and often considered acceptable and normal.
Still, I would argue that a lot of villagers had not
really reflected on many of the issues addressed by
nationalism. Why should they? For most of them,
there were more immediate worries. However, when
the matter arose in conversation, they tapped into
the always available, polysemic, contradictory dis-
course of nationalism. It was the most authoritative
discourse of the moment and it served as a perfect
passe-partout without really taking issue with one’s
own biography. More generally, in contrast to its
alternatives, nationalism provided strikingly straight-
forward stories, an attractive attribute in the post-
war confusion. Most of the people I encountered in
these post-war villages did not seem to be fanatical
believers in the tenets of nationalism, but con-
formism with this dominant discourse provided
them with comfort in uncomfortable times.13 Often,
the discomfort this caused for others was simply not
taken into account.14
Again, I hasten to add that the material for this
text was collected in a specific period after the war,
when Croatian villagers were the ones for whom
nationalism worked. It does not allow generalisations
about the outbreak of the conflict in the early 1990s,
when Serbian villagers demonstrated a similar
enthusiasm for their nationalism. The background
and logic of that outburst should be analysed in a
different contextual light. But by the end of the
decade, it was not a consolation to me that the fre-
quent discriminatory acts and talk amongst Croatian
villagers seemed to rely more on indifference and
conformism than on hatred. And it was frustrating
to be confronted with the same blanket explana-
tions for a variety of phenomena. They were tired,
of course. After years of war, displacement and loss,
they did not want to reflect on events, on reasons or
on guilt. Luckily for them, they did not have to – in
fact, they were encouraged not to – quoting some
story lines was sufficient. So a question by an out-
sider became more often than not an occasion to
throw in some story lines from the nationalist dis-
course. Why? Because that’s what you did. And
because you assumed that that’s what others did.
And they did.
Reconquering everyday life
So: conformism. But not only conformism, of course.
The consequences of the nationalist outbursts, the
violence, the loss and the poverty were real (see
Povrzanovic´ 1997). Even if the existence of a ‘nation-
al question’ was a matter of debate in 1989, it was
certainly reality now (Buden 1996: 171) and maybe
it would be too painful to give up the enormous
importance attached to nationality now, after all
that had happened in the name of it. We should not
forget that in the past decade many villagers had
gone through experiences that had dramatically
affected their everyday lives. This text attempts to
take that into account by conceptualising their cur-
rent practices as coping patterns, mainly consisting
of ‘favourable’ repositionings in a compatible rela-
tion to the authoritative discourse of nationalism.
McKenna’s study of rank-and-file engagement with
Muslim separatism in the Philippines puts forward a
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similar argument (1996). He points out that ‘ordi-
nary people’ do not blindly reproduce the dominant
narratives, but that their support relies on practical
compliance on the basis of their own collateral goals.
However, just as I would argue that acts and state-
ments which strike us as radically nationalist do not
necessarily mean that the villagers in question were
simply militant national believers, I think it also
does not necessarily mean that they were always
just hoping to get the most out of nationalism by
aligning themselves with it. Certainly, this factor
played a role; by positioning themselves as near as
possible to the heart of the dominant nationalism,
they sided with the strong and picked the fruits of
crushing the weak. This process was alternately
accessible to Serbs and Croats during the 1990s.
However, at least after the war, for many of the
villagers nationalism seemed to fulfil another func-
tion as well. Repositioning strategies were not just
about getting near the heart of power. They were
also about keeping a distance from those centres,
about reconquering the everyday life experience,
about fighting the colonisation of ‘ordinary’ lives by
‘politics’. Non-engagement, non-communication,
vagueness, simplification, selective amnesia, scepti-
cal resignation and various story lines allowed peo-
ple to construct their everyday experiences in tune
with the authority of nationalism, without coming
too near to its risks. Thus they lived without
demanding introspection, without posing nasty
questions and without requiring an eye for compli-
cated nuances. They evoked nationalism, without
really going into its ‘ins and outs’, which meant that
they did not come too near the power associated
with the discourse. It also meant that that power did
not come too near them. What else is resignation
other than leaving it all to ‘higher powers’? What
else is vagueness other than keeping it all out of my
house or my head?
World-wide activist experience in war areas teaches
us that the most extreme crimes, the most radical
forms of hate speech and the most violent attitudes
are often not to be found amongst those people who
have been victimised most by violence. Sociological
research in Croatia confirmed this (Hodzˇic´ 1998).
Maybe the idea of nationalism as a coping pattern
which navigates between proximity and distance
and which asserts non-responsibility and control
over everyday life can help us understand this. For
some, the stakes are simply too high – they have to
cling to a distance, they cannot afford to come that
near to powerful discourses of hatred and violence.
People whose stakes are not that high are in an
easier position to align themselves freely with more
dangerous ‘politics’. In Bijelo, Serbian returnees
experienced most provocations by the police, on- or
off-duty. One officer informed me that the best solu-
tion would be ‘to mine all Serbian houses’ and prid-
ed himself that the area had always been a ‘hard
Ustasˇa region’. The man had never even been there
before the war.
How does all this relate to the pessimistic con-
ceptualisation of agency that I mentioned earlier?
While acknowledging depressing levels of homo-
geneity around nationally exclusivist behaviour and
positionings, this article undermines the argument
of structural determination by WWII trauma or
media manipulation – at least for the post-war period.
Impressions of monolithic consensus, I would argue,
do not necessarily rule out agency on the part of
those expressing it (even if this sometimes takes
place through non-action). I pointed out how virtu-
ally all villagers experienced a radical separation of
their everyday lives from ‘politics’: they saw things
as decided for them by powerful others. Through
the same process, in a drive for self-protection, they
postulated at least relative autonomy for their per-
sonal narratives. Villagers then attempted to exert
control over their own lives by evoking authorita-
tive discourses in their practice. Some life experi-
ences were both retroactively and strategically
brought in tune with exclusivist nationalism; in this
way, paradoxically, they were reformulated as if
they belonged to the individual’s everyday life expe-
rience, rather than having been imposed by an
uncontrollable force. These repositioning strategies
allowed proximity and distance, innocence and merit,
lack of responsibility and control. They allowed one
to draw on ‘politics’, materially and psychologically,
but simultaneously to keep the latter at a distance
from one’s personal everyday life. Crucially, this was
compatibly at a distance. In this way these people
exerted power in a situation of extreme powerless-
ness; it allowed them comfort in uncomfortable
times, regardless of the discomfort it caused to others.
N O T E S
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1 Research carried out in 1997-1998. All persons are referred
to by pseudonyms, as well as the villages, which I have
called Bijelo, Plavo, Crno, Sivo and Zeleno. The NGO which
carried out the project was local, Zagreb-based, with me
being the only non-Croatian citizen. Many thanks are due
to colleague-activists, particularly to Sanda Malbasˇa for
support and constructive criticism. I also wish to thank
Jody Barrett, Andy Dawson, Caroline Oliver, Ivana Spasic´,
Mark Johnson, Nerys Roberts and the participants of the
War and Society Seminar at Aarhus University, 2001.
2 It should be emphasised that there were no phenotypic,
clothing or dietary differences between Serbs and Croats
either. All villagers spoke an identical local variant of what
was previously called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian.
Religion was relatively more important amongst Croats
(Catholicism) than amongst Serbs, who were more likely
to have a Partisan background. Still, in former Yugoslavia,
these villages were different from a lot of other nationally
mixed areas, and they presented a rather extreme situa-
tion. Unlike, for example, most larger places, the nation-
ality of all inhabitants was known to all others.
3 The story of a ‘privileged’ Serbian-dominated ‘Communist’
village next to a ‘deprived’ Croatian-dominated ‘Ustasˇa’
village was a common one in this part of the Yugoslav
Socialist Republic Croatia.
4 In my view, the term ‘neighbours’ occupies a problematic
position in debates about the post-Yugoslav conflict. Both
in media and in academic coverage, it is often inappropri-
ately and uncritically employed when referring to Yugoslav
times, resulting in an unquestioned, idealised representa-
tion of that past as co-operative and harmonious. In this
text I straightforwardly use the term (ex-)neighbours for
people who live(d) in the same neighbourhood, regardless
of the warmth of their co-existence. See Jansen 2002 for
a discussion of contested local memories with regard to
previous relations between Serbs and Croats; see Jansen,
forthcoming, for a similar study in a Bosnian context.
5 Davor and Nela had come from other regions. Note that,
like many others, both of them occupied houses owned by
pre-war Serbian inhabitants.
6 1996-1998 research for my Ph.D. dissertation in Zagreb
and Belgrade (Jansen 2000b).
7 In many ways, this situation is only a reformulated con-
tinuation of prevalent patterns in Titoist Yugoslavia.
Sociological research in the Former Yugoslavia always
uncovered a strong adherence to authoritarian values
(Golubovic´ 1995; Biro 1994: 13-38; Hodzˇic´ 1998).
8 See Ricoeur 1990: 167-193; 1991: 32-33; Ganguly 1992:
29-30; Rapport 1997; Jansen 1998; 2000b.
9 Like many others, Robert kept a videotape he had made
when first arriving here. It showed the heavily damaged
house as he had found it. Since then he had made several
improvements and kept the tape as proof of this. This is a
clear indication that, despite his refusal to acknowledge
the issue of property rights on an explicit level, implicitly
he was aware of the possibility that they might apply to him.
10 Duijzings employs the useful term ‘ethnic unmixing’ to
refer to the more material aspects of this process (2000).
Bauman convincingly argues how the extermination of
ambiguity lies at the basis of nationalist discourse (1992).
11 Literally, this story line means that everyone ‘wants to be
his own on his own’, in other words, ‘wants to own him-
self in a place that is his’. This refers simultaneously to two
levels: nations and individual members of these nations.
12 They talk about 1991. It is not a coincidence that Nada
and Jozo should mention Vukovar, a town that occupies
a central position in Croatian nationalism as an icon of
Serbian aggression and Croatian suffering and sacrifice.
Note that Vukovar is situated in Croatia, about 200 km
away from their Bosnian village, which in 1991 was not
involved in the war.
13 See Bolcˇic´  1995: 480-81.
14 In fact, many seemed to have come to a point where they
excluded reflexivity on the issue (see Ivekovic´ 1994: 198).
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The aim of this article is to account for some of the
consequences of the recent war in Bosnia Herzegovina
on matters of identification in everyday life among
the Muslims of Stolac.1 Or, to put it a little polemi-
cally, the lack of effect the war had.
On the level of experience it has had devastating
effects. As ethnographic analyses of war experiences
show, war often radically destroys the everyday
taken-for-granted world of civilians, which, follow-
ing the work of Scarry (1985), has been termed the
‘unmaking of the world’ (Das et al. 2001; Nordstom
1997; Povrzanovic 1997; Zur 1998; Macˇek 2000;
Jackson 2002). Or, as one of my informants once said:
Nicolas [TK], you can’t understand what the war has done to
us. At first sight everything may look normal, but it’s not.
Nothing is normal. The war has changed everything.
But on the level of identification the changes have
not been that absolute and radical. This came as a
surprise to me during my fieldwork, and it also
stands in some opposition to structurally inspired
anthropological analyses of war and war-related vio-
lence.
Such analyses have primarily focused upon the
inherent potential of violence and war to create
identities. In a condensed form the line of reasoning
goes like this: Identity is built on difference, and
when differences become too small identity is at risk;
violence then recreates or reinforces difference. This
is, for instance, Blok’s (2000) argument. He calls it,
following Freud, the ‘narcissism of minor differ-
ences’ when violent practices are aimed at destroy-
ing resemblance and thereby creating ‘the other’. As
he writes in relation to the eruption of war in former
Yugoslavia:
Once more we see the working of the narcissism of minor dif-
ferences: the erosion and loss of distinctions and differences
result in violence. (ibid.: 41)
Violence as a technique to create others is also pres-
ent in Olujic’s (1998) analysis of violence in Bosnia
and in Malkki’s (1998) study of Hutu narratives of
Tutsi violence. As she concludes one of her chapters: 
Through violence, bodies of individual persons become meta-
morphosed into specimens of the ethnic category for which
they are supposed to stand. (ibid.: 88, original italics)
Violence creates the structural division on which
identity is built: we are us because we fight against
them and vice versa. This kind of argument is also
present in Knudsen’s (1989a) study of the vendetta
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on Corsica. Due to the FBD2 marriage pattern the
endogamous group grows and group distinctions
become harder to make. The role of vendettas is
therefore to recreate distinctions. Or consider
Harrison’s (1993) claim that violence in Melanesia
has a structural function, that is, groups do not cre-
ate war, war creates groups. As he sees it, both gift
giving and violence (-giving) create social relations,
which is contrary to the view of Mauss, who saw
violence as the failure of the gift (Corbey 2000).
Theorising on violence, Bowman (2001) suggests in
his re-reading of Clastres that violence does not
even have to be carried out physically to construct
identity. Violence is a force that creates boundaries
and may operate conceptually prior to manifesting
itself in action. It is the imagining of violence that
‘…serves to create the integrities and identities which
are in turn subjected to those forms of violence
which seek victims’ (ibid.: 27) and it is the imagin-
ing of violence against the other that is the medium
through which (embedded) societies are represented
to themselves.3
On quite a different scale but using the same kind
of reasoning, Appadurai (1999) tries to understand
contemporary ethnic atrocities worldwide in relation
to a general culture of modernity. Modernity and
globalisation, he claims, have disembedded social
relations and created uncertain and alienated iden-
tities. In a grotesque way violence thus uses the
body to recreate certainty and intimacy.4
I have two objections against structural approaches
to violence, the second being the most essential in
the present context. First, even if we accept the idea
that violence creates unambiguous identities, such
consequences should not be confused with expla-
nations of why violence occurs in the first place.
Taking Bosnia as an example, the war did not come
from the bottom up, owing to social relations that
had become disembedded or people being alienated
(Appadurai’s argument), nor was it the result of dif-
ferences that had been erased. Rather, the war had
its origin in a struggle for power on the political level
(Ramet 1992; Cohen 1993; Malcom 1994; Naughton
1994; Bennett 1995; Woodward 1995; Glenny 1996;
Hayden 1996; Gallagher 1997; Sofus 1999; Oberschall
2000). The war then to some extent generated its
own dynamic, as for instance shown by Bax (1997;
2000), and war-related violence reinforced ethnic
identities (Sorabji 1995; Olujic 1998; van de Port
1998). However, this is not the same as accounting
for the eruption of war, as the structural approach
implicitly does, operating with a kind of thermo-
dynamic argument: at a certain point differences
become too small and therefore violence erupts.
Second, claiming that violence creates unambigu-
ous identities only accounts for part of the process
relevant for understanding the relationship between
violence and identification. It is probably fair to say
that violence plays a part in constructing a general
polarised atmosphere of ‘us and them’, but this does
not say anything about how people react or relate
to such a dichotomised space of identity. As I see it,
it is not violence that is creative, but rather it is
people’s reactions to violence that constitute the
creative element.5
As regards Stolac, violence has unmistakably cre-
ated potentials for unambiguous identities (Kolind
2002b) by politically ethnifying all aspects of every-
day life. And national identities have on the public
and political level been promoted as the only salient
ones. Furthermore, today Stolac is totally separated
ethnically on the local level of public organisation.
But when analysing everyday identifications of the
Muslims of Stolac another picture emerges, one that
is more complicated and less clear cut. I have previ-
ously looked at how the Muslims of Stolac refrain
from using ethnic stereotypes when explaining the
war and finding out where the blame lies (Kolind
2002a).6 Here I shall examine how the Muslims of
Stolac, when identifying themselves as Muslims,
often refrain from exclusive antagonistic identifica-
tions, but instead highlight coexistence, tolerance
and inter-ethnic respect, all of which constitute
patterns of identifications with clear ties to pre-war
inter-ethnic social life.
I shall take a look at different kinds of identifica-
tion of relevance to the Muslims, each responding
to a different level: a local-patriotic identification on
the local level, an ideal of tolerance on the national
level, and identification with the Balkans and Europe
on the global level. The general picture that emerges
through these three identifications is that people
use and mould already existing categories of iden-
tity to fit their new reality. Only on one front have
I encountered what can be regarded as an exclusive
identification that both sets the Muslims explicitly
apart and stereotypes the ethnic other: when they
identify with the role of the victim. The other
identifications stress commonality, coexistence and
tolerance.
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This pattern of identification among the Muslims
of Stolac is part of what I label a counterdiscourse
(Kolind 2004), which is not necessarily a conscious
or outspoken kind of resistance. But taking into
account a) the creation of exclusive national identi-
ties on the public level among leading Muslims in
Bosnia prior to the war, b) the crystallisation of
ethnic identities due to the war-related violence,
and c) the present division of power along ethno-
religious lines in Stolac, I term the mere non-use of
ethnic and/or religious identification, as well as the
insistence on clinging to already existing ideals and
categories of tolerance and coexistence, as a kind of
resistance or counterdiscourse.
Before analysing the four different kinds of iden-
tification in present-day Stolac, I shall first a) outline
some general features of the public creation of an
explicit and non-ambiguous Muslim national identi-
ty throughout the war, and b) account for the every-
day pre-war status of ethnicity. We are dealing with
two different scales here, both of which are relevant
to understanding the counterdiscourse among my
informants as well as the anchoring of this counter-
discourse in pre-war everyday identification.
Muslim national identity 
in Bosnia Herzegovina
At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s, the Yugoslavian society eroded and the coun-
try experienced religious revitalisation, party plural-
ism, a centralisation of power and most of all a surge
of nationalism (Friedman 1996: 143-77, Ramet
1992: 176-86, Höpken 1994: 231-39, Malcom 1994:
193-212).
From the 1950s up until the 1980s, the Bosnian
Muslims’ interests were primarily secular, and one did
find many of Tito’s stern followers among this group
of secularised Muslims. Religious Muslims only played
a secondary role in the political life, and attempts at
merging religion and national interest were harshly
suppressed by the Communist regime. Therefore, a
Muslim by faith and a Muslim by nationality were
not the same. Just before the coming of the war and
certainly throughout the war these two aspects
became rather suddenly conjoined in public. Muslim
national identity became increasingly defined on
the background of faith, that is, Islam and religious
institutions came to play a central role in the nation-
alist mobilisation of the Muslim community. 
In 1990, inter-ethnic relations among the people
of Bosnia Herzegovina were becoming increasingly
tense, and with the coming of the multi-party elec-
tion, Bosnia Herzegovina saw the emergence of dis-
tinct political parties representing each of the repub-
lic’s three ethnic communities, which was a rather
crucial change in the formation of Muslim identity.
The Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA –
Stranka Demokatske Akcije) was formed in 1990,
mainly by devout religious members directly
involved in Islamic religious activities, and in only a
couple of months it managed to mobilise a huge part
of the Muslim population of Bosnia Herzegovina
(Bougarel, 1996: 96-97, Cohen 1998: 58-61, Malcom
1994: 218-22). Inter-ethnic tensions grew throughout
Bosnia Herzegovina, but also became an important
condition for the existence of nationalist parties, a
factor making the nationalist parties cooperate in
grotesque manners at times (Bougarel 1996: 98).
Muslim religious nationalism became further
strengthened throughout the war. As the ethnic logic
(the logic of carving up the territory of Yugoslavia
and Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines) gained
more and more predominance – heavily supported
by diplomatic activities of the international com-
munity – and as the war progressed with immense
assaults on Muslims by both Croats and Serbs, lead-
ing Muslims became increasingly sectional, religious
and nationalistic, and the space left for imagining a
secular multiethnic society became more and more
limited.
Religious Muslim nationalism spread throughout
the society and its institutions – for instance, the
Bosnian army (Armija BiH), which was multi-ethnic
at the beginning of the war, soon became almost
dominated by Muslims and controlled by the SDA
(Cohen 1998: 69-70; Mojzes 1998: 95). In the edu-
cational system, religious Muslim nationalism
increased with the introduction of Islam into most
schools, and especially the subjects of ‘History’ and
‘Language and Literature’ changed in accordance
with the ongoing process of formation of Bosnian
Muslim identity (Macˇek 2000: 173). Also language
gained national importance, which is not surprising,
since language is traditionally an important signifier
in the creation and imagination of national iden-
tities. Leading Muslims renamed their language
Bosnian and furthermore tried to introduce ‘h’ into
words formerly without it (because the ‘h’ sound was
associated with Turkism) or to use as many Turkish
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synonyms as possible. Greetings were also affected:
on an everyday level, the choice of greeting became
a political act and religious greetings became more
frequent. Street names were changed into old or
new Muslim names, the colour green (associated
with Muslim religious identity) became increasingly
important in symbolic practice, religious holidays
became more and more popular, and TV and radio
broadcasting became oriented towards promoting a
Muslim religious national identity, and so forth
(Macˇek 2000: 172-86).
A last example of Bosnian Muslim nation build-
ing and the politicisation of Muslims’ ethnic identi-
ty is the decision taken by the Bosniac Assembly
(Bosˇnjacˇki Sabor) in September 1993 to replace the
national name ‘Muslim’ with the new name ‘Bosniac’.
This can be seen as an attempt to resolve the issue
of national and territorial claims on behalf of the
Muslims (Bringa 1995: 33-36; Bougarel 1996: 109).
‘With the new name the politicians stressed the
transformation of the Bosnian Muslim community
into a political and sovereign nation, closely linked
to the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina’ (Bougarel
2001: 8).
Thus, despite contradictions and ambivalence, on
a general level Bosnia Herzegovina saw the rise of a
Bosnian Muslim nationalist party and of nationalist
politics in a relatively short period of time. And
though secular opposition existed throughout the
war both outside and partly inside the ruling SDA
(the Muslim nationalist party), a religious, antago-
nistic Muslim nationalism dominated in many pub-
lic and political settings, a situation not many peo-
ple would have imagined only a few years before.
But the situation was special. A war was going on,
the Muslims were under attack from both the Croats
and the Serbs, and the international community
(aside from the Islamic world) had abandoned them.
Bosnian Muslim nationalism grew, therefore, not
because it had been lying dormant throughout the
years, but because the logic of the war created it. In
fact, Muslim nationalism had always been weak,
among other things because attempts at expressing
a solid and unifying Muslim identity had tradition-
ally been centred on confession and/or cultural
traditions or pan-Islamism, aspects hindering the
growth of a strong national identity (Bougarel 1996;
1997).
Bringa (1995: 36) sums up the tragic creation of
Muslim nationalism in this way:
The Bosnians have apparently been organized into tidy, cul-
turally and ethnically homogeneous categories, and the
Muslims seem finally to have become a neat ethno-national
category its neighbours and the international community can
deal with and understand. They have been forced by the war
and the logic of the creation of nation-states to search for
their origins and establish a ‘legitimate’ and continuous
national history.
Bosnian Muslim identity in everyday practice
While Bosnian Muslim nationalism only seriously
began developing in the late 1980s,7 this does not
mean that a strong sense of ethnic belonging was
absent among the Bosnian Muslims, particularly as
regards the countryside. But it is a sense of belong-
ing one should not confuse with the Muslim
nationalism of the late 1980s.
Several writers have argued that Bosnia
Herzegovina has never been truly politically mod-
ernised, that communitarianism (the prevalence of
ethnic identities in social relations) has continued
to be the most prevalent characteristic of the society,
that the state project never succeeded, and that over-
communal identifications never managed to surpass
local ethnic identifications (Simic´ 1991; Bougarel
1996; Sunic 1998). The central element in these eth-
nic identifications has been religion: Serbs have
been Orthodox, Croats Catholic, and also for the
Muslims a strong relationship between religion,
faith and ethnic identity existed (Lockwood 1975;
Bringa 1995).
To clarify the characteristics of this local identifi-
cation in which religion plays a constitutive part,
Bringa (1995) explores the native concept of nacije.
Nacije is a combination of religious, cultural and
social identities, something to which people felt
strong emotional attachment, something into which
one was born and socialised, something that was
normally ‘inherited’ from parents, something
unquestionable. National identity in Yugoslavia was,
on the contrary, something one could choose from
the options given by the state, and it often lacked
the essential feeling attached to nacije in everyday
identification. Bringa translates nacije as ‘ethnoreli-
gious identity’ (ibid.: 22) and concludes that the
Muslims of Bosnia Herzegovina had a strong sense
of ethno-religious identity but a weak sense of
national identity. They referred to their collective
identity not in a idiom ‘of shared blood and a myth
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of common origin’, but ‘in an idiom which de-
emphasized descent and focused instead on a shared
environment, cultural practises, a shared sentiment,
and common experience’ (ibid.: 30). The difference
between ethno-religious identity and nationality was
then exploited in the nationalist projects of the late
1980s in Yugoslavia; in Macˇek’s words:
…[T]he new national political elites could mobilise the ethno-
religious notions of belonging into the new national projects
of constitution of sovereign states for Muslims, Serbs and
Croats respectively, [by] filling the new national identities
with the old ethno-religious feeling of essential belonging.
(2000: 157)
In what follows, I shall highlight four related char-
acteristics of pre-war embedded, local and everyday
ethno-religious identification.
First, though Islam was an important identity
marker for Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina it should
not be understood simply as sets of clearly definable
rules of practices, but rather, as Sorabji (1996: 54)
suggests, as ‘a domain of loose moral imperatives’.
She mentions hospitality, cleanliness, generosity,
honesty, kindness, courtesy, industry and the like.
Though these values are central to Muslims they are
not exclusively Muslim virtues, but rather part of a
general moral codex in which, for instance, there are
overlaps with the ideology of Communism that says
‘work hard, don’t cheat your neighbours, redistribute
your wealth, and so on’ (ibid: 55). Sorabji seldom
found her informants evaluating each other’s actions
in religious terms. It was thus, as she reports, not
‘haram’ (Arabic: forbidden by God) to slander some-
one, but rather ‘ne valja’ (Serbo-Croatian: no good),
and it was not ‘sunset’ (Arabic: recommended by the
Prophet and pleasing to God) to wash your hands
before meals, but rather ‘fino’ (Serbo-Croatian: good)
(ibid.: 55). Lockwood, who did fieldwork approxi-
mately fifteen years before Sorabj and Bringa, came
to similar conclusions. Though Islam was much
more visible and pronounced in ‘his’ village, he
emphasised that: ‘[r]elatively little stress is placed
upon religious doctrine; much more important are
outward signs and symbols’ (Lockwood 1975: 48).
The second characteristic is the contrasting aspect
of Muslim identity. It is not so much that the
Catholics and Muslims are different per se; rather they
continually accentuate differences in establishing
identity. The different ethno-religious groups needed
each other (or each other’s otherness) to construct
identity, and this otherness – though using, for
instance, religious practices – was embedded in a
local setting and everyday practices in contrast to
the national identities constructed and represented
in the public and national spheres. If modernisation
means an increasing disembeddedness of social rela-
tions, then greater parts of Bosnia Herzegovina can
be considered not very modern. Identity in Bosnia
Herzegovina was to a great extent premised upon
actual local face-to-face interaction. So religion was
not that important in itself but rather due to the
difference it was able to make in everyday local life.
Third, though pre-war ethno-religious identity
was fundamental in everyday life, it was one among
many types of identity. Work relations, type of edu-
cation, class, gender, degree of culturedness were all
identities that in certain situations could be more
important than ethnicity (Allcock 2000: 170-211).
In other words, relatively ‘ethnic-free’ zones of social
interaction existed in which identification depend-
ed on the context. Ethno-religious identification
should furthermore be contrasted with higher levels
of identification. In Dolina, Bringa (1995: 65-73)
reports, ethno-religious identity was connected to
the household, the family and sometimes the neigh-
bours, but at a village level a unifying localistic
supra-ethnic identification held sway, defined by an
ethos of hospitality and neighbourliness (komsˇiluk).
The practice of komsˇiluk was, as Bougarel defines it,
a ‘permanent guarantee of the pacific nature of rela-
tions between the communities, and thus a security
of each of them’ (1996: 98). At an even higher level
of identification was the Yugoslav state, which with
its various institutions penetrated village life and
enforced unification.
The fourth and last element relates to the capaci-
ty to live with difference, an ability which many
Bosnians have developed throughout the years and
one that should not be romanticised. Mono-ethnic
communities existed all over Bosnia, and as
Lockwood (1975) shows, inter-ethnic interaction in,
for instance, a weekly market does not necessarily
lead to further ethnic integration. Furthermore, we
also have examples of villages and areas where inter-
ethnic coexistence has been marked by continual
and cyclic outbursts of violence and inter-ethnic
(blood) strifes (Bax 1995; 1997; 2000; Boehm 1984);
researchers have also observed how traumatic
memories from the Second World War have been
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passed on to the younger generations (Denich
1994). Some even talk about a myth constructed by
Western intellectuals in which the Bosnian mental-
ity is presumedly tolerant. The reality is rather – it is
argued – one of inter-ethnic distrust (Simic´ 2000). I
shall not revitalise this often rather intense debate
that has been running in the discipline of anthro-
pology especially in and after the recent war (see
Brandt (2002) for a thorough discussion). My point
is rather that throughout their socialisation, the
people of Bosnia Herzegovina had come into contact
with members of different ethno-religious groups in
different areas, both in the public sphere and often
also in the private sphere, and one should not forget
that the young and the middle-aged had lived in
peace for almost fifty years when the war broke out
in 1992. Ethno-religious identity could then be a
significant factor shaping the content and atmos-
phere of inter-ethnic interaction, but it was seldom
a hindrance thereof, and the interaction between
the different ethno-religious groups was often char-
acterised by respect. A central point here is that
differences were not downplayed; equality as same-
ness was not the ideal, as can be seen, for instance,
in Scandinavian contexts (Gullestad 1992). Instead,
differences were persistently nurtured, but in a way
that Georgieva has described as ‘familiarisation of
differences’ in a different context (Georgieva 1999),8
that is, the net of interconnected lines compromises
all levels of everyday life, eliminates otherness, and
changes it into familiar difference. The ‘others’ are
therefore ‘perceived not as a menace, but rather as
an inseparable part of the complex world of every-
day life’ (ibid.: 68).
The war and the war-related nationalism in many
ways attempted to destroy these aspects of the
Bosnian Muslims’ everyday practice of identifica-
tion. Religion became much more closely connected
to a more doctrinaire reading of Islam. Ethnic iden-
tity became increasingly disembedded and was rep-
resented in new and more rigid and politicised cate-
gories detached from people’s everyday experiences.
Ethnic identity surpassed all other identities, colonis-
ing every aspect of life, and was increasingly pre-
sented as a hindrance for interaction.
So far I have presented two rather opposing
approaches to ethnic identity: a religiously based
public nationalist identity highlighting difference
and arguing for ethnic segregation, and a local embed-
ded practice of ethno-religious identity stressing
coexistence. Following the logic of the structural
approach to violence one should expect the former
to prevail after the war. In the following I shall ana-
lyse four different types of identifications currently
at work among the Muslims of Stolac, which in sum
depict a world characterised by complexity, ambi-
guity and contradictions rather than clarity, certainty
or simplicity; a world resting more upon pre-war
everyday inter-ethnic experiences and cultural cate-
gories than upon the sudden emergence of a public
discourse of nationalist exclusion. Inertia seems to
be a leitmotiv.
Muslim identifications
Considering the logic of the structural approach and
that the war was presented as a struggle based upon
religion and nationality, one might presume that
Islam and Bosnia are the two most important signi-
fiers in creating a distinct and unambiguous Muslim
identity. It is my impression that they are not.
Bosnian nationalism?
Bosnia Herzegovina as a nation-state is not a central
element in the identification of the Muslims of
Stolac. Neither are the typical Herderian aspects
through which a nation is often imagined relevant:
language, history, blood, flag, race, the dead soldier,
and so forth (Mosse 1990; Anderson 1991; Knudsen
1989b; Foster 1991).
For instance, when talking about actually fighting
the war, people seldom say they fought for Bosnia,
territory, cultural traditions, and so on; instead they
claim to have fought for survival, for their homes,
property, families, and because they had nowhere to
run. People are not proud of Bosnia, but they are
proud of having survived. One of my informants
once said that ‘everyone who survived the war is a
success’. For the Muslims, survival was not at all
taken for granted during the war.
Emir fought in the war.9 Once during an inter-
view he showed me some pictures of himself and a
friend in uniform, smiling and holding machine
guns in the air. Emir’s mother felt embarrassed and
did not want me to see the pictures; Emir, on the
other hand, was proud of what he and his comrades
did in the war, but his pride was not related to a
Bosnian nation:
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Emir: We did not fight for any ideas at all. We did not try to
create some kind of state or country; we just did it in order to
survive. I fought at the front with my weapon just to prevent
them from coming and taking my mother. So that they
wouldn’t kill her or the children who were with her. There
were no ideas in my head at that time, because I was hungry
and thirsty and without anything. There were people who
only had 10 bullets in their guns, and they fought against
tanks in that way. And in that situation you don’t think about
creating a state.
During the war, the Muslims of Herzegovina were
pressed from two sides and had no possibilities of
escape. Many of my informants see this as a major
tactical mistake on behalf of the Croats and Serbs.
They would have escaped if only they had been
given the opportunity. People therefore feel they
became Bosnians not by choice, but by fate.
Even today, Bosnia does not serve as a meta-nar-
rative that can bestow meaning upon one’s suffer-
ings, traumas and material losses. People are simply
not proud of their country and do not identify with
it. They are fed up with the corrupt and worthless
politicians; the educational system does not work or
qualify people for jobs – only private connections
do; the unemployment rate is disastrous; people do
not get their pay or pension in due course; the divi-
sion between rich and poor has increased strikingly;
there is no future for the kids, and so on and so
forth. Similar attitudes are revealed in a survey con-
ducted in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2000, which
reveals that sixty-two percent of all youth in Bosnia
Herzegovina would leave the country if given the
opportunity, and among those wanting to stay only
ten percent gave patriotism as a reason (UNDP 2000).
People also feel that Bosnia Herzegovina has lost
prestige internationally. As Amra said, making a sad
joke, ‘today for us Albania is the West’. Albania is
reckoned as by far the most backward country in
Europe.
Below is a quotation that, even though it offers a
rather hopeless perspective, expresses what many
people feel at least part of the time.
Lamira: He [her husband] was a soldier; I was a nurse and
worked all the time at the hospital with wounded soldiers.
People came in to the hospital without legs, arms, totally
destroyed people with psychic traumas. I gave birth to a child,
and then another. We have yet another boy, but he is not here
now. He is three years old. Everything is a big trauma. We
stayed here all the time as domoljubi [those who love their
country]. We hoped things would be better. Now our country
does not make sense. No law. Anarchy, anarchy…criminals.
It’s like the things we only saw in the movies before.
Religion
In the war, religion became politicised and served as
a vehicle for expressing a separate Muslim identity.
My findings suggest that today religiosity has found
a level more or less equal to the pre-war situation
and does not play a major role in people’s everyday
practices of identification (see also Bougarel 2001).
To be a good Muslim means to behave decently and
to be morally upright and does not relate to reli-
gious practices. For some, Islam is totally unimpor-
tant. People generally have a very pragmatic relation
to their faith. 
During the war, people were more religious than
today, which they find normal due to the immense
psychic pressure they endured, and consequently
there is nothing strange about the decline of reli-
gious observance when the war stopped. Osman
mourns, however, the disappearance of religious
solidarity, feeling that it vanished too soon and that
people forget the things that happened too quickly.
Often people lament the loss of sense of communi-
ty and social interaction, but the issue is not religion
but drustvo (approximately: social intermingling),
and I also suppose that Osman mourns the lack of
solidarity in general more than religious solidarity.
Following the Koran one should not drink alcohol,
but the majority of my informants had a relaxed
attitude to alcohol. I do not recall being in a Muslim
home where I was not offered loza (grape brandy),
and often it was homemade. Homemade wine was
also highly estimated. Not that people drank a lot,
but it was just not an issue. Only few people regu-
larly attended the Mosque (or what was left of it) –
the same number of people as before the war, I was
told. At the Friday prayer there were about five to
seven young people, the remaining twenty to twen-
ty-five persons being older than sixty. And never did
I observe people praying during the day/evening.
Possibly the use of religious greetings has increased,
but only rarely did I hear them; instead people said
dobra dan, ˇsta ima, kako si/ste, sta radi to each other, all
of which are secular and religiously neutral greetings.
Before the war, children who attended mekteb
(Koran school) would sometimes learn to recite the
Koran in Arabic. Mensur’s wife knows some of the
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Koran in Arabic, but she does not get much credit
for that. As Mensur said to her once: ‘...well it doesn’t
matter – God understands all languages. Why then
should we pray in Arabic?’
The last example refers to the Ramadan of
November and December 2000, when I did fieldwork.
As a codified ritual in Islam, Ramadan is an individ-
ual statement of one’s personal commitment, and it
could easily be used as a way to identify and collec-
tively emphasise Muslim identity. But not many
people in Stolac observed the fasting. Some did it
some of the days; others ate and drank less during
this period. Often only one or two in a family fast-
ed or partly fasted. In fact, it was not a big issue.
Several times I heard people make jokes about those
who fasted. Once when Sefer’s mother talked about
waking up before sunrise to have something to
drink, her husband laughingly replied, ‘this is sure-
ly not for me’, and later when she told me that
smoking is not allowed during the Ramadan, as did
her daughter-in-law, her husband said, ‘well then
Ramadan is good for something’.
Moreover, those who fasted or partly fasted focused
mainly on the practical aspects: how it is easier to
fast in the wintertime as the days are shorter, how to
wake up at four o’clock to have a morning coffee,
how drinking a little water is allowed if one needs to
take pills, and so on. Or they said that they did it
because it was a nice tradition.
These examples are not meant to illustrate that
Islam does not have a place in people’s lives. Many
people see themselves as believers and respect their
God. And often people said that if the Croats and
Serbs really believed they would behave like the
Muslims who also believed. In other words, to be a
believer is about being a decent human being,
behaving properly, taking care of your family and
fellow man, and so on. It is not about knowing the
Koran, praying, fasting, attending the Mosque, greet-
ing the right way, and so on. In fact, I often heard
people dissociate themselves from more dogmatic
religious manifestations. Instead they want to stick
to what they regard as the typical Bosnian way of
practising religion. Anvere is what one might regard
as a normal believer, to the extent that such a concept
makes sense; she believes a bit, fasted a bit during the
Ramadan, and she knows the Koran a bit. She said:
The Muslims here in Herzegovina were not particularly reli-
gious. Maybe it is different north of Sarajevo, in Zenica. The
Serbs weren’t either, but the Croats go to church every
Sunday… During the war we were more religious – we were
scared…Before the war I never saw anyone with a veil, but
during the war there were quite a few donations from Saudi
Arabia and Iraq, and they brought it with them. But it is not
autochthonous [real] Bosnian. The Muslims here are different…
It seems as though everybody today is afraid of Islam [every-
body in the Western world]…but our Islam is different than in
the Arabic countries; we are not particularly religious.
Throughout the war and afterwards, religious sym-
bols have been manipulated, religious differences
reinforced, and many people have been killed or
had to flee in the name of religion. Today many of
the Muslims in Stolac are fed up with politicians’
nationalistic religious rhetoric. People do not iden-
tify much with their country, neither during the war
when they mainly fought for survival and not for a
state, nor today when the positive symbolic value of
Bosnia Herzegovina is slight. Religion is more impor-
tant; I only met a few people who declared them-
selves atheists. But their religious identity has not
colonised more of their identity as Muslims than it
possessed before the war; on the contrary, it seems
as though people distance themselves from a radical
and dogmatic form of Islam. 
In the remainder of the article I shall analyse how
the Muslims of Stolac define themselves as Muslims,
considering the fact that national and religious
identities do not suffice.
Localistic identification
Local patriotism in Stolac is strong. Not everybody
is necessarily content with living in Stolac, especially
the young find the city boring; nevertheless, most
acknowledge that the city is (or at least was) special,
with a unique atmosphere, beauty and spirit. This local
patriotism focuses upon Stolac as a centre of open-
mindedness, a meeting point for different cultures,
and states that Stolac does not exist without its three
ethnic groups. But at times it also serves as a critique
of the Croats, who are considered blameworthy.
Coexistence
The ideal of coexistence is of central importance to
the Muslims of Stolac and is often associated with a
typical Stolac mentality: people from Stolac are seen
as simply predisposed to co-exist. To be a real citizen
of Stolac is to accept and enjoy multiculturalism; in
fact, it runs in the cultural genes of the people. They
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see Stolac as a crossroads for different cultures and
stress that all newcomers have been welcomed.
People mention, for instance, the Jewish grave just
outside town commemorating the Rabbi Mosha
Danon from Sarajevo, who died on his way to
Jerusalem and was buried here in 1830. Or they refer
to ornamentation on one of the world-famous Stec´aks
at the Necropolis Radimlja, two kilometres outside
town. This stone is decorated with the figure of an
upright man whose hand is lifted upward at the
elbow and whose palm is open, greeting the specta-
tors. This hand is read as a gesture saying that all
strangers are welcome. 
Nusret expressed his idea of local inter-ethnic
coexistence in Stolac in the following way: 
Our wish is that people return. We want the Stolac spirit to
return. And that spirit is the citizens who lived here before the
war – bosnjaki, i serbi, i hrvati.10 And as for those coming from
outside [strani], the best thing would be if they left.
Another element of the Stolac spirit relates to the
feeling of oneness with the beauty of the city.
Several times I was reminded that before the war
Stolac was a candidate for UNESCO’s list of cities
worthy of preservation. People tell about the four
picturesque Mosques, the big city market built in
old Ottoman style; Begovina, the once so beautiful
housing complex owned by the Rizvanbegovic´ fam-
ily; the old watermills; the Hotel Bregava, a newly
constructed but architectonically well-integrated
building; all the cafes, the shops, and so forth. Today
everything is mined or burned. They tell about the
lovely Mediterranean climate – ‘It is November and
I haven’t even fired yet, this city keeps me young’,
as Senad said – about the lovely Bregava River run-
ning through the town, where one can swim and fish
and which provides water for the gardens situated
alongside; about all the fruits: ‘in the summer we
have kiwi, peaches, apricots, figs, apples, grapes,
pomegranate, plums. In the summer you don’t have
to be hungry – fruits are so plentiful’, as Sefer’s
mother said. And they tell about all the industries
and factories in town, which employed a lot of people
and exported to the whole of Yugoslavia and abroad.
In short, they are/were very proud of their city. 
The reason why I write ‘are/were’ is that the people
of Stolac often have ambivalent feelings for their
town. Visual memories from before the war, pictures
from pre-war Stolac, present images, dreams – they
all merge together. Some say they cannot remember
what the town looked like; others say they cannot
drive through the town without seeing the ‘real’
Stolac in their mind’s eye. Everybody thinks the city
has become ugly, but nonetheless I was asked – often
in the expectant way one normally asks visitors to
one’s town – how I liked the city, and it was obvious
that the appropriate and polite answer would be ‘it
is very nice’, but I just could not say it, because
Stolac is ruined, dirty and ugly. And when I said
that, people became quiet for a while and then said,
‘yes, that’s right’. Despite such contradictory feelings,
Stolac is generally constructed in people’s minds as
a beauty, as a pearl on earth with a fantastic climate.
When people are in a realistic mood their Stolac
does not exist anymore; instead they see an ugly
city dominated by Croats, but when talking about
Stolac in a more insubstantial but still physical
manner, the old and real Stolac seems to rise from
the dust and people show great pride for their town
and consider it the best place on earth. It is as
though the beauty of the city coalesced with the
spirit of coexistence, and together they functioned
as a symbolic or cultural space or an idea with which
one could identify.
However, identification with pre-war Stolac is
also a critique of the Croats who demolished the old
Ottoman-inspired town and who today dominate it
and are trying to create a new Catholic and modern
Stolac. So just talking about the past and pre-war
Stolac is a strongly political act. Furthermore, people
say that the Croats do not love the city or do not
have any real attachment to it. If they did they
would not have treated it the way they did, and at
least they would have cleaned up.11 As Nermin said,
‘They want a dump rather than cultural monu-
ments’. Implicitly they are saying that the Croats do
not deserve the city.
The last element in local patriotism has to do
with the value attached to everything homemade –
domaci – in particular, food. People would proudly
let me know that the bread, the cheese, the yoghurt,
the juice, the loza (grape brandy), and so on, which
they served were domaci. The homemade food was
regarded as superior because the food products were
produced in the Stolac area without chemicals or
fertilizers, which in turn made the domaci clean
( cˇisto). The positive connotations of everything
homemade affected other kinds of classifications.
For instance, people would say that they did not
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have a problem with Croats originating from Stolac,
and they labelled them nasi domaci hrvati: our home-
made Croats.
Struggle for local identity
There are not many visible Muslim markers of iden-
tity in Stolac; the Croats dominate the public space
and the Muslims do only little to change this. Many
are probably afraid of the reactions that visible
demonstrations could provoke (Mahmutcehalic
2001), but more importantly this attitude is in line
with the Muslims’ self-perception. As I demonstrate
below, the Muslims identify themselves by not using
the same methods and rhetoric as the nationalists
(the Croats and Serbs). Waving a flag or making
nationalistic graffiti simply would not give respect.
Let me nevertheless turn to some of the few physi-
cal markers of identity I did encounter, which I
relate to a ‘Muslimness’ and just as importantly to
the Stolac spirit.
Before the war, a modest local historical pamphlet
was published in Stolac with illustrated articles on
the history, archaeology and architecture of the
area. After the war and the total destruction of the
Stolac heritage, these booklets suddenly gained new
importance in 1997 when some prominent people
originating from Stolac initiated a reprint of these
booklets as well as of a section comparing photo-
graphs of Stolac then and now in a book format
(Dizdar et al. 1997). The book became evidence of a
time and a city which no longer existed. The articles,
which nearly nobody read before the war, now
became an important source of identity for people
living in Stolac, since the book helped to mentally
(re)construct the picture of beautiful pre-war Stolac
that the Croats had destroyed and now deny ever
existed. Without these publications the ethnic and
cultural cleansing of Stolac would have been total.12
Another source of local identity is the Bregava
River running through town. People often talked
about the river. ‘You should be here in the summer-
time, Nicolas – it is so beautiful then. We sit down
at the river, we barbeque, play football, and when
it’s to hot we go swimming’, or, ‘the river is so clean
that you can drink from it’. Sometimes people
would just say, ‘at least we have Bregava’. I think that
Bregava functions as a central component in the
Muslims’ identification with Stolac and the Stolac
spirit. Here is a small excerpt from my notebook
written after a conversation with Anvere:
…[S]he was laughing a little at the name Sanpero, the name
of the restaurant where the cultural centre was before. She
also said that before [the war] there was a gallery next to café
Galleria, where artists from Stolac exhibited. She then tells me
that it is so strange to realise that all this is destroyed and
gone. The town really had soul before, a spirit: ‘now they have
destroyed everything, the Mosques, Begovina…it is only
Bregava which they haven’t destroyed’. When she said this I
realised why people talk so much about Bregava; maybe they
did before, but now it is of extra importance, because it is the
only thing people have left. It is like a symbol saying ‘we have
not given up’. Bregava is what is left of the real Stolac.
Or, as Alen answered when I asked him if the
Bregava River is the spirit of Stolac: ‘Yes, it is the only
thing left that is ours’. One of the Muslim cafés in
Stolac is called Café Benat. The name refers to the
place in town where the river is most scenic. And
the name is not chosen arbitrarily; rather it is part of
the seizing of the symbolic/physical space of Stolac.
In Stolac is another Muslim café, Café Galleria. It
marks a more contested struggle for regaining a ter-
ritorial marker – not Muslim territory but local terri-
tory, so that the Muslims can say, ‘we are stolcˇanici’
or ‘the Stolac spirit still exists’. The café, located in
the centre of town opposite three Croatian cafés, is
popular. The owners of the place spend a lot of ener-
gy making it cosy and pleasant. It has big panorama
windows so that one can look out over the centre of
town, outdoor serving, flowers on the tables, and on
the walls hang beautiful black and white drawings
of pre-war Stolac – drawings being part of the mental
(re)construction of the pre-war Stolac. The café has
been destroyed twice by Croats. Accepting the café
would be tantamount to accepting the presence of
the Muslims of Stolac. It should also be taken into
account that Muslim houses were also continuously
mined or burned (especially in 1996-1998) in order
to frighten the Muslims from returning. On both
occasions the café has been reopened, which is of
great importance to many Muslims, not in an antag-
onistic way, but rather as a symbol of the integra-
tion of the city and the possible coexistence of the
ethnic groups in Stolac. Several people said that
Croats also went to the café; however, I never met
any. I suppose that people wanted them to use it
and thereby legitimate it and play their part in con-
structing the Stolac spirit. And though the owner
was one of the more antagonistically minded people
in Stolac, he as well as many others hoped the café
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could play a part in reintegrating people in Stolac,
and they saw it as a fight for the city and the Stolac
spirit of beauty and coexistence.
These three examples are some of the few visible
attempts at redefining the physical/symbolic space
of Stolac that I encountered. In addition, there are
all the minor daily acts, which are primarily about
creating an everyday world but which nonetheless
also relate to the creation of the Stolac spirit. It is
difficult to establish a dividing line between the
everyday construction of small life-worlds and the
more visible conquests of physical/symbolic space 
– for instance, families who keep the road outside
their house and garden extremely clean by sweeping
it every day, even though the house next to them
lies in ruins with a huge pile of litter in front. Are
they just cleanly people who in an ugly and ruined
city try at least to keep some dignity? Or is it possible
to see such acts as efforts to clean up (parts of) Stolac
to create a contrast to the total decay in which the
Croats have left the town? My guess is that both
alternatives are true. And what about returning to
a demolished house, reconstructing buildings,
insisting on being positive towards the future if for
nothing else then for the children, the opening of
Muslims’ shops, baking cakes for a birthday party,
tidying op the street, planting flowers, tilling the
soil, going on visits, and so on – all these are actions
that attempt to recreate and normalise life, which
also relates to creating the Stolac spirit. The Stolac
spirit is about the creation of a physical/symbolic
space – that is, a space existing in reality: for instance,
Bregava, Galleria, the Mosques – and a cultural space,
which is more a (re)construction of ideals and the
aesthetic of the town with which one can identify.
The creation of a cultural space is simultaneously
a struggle for physical space, and the struggle for
physical space is also an attempt to reconstruct
Stolac as a cultural place and thereby as a source of
identification.
The Stolac spirit (the ideal of coexistence, seeing
Stolac as a beautiful city and the importance of
things homemade) probably existed before the war
but has gained new significance today. The Muslims
returned to a city from which they were expelled,
their houses were destroyed and/or robbed, every-
thing Muslim was destroyed, and the Croats now
control all public administration and buildings, so
to be a stolcˇanici is not that certain anymore. Hence,
just to talk about the beauty of the city, the excellent
climate or the autochthonic and tolerant soul of
Stolac, to open a café, stroll through the streets, use
the Bregava River, produce and praise homemade
food, identify nasi domaci hrvati, and so forth, is now
more or less politically significant. The Stolac spirit is
a source of identification but it is also a sort of polit-
ical manifestation, saying we (also) have the right to
live here. But it is important to distinguish such a
local identification from a nationalistic or religious
one. Evoking the Stolac spirit is not about being
Muslim, but about being a Muslim citizen of Stolac.
Ideal of tolerance and coexistence
The Muslims of Stolac hold an ideal of tolerance and
wish for coexistence with the other ethnic groups,
but they are also rather conscious of this tolerant
attitude when it is used to identify Muslimness in a
self-reflexive manner. People’s talk about the past
and their steady wish for coexistence are linked
together, for when they talk about the past they
focus upon how everybody lived peacefully together
and how ethnicity did not matter. This fusion reflects
people’s actual experience, their pre-war habitus.
But talk about the past is not just nostalgic, it is also
a political commentary on the present, and it is a
source of identification.
Differences were an advantage
Talking about the past, people often stressed that
cultural diversity enriched everyday life. People
learned from each other, had more festivals in which
to participate, and their social network was large.
Ethnicity mattered, but the different cultural prac-
tices were not related to a larger political (national-
istic) framework. They were just differences articu-
lated in relation to everyday habitual practices of
identification, as also argued above in the section
about the identity of everyday Muslims before the
war.14 Today people mourn the loss of these differ-
ences, or rather the respectful and habitual handling
of them. 
The war has highlighted and created ethnic dif-
ferences, but it has also changed the positive con-
notations related to these and instead tried to pro-
mote an ideology where ethnic dissimilarity is seen
as a hindrance for interaction and a threat against
cultural survival. Therefore, talking about ethnic dif-
ferences and evaluating them in a positive manner is
a means to resist the rhetoric of ethnic separation
that nationalistic politics communicates today in
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Stolac. And for the Muslims it is a way to identify
themselves by saying ‘we have no problems inter-
acting with the different ethnic groups; we are a tol-
erant people’.
Take, for instance, Osman, who tells how the
Muslims’ tolerant attitude during the war was
turned against them.
In school I had Serbian and Croat friends. And for instance at
Bajram, I invited my Serbian and Croat friends home, and at
Christmas, the 25th [of December] and the 7th of January,
respectively, the Muslims were invited home to them to roll
eggs, but you do not do that today; it is unthinkable. Before
the war the other cultures were an advantage for us; if there
are only Muslims everybody knows each other, but with other
religious communities we learned from each other – it was
enrichment. Differences did exist, but it was a difference that
enriched us. For instance, one participated in a Serbian wed-
ding and saw how they did it, had some different food. But
with the war the differences became our disadvantages. We
were conscious about being different before the war, but it was
a difference that enriched us. With the war this difference was
turned against us [They were targeted because of their different
ethnic identity].
So in this perspective, difference, respect and toler-
ance are three inseparable issues.
Nationality did not matter
But people also said that before the war there were
no differences; everybody lived together and had a
good time, and no one cared about ethnicity. At first
glance this would seem to contradict the aforemen-
tioned views, but in fact they are rather similar.
When my informants say they were not aware of
ethnic affiliation before, it is probably not true, but
this is not the point. They knew which religious com-
munity people came from. What they are expressing
is that they did not care. This is in keeping with the
official ideology of the Yugoslav regime (Brotherhood
and Unity), which tried to make ethnicity a thing of
the past, and to many of the Bosnian generations
from after the Second World War a pan-ethnic
Yugoslav identity was important. 
Nijaz, a man of about thirty-five, depicts the days
before the war as joyful, a time when ethnicity was
unimportant. I think this memory is important to
him, enabling him to imagine a better future and
reminding him of what he is, of his values, inasmuch
as he now lives in a totally different context.
TK: Do you remember how life was before the war?
Nijaz: Let me tell you one thing: everybody had their life. We
had work – I began building my house before the war, I also
started with my business and I was about to open a coffee bar.
Things were going well for me. I had a good group of friends.
You are born here in Stolac, grow up together and have your
friends until you get married, and I married before the war.
We had a circle of friends. And that’s enough…[…]…You have
a job, family, some everyday obligations; it was a normal life.
You knew where to go in the evenings, and that you would
meet your friends at that place. Then came the war and
turned everything upside down. Now I can find some of my
friends all the way from Canada to Australia. And not only
Bosnians; also Serbs and Croats. I had a big circle of friends;
we were about ten to twenty in that circle. It was my genera-
tion who was in it. Before the war it did not matter if you were
Serb, Muslim or Croat. You did not know what people were,
you were not weighed by it …[…]…When I was married, my
best man was Croat, and at my boy’s first birthday his godfa-
ther was Serb. Now they live in Canada. That’s how it was.
The contradiction Nijaz expresses – that ‘you did
not know what people were’ and at the same time,
in line with the tradition of respectful interaction
between the different ethnic groups, his friendship
with and deliberate choice of a Croat and a Serb to
be best man and godfather, respectively – does make
sense. Firstly, claiming to be unaware of the ethnic
identity of one’s friends simply expresses indiffer-
ence. Secondly, the habitual pre-war pattern of tol-
erant and respectful inter-ethnic interactions is now
objectified and constructed by many Muslims as
conscious knowledge, relevant in identifying the
present Muslim identity. This should become more
evident in the following examples.
People sometimes told me they have Croat
friends, mingle with Croats and use Croatian cafés
and shops and vice versa. Sometimes this is true, but
often this is not quite correct. It was as if people
wanted to assure me and themselves that they still
uphold the ideal of tolerance and inter-ethnic inter-
action. Sefer, for instance, told me when I first met
him that he had several Croat friends and acquain-
tances. But some months later when I asked him if
he knew some Croats I could interview, he said that
he did not really know any. And once when I invited
Mensur, who had told me that he frequented the
Croatian cafés, for a cup of coffee as we were stand-
ing outside a Croatian coffee bar, he said ‘yes, but
then we go to Galleria’, which was the nearest
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Muslim café, even though he was in a bit of a hurry.
The point is that it is important for people to state
that they are tolerant and to identify with the ideal
of coexistence, but in practice this is rather difficult.
Critique of the Croats – identification of the Muslims
In talking about past inter-ethnic interaction or
present tolerance, sometimes the Muslims blame
the other ethnic groups – especially the Croats – for
abandoning these ideals. This blaming and the
implicit identification of oneself as tolerant is part
of the same logic.
Below is an excerpt from an interview with a
schoolteacher and one of her colleagues. She lives
outside Stolac, in an area with many Croats. She
wishes for a better future but is rather despondent. 
TK: Did you know who was Muslim or Serb or Croat before
the war?
Teacher: Yes, I did, but there were no differences; it did not
matter. On the street in Stolac where I lived, there lived Serbs,
Croats and Muslims. You received the flats from the factory
where you worked and nobody asked about who the neigh-
bours were – if you where Serb, Croat or Muslim. There were
also mixed marriages. And nobody felt it mattered. We were
all as one. My first neighbour was Croat, and my sisters and I
raised their children. We were close. Not a day went by with-
out visiting each other. We talked about everything. We knew
each other’s problems. Today she [the Croat neighbour] doesn’t
even bother to visit my parents, or even to talk to them. Our
window is placed next to their terrace; you can jump from our
apartment to their flat. It is senseless…when you realize all
these things…you have to hope…but it is difficult.
Other examples more explicitly touch upon the
issue of identification. People said, for instance, that
‘Muslims read Serbian or Croatian literature but they
do not read ours’, or ‘we read Cyrillic letters but
they do not learn our alphabet’, or ‘we listen to their
music, but they do not listen to ours’. Comparing in
this way means that ‘our’ tolerance in fact exists at
the expense of ‘their’ intolerance and ignorance.
Whether the intention is to criticise them (Croats
and Serbs and the whole nationalistic project) or if
it is to approach what it is to be Muslim is hard to
tell. It is probably both. 
The war has forced people to reflect upon pre-war
practices in order to make some sense of it all.
Ethnic difference, including the way this difference
was nurtured, articulated and created before, has
become objectified and part of the Muslims’ con-
scious identification. Practices of interaction (cp. the
‘familiarisation of difference’) have become ideals of
identification. But persistently highlighting the
trouble-free and joyful interaction among ethnic
groups in the past, and stressing the possibility of
resuming interaction in the future is also a way of
rejecting the nationalistic rhetoric and practice of
ethnic exclusiveness.
The Balkans – Europe
Maria Todorova’s (1997) analysis of the Western
image of the Balkans has shown how the Balkans as
a distinct geographical area with specific cultural
traits was only discovered/invented at the end of
the 18th century, mainly through European travel
literature. The Balkans then became associated with
the traditional, non-civilised, tribal (politically
undeveloped), rural and unenlightened. During the
Balkan Wars and the First World War, violence was
added to the picture and has remained a leitmotiv of
the Balkans ever since. After the Second World War,
a new demon, Communism, was grafted onto the
image (see also Bakic´-Hayden and Hayden 1992: 3-4),
and during the recent war the image of the Balkans
has come full circle, Western observers explaining the
war as, if not unavoidable, then proof of the typical
Balkan mentality (Kaplan 1993). Europe/Balkans has
thus been constructed as a hierarchical symbolic
geography in which West and East are valorised in
terms of religion; the tendency seems to be the more
eastern the more primitive and conservative. (Bakic´-
Hayden and Hayden 1992; Bakic´-Hayden 1995;
Ritman-Augusˇtin 1995; Zarkov 1995). 
Europe/Balkans is a discursive field in which my
informants were often caught, but rather than
maintaining solid and unambiguous positions their
evaluations and identifications were placed in the
middle of an existing predicament. Sometimes Europe
was seen as decadent and unsympathetic; at other
times as the future and as civilised. Sometimes the
Balkan-like was authentic and honest; at other times
it was violent and crude. And at times the Balkan-
like was depicted as an unavoidable destructive force
which people could not refrain from acting out.
Balkan
In everyday life, when Balkan is used to evaluate
behaviour and attitudes, it often bears negative con-
notations such as laziness, callousness, disrespect
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and violence, and it is associated with a lack of
structure and aesthetics, trouble, complexity and
corruption. It is, for instance, possible to say that a
person not behaving properly is displaying a typical
Balkan mentality. 
But Balkan is also used in a more fundamental
way to explain and comprehend the war and the
post-war violent and complicated situation. Balkan
then becomes associated with violence, madness
and death. As Senad once said:
This war could never have occurred in Europe; it is a typical
Balkan war. It’s insanity and savagery. We have to try to get rid
of it, this Balkanism, but it is a part of us.
The Balkan metaphor is employed to make sense of
the madness. People in the Balkans are subsequently
represented as being used to recurrent insane vio-
lence; they simply know it by heart. For instance, I
often heard people say that every twenty-five or
thirty years there is war, or ‘we build up everything
– houses, family, economy – and then we destroy it
all’. One might anticipate that the Muslims of Stolac
would associate the other ethnic groups with this
Balkan mentality, as an ethnic critique in disguise.
But they seldom do. The war, not the other ethnic
groups, was Balkan-like. People perceive the Balkan
mentality as a force operating in the world, an
unavoidable aspect of living in the Balkans, or some-
thing that is capable of explaining without having
to be explained itself. People sometimes describe
themselves as crazy Balkan people, but do not con-
ceive of themselves as acting subjects; rather it is the
Balkan mentality and its irreversibility that are acting
through them. As one of my informants said in ref-
erence to this mentality, ‘maybe there is something
in the air, or maybe in the cigarettes – maybe they put
marihuana in the cigarettes here in Bosnia’. The wild
and chaotic Balkan mentality is in this way created
as an explanatory yet also isolated factor, thereby
helping to uphold a normal and ordered world.
Other times Balkan has positive connotations.
Sometimes when compared with the European men-
tality it represents the authentic, warm, real, impul-
sive and unpretentious, whereas Europe represents
the decadent, commercial, false and cold. I have
heard people say that it was only after the war, with
the presence of the international community, that
drugs and prostitution entered Bosnia for real; that
Westerners are often very patronising and conde-
scending; that the kind of democracy that, for
example, America defends only pretends to be
democracy (this was after the election in USA, when
the few votes in Florida determined the outcome),
and so on. And many people fancy employing the
well-known stereotypes of cold (northern) Europe
versus the warm and hospitable Balkans, emphasis-
ing that they are more impulsive than Europeans,
less stressed and more emotional.
Balkan identity is complex and contradictory. It
is both a violent and destructive force, and an
authentic, real and creative attitude. And sometimes
people embrace the contradictions and adopt the
wild and chaotic madness because it also represents
something real, that is, non-European. Here is an
excerpt from my diary:
He [Nihad] says that ‘people in the West look at us and think
we are crazy; they all think we are crazy’, and he says some-
thing like ‘our mentality is different’. He is not explicitly refer-
ring to a Balkan mentality, but something like it. This thing
where you at one and the same time hate your culture, the
Balkan-like – which is chaos, craziness, violence, war, the
incomprehensible – and if not exactly love it then also identify
with it. It is like saying, ‘I am crazy, insane, and I am proud of
it’. Like when we hear this powerful and crazy yell from down
the road and I think some kind of catastrophe has happened;
I ask what it is, and Nihad replies: ‘Nothing, it is normal here’.
And then they laugh a strange laughter, but also one that is
meant to tell me [as a European], ‘this is how we are: we are
wild and we are proud of it’. It is this embracing of the other-
ness that they are perfectly aware Westerners see in them. As
when Fahrudin says, ‘people from the West look at us and say
we are crazy, abnormal, but here everything is abnormal;
that’s why I feel normal’.
Balkan, then, is negative and positive, and also
unavoidable. It is the opposite of the European
mentality – sometimes better, sometimes worse. It is
destructive and creative. It is used to understand the
war, violence and destruction, and it is a central
though contradictory element in the process of iden-
tification in which the Muslims of Stolac engage.
Europe
Opposite Balkans is Europe. The Muslims of Stolac
have three ways of comparing and identifying them-
selves with Europe: as lagging behind, as being alike,
and/or as being better – not by being Balkan but by
being more European than Europeans.
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Many associate Europe with peace, prosperity and
orderliness and believe it offers a better life. ‘Towards
Europe’, as an election poster stated in the general
election in November 2000. Europe is a dream, and
for many an unattainable one. Bosnia Herzegovina
is seen as lagging behind materially and technolog-
ically in regard to their legal systems and societal
development. I remember once Nusret showed me
some pictures, one of which was of his family during
the war. Its quality is bad, the background is a wall
with graffiti on it, his children, who look sad, are
wearing ragged clothes, and everything seems to be
run down. Another picture is taken inside an apart-
ment, in front of an empty peeling wall; one of the
boys is sitting on an old mattress full of holes. That
is all. Right next to the pictures in the album is one
taken by his sister, who lives in Germany. The home
is pretty and the quality of the picture is good. The
children are well dressed and well groomed, pictures
are hanging on the wall, and there is nice furniture
and china on the table. Everybody looks healthy
and lively. Nusret’s comment was, ‘it is the same,
right? Totally the same; can’t you see it? [He laughs a
little]’. I know that his dream is to be able to give his
children and himself such a future. In fact, he emi-
grated with his family to Sweden two months later.
On other occasions when people compare the
Balkans with the pregnant symbol of Europe, they
do not depict themselves as lagging behind, but
rather as being no different. They stress that it is
people in [Western] Europe who deem them under-
developed and abnormal. As Mensur once said, ‘The
Bosnian Muslims are the most intelligent and most
educated Muslims in the world, probably because
we are from Europe’. Sometimes I was confronted
with the view – contrary to the Balkan explanation
– that the war could have occurred anywhere, that
Europe also has a bloody history, or that it all was
due to international as well as national politics, a
view with which people resist attempts at linking up
the war with a typical Balkan mentality.
The last aspect in comparisons between the
Balkans and Europe is when people state that
Bosnians are in fact better than Europeans, not
because they are more authentic, emotional and
hospitable, as was the case when the Balkan dis-
course was embraced and the otherness internalised,
but because they are more European. The main
arguments employed to support this identification
relate to education and general knowledge.
Nihad’s father, for instance, clearly places Bosnia
Herzegovina at the top of Europe. He is a well-read
man and was part of an intellectual group in Stolac
which does not exist anymore because, as he says,
the majority of the intellectuals have left the country.
He often talked about the high intellectual level of
former Yugoslavia: ‘…we had one of the best school
systems in Europe – philosophy, architecture, math-
ematics…Plato, Aristotle, everything’, and he tells
me that the West does not reckon the people in the
Balkans as capable of anything. One day he told me
about a Spanish SFOR soldier who used to come and
visit him: ‘…I asked if he knew [he mentioned a
Spanish writer whose name I did not catch]; he didn’t,
so I had to teach him Spanish literature’. He also
talked about civilisation, about the idea that a culture
has to settle. He said that civilisation has existed in
Bosnia and in Yugoslavia for many years, which may
be regarded as a tree with close rings, while American
culture has the same quality as a tree growing very
fast. He speaks Russian and taught himself German
from a tape. One day he told me about the superior-
ity of the letter c in the Bosnian language; in German
you need three letters to create the same sch sound.
In their attempt to define their identity as
Muslims, my informants draw on the discursive
construction Balkans/Europe, which in the war
became even more relevant due to extensive use of
this construction by ex-Yugoslav politicians trying to
legitimate succession, for example, Western politi-
cians, journalists and academics trying to Balkanise
the war and thereby legitimate non-interference;
and civilians trying to grasp the madness by encap-
sulating the violence as the result of some kind of
unavoidable Balkan mentality.
The Muslims of Stolac employ the opposition in
different and rather incongruous ways. Often the
same persons made different statements depending
on the situation or the topic discussed. The Muslims’
dilemma of being (n)either Balkan (n)or European is
a central aspect in everyday processes of identifica-
tion and it is an identification which avoids ethnic
connotations. To be a Muslim of Stolac means to
continually place oneself somewhere in the discur-
sive tension of Balkans-Europe.
The role of the victim
This last section relates to the Muslims’ identifica-
tion of themselves as victims, and in contrast to the
previous identifications it serves as an explicit critique
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of the Croat/Serbian other. The role of the victim is
the only identification I have encountered that
explicitly focuses upon the Muslims as an isolated
group, that sets the Muslims apart, and that in a way
reinforces the nationalistic rhetoric of exclusiveness
and non-ethnic interaction. The role of the victim
works, therefore, in opposition to the other three
types of identification, but it is also the only antag-
onistic identification I have encountered among the
Muslims.
The victim’s role is linked to the national politi-
cal rhetoric. Though not well documented it seems
as though Muslims as a group were being promoted
as victims in Bosnian politics throughout the war in
order to gain sympathy internationally and to legit-
imatise the preservation of an ethnically heteroge-
neous Bosnia Herzegovina (Velikonja 2001: 282,
Bougarel 1996: 108-109). For instance, looking at
the many terrible rapes committed during the war it
appears that the raped women only became impor-
tant politically when they disappeared as individu-
als and were transformed into a symbol of the raped
nation (Meznaric 1994; Morokvasic 1998, Olujic,
1998). As Olujic (1998: 45) writes, ‘… the rapes of
individual women were microcosms of the larger
invasions of territory’. In other words, the raped
women symbolised the raped Bosnian nation.
In Stolac, Muslims recurrently talked about them-
selves as victims in the war, and how they had not
committed any atrocities. Often it was a kind of
mutual confirmation of their own fate – the situa-
tion, the humiliation and fear they had lived through
and their communality as Muslims. The discourse of
the victim’s role was a way of representing identity.
One of the aspects of this role concerns the Muslims
as victims of a conspiracy.
Almost everybody I talked to recalled how the
war came as a surprise, and they explain this by
saying that it was all a conspiracy and that they
were betrayed. People believed in Yugoslavia, in
Brotherhood and Unity (bratstvo i jedinststvo), in
their army JNA (the people’s army), and later when
the war had started they believed that they and the
Croats were facing the same enemy – the Serbs. But
when the war started the Muslims realised that the
Serbs had had it planned out for a long time, and
the Croats had intended to go against the Muslims
when the two groups were still allied in 1992/1993.
Nermin often talked about the deceit he, his family
and the Muslims had experienced. 
The Croats had planned it all far in advance. Before the war,
in 1991-1992 they had already begun printing their own birth
certificates. It was all planned. 
The Serbs and Croats had a deal. The Serbs should have the
territory to Neretva [the great river running through
Hercegovina and also Mostar], and the Croats the territory
from Neretva. What about us then? We were supposed to end
up in the river.
Anvere (his wife): Nermin, he didn’t think there would be
a war; he just worked all the time. He thought that if one just
works nothing would happen. At that time, in 1991, he
helped a friend build a house in Dubrave. Then a Croatian
friend of ours came by and asked, ‘why are you working,
Nermin; the war will still come and destroy everything’.
Nermin: I was standing there by the road working, and he
passed and asked, ‘Nermin why are you working? The war will
soon come and everything will be destroyed’. I didn’t take any
notice of him; he has always been a little nervous. It was all
planned. The Croats, they stabbed us in the back.
People also feel that the West let them down by not
having intervened soon enough, by not having
allowed the Muslims to arm themselves (due to the
weapons embargo), and by having pretended not to
know what was going on in Bosnia Herzegovina
(especially the existence of the Croat prison camps).
They feel as though they were part of an experiment.
It was seldom explained what the experiment was
about, but it relates to being part of a political game
that they were unable to see through: old alliances,
territory, military access to the sea, international pol-
itics, arms deals, and so on. On the other hand, people
stress that it was the West that finally ended the war
and ensured peace. People are therefore grateful, yet
they ask themselves why the West did not intervene
long before and thereby save thousands of lives.
To be a Bosnian Muslim, then, is to be betrayed
by everyone and only have oneself to turn to, but at
the same time people keep expecting the interna-
tional community to sort out their present problems.
It is as though they feel that the West ‘owes them’
for having let them down in the war.
Another aspect of the victim’s role is that, when
talking about the betrayal, people perceive them-
selves as credulous and naive. They ask themselves
why they did not see things coming, why they
believed the Croats and why they did not prepare
themselves militarily for war. But at the same time
this naiveté is also read as evidence of the Muslims’
honesty, trustworthiness and decency.
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Consider what Armin’s mother once said:
In the beginning it was the Serbs [who started] and then they
persuaded the Croats to do the same. Tudjman and Milosˇevic´
were in Karadjordjevo, where they planned how to divide up
the country. Then Milosˇevic´ said to Tudjman: ‘You can have
your country to Neretva, you can have half of Bosnia
Herzegovina and then I want half of Bosnia Herzegovina, then
we’ll make a deal and we will kill all the Muslims’. We Muslims
did not know anything about the deal at that moment. We are
decent people and want a good relationship with everybody;
we are not bad people. There is one word very characteristic
of us Muslims and that is merhametli [helpful; afterwards, while
listening to the tape, one of my interpreters said that ‘some
think we were too merhametli during the war and that’s why
all this happened; we were too tolerant’]; we are not bad
people. We cannot all be brothers and sisters, but we have to
be good friends, we have to understand each other, take care
of each other and be together, communicate. And if I do not
have anything today and you do, you should help me, and
tomorrow if you do not have anything I’ll help you. 
The old lady clearly communicates the feeling of
deceit, and the sense that the Muslims were victims,
but with this fate as her starting point she also moves
towards a definition of Muslimness: a deceived,
naive, but decent people. The Muslims feel they
showed their true nature during the war by not
‘speaking’ the same language as the other ethnic
groups – that of destruction, looting and killing.
Once I asked Emir why the Croats behaved so cruelly
during the war, especially in the prison camps. He
answered, ‘I don’t know; if I knew I would be like
them’. The central strategy is to turn the wrongdoers’
actions back against them. The misdeeds affected
the Muslims, but they talk about their executers. It
is also a way for the Muslims to identify the Muslim
mentality. For example, people refer to the horrible
atrocities against civilians committed by Serbs and
Croats, but not by Muslims. They became innocent
and are astonished by the brutal violence commit-
ted in the war. As Aida once said, ‘we showed our
nature by not being inhuman’.
A third element of people’s talk about the betrayal
is their lack of trust in the Croats. They can live
together but will not trust each other again. And
many feel an obligation to tell their children the
truth, so the war will not repeat itself. When we
discussed the curriculum in the school, Ljiljana, a
schoolteacher, made the following remarks:
I cannot teach my child to forget it all. My mother never
taught me about the things that happened before [the Second
World War], and that’s why these things happened to us. If we
were a little stronger and if we didn’t believe in everything
they say… The worst thing is that we believed in them. We
paid the highest price because we believed in them. We shall
never forget. If we forget, it will happen again. They raise their
children to become the greatest Croats or the greatest Serbs,
and things will remain the same until they change their edu-
cation.
The different elements in the role of the victim (we
were deceived by everybody; we were naive but
decent; we are not like them, and we will never trust
them fully again; this will never happen again) are
all parts of Muslim identification. But it is also a cri-
tique of the ethnic other and a legitimisation of the
Muslims’ return to Stolac. The Muslims have a dual
way of legitimising their return, which at first glance
can appear contradictory: legitimising by downplay-
ing the relevance of ethnic categories (as seen in the
ideal of tolerance), and legitimising by criticising the
Serbian and Croatian aggressions and attempts at
exterminating the Muslims. This duality was clearly
expressed by Nusret during an interview:
There are no Bosnjaks without Bosnia Herzegovina, but there
is no Bosnia Herzegovina without Serbs or Croats. Three dif-
ferent people live here; that is our fate.
The first part of the citation refers to people’s criti-
cism of the other ethnic groups and their attempt to
exterminate the Muslims, and it is inside this rea-
soning that the victim’s role is played out. The other
part refers to the downplaying of antagonisms
between the ethnic groups, simply because ‘we have
to live together’. The Muslims at one and the same
time are saying ‘we want to live here’ and ‘we have
to live here together’. Besides being part of an ideal
of tolerance this is also due to the fact that the
Muslims, contrary to the other ethnic groups, do
not have any adopted country to go to. They have to
live in Bosnia Herzegovina.
By writing about how the Muslims of Stolac con-
struct themselves as victims in order to identify
Muslimness and not about how the Muslims in fact
were victims, I feel I fail to do justice to their actual
experiences. However, this tension also exists in the
Muslim community of Stolac and relates to genera-
tional differences. Many of the young simply feel
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that the persistent talk about how Muslims are vic-
tims is a hindrance to creating a future. For them
there is no status in dwelling upon the role of the
victim. They sometimes entered the discourse of vic-
timhood, but mostly they preferred to talk about
football, cars and music, and they were often tired
of the older generation clinging to the past. 
I shall conclude with an example of this kind of
conflict acted out between a mother and her son.
One day, talking to Amra about my trip back home
to Denmark, I said that in Sarajevo taxis are very
expensive but are the only way to get from the hotel
to the airport. Then Amra said, ‘Why don’t you just
take the bus to X [I do not remember the name] and
from there it’s only a 250-300-meter walk. Everything
is destroyed there, but just follow the road, because
there are mines, so don’t go off the road’. Her son,
who obviously had overheard our conversation,
interrupted in a somewhat resigned manner, ‘there
are no mines, mother’. And she replied, ‘Yes there
are. A lot of things were destroyed during the war;
the frontline was there, and there are mines’. And
her son said in a slightly unfriendly way, ‘Mother
there is no war anymore, the war is over!’
Discussion
Though not originating in ethnic and religious
differences, the war in Bosnia surely exploited,
enforced and to some extent constructed them. And
while it is true that Bosnian Muslim religious
nationalism came late and was not as articulate and
extreme as Serbian and Croat nationalism, it did
exist and it did preach and practice ethnic exclusion
despite being somewhat contradictory. Considering
the Bosnian Muslims’ nationalism, the structural
theories of violence, and finally the fact that today
Stolac is totally ethnically divided and marked by
nationalistic politics, one might expect the Muslims’
identification to be unambiguous, exclusive, based on
religious and national values, and strongly focused
upon ‘Muslimness’. My results show on the contrary
that local Muslim identifications in Stolac are much
more complex, ambiguous, and not at all as clear
cut as structural theories of violence would have it.
The new Bosnian nation-state neither serves as a
central imagined community for people nor has
positive connotations. Religion is important, but in
the sense of values attached to an everyday morality
and not a doctrinaire reading of Islam.
I have pointed out four different identifications
central to people’s lives in trying to ascertain what it
means to be a post-war Muslim resident of Stolac/-
Bosnia. Three of these were not concerned with
defining Muslimness as an exclusive and detached
category; rather they centred on what it means to be
a Stolcˇanici, a good neighbour living with difference
and finally a Bosnian (Balkanian) in Europe. 
The first one – local patriotism – was about
(re)defining Stolac as a place for coexistence partly
by constructing an endemic Stolac aesthetic. Stolac
was/is a pearl on earth; it is beautiful and charac-
terised by its unique broad-minded mentality. The
second one referred to an objectified habitual pre-
war practice of local inter-ethnic interaction charac-
terised by tolerance (‘familiarisation of difference’
and the value of komsjiluk), an ideal of tolerance
that partly was associated with a Muslim mentality.
The third one placed the people of Stolac in relation
to a more global discourse of the connections/rela-
tionship between Europe and Balkan. Different and
contradictory positions exist here, but all are char-
acterised by not focusing upon ethnicity. It is not
the position toward the other ethnic groups which
is central, but the position vis-à-vis Europe. Only the
fourth identification, the role of the victim, was
antagonistic, exclusive and focused explicitly on the
Muslims as a separate group. And it was furthermore
an unmistakable criticism of the ethnic others, pre-
dominantly the Croats.
In sum, the war has definitely changed the way
the Muslims of Stolac identify themselves. But the
changes have not been as radical as one would
expect. Bosnian/Muslim nationalism is not very
important, religion has returned to a more or less
pre-war level, and pre-war values such as tolerance,
coexistence, solidarity, neighbourliness and civilisa-
tion (Balkans/Europe), though somewhat changed,
are still central.
Practices of violence certainly have the potential
to consolidate, accentuate or even create identities.
However, this is not the same as explaining why vio-
lence or war arises, which some structural theories
of violence more or less explicitly attempt to do (see
references in the introduction). Such a functional
argument in which violence is supposed to erupt
when differences become too small should – at least
in the Bosnian case – be replaced by a focus upon
political strategies. It was the war and post-war pol-
itics which initiated the ethnic division of Stolac,
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because ethnic cleansing was the explicit aim and
method of power-seeking nationalistic politicians.
War did not occur due to an intrinsic potential of
violence; rather the violence in Stolac manifested
and augmented the politically created division
(Kolind 2004).
Secondly, the potential of violence for consoli-
dating differences should be related to moves in the
opposite direction. That is, everyday attempts at
making social relations ambiguous and indistinct.
In this paper I have analysed such an opposite move:
resistance to nationalism. This counterdiscourse – as
I call it – exists through the many ways the Muslims
of Stolac reject the nationalistic paradigm and insist
on pre-war values of tolerance, coexistence, neigh-
bourliness and – as I have shown elsewhere (Kolind
2002a; 2004) – through their refusal to employ
ethnic categories when accounting for the war and
the erosion of their everyday world. However, this
counterdiscourse is often flawed. Contradictions exist
between the role of the victim and the other iden-
tifications, and ‘inside’ the different types of identi-
fication lurk potentials for ethnic hatred. But the
ordinary people of Stolac, contrary to nationalistic
politicians, cannot afford the luxury of ethnic
hatred, because they have to live with the conse-
quences of such antagonistic feelings (see also Jansen
in this volume). What we see instead, to paraphrase
Das and Kleinman (2001: 16), are not necessarily
grand narratives of forgiveness and redemption, but
small local stories in which people are experiment-
ing with ways of inhabiting the world together.
So when people stress ideals of tolerance and coex-
istence, but tend to attach such values to a
Muslimness; when people identify themselves as
belonging to Stolac, but implicitly question (some
of) the Croats’ love for the town, and when people
project themselves as victims and identify the others
as dealers in atrocities, we have examples of contra-
dictions, but also attempts at reconciliation and the
creation of possibilities for future coexistence. As I
see the situation in Stolac, potentials for peace and
(pragmatic) co-existence come from the bottom up
– a situation contradicting the Hobbesian dictum
that in the absence of inter-social regulating struc-
tures the world would be all against all. What we see
in Stolac is an example of another ‘human nature’,
one characterised by a will to build enduring social
relations, not in a romantic or unproblematic way,
but pragmatically, contradictorily and unavoidably.
N O T E S
1 Stolac is situated in southern Hercegovina, with approxi-
mately 5,000 inhabitants. During the war, the Croats vio-
lently expelled the entire male population and placed them
in horrendous prison camps, whereas the women and
children were expelled to Muslim controlled areas. The
whole of Stolac was then razed. The Croats destroyed all
the buildings, objects of art, monuments, Mosques, and so
on, bearing witness to the former Ottoman occupation,
and they robbed all the Muslim houses. In 1996-1997, the
Muslim population started to return supported by the
international community. In the initial phase of their
return, the Muslims were persistently met with violence
and threats and their houses were mined. But gradually
such incidents stopped, and during my fieldwork in
September 2000 to April 2001, it seemed as though the
Croats had accepted the idea that the Muslims would stay;
however, the town remains totally ethnically divided.
2 Father’s brother’s daughter.
3 Cp. Allcock, inspired by Durkheim, who suggests that we
view atrocity as sacralisation, that is, a symbolic focus for
solidarity (2000: 401).
4 Analyses on such analytical levels are often rather specu-
lative. One could argue otherwise and claim that violence
itself has become a disembedded practice. As Bauman’s
(1994) study of the Holocaust shows, violence in modern
bureaucratic systems has in fact been lifted out of concrete
social relations and developed into a rational bureaucratic
tool. In a similar vein, Pick (1993) argues that the conduct
of violence and slaughter (both of animals and men) in
Western Europe in the recent 150 years has followed the
overall pattern of systematic industrial rationality.
5 This point comes from Ivana Macˇek in personal corre-
spondence. 
6 See also Jansen (2000) for similar findings from Belgrade
and Zagreb.
7 Attempts were made, but they had been persistently polit-
ically marginalised (Bougarel 1997; Babuna 1999).
8 Interaction between Muslims and Christians in Bulgaria.
9 All the informants’ names in this article are pseudonyms.
10 The reason why I write this in the vernacular is that I
often heard exactly this expression: ‘Bosnjaks, and Serbs
and Croats’. It seemed to be a deeply felt and engraved
memory device.
11 But not all Croats are blamed. Mostly people feel that the
Croats from other parts of Bosnia who moved to Stolac
during the war are the guilty ones. They do not come from
the town and are therefore not seen as having any deep
feelings for it; that is, they do not share the Stolac spirit.
12 Several times leading Croats have denied the existence of
Mosques in Stolac, all remnants of them having been
removed. For these Croats pre-war Ottoman Stolac has
been repressed.
13 Remember that during and after the war many house-
wives did not bake cakes, as cakes symbolise joy and cele-
bration.
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14 Fatima’s story below is an example of a story about respect-
ful and tolerant interaction among the three ethnic groups:
Our whole family was mixed. It didn’t matter if one was
Serb, Croat or Muslim; everybody was good enough. When
my oldest brother was going to be married, he came with
his bride, and her name was Olga, and I knew her from
beforehand. We used to go down to videvo polje, and
there she saw me with my son. ‘Well you know who I am’.
‘Yes, you are going to marry my brother’. When my broth-
er came, he said to me: ‘go to our father and tell him that
I will be coming with my bride. How is he going to react
when he hears that?’ I went home and told him, and my
father said: ‘why are you asking me? If he loves her, so do
I. If he can sleep with her, I can dine with her’. My sister-
in-law says that she can never think of my parents with-
out starting to cry. She also says that they received her
well and weren’t too religious, and that it did not bother
them at all that she was Serb. And my uncle, he married a
Croat woman. We took good care of each other. And one
of my uncle’s daughters married a Serb and they lived in
Serbia. And another one married one from Montenegro…
Now I can’t remember them all. Everything was mixed in
our family’.
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Post-war Guatemala is marked by unprecedented
levels of non-political violence. Organised crime,
hijackings, and lynching of suspected outlaws by
local mobs in rural Maya-populated areas threaten
the yet to be fully implemented peace agreement of
December 1996 (Moser and McIlwaine 2001). 
Another marker of contemporary Guatemala is
the growing presence on the national political arena
of the Pan-Maya movement – an anti-racist initiative
for the support of the Maya people and of its threat-
ened values. In its most central documents it claims
that the pre-Columbian Maya past was one of peace,
and that violence – like disease and every kind of
human evil – was brought by ‘the mighty men’ of
the 16th century conquest (COMG 1995 [see the
Chilam Balam quote above]). It is hardly surprising
that a cultural movement, resembling a nationalist
project in every aspect but the claim to their own
state, makes such an effort to connect the plans for
future harmony to the notion of a harmonious his-
tory. What is remarkable, however, is the absence of
similar statements among those rural Mayas whom
I encountered during the different phases of my
anthropological fieldwork in the 1990s.
My assumption in this chapter is that culture in
war is subject to processes of politicisation and
essentialisation to which violence is crucial. Violence
here is not a consequence of cultural difference but,
rather, the means by which cultural difference is
politicised (Harrison 1993; Warren 1993). In order
to prove that assumption right I explore the location
of knowledge about the Maya past and about what
that location implies in terms of different notions of
the very content of contemporary Maya culture. 
Both anthropology and archaeology have a stake
in the identity politics of post-war Guatemala. The
role of foreign anthropologists in the production of
knowledge is nowadays a highly contested issue
among, in particular, the activists of the Pan-Maya
movement (see Warren 1992; 1998; Watanabe 1995;
Montejo 1999). Many of them perceive of anthro-
pologists as the true colonialists of the era of global-
isation. When American anthropologist Kay Warren
discussed this with Maya intellectuals she was told
that ‘the appropriate role for North American
Anthropologists should be one of helping to identify
continuities in Maya culture, the timeless character-
istics that make Mayas Maya’ (Warren 1998:74).
Post-modern critiques of cultural essences were thus
seen as colonialist attempts at stripping the Mayas
of their very last possessions – their culture and their
pride.
The role of archaeology, and of ‘foreign’ archae-
ologists in the production of knowledge, is equally
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11 Ahau was when the mighty men arrived from the east. They were
the ones who first brought disease here to our land, the land of us
who are Maya, in the year 1513. 
Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel (Roys 1967: 138)
Control of the Maya past is equal to the control of our power in the
present, for history is the basis for demanding respect for our political
and cultural rights as a People. 
Maya intellectual Avexnim Cojtí Ren (2002)
contested. Maya archaeology has developed consid-
erably during the last twenty years, and this has had
a particular effect on the Maya movement. Prior to
the deciphering of ‘the Maya code’ (see Coe 1992)
the mystery of Classic Maya civilisation (AD
300–900) inspired not only the New-Age-movement,
but also the Maya revivalists themselves. Practically
anything that served the interests of Maya identity
politics could then be written on the tabula rasa of
the Maya past. The problem now lies in the discov-
eries made by linguists and archaeologists of the
violence from within that contributed in bringing
about the collapse of Maya civilisation (see Sharer
1994); and of the role of sacrifice and the symbolism
of blood in Maya religion and culture (see Schele
and Miller 1992). The idea that the Spaniards brought
violence to the Americas, and that pre-Columbian
culture was one of peace and harmony is, to the
regret of a certain strand of Maya activism, now dif-
ficult to sustain. 
In a self-evaluating conference on the role of
archaeology in the perpetuation of discriminatory
Guatemalan politics, archaeologists from the
University of British Columbia, Canada, admitted
the impact of excavations and research on Maya com-
munities. The practices of archaeological research
have created new incentives for tourist economies
that sometimes, but far from always, benefit the
community in which the excavations take place
(Castañeda 2001). At the same meeting Canadian
archaeologist Marvin Cohodas (2001) argued that:
‘archaeologists have appropriated ancient Maya his-
tory to exemplify what it means for a society to fail.’
This equation of collapse with failure has, according
to Cohodas, damaged Maya interests since it sepa-
rates the past from the present, and, in the end,
because the alleged break permeates the portrayal of
contemporary Mayas as inferior to their ancient
forebears. Such an inferiority legitimises contempo-
rary discrimination. Maya intellectual Avexnim
Cojtí Ren writes: 
[The notion of] [c]ollapse denies our continuity as the original
people of countries in which we reside and our possible claims
to that historical continuity. The result of that discontinua-
tion of our history is that Maya are denied a true identity;
we are regarded still by the general population and even our-
selves as just ‘Indios,’ with no history nor culture but customs
and traditions, no land title, with dialects, and so forth. (Cojtí
Ren 2002) 
The object of this criticism is thus not the revelation
of Maya violence, but the overemphasis on it, and
the widely spread association of ancient Maya civil-
isation with the notion of abrupt political transfor-
mation.
It is important to incorporate a discussion on
Guatemalan racism, and the satisfaction with which
a non-Indian anti-Indian discourse now concludes
that it is not only the present of the backward Indian
that breathes chaos and violence, but also the past.
Victor Montejo, exiled Maya and trained anthropol-
ogist suggests that the turn away from archaeologist
Eric Thomson’s ‘peaceful Maya’, to a new archaeo-
logical interest in blood and internal violence, coin-
cided with the mayhem of the Guatemalan highlands
of the early 1980s for political reasons (Montejo
1999; see Wilk 1985). In his paper for the British
Columbia Conference, Montejo claims to be repre-
senting an ‘insider’s perspective’ and argues that:
archaeology has played an endemic role in perpetuating the
contemporary indigenous people in a timeless past or
allochronic time. The continuous aim of some archaeologists
in excavating tombs and sacred sites is to perpetuate their
power (intellectual colonialism) over those whose remains and
ancestors are being desecrated. In this process of free enter-
prise, working at the margins of ethical and human rights
issues, the new and old archaeologists need to be reminded of
their accountability to indigenous people as they transform
their speculations into science and ‘the Truth’ about Mayans.
(Montejo 2001) 
But the attack on archaeology is countered by
archaeologists in the field. One of them, Arthur
Demarest, claimed in a lecture recently that Mayas
are no less capable of objectively understanding the
decline of Classic Maya civilisation than are
Europeans the fall of the Roman Empire. He went
on to say that it is a misguided and paternalistic
North American attack on Maya archaeology that is
to blame for the idea today that contemporary
Mayas cannot accept new archaeological discoveries.
The target in Demarest’s critique is thus a growing
reflexivity among western archaeologists (see, in par-
ticular, Pyburn 1998; 1999, and the British Columbia
Conference ‘Towards a more Ethical Mayanist
Archaeology’ at www.ethical.arts.ubc.ca). What
interests me here is the location of the contested
knowledge. On the one hand, Montejo is a born
Kanhobal Maya. His critique of North American
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archaeology is admittedly from within a Maya posi-
tion. But Montejo is also a U.S. trained anthropolo-
gist, a fact that Demarest implicitly chose to empha-
sise since Montejo’s critique, by him, is referred to as
North American paternalism. This connects to the
violent break between culture as lived experience
and culture as ideology in Maya nationalism. Is it
possible to identify the roles, not just of violence,
but also of anthropology and archaeology in that
break?
Experiencing and establishing continuities
During fieldwork in the mid 1990s when I once had
to leave Guatemala for a couple of days, I decided to
embark on an excursion to the Maya Copán ruins
located in Honduras just south of the Guatemalan
border. I was lucky to travel in the company of one
of the intellectuals of the Pan-Maya movement –
then newspaper columnist Miguel Angel Velasco. To
me the trip represented a short vacation, but for
Miguel it was a pilgrimage to what once was the cul-
tural and artistic centre of the Maya world. The
Hieroglyphic Stairway of Copán (see Sharer 1994:
300-10) took our breath away and we engaged in
long discussions and pondered on the possible sig-
nificance of such a magnificent architecture. My
friend is not an archaeologist by training, but what
struck me as so fascinating was the eagerness and
wit by which he interpreted the signs of the past
in a culture and language of the present. He was
certain that the patterns of the stone walls mim-
icked the patterns of the huipiles – the women’s
blouses back in Guatemala – and he repeated, with-
out any hesitation and despite the fact that we were
exploring the territory of Honduras, that he felt like
‘coming home’.
I have also encountered more fundamentalist
claims to Maya particularities. Another friend of
mine, a young woman whose wedding was about to
take place near a Maya mountain shrine in the
Kakchikel speaking community of Chimaltenango
invited me to partake in the ceremony. It turned out
to be a beautiful event and the fact that I was the
only canche (blond person) in this domestic, yet
politically significant, celebration made me enjoy it
even more. That is, until the Maya priest switched
from blessing the wedding couple to a political agi-
tation against the evil of foreign influence. The
priest turned his own, and the others’, attention to
me and my association with what he termed a
‘European evil’. I was then advised to leave.
Theoreticians associated with the Latin American
left (e.g., Friedlander 1975; Hawkins 1984) have
argued that the very process of state formation in
Latin America needed a stereotyped ‘Other’ and that
indigenous identity was formed by the oppression
of a dispossessed majority. The experience of being
ascribed an identity as the ‘Other’ of the state thus
resulted in a ‘being’. The disciplines of both archae-
ology and anthropology have certainly proved that
argument overly simplistic, but it is my position
here that the anti-Western sentiments of the Maya
priest in Chimaltenango, and also the doctrines of
the Pan-Maya movement, cannot be understood
without taking into account the racial foundations
of the Guatemalan nation-state. 
Demitrio Cojtí Cuxil, both analyst and ideologue
of the Pan-Maya perspective in Guatemala, explores
the arrogance of the state in relation to its Maya
majority (1994). He argues that the Maya People is
the rightful owner of the archaeological sites cur-
rently and ‘legally’ in the hands of either the state
or private owners – neither of which has been Maya
by any standard. In a sinister way, this way of
exploiting Maya property claims an ownership of a
Maya past, i.e., in administering and marketing the
archaeological centres as treasures of the nation, the
Guatemalan state competes with the Pan-Maya
movement over the political and economic benefits
of the positive symbolism of the Maya past. Cojtí
Cuxil writes: 
With regard to the access of the Mayas to the archaeological
centres of their forefathers, one could say that today, the
Mayas not only have to pay the entrance fee to see the ‘ruins’
of their forefathers (Tikal, Iximche, Saqulew, etc.), but they are
also treated as third class citizens by the employees who work
in these sites. (1994: 70, my translation) 
The possible discovery of ancient wisdom, and/or
of remnants of an older knowledge is, contrary to
what is claimed by Maya critics, what inspires a great
number of academics to pursue research on the pres-
ent day cultures of Guatemala and southern Mexico
(Watanabe 1992). In the last chapter of the epic 1993
volume on ‘threads’ connecting the ancient Maya
with their contemporary inheritors (Freidel, Schele
and Parker 1993), the late American art historian
Linda Schele reflexively narrated an encounter that
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made her aware of the fact that the ancient Maya
ballgame was, in a way, alive and well in parts of
highland Guatemala. In 1989, in the colonial
Guatemalan capital Antigua, Schele was hosting a
workshop with forty Maya participants representing
no less than eleven contemporary Maya language
groups. After having explained the process of deci-
phering the glyphs of a Maya tablet to her Maya stu-
dents, Schele states:
I looked around the room to see if my Maya listeners under-
stood this complicated argument, especially since it had been
delivered in my personal brand of Spanish […]. To my right I
spotted a handsome young Q’anhob’al named Ruperto
Montejo, who has taken the Maya name Saq Ch’en. He sat
with a beatific grin on his face, his hand palm up, moving as
if he were bouncing an imaginary ball. I stopped talking in
mid-sentence as it dawned on me what he was indicating.
‘You know this word?’ I asked in excitement. ‘Do you have
it in Q’anhob’al?’
His grin deepened as he explained that pitz referred to a
children’s game played with a grass ball.
‘Jugador llamamos “pitzlawom,”’ he said with equal excite-
ment.
‘Qué me dices?’ I asked swiftly, not sure I had understood
the Spanish correctly. 
‘Pitzlawom is the word for “ballplayer,”’ he said in Spanish
that I understood clearly. A feeling of elation expanded in my
chest. (1993: 339)
Archaeology’s part in the identity construction of
the present is far from an exclusively Guatemalan
phenomenon, and archaeologists have discussed
and critically reflected on the role of the discipline
in relation to nationalism and ethnic war worldwide
(e.g., Meskell 1998; Kohl and Fawcett 1995). Regions
like the Balkans and the Middle East are particularly
relevant since many ‘overlapping pasts’ exist within
a common framework. But just as in the case of the
Schele quote above, it is not a focus on warfare and
violence, but rather the establishment of a certain
kind of continuity for a certain kind of people that
politicises the past. When the writings of Schele are
now criticised from a Maya position, it is an irony
that the strong emphasis on continuity is ignored in
favour of the issue of the violence within.
If Linda Schele managed to bridge millennia of
socio-cultural transformations, anthropologists have
successfully identified Maya cultural continuities
through the more recent history of colonialism and
modern war. Barbara Tedlock’s Time and the Highland
Maya (1982) demonstrates how ancient Maya con-
ceptions of qualitative time organise relations and
ritual in Quiché-speaking Momostenango, and
Robert Hill and Jonathan Monaghan dedicate their
book Continuities in Highland Maya Social Organization
(1987) to presenting ‘evidence’ that the closed cor-
porate community – coined by Eric Wolf in 1957 as
a socio-cultural survival mechanism emerging in
the encounter with colonial oppression – actually
stretches beyond pre-colonial times into the past and
also into the post-colonial, post-genocidal present.
War… 
The Guatemalan war officially extended from the
first insurgent activities in the early 1960s to the
signing of the peace agreement on December 29,
1996, making it then the longest ongoing armed
conflict in Latin America. The total death toll was
estimated to 200,000, of which the national army
directly and indirectly bore a responsibility for 99
percent and the insurgents for the remaining one
(CEH 1999). 
The politico-military usage of the concept of war,
and its roots in the writings of Prussian military
strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1976[1832]), conceals
a number of experiential and qualitative dimen-
sions of political violence recently explored in a
growing body of anthropological studies of political
violence (see, e.g., Daniel 1996; Nordstrom 1997;
Aretxaga 1997; Mamdani 2001). This literature argues
for the need to explore how violence becomes rooted
in local communities, resulting in silence and
diminishing spheres of loyalty and trust; how struc-
tures of inequality and poverty are dialectically
linked to processes of political and ethnic mobilisa-
tion; and, how contemporary warfare resists spatial
containment through its intrinsic connections to
the global network of markets, to forced migration
and the cultural production of diasporas and exiled
nationalism. 
My research has been inspired by this new
anthropology, and I have examined the Guatemalan
war in a very specific location in time and space. In
August of 1996 I went to a guerrilla occupied ‘pocket’
in the western highlands, inhabited by an ethnically
mixed group of displaced Maya peasants of some
10,000 individuals. From the ethnography of that
society (Löfving 2002) I will focus on two inter-
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related examples and arguments. The first is an
alternative perspective on cultural continuity, an
analysis of how cosmology orders the powers of the
world, both the divine and the political, and how
cosmology thereby serves as a sense-making struc-
ture that admits radical political changes without
loosing its own explanatory power. The second is
the example of a group of organised Maya diviners
and the changing meaning of culture and history
when the trauma of war and displacement is
expressed in the language of cultural revitalisation
and indigenous nationalism. 
…and cosmology
One anthropological way of approaching the past is
emic, that is, ethnographers tend to explore not the
factual history, but how the past as a notion enters
the life worlds of people in the present. It has been
argued that the writers of the Popol Vhu, the Maya
Quiché book of creation, mixed the known facts and
noble lineages of then-recent years (16th century)
with poetic narration about pre-historic events. This
phenomenon is said to constitute a culture-specific
view of the past (Tedlock 1985). About the people
who are the subject of my studies, Colby and van
den Berghe write: ‘The Ixil have a strong conscious-
ness of their past as shown in their ancestor worship
and especially in their oral traditions where the his-
torical and the mythical are intermixed’ (1969: 146).
Don Nicolas Toma, a Catholic former politician
in his early sixties, lived on the periphery of guerril-
la controlled domains, and the power of his age and
experience made him an unusually communicative
informant. He told me how he had been persecuted
in his hometown Cotzal, caught and tortured at the
army barracks in the neighbouring town of Nebaj.
He wanted me to understand that he had been
forced by army repression to take refuge with the
guerrillas and emphasised not having had knowl-
edge of the activities of the rebels before he was
accused of terrorism. But in the eyes of the local and
army connected land-owning elite in Cotzal, Nicolas
Toma was not without guilt. His position within a
radicalised Catholic Church, in the peasant league
and trade union of Finca San Fransisco – the local
coffee-producing and non-indigenous grand estate
– and in the then politically radical Christian
Democratic Party made him an ideal, albeit pre-
sumptive, guerrilla. Don Nicolas said:
When they [The Christian Democratic Party] presented this
Rios Montt as candidate for the presidency, and myself in
Cotzal as mayor [in the elections of 1974], the people were
very satisfied. I triumphed in politics, won the candidacy, but
they robbed my votes. The name of the mister who robbed me
was Gaspar Perez, the one of the MLN [Movimiento para la
Liberación Nacional, a right-wing political party in Guatemala
with close ties to hard-line officers of the army]. As a result of
this he came to fear me a great deal. But I didn’t want to do
anything to him. You know, I am a worker as opposed to him,
who lived by his party. […] Eventually he took office as mayor.
But he couldn’t let go of the thought that I would cause him
trouble. So he accused me of being a guerrilla. He informed
the army, even though I did not have any connections to the
guerrilla. Even before this, they [adherents of the MLN] had
depicted us [the Christian Democrats] as guerrillas, but the
governor of Quiché didn’t believe them. They went to inform
on me in Quiché. ‘The guerrilla is in Cotzal,’ they told him.
‘What’s his name?’ ‘His name is this and that,’ and they gave
my name to the governor. ‘And what about this person?’ he
asked them. ‘He is a businessman. He is with the political
party.’ The governor asked whether I had a woman. ‘Yes he
has a woman.’ And if I possessed lands and house. ‘Yes he does.’
‘Then listen Gaspar,’ the governor said. ‘You are accusing this
person of nothing else than the problems you have with his
political party. Don’t do that, because a guerrilla doesn’t have
a woman, he doesn’t have a house or any other possessions.
He is roaming the mountains. So you should not go spreading
such lies.’ Ha! Gaspar returned sad and empty-handed to
Cotzal. Next time he went all the way to Guate [the capital] to
meet with the president.
In the above Nicolas takes the liberty of adding to
his story the exact dialogue of events that occurred
more than twenty years before in a place a day’s
journey from where he was at the time. This tech-
nique becomes more frequently employed as the
story unfolds. Let us follow local mayor Gaspar’s
journey to the capital – which proved to be his last
– in the words of his rival Nicolas:
So he went to the palace to obtain an audience with President
Laugerud. There he announced that I was a guerrilla. But what
he had been told by the governor of Quiché, he was told by
the president as well. ‘Don’t get yourself mixed up in these
things, hey, Gaspar! You might get yourself killed,’ the presi-
dent said. ‘Ah,’ said Gaspar, ‘is that so?’ So he took leave of the
president and went to sit down in the Central Park. He was
sad where he sat, because the government hadn’t accepted his
plea. But all of a sudden… there came the owner of Finca San
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Fransisco – Osmundo Brol! ‘What are you doing here, hey
Gaspar [voz Gaspar – indicating a friendship between them]?’
he said. ‘I am announcing that the guerrillas are fucking things
up in Cotzal, but this government is also guerrilla since they
do not accept my complaints.’ ‘Ah, don’t worry Gaspar. Be
patient. If you’d like you could stay here a couple of days, and
then I can help you with the audience,’ Brol told him. ‘Okay,
I’ll wait a couple of days,’ he replied, and then they both went
to see the president. The thing was that they [the guerrillas]
had killed the brother of Osmundo – Jorge Brol – before, when
I was younger. So now they told the president and he said: ‘Is
that so, is that so, ah. Then you must listen, Gaspar. The army
will come from the city to your village. But be prepared, it will
come like lightning or like a river and it will be very dangerous.
If like a river it will destroy everything in its way. If like light-
ning it will burn everything. It won’t even spare you. But
okay, you took heart to tell it all and that is good. You will see
what will happen.’ And Gaspar took leave of the president once
again, and once again he was sad. He took to drinking and
very drunk he returned to Cotzal. He kept tippling for two
weeks, and a couple of months later they killed him. When I
was held hostage [by the army] they told me that the guerril-
las had killed him. The lieutenant of the army said: ‘Listen,
you [Ustedes – plural] killed Gaspar. You are powerful indeed.’
‘What do I know?’ I said to him. So due to [my role within] the
political party in Cotzal they accused me of being a guerrilla.
Note the president’s verdict on the infidels. With
the powers of a god he sentenced the people of the
highlands to extinction. His words and metaphors
echo methods usually associated with gods: lightning
would strike the villages; a flood would sweep every-
thing in its way. In the existing body of ethnography,
I have found a proof-like linkage between Nicolas’
telling of war memories and pre-war Ixil mythology.
Anthropologists Colby and van den Berghe write:
According to current oral tradition [Nebaj in the 1960s], there
was a time when the high god, Q’esla Kub’al, was more directly
connected with earthly events. He became angry with the
inhabitants because they were too close to him and spied on
him. He sought to destroy them with flood. By building boats
and tall houses the people survived. He then made plans to
destroy them with fire. Word got around that the fire would
penetrate the earth by two staff-lengths. Many people accord-
ingly buried themselves in large urns just below the two-staff
line. Others hid in rivers, caves, and mountains. When the
fire came it penetrated not two, but three staff-lengths and
killed all the people hiding in the urns. However, those who
had taken refuge in the caves and rivers survived. (1969: 96-97)
The flood and the lightning are thus not metaphor-
ical inventions of Nicolas Toma. Instead they are
symbols of destruction and change. In the Ixil myth
of creation documented by Colby and van den
Berghe the high god later forgave the survivors and
assigned them the duty of watching the next inhab-
itants of the earth. These were the humans. The sur-
vivors thus turned into intermediary deities whose
power was founded on their connection to a high
god: Q’esla Kub’al. If the humans failed in pleasing
the deities in rituals and offerings, Q’esla Kub’al
would send sickness as punishment upon the
humans. ‘The actions of the intermediaries thus
depend entirely on the behaviour of humans’
(Colby and van den Berghe 1969: 97). The location
of Osmundo Brol as the one mediating the contact
between Gaspar (the People) and the president (the
God) is one avenue to ponder in this juxtaposition
of political and cosmological orders, but so is the
position of the rebels. Their stated goal, of over-
throwing and substituting the earthly power with
another, means that they are playing the subversive,
but also powerful, role in the cosmology of Nicolas’
narration.
The issue of culpability seems inevitable if we
elaborate further on the connections between the
myth of creation and the memory of war in northern
Quiché. It is one of Colby and van den Berghe’s
main points that disaster is believed to be brought
on a people that has itself to blame. The effects of
guerrilla presence among the Ixils and on their sense
and conceptualisation of guilt escapes simplistic rea-
soning in terms of cause and effect. It seems as
though we are facing two alternative interpretations.
On the one hand, there is the personal portrayal of
the enemy – the name of the president, the identity
of the close political rivals back home. This intima-
cy is pronounced by the tale-like representation of
their dialogue. Accordingly, it could be claimed that
the effort on behalf of the guerrilla project to change
the direction of guilt out towards external agents
has been successful; blame seems to work as long as
you know its object. 
On the other hand, if the president of the republic
is equated with a god and the finca owners with
intermediary deities superintending the people,
then the guerrillas could be said to have failed com-
pletely. It follows that the threatening ‘other’ is
impersonal and that the fatalism associated with a
politically passive life of the oppressed prevailed. I
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noted the frequency of expressions like ‘they perse-
cuted us’, and ‘they exploited us’ in the stories I heard
and documented during fieldwork. The unwilling-
ness to name the enemy is thus not a measure of
security, nor a direct reference to chaotic percep-
tions. Instead we could position ‘they’ – meaning
anything from the neighbouring Ixil-speaking
Chajules to the Spaniards during colonial times and
the Pentagon – at the same level of abstraction as
god. And ultimate power, then, is repositioned (or
maintained) beyond the community. 
An essentialised perspective on this cosmology
would maintain that the identity of the God could
(read should) not be changed. The quest for estab-
lishing continuities (see Cojtí’s exhortation to
Warren above) tends to put the emphasis in the
wrong places. Essentialism in this case would imply
an application of a monotheist notion to a much
more diversified theological context. The equation
of God and President in the war memory of this
(Catholic) Maya politician does not mean that the
political power of the world is perpetual, or that it is
beyond questioning. His own commitment to the
revolution, and to the ‘disobedient’ guerrillas, retold
in a triumphant narrative in the context of a still
vibrant resistance before the peace agreement of
December 1996, indicates that culture/cosmology
mediates political views and identities, rather than
determines them. It also questions the alleged con-
servative essence of contemporary Maya politics
(e.g., Stoll 1993). In line with the constructivism I
cherish I would argue that Don Nicolas masters the
complicated situation in which history and oppres-
sion locates him, he is a victim neither of the
Guatemalan army, nor of the essences of his culture
and cosmology.
… and ethnic resurgence
Ever since the displaced communities in the Ixil
area were guerrilla-organised during the war and
until the disarmament of the rebels in 1997, Majawil
Q’ij – the guerrilla-initiated and politically radical
branch of the Pan-Maya movement – was the people’s
self-evident representative among the Maya revivalist
institutions in the capital. This contact required
messengers between organisations in Guatemala City
and the rural areas, several of whom were recruited
from the displaced people. These messengers did
not lack agency of their own, however. One of my
key informants, a relatively young Mayan priest and
former guerrilla hard-liner, defected from the
Majawil in protest during the first half of my field-
work because he was dissatisfied with the lack of
individual freedom in his work, and critical of rebel
involvement. The guerrillas responded aggressively
and forced him to return to his politico-religious
duties. He obeyed, and others who had followed his
escape from guerrilla influence turned from being
his friends to what seemed implacable enemies.
My key informant was later rewarded for his loyalty
and given opportunities to move up in the organi-
sation towards a position in the nationwide indige-
nous coalition COPMAGUA (Co-ordinadora de las
Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala).
If we follow the messengers who trudge the path
between the local and the national spheres of Pan-
Mayanism into the local field, we find that the
image of Maya culture is as contested on the village
level as it is among political organisations in the
capital. To both Catholics and Protestants in the
villages drinking represented the dark force that
threatened the physical and spiritual well-being of
the community, while the drinking customs were
defended by the Maya traditionalists, indeed pro-
moted by them. If the Catholics and the Protestants
saw a common denominator of evil in the practice
of the locally produced liquor, kuxa, the traditional-
ists had a new rhetoric imported from the Majawil
Q’ij that condemned the two churches as represent-
ing a common evil, that is, the connection to, and
historical legitimisation of, colonialism and genoci-
dal political practices. Members of all three religious
groups thus acted in replacing the more common
divide in other parts of Guatemala between Catholics
and traditionalists on the one hand and Protestants
on the other, with one that isolated the self-pro-
claimed ‘Mayas’ against the other two.
New socio-cultural phenomena emerged in this
contested field; in the interface between the Majawil
Q’ij and its local partner – the organisation of the
traditionalists. There was an altar with a wooden
cross that was placed at the gable opposite the
entrance of the traditionalist church in the village
where I spent most of my time. About a hundred
similar but smaller crosses with names of the dead
hung on the walls of the log-house. This was their
final destination. The crosses had once been made
by relatives of the dead and used in ceremonies and
marches to commemorate dead loved ones. The
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house was a place with dense symbolism, frequently
exploited by photographers and organisations that
had been in the area. The picture depicting a griev-
ing man or woman with such a cross is, I believe,
the most common visual representation of the dis-
placed. And members of their communities are
(without access to statistical evidence) the most com-
mon visual representation of contemporary Mayan
war victims. This Maya church could, in other
worlds, be said to occupy a central location in the
political imagery of indigenous martyrdom in
Guatemala. Such symbolism, when consciously
used by local and guerrilla politicians, was directed
inwards as well as outwards. The martyr, and the
survivor’s relationship to the martyr, had come to
shape the identity of people in resistance. Here,
however, I got the impression that the crosses and
the very church or temple of the traditionalists were
mainly for show; its symbolism was directed solely
outwards. The house was always empty, except
when a delegation visited, or when a meeting with
the traditionalists was centrally organised. Nobody
remembered any church of this kind in their places
of origin before the war. There are no references in
the ethnography of the Ixils and the Quichés of a
locale for worship in the shape of a public house.
Instead, it seems as if this one, referred to as ‘the
church of the Mayan priests’ constituted a political
attempt at equalising the importance of what was
here perceived as three religious branches: hence the
word ‘sacerdote’ (priest) instead of ‘shaman’ (as used
by ethnographer Tedlock 1982), ‘diviner’ (as used by
ethnographers Colby and Colby 1981), or ‘father
before god’ (the meaning of the local term in the Ixil
language), and hence the word ‘church’ and the con-
struction of a spatial centre for their organisation.
What appears here is a contradiction between the
alleged continuity in the religious aspects of Maya
culture on the one hand, and the practices and ide-
ologies of new ‘inventions of tradition’ (Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983) on the other. 
The difference between ongoing practices and
new dictates from the Maya movement emerged as
small conflicts now and then. When old Andrés
decided to organise a ceremony in his new house,
with the stated purpose of thanking the angels for
their generosity, he picked ‘the day of the diviners’.
He bought firecrackers in the neighbouring town
and drums of kuxa from his relative. He contracted
the marimba players and spent the small fortune of
150 Quetzales on the event. But Juan, his literate
son, checked the calendar produced and distributed
by the Majawil Q’ij, and found out that Andrés had
picked the wrong day. Juan announced the fallacy
in public. The ceremony was celebrated as planned,
but uncertainty as to the power of the day was a fly
in the ointment.
One result of this conflict appeared in chats and
interviews with older men, who repeatedly said that
they felt confused over what it was that their culture
was supposed to entail, what this ‘new project’ of
politics and identity was all about. Many confessed
that they had indeed lost the knowledge of their
forefathers, but that they were struggling to regain it
through studying. In ways I found ironic, I was con-
sulted in this matter. One of the young Basque vol-
unteers in the area invited me to a meeting with
the traditionalists in which they wanted me to
explain the meaning of the concepts of ‘spirituality’
(Paragraph III: C of the peace accord), and the very
content of ‘customary law’ (Paragraph IV: E). The
volunteer thought that an anthropologist should
know. I told what I knew but emphasised the right
of the Mayas themselves to define the content of
their culture, which of course did not help them at
all. The concepts were made topical in the authori-
ties’ attempts to explain the details of the peace
agreement. The awkward request that was made to
me was thus instrumental. People needed to know,
not what their culture was, but rather how to make
good use of the accord in order to gain something in
the ongoing negotiations with the government and
former landowners. The dilemmas posed by war,
displacement and the new political framework with-
in which a resettlement was about to begin indicates
that the meaning of the concepts of culture and his-
tory now in use are defined by outside powers, such
as the national discourse of the peace accords, or the
Maya movement. 
That is not to say that history had been unim-
portant before the war. The perception of past events
in Maya rural areas was and is marked by the pres-
ence of the dead and the presence of geographical
reminders of past events – indeed a geography that
received the inscriptions of prayers and offerings.
Dennis Tedlock compares the mountain shrines of
Quiché-speaking Momostenango with books, and the
prayer makers with writers who ritually document
events among the living (1985). But forced migra-
tion interrupts the rhythm of this documentation as
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it separates the dead from the living through the
separation of the living from the places of worship.
The absence of relations and of a previously known
landscape that served as ordering mechanisms for
Self and Community, creates, under the influence of
violence, a void that new discourses on power,
morality, and order seem eager to fill (Scarry 1985).
Ideologies with clear-cut messages of resurrection
and revenge are likely to be the most attractive.
What we have are thus two different notions of the
past that the displaced traditionalists tried to under-
stand. Rather than negotiating between them,
between the past as lived experience ritually com-
memorated in everyday practice and the past as part
of a new ideology of culture, they tried to under-
stand the former through the latter.
Some of the Balbastixhes – ‘fathers before God’ –
knew how to interpret dreams, while some did not.
Some dream interpreters were not Balbastixhes but
instead dedicated Catholics or Protestants. Some
knew how to cure with ‘magic’ while others were in
the process of learning what they needed to know to
prescribe the right herbs. Some knew the names of
the days, and hence their meaning, but most did
not. In order to find a common denominator among
them, we need not explore further their professional
expertise, but, rather, their positions within social
hierarchies. In certain conceptions that could per-
haps be labelled Mayan, God is inseparable from the
cosmological order, which in turn is inseparable
from the social order (see the story of Nicolas above).
‘Father before God’ would accordingly mean a per-
son worthy of fatherly responsibilities before the
collective; for example the extended family and
patched-up household, the guerrilla unit, or the
resistance community. The politicised version of
culture distorts those responsibilities as it models
God after Christian ideas. Maya culture is no longer
related to relations, nor to experiences, but rather to
an invented tradition that is of necessity perceived
as lost.
This sense of loss was repeatedly expressed, and
many elders complained about the ignorance among
the young, the Catholics, and the Protestants. The
Balbastixhes also lamented their own lack of knowl-
edge, and their own ‘lives in oblivion’. This con-
nects to the distribution of authority and influence
among the Balbastixes according to a ‘knowledge
scale’: the greater the knowledge, the more impor-
tant the authority. Along this scale, or in this hier-
archy, people move at different speeds. For a man
like my key informant, who acted as a messenger
between the revitalisation movement in the capital
and the group of traditionalists among the displaced,
the effort of moving upwards was notable. Others
were studying the pamphlets and calendars of
Majawil Q’ij, unhappy about their present condition
but struggling ahead. Yet others seemed to be quite
content with what they knew and what they were
able to accomplish with what they knew. They
belonged to a category of people who did not
preach, who could not read and hence not study in
a western sense, but who practiced the knowledge of
previous generations. Their category lacked official
leadership status, however. Thus the scale also had a
dimension leading from cultural knowledge as prac-
tice to cultural knowledge as textually objectified
systems of thought, which by the definition I pro-
pose is the essentialisation of culture. Without vio-
lence, no such essentialisation occurs.
Conclusion
The voice of the dispossessed is no longer that of the
rebellious, which, according to the interpreters of
Marx, was bound to transform oppression into uni-
versal equality. Rather, it is that of the uprooted,
deprived of both territory and language (Bhabha
1994). Maya criticism of foreign expertise exempli-
fies the epistemological relocation of the concepts
of culture and identity, from the narrative of those
describing to the narrative of the described. That is
the still understudied link between the content and
the location of knowledge.
In the neo-liberal world, the issues of ‘labour’ and
‘state’ are not viewed as the sources of power and
identity they once were (Hale 1997). Since ‘identity’
– through the cultural essentialising processes of war
– and ‘history’ – through the replacement of ‘race’
with ‘origin’ in discourses on political legitimacy and
territorial rights – have taken their place, anthropol-
ogists, the explorers of identities, and archaeolo-
gists, the explorers of the past, find themselves in
the loophole of anti-neo-colonialist artillery.
What then, if anything, is wrong with this angry
criticism? It is certainly not incomprehensible, but
from whatever location we approach the violence
of the past we are bound to accept the fact that vio-
lence is, and always has been, a socio-culturally
informed ingredient of every human society. So
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much for the peaceful Maya. But our next step
would be to explore what it was that the Spaniards
after all did bring five centuries ago. If it was not
violence per se, it most certainly was a transforma-
tion of power and a violent dislocation of political
agency. Anthony Giddens’ model (1987) of the
characteristics of the modern nation-state, in terms
of the degrees of penetration of everyday life on the
part of the state and through its monopolisation of
legitimate violence, adheres to an analytical toolkit
that would enable a combined grasp of political dis-
ruption and cultural continuity. 
My second concluding emphasis would be a
reflexive one. I have been urged by Maya friends in
Guatemala to work for the translation of my own
studies so that my foreign arguments can be made
transparent, criticised, or, possibly, come to be of
use to the people who are the subject matter of my
research. That quest represents one of the locations
where an abstract reasoning about the production
of knowledge becomes concrete. Anthropologists,
like Kay Warren, make it difficult for others to come
up with excuses. In Guatemala, the Maya publish-
ing house Cholsamaj is printing a Spanish edition of
her 1998 book on the Maya movement, in which
she writes: ‘Repatriating research is particularly
important because the traditionalist archive, the
specialised knower or k’amöl b’ey, has disappeared
in many communities, and costumbre is being revi-
talised by various groups with their own political
agendas’ (Warren 1998: 77). If a scent of heroism
can be detected in such an effort, I think a final
quote from Linda Schele, from a context where she
praises the linguists who work with, rather than on
Maya communities in Guatemala, reveals what is at
stake for contemporary scholarship: 
In our experience, other disciplines [i.e., other than linguis-
tics], like archaeology, have not concerned themselves with
returning knowledge and experience to the Maya community.
We believe the world has changed in the last decade and that
in the future academics of the developed world must consid-
er the needs and goals of the people whom they study. The
cultural scientists who should be in the forefront of this kind
of interaction, in fact, are often the most unaware. We coun-
sel our colleagues to try it. They will learn far more than they
teach, and the returns are beyond value. (In Freidel, Schele
and Parker 1993: 139)
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The three articles in this section all deal with warfare in societies of the Bronze
Age. In addition, they share a material perspective. In their articles Anthony
Harding (chapter 33) and Henrik Thrane (chapter 32) assess the reliability of
material culture as a source of data about Bronze Age warfare asking the essen-
tial question of how far the material evidence can bring us in understanding
affairs of war in the Bronze Age. My own contribution reflects on the social role
of weaponry, in strategies of power taking place in the ideal society described so
persuasively by Homer. 
Archaeology and material culture
Material culture has more than one application in archaeological research. First,
it is the main source of empirical data about the past: only material remains
have been preserved for long periods of time in the past, and these are the sole
means of gaining access to prehistoric society. Archaeological sources for pre-
history are, basically, material fragments of past human actions carried out by
situated actors. On the basis of archaeological data past human actions can be
reconstructed, and their structuration – their repetition and change – in
time/space can be figured out through analysis. More precisely, archaeology
may be described as a discipline that studies, mainly through material means,
the reproduction of and changes in human action, which is in fact embodied
social structure across time and space. Second, material culture is inevitably a
third party in the relationship between human actors and society, and for that
reason it is central to any interpretative enterprise. In archaeology material
culture therefore holds a twofold position as data material and as a principal
agent that has structured the lives of prehistoric beings. 
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So the possession of costly bronze daggers, swords, and rapiers consolidated
the positions of war-chiefs and conquering aristocracies as did the knights’s
armour in the Middle Ages.
(Childe 1941: ‘War in prehistoric societies’. The Sociological Review 33, p. 133)
The nature of material culture, identification, and warfare
Material culture functions intentionally as a silent form of discourse, especially
in the domain of the human body, but also as a surrounding material setting,
which furthermore constrains as well as enables action. Personal appearance can
be emphasised as basic to organising and maintaining all sorts of social identi-
ties and therefore deserves particular attention. Objects certainly inspire social
identification in various domains. Material culture is indeed the mediator and
creator of various distinctions in society: age, gender, social status, profession,
and so forth. And warriorhood combines such distinctions in different ways. 
Weapons make warriors, in a manner of speaking, and weapons are tools of
war. The material link makes it realistic to identify and study warriors and warfare
in prehistory. Specific dress and weaponry are notably important in creating and
recreating the warrior as identity and ideal. It should be repeated, however, that
function is largely independent of material form. A stone axe, or a sword, does
not automatically – and certainly not outside its context – allow interpretation
in terms of warfare and warriorhood as emphasised in the succeeding articles.
The function of objects sometimes falls well beyond the obvious, and since
function and meaning are constructed through the social context, the latter
needs to be studied carefully. Structuration theory maintains that discourse
always forms part of the duality of structure and agency as ‘signification’, and
this is important in archaeology, in which material culture as a silent form of
discourse is intimately related to traces of action/structure. Signs, whether mate-
rial or spoken, have no existence beyond the meaning-creating and commu-
nicative processes of interaction; they are, in Giddens’ phrasing, the medium
and outcome of these (cp. Giddens 1984: 31f).
It may nevertheless be added that material culture is in itself very persuasive
and durable and creates social relationships in an interactive and recursive
process. Material culture thus holds an unintentional stain in the sense that it
continues to influence people and their actions and thoughts even when the
memory of its original functions and meanings has been lost. Things, cultural
landscapes and material settings are in themselves potent and persuasive due to
their materiality. Exotic objects and inherently attractive materials like copper,
gold and amber readily serve as valuables with potential uses as cultural, sym-
bolic and economic capital in the quest for wealth and social position. Material
culture is in sum a substantial and meaningful ingredient in any society, past
or present, and therefore also for the understanding of war and warriors. The
archaeological sources for warriors and warfare can be summarised in four
groups:
Weaponry
Weaponry divides arbitrarily into implements with a potential for war and
weapons intended for offensive and/or defensive purposes. Bows and arrows,
points, axe blades, knives, daggers, and so on made of various organic or non-
organic materials belong to the first category (cp. Capelle 1982; Vencl 1984;
Chapman 1999). The second category comprises mainly swords, spearheads,
shields, and body armour, but also maceheads and battle-axes. 
This rough division indicates that most so-called weapons have potential uses
outside warfare, notably hunting. Bones from Neolithic and Bronze Age settle-
ments normally show little inclusion of wild animals, and I therefore presume
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that hunting in the Neolithic, and most certainly in the Bronze Age, was more
a matter of prestige than economic necessity. The line between prestige-hunter
and warrior can be blurred, as illustrated by the lion-hunt dagger from Shaft
Grave IV at Mycenae, showing warfare against the lion, which is likely to be a
metaphor for the elite warrior. 
The multi-functionality, or ambiguity, of material culture in general implies
that weapons cannot be reduced merely to tools of war. A series of other potential
functions and meanings presents itself. Notably, weapons often maintain iden-
tities of gender, age, rank, or various other types of group identity like kinship,
ethnicity and profession. In European prehistory the cultural biographies of
weaponry typically ended with a ritual deposition either in burials or in votive
offerings. Such depositions may comprise one item or a combination of several
items depending on cultural and social factors. The archaeologist thus obtains
intimate knowledge mostly of the destination, the ritual death of things, which
may have had several very active lives prior to the final deposition. The desti-
nation of weaponry, however, may still be able to tell stories about the living
society. Let us first look briefly at the deposition of weapons in burials, weapons
in sacrificial deposits, weapon combinations and finally weapon technology:
Weaponry in burials
Objects can be deposited in burials for a variety of overlapping reasons related
to culture and society such as emotion, social ambition, social rivalry and social
identity, cultural values and norms, and religion. Burials can be carried out
routinely as the way things should be done or more deliberately as political
announcements, although also the former of the two modes may be carried out
from the perspective of social strategy and power. Funerals and funerary monu-
ments are suitable means to question, confirm or legitimise existing relations of
social power. 
Weapons in burials are often a material extension of the dead body and thus
somehow relate to the collective social identities of the deceased, and perhaps
in some cases also to his or her personhood. Using James Whitley’s classification
(1995: 5ff), a metonymic and metaphoric statement can be distinguished in the
funerary domain: 1. Weapons and dress accessories may be a specific (metonymic)
statement of the roles played by the dead individual in life. If, for instance, a
sword accompanies a young man in one burial, and this relationship is repeated
in other burials, the conclusion would be that among the identities young males
carried in that society the warrior identity was an important one. 2. Weapons and
dress accessories may alternatively be used to make more general (metaphoric)
statements and have a less direct bearing on the lived identities of the deceased.
If a small, exclusive group of mature males are interred with rich weaponry, this is
likely to reflect symbolic warriorhood in the sense of an earlier warrior identity,
heroic status or ambition, political authority or high social rank. Likewise, weapons
accompanying small male children and young adolescents are likely to be
metaphors originating in warrior values rather than actual signs of warriorhood.  
Weaponry in votive deposits 
A large number of weapons are known from sacrificial deposits all over north-
ern and central Europe, and many of them have been retrieved from wetlands
(Bradley 1990). Behind this specific practice, which is in general thought to
involve a larger number of people than funerary rituals (Vandkilde 1996; 1999),
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are several social as well as religious motives such as commemorating the past,
gifts to the gods, rites of passage, and potlatches to promote the importance of
particular persons and social institutions and to confirm, question or legitimise
power relations. These motives need not exclude each other. 
In the Neolithic Period we are dealing mainly with implements with the poten-
tial for war, while in the Bronze Age the association with war often becomes
unequivocal, due to the distinct warlike character of the objects. War booty
offerings are a generally accepted find category in Iron Age Europe, probably
because it is a practice sustained by written sources. Klavs Randsborg (1995) has
suggested that Neolithic, and especially Bronze Age, depositions of weaponry
have a similar background. A proportion of Neolithic and Bronze Age ritual depo-
sitions of weaponry might well be considered the culmination of actions relating
directly to warfare, which even today is intertwined with rituals. Some weapon
hoards may alternatively have been ritually deposited as part of ‘fighting with
property’ – that is, the potlatch as a sort of surrogate warfare (Bradley 1990:
139f; Paige and Paige 1981: 52). Among the Northwest Coast Indians, however,
potlatch rituals only became truly elaborate when the Canadian government
prohibited warfare (ibid.), and therefore this analogy may not be fully appro-
priate to draw on in the interpretation of prehistoric ritual depositions. Warfare
cannot in general be understood as a ritual, but it nearly always contains aspects
of ritual (e.g., Ehrenreich 1997; Otterbein 2000). Warfare is in reality a flow of
social actions that may be initiated and concluded by rituals. Ritual depositions
of weapons in watery places can thus arguably be considered from the perspec-
tive of war, particularly if such an interpretation is supported by the specific
social context. A weapon offering may then be seen as a metonymic statement
of concluded warlike actions in terms of victory, peace-making, and alliance
maintenance, or perhaps as an offering made to ensure luck in an impending
war. Weapon offerings may also be metaphoric statements, which more dis-
tantly relate to the waging of war. It can be argued that the increasing institu-
tionalisation of warriors and war generally implies that these two phenomena
will be carried more symbolically into other social fields as part of their signifi-
cation and legitimation. In either case, the war hypothesis works well with the
series of motives mentioned above. 
Weapon combinations
Weapon combinations can, used with caution, tell us about the equipment and
fighting methods of the warrior, notably a preference for close or distant combat.
It is, however, also necessary to note – and this tallies with what has already
been mentioned above – that the warrior may not be interred with their full
equipment but rather only those parts of the equipment that have a certain
symbolic meaning. Weapons may be very personal objects (swords usually are)
and thus invested with personalised names and meanings and at the same time
function as insignia of gender or rank. Alternatively, weapons may have whole
biographies and stories attached to them, which could have been invoked on
special occasions (cp. Vandkilde chapter 34: the famed boar's tusk helmet which
Odysseus puts on for a nightly spying expedition). Such particular weapons are
perhaps more likely to be inalienable possessions that remain in the family as
tokens of memory and inheritance than ones ritually exchanged with the dead
or the gods.
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Weapon technology
Weapon technology is not unimportant for the outcome of war. Improvements
in weaponry have been known to escalate the degree and viciousness of warfare
in numerous ethnographic cases. It is thus possible that innovations in the tech-
nology of war could have increased the speed of social change in prehistory. A
comparison of weapons over time can give clues to significant changes in
weapon technology, understood as the quality of weapons and styles of fighting.
The emergence of the sword around 1600 BC in central and northern Europe is
likely to have been such an important innovation with considerable social and
symbolic effects in warlike as well as in more peaceful interactions inside society
and between societies. Likewise, the introduction of horses would have changed
conventional warfare as well as the whole social habitat, as documented, for
instance, among the Grand Chaco Abipón in South America during the eigh-
teenth century (Lacroix 1990).
Fortifications 
In central Europe fortified settlements occur from early on and progressively
more frequently, while in southern Scandinavia they remain more or less absent
throughout prehistory and earliest history. This is certainly not because
Scandinavians are more peaceful than central Europeans during these periods.
Clearly the presence or absence of fortified settlements cannot be used as evi-
dence of war and peace, but might be rooted in different cultural practices.
Cultural tradition, degree of openness and topography of the landscape, settle-
ment organisation, and social and inter-societal structure are relevant factors
that might explain why settlements are sometimes fortified in central Europe
and rarely so in southern Scandinavia. 
Fortifications are as multi-functional as other kinds of material culture.
Fortified settlements are sometimes urban or proto-urban centres for a limited
region or even nodal points for super-regional trade and crafts. At other times
they are marginal phenomena placed at the boundaries of settled areas to scare
off the enemy and to protect against intruders. In the latter case, they may not
be permanently settled, or perhaps only with certain specialised personnel.
Fortifications and territorial marking go well together, but distinct territoriality
can exist without fortifications.
Skeletal trauma 
Traumata on skeletons are caused by various forms of interpersonal violence like
warfare, homicide, gang aggression, intra-family fights, and forceful kinds of
sport. The boundary between these forms of violence can be quite subtle, and
ethnographic examples suggest that a high occurrence of inter-personal violence
other than warfare quite often coincides with situations of war (e.g., Chagnon
1968). Skeletal traumas are, in fact, relatively frequent in European prehistory
when it is taken into account that in some areas skeletons are not well pre-
served, that they are not routinely examined for marks of violence, and that
much physical violence does not leave visible traces on the skeleton.   
Abnormal mass graves with several injured individuals as well as normal single
interments with an injured individual occur throughout the Neolithic and the
Bronze Age all over Europe. The injuries vary from projectile wounds to marks
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and cuts from weapons. Some wounds are healed up, while other wounds were
the cause of death. Skeletal trauma is a valuable source of additional information
when it comes to detecting warrior identities, but it should also remind the
archaeologist that war is always abominable. Prehistoric humans actually suf-
fered from war through the loss of loved ones and through the injuries they
received as combatants, supporters or victims. 
Iconographic presentations in art and rituals 
The Scandinavian Bronze Age rock carvings with – amongst other themes – repre-
sentations of warfare and warriors are particularly relevant to this introduction.
A similar reasoning may, however, pertain to warlike presentations in the field
of wall painting and bellicose imagery on, for instance, grave stelae and vases.
Without discounting the vast amount of literature interpreting the southern
Scandinavian rock carvings, I would like to propose that the images of war – and
perhaps in general the more elaborate of the themes – on the carvings are nar-
ratives of a highly ideal nature, but possibly rooted in historical events. The
same realist root arguably adheres to the scenes of warfare carved on rock in
southern Africa and attributable to groups of San Bushmen (Campbell 1986:
265). I suggest that the images carved in rock in Scandinavia were tales about
privileged groups in society that probably created them as part of their rich oral
tradition as well as part of their tradition of imagery. The carvings are analogous
to Homer’s epics in the sense that that there are certain recurring and therefore
easily recognisable traits, the actions and myths of ‘gods’ and mortals occur
intertwined, and the narrative, and certainly the interpretation of it, continues
forever. Both are arguably narratives of an ideal nature maintaining the interests
and ideology of a particular social group. 
Jarl Nordbladh (1989) has analysed patterns of fighting at the rock art site of
Kville in Bohuslän. Single combats predominate, the combatants are of equal
size, and weapons never touch. When fighting occurs on ships, only a few crew
members, made larger than the rest, carry weapons, and some ships have more
than 135 crew members. Nordbladh finds this number much overrated, and
therefore hints at the idealised character of the narrative. He nevertheless sug-
gests that the pictures of combat at Kville provide a fairly correct picture of how
fighting was actually carried out in Bronze Age society. Richard Osgood presents
a similar view (1998; Osgood et al. 2000: 34). Fighting supposedly took place as
heavily ritualised action or performances of a sport-like character (ibid.) – that
is, as a rule with a non-deadly outcome. 
War scenes in rock carvings undoubtedly reduce fighting to the demonstration
of potency among high-ranking warrior heroes, who fight as equals and accord-
ing to certain aristocratic rules and ethics. A rather similar pattern – combining
sport-like duelling with glimpses of cruelty and death – is encountered in the
Homeric epics, but here there are traces of other kinds of war, much more
vicious and much less heroic, like raids on settlements to obtain slaves, women
and portable wealth. It is highly likely that the rock carvings – like the poems
of heroes and war in early history – overemphasise the ideals of war combat and
aristrocratic companionship, and consequently underrate another, much more
violent face of war. Skeletal trauma (e.g. Kjær 1912; Vandkilde 2000; Louwe
Kooijmans 1993; Fyllingen 2002; Fyllingen chapter 22) and damages and sharp-
ening traces on swords (Kristiansen 1984; Bridgford 1997) suggest as much.
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A great potential for studies of war and peace
The obstacles of obtaining true insight into prehistoric warfare and warriors are
surely many, but let us not become totally overwhelmed. Harding’s contribution
(chapter 33) is a sharply source critical analysis tending to uncover cracks in the
evidence rather than attempting to link together existent evidence in an effort
to understand. Such moderate pessimism does serve the purpose of reminding
fellow archaeologists that our tales of war and peace in prehistory are utterly
dependent on the archaeological sources. I must also agree that the evidence of
the earlier Bronze Age is generally weaker than the later Bronze Age of the
Urnfield Period. Still, I believe that context-based analyses of selected areas such
as the Nordic Older Bronze Age with its numerous grave mounds, ritual deposits
and settlements provide a very great potential for examining actions and iden-
tities of war and peace across a considerable period of time. Likewise, the
Danubian-Carpathian Early Bronze Age with its geopolitical hotspots, extensive
inhumation cemeteries, rich hoards, and defended hill-top settlements provides
excellent possibilities. 
Thrane (chapter 32) presents an optimistic, if still source-critical, view high-
lighting the rich Scandinavian evidence of weaponry in various ritual contexts
and concludes that what we see in Bronze Age Scandinavia may well have been
similar to the patterns of warfare and warriorhood described in the Homeric poems.
Used with caution, Homer may indeed serve as an appropriate analogy to
Bronze Age society north of the Alps. This is in tune with my own contribution,
which examines the social and material world of Homer’s epics with the under-
lying assumption that a comparative analogical enterprise could bring forth new
insight on the subjects of warfare, gender and materiality in the illiterate Bronze
Age of northern Europe. However, a precondition for advances in this respect
might well be that the four classes of material evidence considered above are com-
bined and thoroughly brought into dialogue with adequate theoretical platforms. 
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Warriors were mentioned early on in the study of
the Nordic Bronze Age (Worsaae 1843; Müller 1897)
and so was warfare, but not at any length. Any
implication that violence of any kind was an impor-
tant part of life was not manifested. Warfare and
warriors were mentioned but not prominently and
weapons were treated just like ornaments and pots.
It didn’t take long for the myth of the peaceful,
happy and sunny Bronze Age as the first Golden Age
to become the truth (Brøndsted 1939). In his book
on the Bronze Age, Gordon Childe only mentions
war when he reaches the Late Bronze Age Urnfield
migration, but then he does so extensively (1930:
43, 192).
Curiously enough, C.J. Thomsen’s three-age system
was a reaction to the Latin poetical division of the
past, in which the golden period was introduced as
a term. In the 1840s people were not aware that
they lived in the Danish Golden Age, and they did
not use the expression, but by the end of the century
and through the twentieth century that was how
the Bronze Age came to be viewed, consciously or
unconsciously. Of course, in a Golden Age peace and
prosperity ruled, so there was no place for warfare –
that only came with the crude and cold Iron Age.
Retrospectively we may find this curious, con-
sidering how many swords were known already by
the time Thomsen formulated his model or by the
time J.J.A. Worsaae, who knew several hundreds,
divided the Bronze Age into early and late phases in
1859 (Worsaae 1843: 24). Swords, spearheads and
axes (palstaves) were prominent among the early
finds that filled the showcases of Thomsen’s muse-
um because they were big and solid and therefore
observed and noted when farmers (or archaeologists)
broke into the burial mounds. Thus the dichotomy
between the material evidence and its interpretation
existed right from the beginning of serious research
on the Bronze Age. With the ‘War and Society’ project
it became imperative to examine the material base
for information on warfare in order to present a state
of the arts and formulate a theory of the role of war
in the Bronze Age. A couple of studies had already
been made (Kristiansen 1984; Nordbladh 1987;
Randsborg 1995) but no comprehensive study was
available. We have tried to examine the data that
may indicate the presence of war.
The first problem is that we only have sources
which, at their best, indicate violence. How this vio-
lence was organised and whether it to a degree
deserves the name War (Steuer 2000; Steuer chapter
16) is an open question. A general scale from group
to individual violence can be made, however, and
we can examine how the archaeological sources fit
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into this scale before moving on to an interpreta-
tion of the existence of warfare. Social groups nor-
mally find the will and means to defend themselves
in societies where warfare is a normal phenomenon.
Here it is unnecessary to speculate upon when this
stage was reached. Suffice it to say that by the Bronze
Age, European societies must have reached a stage
where there was enough wealth around to tempt
aggression and where social organisation had reached
a level that made organised violence at a level of
proper warfare possible. 
Defence
An immediate effect of warfare in archaeological
material would be in the settlement organisation. If
it had not been organised into larger units already
– as a means of providing the basis for the levying of
forces for warfare – one effect of war could be to move
settlements together in larger and better defensible
units.
We know of a large number of Bronze Age settle-
ments by now, probably more than 1000, covering
the period from c. 2200 – 500 BC, albeit with some
problems in certain periods, and so far there is no
clear evidence of large agglomerated settlements of
a kind that we may term village, whether fortified
or open, as they are known from Central Europe
from the Early Bronze Age (Jankuhn et al. 1977;
Jockenhövel 1990). It is only in Central Sweden
(Apalle and Hallunda) and perhaps at Voldtofte on
Funen (Thrane 1995) that more than a couple pro-
duction units – farms – form such settlements, which
were also more permanent than normal. Yet even
these deserve reservations. Only by c. 300 BC do vil-
lages bounded by palisades, which are thus clearly
definable spatially, turn up in Jutland (Becker 1982;
Rindel 2003) and Holland (Waterbolk 1977).
The tradition from the Late Neolithic went on
through the Bronze Age with single farms or at the
most two–three farms, each for a single family, form-
ing somewhat dispersed settlements (Nielsen 1999).
None has yielded any form of defence in the shape of
palisades or ditches. The position on elevated parts
of the landscape may, at best, be regarded as a strate-
gic solution, enabling the inhabitants to escape
should an enemy appear (as on Bellona: Kuschel
1988). Destruction levels are also absent. There is no
clear evidence of war at any scale to be gleaned from
the settlements (cp. the survey by Olausson 1993).
This negative evidence is all the more remarkable
since substantial defensive earthworks at elevated
settlements or using lake situations (Biskupin and
Sobijuchie) form integrated elements of the Late
Bronze Age Lausitz and Urnfield cultures in Poland
(Bukowski 1962; Harding and Ostoja-Zagorski 1993)
and as far west as Brandenburg (for the latest version
of the distribution see Köpke 2002: map 5) and
Central Europe (with the strange Early Bronze Age
group in Slovakia and neighbouring countries
[Jockenhövel 1990]).
The still ambiguous and certainly atypical settle-
ment of Vistad in Östergötland (Larsson 1993) rather
confuses the picture and could perhaps best be seen
as an intrusive element, not representing the Nordic
tradition. At the level above the settlements, com-
munal defences are not absent from Scandinavia but
none can be dated earlier than the early centuries
AD (Jørgensen 2001). So, again we cannot adduce
any positive archaeological evidence for organised
group aggression or defence, and war may not be
the motivation behind the suggested use of natural
features as territorial borders (Thrane n.d.).
Traumata
At an individual level the direct evidence of violence
is, of course, the traumata on skeletons – with the
Norwegian case as the exception (Fyllingen chapter
22). Here the archaeological (de)formation processes
have restricted our position severely. In spite of the
hundreds of inhumation burials from the Early –
Middle Bronze Age, c. 2200 – 1100 BC, very few have
left more than soft traces of bones, normally just of
the enamel of the teeth. Even graves with more or
less complete skeletons have yielded little informa-
tion – even if the bones have been kept. From
Denmark (Brøste et al. 1956) and Scania (Håkansson
1985) we have just a single unambiguous instance
of violence – the well-known broken off spearhead
tip from period I at Over Vindinge (Aner and
Kersten: no.1291 I; Bennike 1985: 109f). It is inter-
esting that this observation fits remarkably well with
the skeletons from Tormarton (Osgood chapter 23)
and Dorchester (Osgood 1998: 19; Osgood chapter
23; Thorpe chapter 10) all of which have spearheads
embedded in the pelvic region, curiously enough
entering from the back.
The only partly preserved find from the bog of
Granhammar in Central Sweden (Lindström 1999)
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and the cape from Gerumsberg (with its stabbed holes
from a sword blade – von Post et al. 1925) indicate
that the burials may not be as reliable or representa-
tive sources as we would like to think. The unexpect-
ed find from Norway (Fyllingen chapter 22) adds
weight to this notion. It should be expected that 14
C-dates may bring more skeletal evidence into the
Bronze Age when more stray skeletons are dated – cp.
the Neolithic date of Sigersdal (Bennike et al. 1987).
If we know of skeletons in a condition where
traumata may be recognised from only few of the
graves with inhumation burials, and one of these
gives undeniable evidence of violence by a proper
weapon, how does this represent the Nordic Bronze
Age skeleton population? The Over Vindinge grave.
It could be argued that traumata are over-represented
rather than under-represented in the preserved
sources. Admittedly, we only have a fragile base for
further inference, but it could also be argued that
such violence was more common than would appear
at first sight. Still, we are not yet in contact with
proper war. One trauma does not make a war. 
Weaponry
The trauma evidence leads to the dominant poten-
tial source for warfare, the weapon arsenal. While
lethal damage may be inflicted by any casual means
such as muscle power, simple stones and a big
enough bone, or by common tools like clubs, ham-
mers and axes, or by hunting implements like har-
poons, arrows or spears (Kouwenhoven 1997), proper
tools for violence made exclusively as weapons seem
to be a metal age phenomenon. Developing from the
small copper daggers of the Bell Beaker culture and
the Early Bronze Age ubiquitous daggers (Thorpe
chapter 10), the sword came to be the most impres-
sive weapon from the Bronze Age until the break-
through of firearms millennia later. In the Nordic
Bronze Age we find the same types of weaponry as
elsewhere in Europe although with a different
emphasis. Defensive weapons are nearly absent, or
are at least much less prominent than in the other
European Bronze Ages (Harding 2000). Up here we
find offensive weapons like swords, daggers, axes,
spears and arrows but no evidence of slings or maces.
These five main weapon types vary according to
time and place as expressed in the archaeological
record, and even a brief examination demands a
look at such aspects of the formation processes as
production, treatment, deposition, context and
retrieval (or availability to us). 
Axes
Leaving aside the earliest (flint) daggers and the
later (Early Iron Age) spear tips of bone (Randsborg
1995), the only types that were made of non-metal
materials to any extent were axes (Baudou 1960;
Horst 1986) and arrow heads. Shaft hole axes con-
tinued to be made of stone well into the Late Bronze
Age with specific local or regional types indicating a
widespread use (mainly outside the central regions
of the Nordic Bronze Age). They continued the
Neolithic tradition of ‘battle-axes’. Whether this
term is accurate is another matter and it may be
argued that the stone axes have more in common
with the bronze ‘cult axes’ than with the ordinary
tree felling tools, which dwindled during the Bronze
Age to the rather diminutive socketed axes of period
VI (Baudou 1960). 
Stone axes and metal ‘cult axes’ do not occur in
graves after the Middle Bronze Age (periods II-III).
Interesting though they are, I prefer to leave them
out of this paper. The axe had a long tradition in
the North, so it is no wonder that it was the first
tool to be made locally in the new material in the
Early Bronze Age (Vandkilde 1996). Soon the oppor-
tunities for a better connection of blade and helve
offered by the bronze led to a series of experiments
via the palstave to the socketed axe. Even if this was
a broad European trend (Struve 1979: Taf. 53), we
are able to observe the stages of a local Nordic devel-
opment during the Early – Middle Bronze Age
(Montelius I-III).
The socketed axe was obviously the solution that
suited the Nordic metallurgists who produced them
for 700 years in ever more economic versions. Even
if one can hurt an opponent with a small socketed
axe it hardly makes an ideal weapon. No emphasis
was made on individual decoration – unlike the early
flanged axes or the finer so-called weapon palstaves
of period II. The exception is the axes with very
high flanges and over-dimensioned ornate chapes
(Asingh 1988; Vandkilde 1996: 114ff). Their weapon
quality seems rather doubtful. Presumably the axe
was no longer used as a weapon by the end of period
II. That left the stage to the double-edged weapons.
There are hardly any axes in certified contexts with
period III swords. 
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Spearheads
The separate spearhead was an invention of the
metal age. From the small but nearly always expres-
sively decorated Bagterp type (Vandkilde 1996) to
such monstrosities as the 45 cm long and richly dec-
orated Valsømagle (ibid.) or the up to 50 cm long,
stereotypic Baltic spearheads of period V, a long and
highly varied development can be traced (Jacob-
Friesen 1967; Thrane 1975 and below). Similar lengths
are known from Minoan and Mycenaean (Höckmann
1980 and 1982) and Irish spearheads (Ramsey 1995).
Their lethal qualities are well documented (Osgood
chapter 23; Thorpe chapter 10). Whether these
heavy points were thrown or thrust will remain a
question, and quite likely both methods were used
(Harding chapter 33).
Bow and arrow
Arrowheads of flint are not common in dated con-
texts but they do occur occasionally in graves during
the Bronze Age – normally, alas, unassociated with
other objects (Aner and Kersten: passim; Baudou
1960; Oldeberg 1974: nos. 169 I, 527, 694, 702, 715;
Strömberg 1975: grave 33, normally just a single
arrowhead per grave).
Of these few graves hardly any contain swords
(Aner and Kersten: nos. 72, 4690 full hilt; 1835
plate, 4296, 4648, 4711A and 5029A flange hilt).
This Nordic usage contrasts with other neighbour
groups such as Mecklenburg (Schubart 1972) and
the Lüneburg Early Bronze Age graves where several
arrows, obviously placed in a quiver, like the Hallstatt
burial in Hohmichele at the Heuneburg (Clausing
1998) – and presumably accompanied by the bow –
belonged to the male equipment (Laux 1971: 90f).
Other European groups like Wessex (Thorpe chapter
10) or Brittany, or the central European Urnfield,
Hallstatt and Lausitz cultures did the same (Eckardt
1996).
Metal and bone were used in these cultures along
with flint. In Scandinavia the cremation grave from
Stora Vikers on Gotland is the only comparable
find (Rydh 1968) with its eight long, lethal bone
points which seem rather too numerous to kill a
man (cp. Thorpe chapter 10). They had been burnt
with the corpse, which the bronzes in the burial had
not. So, like single calcinated flint arrowhead in
some Late Bronze Age cremation graves it may well
be that they sat in the corpse during cremation (cp.
Harding chapter 33; Osgood chapter 23; Thorpe
chapter 10).
In an inhumation grave from Himmerland with-
out weapons a male body had a flint arrowhead in
the right chest (Aner and Kersten: XIV ms; cp. Härke
1992: 211), and another from Zealand with a dagger
had 11 flint arrowheads, presumably in a quiver, and
an additional one at the throat (Anon. 1989: no. 3).
It was not common to place the equipment for the
dead person on the funeral pyre in the Nordic region
– in contrast to the Lausitz and Urnfield cultures
(Thrane 1984: 134ff). Thus these rare cases could,
like the Over Vindinge grave, represent a continua-
tion of violence. Still, this is no more an indication
of war than the Neolithic Porsmose man killed by a
bone arrow in the Neolithic (Bennike 1985: 110ff).
These cases may just as feasibly be the result of
ambush or individual revenge as war incidents.
Sword production
Nordic metallurgy concentrated on the cire perdu
technique, although solid moulds were used for tools
such as palstaves, socketed axes, knives and sickle
blades. Larger and more complicated objects were
cast in clay moulds, which we only know from the
Late Bronze Age. While moulds for sword blades or
hilts have rarely been recognised (Neergaard 1908;
Oldeberg 1960; Thrane 1995; Aner and Kersten: XI
no. 5273), a whole set of spearhead moulds is known
from Galgedil (Jensen 1995) and other fragments
have been recognised (Nielsen 1956; Oldeberg 1960;
1974: no.1575; Thrane 1971: fig. 15; Kaliff 1995: 69).
Our knowledge of weapon production is therefore
nearly exclusively based upon the finished objects.
Apart from special objects like lurs (Thrane 1995),
the production of large objects like swords and spear-
heads seems to have been widespread. Perhaps it
was not as ubiquitous as smaller and simpler objects
like rings or buttons, but it was concentrated in
regionally working workshops where the necessary
skill and artistic experience were available. This is
what Ottenjahn suggested for the Middle Bronze
Age sword production of bronze-hilted swords
(1961; 1969). The use of ‘once-casting’ clay moulds
(à cire perdue) resulted in a high degree of individu-
ality, which explains Ottenjahn’s difficulties in
establishing clearly defined chorological groups (cp.
Preben Rønne’s style studies [1987]). So far no such
workshop has been identified, but settlements (of
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periods II-IV) with good – i.e. find productive – rub-
bish dumps are hardly known either.
We therefore have to infer from the objects them-
selves. The swords and spearheads show great varia-
tion not only over the centuries but also regionally
within the archaeological periods (Baudou 1960;
Ottenjahn 1961; Jacob-Friesen 1967; Thrane 1975).
There is a striking difference between the early multi-
type generations in periods II-III through period IV,
with its restriction of the number of sword types but
a broad variety of spearheads continuing to the final
stage in period V, with its uniform sword blades and
the nearly mono-typic Baltic spearheads. This devel-
opment towards standardisation must reflect the
role of weapons in contemporary society, but the
question is how. A move from individual to more
regulated – i.e., communal or controlled – produc-
tion, and use, may be an option.
Period V is also the time when Nordic sword pro-
duction really deviated from the otherwise domi-
nant trend in Central Europe. Instead of adopting
the tendency towards cut and thrust swords with
willow shaped blades (Harding 2000), the final
Nordic bronze blades were more rapier like, pointed
with a strong tip with flanking grooves (Baudou
1960: type 2). This is a thrusting weapon. Even if
there was an intermediate period (IV) with blades
that look well suited for cut and thrust fighting, that
type of sword never dominated in the North.
An extensive import of swords from Central
Europe can be observed during the Middle Bronze
Age, comprising fully hilted and flange-hilted swords.
The scale was such that the Nordic region showed
a high proportion of finds compared to Central
Europe. This took some explaining (Sprockhoff 1931;
1934; Holste 1952), but it was only later that more
intensive studies produced the right explanation,
namely, that the numerical preponderance of octag-
onal hilted swords in the north is caused by the large
number of local copies, combined with a stronger
emphasis here on burying swords with the dead
(Hachmann 1957; Quillfeldt 1995). A similar study
of flange-hilted swords has not been made, but I am
quite confident that they followed a similar trend
(Cowen 1955; Thrane 1964: 156ff). The remarkable
similarity of the flange-hilted swords over large
tracts of Europe caused names such as the common
European sword to be coined (Cowen 1955). It is
tempting to see this main type as part of a cross-cul-
tural set up – an international warrior segment.
The whole innovative or renewal process that can
be followed in the armament presents some perti-
nent questions. Was it simply prompted by metal
workers bringing the new fashion to foreign patrons
or did warriors travel, displaying the latest improve-
ments of their panoply? If the latter option is con-
sidered, a mercenary set up or travelling warriors
joining the local leader’s troop may be a possibility.
Obviously, applying much later models and texts to
a wholly Dark Age period is thin ice to walk on. Still,
it may be worthwhile to ponder this kind of inter-
action, which could explain the preference for for-
eign types of male equipment, mainly weapons that
we can follow through the Bronze Age. Clearly,
above all arms were imported and adopted (Thrane
1975: 259). More comparative research is needed,
however.
The situation is radically different in the Late
Bronze Age. Great numbers of one type are no longer
found. Only single specimens are known, graves no
longer contain swords (cp. below), and the local
sword production proceeded largely uninfluenced
by the foreign sword types. Miniature swords take
their place in the burials, curiously enough indicat-
ing the width of the import better than the proper
swords. The change could reflect a change in the
attitude towards weapons and their masters – the
warriors – restricting the deposit of weapons in the
graves (a grave from Löderup contains a fragment of
a sword blade exactly like the bits found in period
IV hoards [Strömberg 1975]). It is one of the changes
which distinguish the Late Bronze Age from the
preceding centuries.
Treatment
Any suggestion of how swords were used must be
based upon the morphology of the blades and hilts
(Fig. 1) and, more recently, upon observations of the
wear and tear that only the best preserved swords
permit. Kristiansen (1984) suggested that blades
were subject to a secondary surface treatment in
order to keep the edges sharp. This treatment could
be so coarse that the whole profile of the blade was
altered, reducing the edges by several millimetres.
The only good reason for this would be such deep
cuts in the edges that these could not be repaired
simply by hammering and filing the original cutting
edge. Here we have a contradiction. Such damages
cannot result simply from stabbing at the opponent.
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They must mean that the damaged blades had cut
into the opponent’s sword (hardly a spearhead) with
considerable force. This may serve to demonstrate
that real life transcends the stiff rules that we may
suggest (for other conclusions see Harding chapter
33; Thorpe chapter 10). The pre-depositional dam-
ages show that these swords were actually used
against other sharp-edged objects (weapons), swords
being the most likely candidates. Even if the edge
damages are clearly observable only on a minority of
the swords – due to post-depositional damage or cor-
rosion – it seems reasonable to infer that the damage
happened to most of the swords – indeed, that it
was part of their purpose. It is curious that a different
pattern with fewer damages emerges in Southern
Germany (Quillfeldt 1995: 5ff, 21), where at least the
Late Bronze Age swords look so much more func-
tional.
Kristiansen claimed a significant difference in the
degree of re-sharpening of bronze-hilted and flange-
hilted swords (1984: 195ff), the bronze-hilted swords
more often having mint blades. Even granting that
the sample is just 260 out of c. 2160 swords (only
Aner and Kersten: volumes I-III), the trend is clear.
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F I G .  1 : The main types of swords from periods II-III in Denmark: a. metal-hilted period II; b. hexagonal metal-hilted
period II; c metal-hilted period III; d. plate-hilted period II; e. plate-hilted period III; f. tanged-hilted period III; g. flange-
hilted per II; h. flange-hilted per III (adapted from Aner and Kersten 1973ff).
a b c d
We look forward to the full documentation recently
promised by Kristiansen. The metal hilted swords –
94 of 168 observed period II swords and 28 of 92
period III swords in Kristiansen’s sample as well as
21 period II and 29 period III flange-hilted swords –
display nearly identical percentages of wear in both
periods. The blades generally show many more signs
of wear and re-sharpening in period III, which
matches the trend of less metal and longer use than
he advocated earlier (1978). The swords with organ-
ic hilt plus metal pommel function like the flange-
hilted swords in both periods.
Kristiansen maintains that there are more fully
hilted swords with worn hilts but fresh blades than
swords with worn hilts and blades.
The suggestion that the bronze-hilted swords, as
the most precious ‘schwersten und kostbarsten’,
were taken out of circulation faster than the other
sword types does not carry much weight. If the
other types were used more frequently for fighting,
the risk of damage and diminished value would pre-
sumably increase and lead to a shorter circulation
period. Wear is an effect of the intensity of use as
well as of the length of use.
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Kristiansen concludes that the bronze-hilted
swords were only rarely used in combat. He further
concludes that the use of these swords for fighting
was secondary to their symbolic use, and that they
therefore indicate chieftains while the swords with
loose pommels or flanged hilts were wielded by
warriors (see below). This interprets two technically
rather different solutions as equally effective weapons
– which seems doubtful. 
The analysis of contexts shows different equipment
for the two groups, apart from the octagonal hilted
swords, which resemble the two simpler types in
their contexts. Unfortunately, the octagonal hilted
swords are included with the other bronze-hilted
swords in Kristiansen’s re-sharpening analysis. It will
be interesting to see how different their patterns are.
The octagonal hilted swords complement or substi-
tute the Nordic metal hilted swords chronologically
on Zealand (Rønne 1987: figs. 52-53). Their position
in the hierarchy of the graves is still not clear (cp.
above) but rather interesting because of the many
copies that were made in the Nordic Bronze Age
(Quillfeldt 1995). Generally they have few associated
objects (Table 2).
Only 21 of the 168 swords from period II used by
Kristiansen (1984: 205ff) and 13 of the 92 from
period III belong to well documented contexts and
are therefore reliable according to my definition of
closed finds.
Deposition
The deposition manners which enabled us to retrieve
the weapons were not uniform, neither at a European
nor a Scandinavian level. A sample of some available
regional counts will show something of the variation,
which depends partly – and mainly – on different
deposition rules in the Bronze Age (Table 1). From
the end of period I to the transition from period III
to IV, nearly all swords and a large portion of the
spearheads and axes in the Nordic West Baltic area
come from graves. This allows us to study the con-
texts with other objects and with the construction of
graves and tumuli – including energy expenditure.
The change during period IV may partly be seen
as a result of the cremation rite which demanded less
room in the grave. After a transitional stage with
full-length graves with swords, especially in North
Zealand, the deposition ceased. That is hardly the
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Table 1. Regional samples of metal-hilted bronze swords;
cp. Fig. 1
South Germany. Bronze Age including Urnfield Period
(Quillfeldt 1995; in addition c. 300 flange-hilted and grip
plate swords are known cp. Schauer 1971).
No. Percent
Deposition in graves 66 22%
Deposition in hoards 23 7%
Deposition on dry land 48 16%
Deposition in wetlands 120 40%
Deposition on settlements 5 2%
Unknown 38 13%
Total 300 100%
Poland. Bronze Age and Hallstatt Period (Fogel 1988).
No. Percent
Deposition in graves 9 4%
Deposition in hoards 83 41%
Single finds 116 57%
Total 204 100%
Mecklenburg. Early – Middle Bronze Age periods I - III
(Schubart 1972).
No. Percent
Deposition in graves 74 63%
Other kinds of deposition 44 37%
Total 118 100%
East Germany. Bronze Age – Hallstatt Period
(Wüstemann 2004).
No. Percent
Deposition in graves c. 230 29%
Deposition in hoards 111 15%
Single finds c. 250 31%
Unknown c. 200 25%
Total c. 800 100%
Denmark – Scania – Schleswig. Early – Middle Bronze
Age periods I-III (Aner and Kersten 1973ff: volumes I-XI,
XVII and manuscript to volumes XII –XIV; Oldeberg 1974).
No. Percent
Deposition in graves 2103 83
Deposition in hoards 44 2
Single finds 376 15
Total 2562 100%
whole explanation, as indicated by the occasional
(exceptional) grave with sword even during period
V (Thrane 1984: 142). A change in attitude is also
witnessed by the introduction of miniature swords
in period IV (Thrane 1969). These never approached
the Middle Bronze Age swords in number, but com-
pared to the genuine Late Bronze Age swords the
mini swords are not unimportant numerically. They
are also relevant insofar as they copy a wider range
of Urnfield culture types than we know as proper
swords – indicating a problem in the survival of the
sources. We may infer that only some of the imported
swords were buried and that our picture is thus
eschewed.
Swords were, above all, placed in graves during
periods II and III. This is fortunate because the posi-
tion and the accompanying objects inform us how
the swords were carried and which other weapons
were worn with them. Needless to say, this applies
only to well-documented inhumation burials. I shall
return to the complexes of objects and the position
of the sword graves in the mounds below.
The swords are interesting enough by themselves.
Under good conditions we see details of swords’
hilts and scabbards and shoulder straps and belts in
Middle Bronze Age contexts (Aner and Kersten: nos.
2242C, 2529, 2663A, 2667, 2669, 3817A; Oldeberg
1974: nos. 247 and 540). The sword – scabbard rela-
tionship is interesting. Considering the small num-
ber of preserved scabbards of wood or wood and
leather, it is surprising how many give the impres-
sion of not being in an original combination. There
are scabbards which are much too long and have
quite a different mouth from the sword hilt so that
sword and scabbard do not match (Aner and Kersten:
no. 2726E). The classic case is the young man from
Borum Eshøj (Boye 1896: pl. X) with a complete
scabbard holding but a dagger blade. This indicates
some manipulation before interment, perhaps related
to the burial situation. This lack of coherence between
sword and scabbard may indicate that the swords
had complicated histories and suggest manipulation
at burial for various reasons.
Another fact apparent from the scabbards is a
change from the handsomely carved broad wooden
ones of period II to narrower and simpler leather
scabbards with metal chapes in period III. This
would seem to reflect an increase in the importance
of functionality to the detriment of the significance
of display. Unfortunately, we do not have anything
comparable from the Late Bronze Age because of
the cremation rite: swords deposited outside burials
never have preserved scabbards. Only a single scab-
bard is known from the Late Bronze Age (Femhøje,
see Broholm 1946: no. 394a).
Hoards
Weapons were deposited in the open countryside
even before period I (Vandkilde 1996), and this rite
continued to the end of the Bronze Age. The domi-
nance of simple axe blades changed to the broad
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Table 2: Associations in Danish sword burials from periods II-III. Only finds documented by professionals, amateurs 
or observant other persons are included (Aner and Kersten 1973ff: volumes I-XI and manuscript to volumes XV-XVI).
Association with gold is marked by *.
Number of associated metal and amber objects
Type 1 2 >2 ∑ Percent
Metal-hilted swords Period II 27 *4 7 *1 15 *7 49 *12 24 %
Hexagonal-hilted swords Period II 11 *2 3 *1 2 16 *3 19 %
Metal-hilted swords Period III 8 *5 6 *2 3 *1 17 *8 47 %
Plate-hilted swords Period II 21 *1 14 *1 17 *8 53 *10 19 %
Plate-hilted Swords Period III 2 5 6 *2 13 *2 15 %
Tanged-hilted swords Period II 2 4 *3 4 *3 12 *6 50 %
Tanged-hilted swords Period III 27 *9 29 *9 28 *8 84 *26 31 %
Flanged-hilted swords Period II 13 *  3 5 * 1 4 *  2 16 *4 25 %
Flanged-hilted swords Period III 64 * 26 32 *10 25 *  8 121 *42 35 %
Sword type unknown Period II 117 *4 10 *3 7 *2 134 *9 7 %
Sword type unknown Period III 4 *1 6 *3 4 *4 14 *8 57 %
Total 300 *46 124 *47 116 *94 529*136
variety of weapons and weapon-effective tools
through periods II-VI and hundreds of single or
multiple depositions on dry or wet land took place.
Randsborg tried to interpret the mixed Smørum-
ovre hoard and the Thorsted spearhead hoard retro-
spectively from the interpretation of the Iron Age
weapon depositions as equipment of armed units
(1995). This may be questionable methodologically
and certainly has little support in the Bronze Age
material. Depositions of weapons normally consist
of a single weapon, sometimes of two. More than
two (six swords at most [Aner and Kersten: nos. 831,
984, 2114 (3), 2075; Kristiansen 1984: 194]) careful-
ly bundled and placed in lakes or bogs (or on dry
land like the eight period I swords from Dystrupgård
– Anon. 1993: 232f; Boas and Rasmussen pers.
comm.) are rare. What do they reflect? The property
of a local group or a larger entity? Was the deposi-
tion motivated by the same ideas as the other depo-
sitions of non-belligerent bronzes? Or were they
genuine precursors of the Iron Age weapon deposits
made by Celtic and Germanic tribes, as inferred by
Randsborg (1995)?
If the latter is accepted then the forces involved
must have been very different from the Iron Age
ones. A comparison with the Iron Age officers’ pre-
cious belts and so forth may be more to the point,
indicating a ‘state of warre’ involving a few warriors
fighting (duels?) with their swords. Did the buried
swords perhaps belong to the victors (and not to the
losers) who abandoned them to the powers of the
earth or the water in gratitude? On the other hand,
the composition of hoards need not be a faithful
reproduction of the conditions of the living culture,
but instead may serve to the purpose of communi-
cating with the higher powers.
Hoards of weapons mixed with ornaments may
have been deposited by a group comprising men and
women as opposed to the exclusive weapon hoards
(which are rare, apart from one-piece deposits) or
ornament hoards which may be individual or group
based. Even a hoard like Sørup with an imported
sword and a big spearhead does not look like a single
warrior’s equipment because of the additional sword
blade (Thrane 1969).
The interpretation of hoards has always been
problematic, the alternatives being too numerous.
The elements for any interpretation are rarely well
documented. Even when they are, the conclusions
are seldom safe.
I have suggested that single weapons – spears and
swords alike – were placed in wet areas, functioning
as a no-man’s-land between the settlement areas,
but so far this is a hypothesis (Thrane n.d.). It just
indicates that weapons were used politically but
does not inform us about the level of aggression,
although a group level seems most likely. So we are
still not at war but almost.
Contexts 
Graves provides the best documented and most var-
ied Bronze Age contexts. A source-critical analysis of
them is a prerequisite for any use of the contexts and
normally reduces the number available for further
interpretations considerably. Most graves were not
observed or documented by professionals or well-
instructed amateurs and some of the most promising
contexts have to be left out of consideration because
of insufficient documentation. 
It is important to know whether a sword was the
only metal object in a burial. Equally interesting
from our point of view, and more enlightening, is
the selection of objects associated with the swords
(Table 2). The list of combinations with ornaments,
personal toilet items, other weapons, containers for
drink and food, furniture and unique objects inter-
preted as cultic, and from the simplest materials –
bone, wood or flint – to the most expensive, like
bronze or gold and the occasional amber, glass or jet
is long.
The contexts are crucial for Kristiansen’s assess-
ment (1984: 19ff; 1999) of a dichotomy between
chiefs and warriors, each with their own favourite
sword type and each characterised by different con-
texts. The chiefs’ graves contained Nordic bronze-
hilted swords and a wide (and richer) range of extras,
sometimes very special, while the warriors’ graves
had functional swords and little else – apart from a
razor and that sort of personal tool. This hypothesis
should be controllable since, assuming that chiefs
had easier access to wealth, the fully hilted swords
ought to be found in richer associations than the
flange-hilted swords. The evidence does not support
a clear-cut division.
Kristiansen’s key find is a double grave from period
II at Norby in Schleswig, which does not have the
best documentation (Mestorf 1890) but seems to
consist of one skeleton with two spearheads, a
bronze clad staff, an awl and a pair of tweezers, and
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a palstave with a fully hilted broadsword inhuma-
tion and another with just a flange-hilted thrust
sword (Aner and Kersten: no. 2538). To Kristiansen
(1999: 544), this is the ‘chiefly high priest’ and his
‘“twin” ruler, the warrior chief’, which creates a
partnership otherwise quite unknown in a Bronze
Age society. The person with no fewer than four
weapons is the peaceful chief, and the unique staff
is his ‘ruling staff’, while the person with just the
sword is a warrior chief. I fail to see the logic of the
inference. The set up is without doubt special, but
other interpretations that do not equate the social
and political status of two such different burials may
be equally plausible. Obviously, a retrospection of
much later texts on Germanic Iron Age tribes has
been made (Thompson 1965; see Steuer chapter 16).
Taking Denmark as a whole, if one looks at the
combinations of the four main types, a rather dif-
ferentiated picture emerges of marked change from
period II to period III. The dominance of the full hilt
and plate swords in II gives way to the dominance
of the tanged and flanged types in period III. Not
only the frequency but also the richness of the asso-
ciated objects shows the same trend.
Further details are interesting. The period II flange-
hilted swords with richer associated finds are nearly
all from oak coffins in wet core tumuli and one of
four contains gold. Gold rings, gold wire and sheet
gold are found with all four types, but in period II
they prefer full hilt swords (Table 2). Gold is more
frequent in the richer graves, whatever the sword
type may be – tanged, flanged or fully hilted swords
– from forty to twenty-five percent.
In period III the move from fully hilted and
plate to tanged and flanged is not only numerical
but accompanied by a similar rise in rich combina-
tions for the latter types. It should be noted, how-
ever, that grip-plate (Griffplatten) swords occur in
equally as modest contexts, and there are exceptions
to all the ‘rules’. The richest period III grave with its
gold arm ring and bronze wheeled cauldron con-
tained a flange-hilted sword (Aner and Kersten: II:
no.1269), thus flatly contradicting his thesis. Who
was buried in this thirteenth-century grave in
Trudshøj? Was he a big man, a chief, a ritual leader,
a warrior chief, or a warrior with a special cultic
responsibility and power? The answer will depend
upon how we interpret the structure of Bronze Age
society and how far we are prepared to go on the
path of inference.
There are other graves with rich associations doc-
umenting the social rank of persons buried with
flange-hilted swords in both period II and III – e.g.,
bronze cups, even stools which are considered high
status (symbolic) furniture (Werner 1994). Gold wire
rings and solid gold arm rings cross the boundaries
between the sword types. They may make a smaller
percentage of the flange-hilted sword graves but they
are by no means restricted to fully hilted or plate
swords in either period II or III.
Whatever reservations we may have about a social-
rank interpretation of grave finds, when a culture
expresses itself so blatantly in the burial equipment,
we can use the evidence for relative ranking within
this culture.
The swords that we are able to determine by
types form a qualified minority. There is a marked
distribution and change from period II to period III,
with the fully hilted sword as the leading type in
period II in the Danish provinces (except volume 9
and Randers, where grip plated or flange-hilted
swords, respectively, are slightly more frequent). It is
a close race between flanged and tanged swords,
with, in Jutland, a heavy preponderance of flange-
hilted swords (Aner and Kersten: volumes VII-XI) –
i.e., the two more effective technical solutions came
to dominate. The desire for a posh hilt was frequent-
ly met in period III by adding a series of bronze discs
to the tanged hilt so that it came to look very much
like the (much rarer) fully hilted swords.
Whether the change is a reaction to a shortage of
fresh metal (as suggested by Kristiansen 1978) or had
other causes, we cannot know. The connection of
technically better editions with aesthetically pleasing
solutions does not need to have a purely economic
background.
Conclusion
This somewhat cursory review of the arms situation
in the Nordic Bronze Age reveals one salient feature:
variation, which is not restricted to the armoury.
However, one may find so much variation that pat-
terns seem to be non-existent or one may hesitate to
attribute much importance to the patterns observed.
Although noted before, it seems worth repeating
that we have to calculate with a range of hostile
actions that will be indistinguishable from full-scale
war in an archaeological record without oral or his-
toric sources. I am referring to feuds, piracy and raids.
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The victims of such actions would presumably be
cared for as individuals, much like ordinarily
deceased persons (cp. the graves with flint arrows
mentioned above). Mass graves are only to be expect-
ed where the magnitude of the disaster prevented
proper care by the relatives or where the kinsmen
were no longer around to attend to a proper burial.
Ritual may be another cause.
What is impressive is the massive existence of a
broad range of proper offensive weapons combined
with a nearly complete absence of defensive means.
It is also striking that the weapons are all for close
(to medium) range fight, not for long range fight.
Finds indicating the existence of troops exceeding a
handful are rare. The emphasis was consistently on
individual equipment whether just a single weapon
– most often the sword – or a combination of differ-
ent types of weapons. The maximal but rare combi-
nation is sword, spear and axe.
The change from period III to IV, gradual though
it looks, nonetheless seems significant and not just
conditioned by the complete and exclusive domi-
nance of the cremation rite. The period III crema-
tion graves are closer to the period II inhumation
graves than to the later period IV cremation graves
when it comes to types and the multitude of objects
buried with the bones. The Urnfield culture shows us
that cremation was no hindrance to rich and diverse
equipment, whether the bronzes were cremated
with the deceased or placed in the grave unscathed
by fire (Harding 2000). However, the distance from
poor to average funerary equipment grew in the
Late Bronze Age both in the Urnfield culture and
later in the Hallstatt culture and in the North.
Weapons, again above all the sword, were pre-
dominant among the types signifying a rich grave.
Thus a common attitude, maybe better expressed in
the Late Bronze Age, is observable in those parts of
Europe where burials were used to mark differences
between individuals, especially males. To associate
swords (and spears) with warriors does not seem to
require a great mental leap. Nor does an interpreta-
tion of rich graves with weapons as those of leading
persons in society (members of leading kinship
groups). The fact that the rich and richest graves
nearly always contain at least one weapon whereas
not all graves with weapons are equally rich does
not mean that the male sphere was split into three
– chiefly warrior, non-chiefly warrior and non-war-
rior. Why assume that there were no local differ-
ences in affluence which were reflected in the burials
of the leading men? Already a cursory review shows
significant differences in the use of gold with or
without weapons (Randsborg 1974; Hartmann 1982).
It would be much more remarkable if the rich graves
were all at a similar level, no matter what the local
subsistence and exchange conditions allowed in the
way of accumulated wealth.
The Nordic Bronze Age certainly had its own rules
and norms, and the wealth of material may blind us
to the fact that it was not an isolated, self-sufficient
phenomenon but always part of a wider European
network or system, whether centre-periphery or other-
wise. Thus it is highly likely that norms and ideals
were transmitted – and transformed – from the more
complicated and in some aspects more advanced
Bronze Age societies further south and southeast.
The existence of a Homeric model or code for the
Warriors in Europe’s Bronze Age seems supported by
several kinds of material evidence which compare
extraordinarily well with the oral tradition of Homer
– e.g., burial rites like the Caka mounds or Lusehøj
– and somewhat less so with the contemporary
archaeological evidence from the Aegean. This obser-
vation or interpretation does not mean that every
aspect of the Homeric warrior ethos was copied and
was present in every nook of Europe whither the
Bronze Age had reached. But I do think that some
elements were adopted from the source that is now
best known from the Iliad. Therefore, it is a proper
reference for our understanding beyond the purely
material interpretations that we would be left with
if we were to study the Nordic Bronze Age solely on
its own premises.
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In considering the nature and significance of war-
fare in the Bronze Age, we are inevitably drawn to a
discussion of the topic in the light of the archaeo-
logical evidence as we find it. True, analogies drawn
from ethnography, and comparison with what
Homer tells us of warfare practices in the heroic age
of Greece, are tempting and possibly enlightening –
if we could only be sure that they are apt. One of the
many things that recent debates on warfare have
taught us is the range of possible material that one
could bring in to any discussion of prehistoric war-
fare and its significance for ancient society. But they
also show how uncertain one must remain about
the relevance of this material. If we are to use anal-
ogy in the study of warfare, we need to find a
methodology that reassures us that our analogies are
appropriate ones.
The various categories of evidence that bear on
Bronze Age warfare have been discussed many times
before. Apart from the weaponry itself, there are the
very familiar Scandinavian rock art depictions that
appear to show people brandishing various items of
weaponry – axes, swords, spears – sometimes placed in
pairs as if duelling is taking place. The significance of
sword wear has often been stressed, apparently elo-
quent testimony to the way in which these weapons
were intensively used, at least in some places at some
times (Kristiansen 1984). Others have devoted studies
to other categories of weaponry, for instance the Early
Bronze Age daggers of copper and their flint imita-
tions (Lomborg 1973; Vandkilde 1996). Here I pro-
pose to concentrate on aspects of the material that
have not received the attention they deserve: the
context of deposition of the weaponry, and what it
can tell us about the function of the weapons, in
warfare or other aspects of Bronze Age life.
Assuming that we have correctly identified the
purpose of the items in question, we are dealing with
the following offensive weapons: bows and arrows;
daggers and related items; swords and rapiers; spears
and lances; battle-axes; and perhaps slings or other
equipment designed to hurl projectiles, such as cat-
apults. In terms of defensive weaponry, helmets,
corslets, greaves, and shields are involved. There is
a lot of such material in the Bronze Age, though
much more offensive than defensive weaponry. But,
and this is an important but, it is not evenly distrib-
uted in time and space. Some places at some periods
have much more of it than others, so whatever it
was for, its role was not constant, and people either
had differential access to it, or used it in different
ways. In other words, there is no one story to be told
about Bronze Age warfare and warriors, at least on
the evidence of weaponry.
In studying all this material, we have at our dis-
posal a rich resource in the form of the Prähistorische
Bronzefunde series, while many individual studies of
weapon types have appeared in other places. Not all
classes of object are equally well served: swords and
daggers have occupied pride of place, while spear-
heads and arrowheads are relatively poorly provided
for. I want to take as my starting-point, therefore,
the information to be derived from a study of select-
ed classes in particular areas. I intend to make use of
the term ‘warrior’ to indicate the person who used
the weaponry, without embarking on an analysis of
the appropriateness of the term. I am conscious,
however, that the production, availability and use
of weapons need not necessarily lead one directly to
the conclusion that they were inevitably and invari-
ably associated with a warrior caste or a mode of
action that presupposes the existence of warrior
elites. Other modes are possible (associations with
hunting; ritual; emblemic use) if less likely, but for
present purposes the designation ‘warrior’ will con-
tinue to be used. Furthermore, the assumption that
the warrior was male will also be made, though
there are interesting discussions which consider the
possible role of women in weapon use and fighting,
and it is certain that not all instances of weapon
burials were those associated with men. This female
role is notable, but beyond my present scope.
Early Bronze Age: 
bow-and-arrow, dagger, halberd
The Early Bronze Age warrior possessed two main
forms of offensive weapon: the arrow and the dagger.
Another utilised form was the halberd, which bears
some formal similarity to the dagger but was hafted
and used in a quite different manner. In the latter
part of the period, the spearhead made its appear-
ance. Deposition is usually in burials, though hoard-
ing started to become common in the period, and a
number of well-known hoards from the latter part
contain daggers (though not normally arrows). There
are also a number of well-known depictions of bow-
and dagger-bearing warriors, for instance on the
stelae at Petit Chasseur, Sion (see below). 
I do not attempt here to quantify the distribution
of daggers by deposition type on a European scale,
but if one takes as an example von Brunn’s study of
Early Bronze Age hoards in Saxony and Thuringia
(1959), out of 94 hoards only ten contained daggers
(or parts thereof), seven contained halberds, and
two spearheads. The great majority of the content of
these hoards consisted of rings, flanged axes and
ring ingots; weapons clearly occupied a lesser posi-
tion (which does not mean they were unimportant
in hoard deposition, however). Conversely, if one
looks at a corpus of Early Bronze Age daggers such as
Gallay’s for France (1981), it is clear that the great
majority are from graves. Only with material of the
developed Early Bronze Age do hoards and wet finds
start to make an appearance (where find circum-
stances are known). Interestingly, in Italy the situa-
tion is somewhat different, with a sizeable number
of Early Bronze Age daggers coming from settlements
and hoards, and only a few from graves (Bianco
Peroni 1994: 181; four out of 80 are in tombs); the
settlements are all in the north and are mainly ter-
remare and pile sites.
For Britain, Gerloff’s (1975) corpus shows that of
352 listed daggers (including knife-daggers) only a
handful – mostly of the (late) Arreton series – came
from hoards, and while there were many single finds
and some river pieces, the great majority of those
with known provenance came from burials. Other
corpora of daggers illustrate much the same point.
In eastern Germany, according to Wüstemann
(1995: 39), 98 Early and Middle Bronze Age daggers
are from graves, and 13 from hoards, while 82 are
single finds and 53 are of unknown context.
For the student of warfare, what is uncertain is the
extent to which these things were used in combat
with humans, as opposed to hunting implements,
and here the context of deposition has little to say.
There are of course a number of instances where
arrowheads are embedded in the skeletons of people,
for instance a young male of the Beaker period in
the ditch at Stonehenge (Evans et al. 1983), and
these people presumably came by their death
because of those arrow shots. But especially in such
a context, it is far from certain that this act of inter-
personal violence was an act of war; it could equally
well have been some kind of ritual killing. Ötzi the
Iceman had a bow and quiverful of arrows, as well
as a flint knife-dagger (Egg 1992), and until recently
it was thought unlikely that he was a warrior, though
the recent discovery of an arrowhead in his shoulder
has reopened this question (though not, in my view,
to the extent that a warrior role can seriously be
considered for him). Like most people, he had these
things as part of his equipment for obtaining food
through shooting game, and only on occasion for
shooting at other people. Such a use continued, no
doubt, throughout prehistory and indeed most of
history. The bow and arrow was used in warfare into
Medieval times and later, until the invention of gun-
powder and the musket rendered the bow obsolete,
and it certainly seems to have been used in the Iron
Age (e.g., Chochorowski 1974; Dusˇek and Dusˇek
1984); there is good evidence that it was also much
used in the Neolithic, as attacks on causewayed
enclosures vividly demonstrate (Mercer 1999).1
Daggers, too, must surely have started life as func-
tional implements for use in hunting, or even as
knives. A use in warfare could only mean that hand-
to-hand combat was practised, and while this may
have been the case, it is hard to be sure that it was, at
least as a normal aspect of life in the Bronze Age. In
fact both the arrow and the dagger must have
changed their meaning over time. Even if hunting
was their primary role, that itself must have taken
on different meanings at different times, since his-
tory and mythology show us that hunting was fre-
quently a prestige activity that had little to do with
mere subsistence. Nimrod, ‘a mighty hunter before
the Lord’ (Genesis 10:9), was presumably not so
highly esteemed because he was a good food pro-
ducer, even if in origin that was the function of the
activity. Thus the great stelae from Petit Chasseur at
Sion (Sauter 1976; Bocksberger 1978) and other sites
(Ambrosi 1988) certainly do show us stylised ver-
sions of prestige manipulators of the bow(s) and
dagger(s), but we cannot directly tell if they are
being depicted as warriors rather than as top-rank
hunters. Probably both are involved, as hunter pres-
tige may have been part of a broader status-related
male identity.
Now Kristiansen (2000) and others have made a
strong case for viewing Early Bronze Age dagger
owners as warriors, part of a warrior-based society in
which possession of elite weaponry marked individ-
uals off as members of special groups, and there are
good reasons for believing this to be true. What it
does not tell us, however, is how those weapons were
used, and one may be sceptical that the weaponry of
the Early Bronze Age has much to tell us about war-
fare practices, however much they tell us about the
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status that followed from successful manipulation
of these items. But it is certainly true that during the
course of the period, the dagger started to assume a
different role, as production of the form in metal
became standard. Thus its presence in hoards, its
hafting in metal as well as in organic materials, the
variety of types that come into being, and above all
the different contexts in which the dagger appears,
show us how its function was becoming flexible.
One of those functions was that of an item of pres-
tige, carried and used as a badge. Such a badge may
not necessarily have been that of a warrior, even if
skill in combat was one desirable attribute. It was as
much the attribution of huntsman/warrior status
that may have mattered as anything to do with the
ability to kill animals or humans. This transition
from hunting role to warrior role, as seen in the car-
rying of dagger and bow, recalls the transition chart-
ed by Chapman (1999) for tools to weapons in the
Late Neolithic, Eneolithic and Copper Age of south-
east Europe.
Halberds clearly played an important role at cer-
tain times and in certain places in the Early Bronze
Age, though for a relatively short period. While we
know from the finds of metal-hilted halberds how
they were hafted and therefore what they looked
like (they are also depicted on rock art), it is much
less certain how they might have been used.
Apparently they were wielded so as to bring a blow
down onto an opponent from above or perhaps the
side, and thus to have served something like a dag-
ger held at a distance (though not for thrusting or
stabbing blows – that was the role of the spearhead
when it arrived). If two warriors were both using
halberds to fight each other then the contest might
be regarded as an equal one (depending on skill and
strength). At least they may have served to prevent
an opponent from getting in close where he could
make use of his dagger for thrusting.
In contextual terms, the situation is markedly
ambiguous. In Ireland, where around 40% of all
known examples occur, contextual information is in
short supply. ‘If a dead warrior of the Early Bronze
Age brought with him a personal weapon to the
grave, it was a dagger, but never a halberd which
was chosen’ (Harbison 1969: 35). According to
Harbison, no halberd has ever been found in a grave
in Ireland, while only 12 out of 150 are associated
finds and all are from hoards. In eastern Germany,
most are from hoards (such as the famous Dieskau
finds), though a certain number occur in high-status
burials – such as Leubingen, or, further east in
Poland, Leki Male – so that there was a ‘personal’
usage as well (Wüstemann 1995: 87). Hoards that
include metal-hafted halberds are, however, prefer-
entially located on moors or in bogs, clearly indicat-
ing a special means of selection and a special role for
halberds in deposition (ibid.: 34). This tells us some-
thing about hoards but little about the function of
halberds as weapons – though it can be argued that
their occurrence in hoards but only rarely in graves
– and then in special graves – is important in itself.
Middle and Late Bronze Age: 
sword and spear
With the increase in length of the dagger, first to the
relatively modest proportions of the rapier, and later
to that of the sword, we enter a new arena. Similarly
with the spear, which appears in later contexts of
the Early Bronze Age, we are no longer looking main-
ly at hunting, useful though spears can be to the
huntsman. Now we enter a phase when items were
being produced that can have had little or no purpose
other than inflicting damage on people, actually or
symbolically. But even here caution is necessary, as
the depictions on Aegean seals and signets show us:
both swords and spears are shown in use against
animals, as well as humans (Kilian-Dirlmeier 1993).
So no doubt they too had their origins in hunting.
But several types of evidence illustrate to us graphi-
cally that a use in fighting became the norm: rock
art, where people wave weapons at other people,
not at animals; defensive armour in leather and
sheet bronze (however impractical it may have been
in actual use); and trauma on individuals.
When we turn to the finds themselves, there are
intriguing regularities to explore. The obvious dif-
ference between swords hilted in bronze and those
hilted with organic materials has often been
thought to signify some special aspect of warrior
practice, apart from certain technical aspects which
meant that bronze-hilted swords were more difficult
to produce than organic-hilted ones. It has been
demonstrated, for instance, that solid-hilted swords
(Vollgriffschwerter) tend to be less heavily used than
flange-hilted swords (Griffzungenschwerter), indeed
they were quite often not used at all, to judge from
the lack of edge damage. Kristiansen (1984) has pro-
vided figures which appear to show that in Periods
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II and III of the Nordic Bronze Age 65-70% of
Vollgriffschwerter had not been sharpened at all and
only 10% or less heavily sharpened; sharpening
being taken as an indication of heavy use. What is
also of interest is that their relative numbers vary
considerably. Usually, taking Europe as a whole,
Griffzungenschwerter are commoner than Vollgriff-
schwerter, but the Nordic area is a notable exception
to that: the numbers are approximately equal. In
central Europe and Hungary there is a modest bias
towards Griffzungenschwerter (1.37:1 and 1.12:1); in
Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania the bias is more
marked (2.57:1, 3.59:1 and 3.41:1); and in Britain and
Ireland the bias is extraordinary (33.7:1 in Britain,
while in Ireland there is no relationship because
there are no Vollgriffschwerter at all). Extraordinary,
that is, if you think that Vollgriffschwerter were impor-
tant for people in Bronze Age Britain and Ireland –
but they clearly were not. They used other things for
whatever purpose Vollgriffschwerter were intended to
fulfil, or they did not do those things at all. If it is
true that Vollgriffschwerter were largely for parade
and display, then perhaps more fighting and less
display occurred in these far western areas. On the
other hand, Bridgford (1997) was able to demon-
strate that different classes of Irish Bronze Age sword
had different wear and use patterns, with Ewart Park
swords having significantly more edge damage than
early Hallstatt swords, where the numbers of dam-
aged and undamaged pieces was not greatly different.
Equally, if we look at density, there are striking
differences (Table 1). Some areas, notably Italy,
Yugoslavia, Romania and Britain, were relatively
poorly provided with swords. Other areas, such as
the south German/Austrian/Swiss area or Hungary,
were well provided for. But compared with Denmark,
north Germany, or – above all – Ireland, these figures
are modest. In Ireland, indeed, where there is on
average a sword roughly every 130 km2, the number
and density of swords is truly remarkable.
Now this may be telling us something about how
swords were viewed, and potentially how they were
used, in different parts of the Bronze Age world. But
there is a further important aspect to be examined
before we can consider such a hypothesis, and that
is context. Swords are deposited in different contexts,
most obviously some in burials, some in hoards, and
some in wet places. (Most of the rest are isolated
finds, which might belong to any of these three
categories, though many are from gravel deposits
that were almost certainly wet in prehistory.) I have
not conducted a full examination of this matter,
though this deserves to be done. In some areas,
however, the figures are readily available and speak
for themselves. In Britain, the 769 swords are divid-
ed as seen in Table 2. 
This picture, while not unexpected to anyone
who knows the British material, throws an entirely
different light on the absolute figures mentioned
above. In particular, the tiny number of swords
known or thought to have been found with burials
is remarkable, if these really were the fighting equip-
ment of warriors, owned and used by them.
However, there are further aspects to this matter
buried within the crude figures: there is a big differ-
ence in context between swords of the main part of
the Late Bronze Age, down to and including the
Wilburton period, and those of the latest part of the
period, characterised by Ewart Park swords. Material
deposited in wet places is distributed pretty evenly
across all periods, but that found in hoards is pre-
dominantly from the Ewart Park phase (about three-
quarters of the total). This means that even in so
prolific a metalworking phase as Wilburton, with its
numerous hoards, the majority of the weapon finds
occur in wet places. So the dominant context of dep-
osition changed even between two adjacent phases
in this instance. In interpreting this pattern, much
will depend on one’s thoughts on hoard deposition,
i.e. whether or not they were intended for recovery.
If they were not, then of course wet deposition and
hoards become rather similar in nature, or at least
in end result. Since much of the material in hoards
is broken or scrap metal, however, things are more
complicated, and it would be foolish to maintain that
scrap metal hoards represent the same intention as
collections of whole and perfect objects, like those
from Vysˇny´ Sˇliac or the Elbe at Velké Zˇernoseky
(Novotná 1970: 123, pl. 24; Plesl 1961: 155, pl. 54).
In fact weapons are integral to wetland deposition,
and incidental to hoards. So the explanation must
lie elsewhere – and here one recalls the various ideas
that have been advanced to account for the extraor-
dinary number of hoards of the Ewart Park phase,
for instance the dumping of bronze in response to
the arrival of iron (Burgess 1979). If that is the case,
then the appearance of swords in hoards is not par-
ticularly significant, certainly not by comparison
with their presence in wetlands and their absence in
burials. On the other hand, there are regularities to
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be observed in the state of swords deposited in wet
places. In Ireland, Bridgford’s analysis (1997: 110)
has shown that a higher than expected proportion
of swords from wet places had little or no damage –
over 70% of those from rivers, for instance. Clearly
selection was at work, so that undamaged pieces
were selectively deposited in such contexts.
Before we explore this further, let us look for com-
parison at south Germany, Austria and Switzerland,
where the picture emerges as shown in Table 3.
Even allowing for a number of structural differ-
ences in the figures presented here, it is immediately
obvious that the picture is quite different from that
in Britain: while the proportion found in water is
very similar, the situation with burials and hoards is
completely reversed. Admittedly a sizeable number
of the burials belong to the Middle Bronze Age, and
the British figures do not include dirks and rapiers
which belong to that phase, but in Central Europe
there are plenty of burials in the Late Bronze Age and
Urnfield period as well. There may be more hoards
with sword fragments to include than are listed here,
but even so the imbalance is remarkable.
Such a scenario may well be repeated in other parts
of Europe. We know, for instance, that in the Nordic
area many swords emanate from graves, especially
in Periods II and III, and though no figures have
been calculated here they will assuredly repay study.
What the two case studies illustrate is that swords
were deposited in different ways, so they had differ-
ent life-histories (‘biographies’) that may reflect dif-
ferent uses. It is natural to think of a sword found
in a grave as the personal weapon of the deceased,
but of course the converse is not necessarily true:
swords found in other contexts may well also have
‘belonged’ to someone. The important thing is that
in the British context they became divorced from
their ownership at the end of their life, whereas in
central Europe their specific biographies meant that
they continued to maintain that aspect.
In the former Yugoslavia, there is another striking
pattern: in parts of the country that are mountain-
ous and harder of access (parts of Serbia, Bosnia and
Macedonia), swords are usually found in burials and
hoards are rather infrequent (Harding 1995). Along
the great river valleys (Danube, Sava, Morava near
its confluence with the Danube), by contrast, almost
all sword finds are from hoards, with a fair sprinkling
from rivers. This is a complex issue that cannot be
dealt with in detail here, but one may suggest that
the presence of swords in burials in mountainous
areas is connected with a need to express warrior
identity in ways that were not appropriate where
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Table 1: Numbers of metal and organic-hilted swords in various countries of Europe
Organic Metal Area Density
(1000km2) (swords per 1000 km2)
Switzerland, Austria 
and South Germany1 672 489 275 4.22
Italy2 167 65 301 0.77
Romania3 273 80 238 1.48
Hungary4 226 202 93 4.60
Former Yugoslavia5 183 51 256 0.91
Denmark and North Germany6 604 641 181 6.88
Britain7 641 19 230 2.87
Ireland8 624 0 82 7.61
References: 1. Schauer 1971; Krämer 1985; Quillfeldt 1995. 2. Bianco Peroni 1970. 3. Bader 1991. 4. Kemenczei 1988;
1991. 5. Harding 1995. 6. Sprockhoff 1931; 1934; Ottenjann 1969. 7. Burgess and Colquhoun 1988. 8. Eogan 1965.
Table 2: British swords by context (after Burgess and
Colquhoun 1988)
Context No. %
Water 213 27.7
Hoard 260 33.8
Single 167 21.7
Burials 3 0.4
Cave 2 0.3
Settlement 1 0.1
Unknown 123 16.0
Total 769 100.0
hoard deposition represented the dominant ideology.
Does this mean that swords in central Europe
were considered more personal objects than those
in Britain? Were swords in the mountainous regions
of the Balkans objects more to be prized than those
in the Danube-Sava corridor? This is certainly one
possibility. The further removed from production
centres they travelled, the more they might have
gained in value, and thus the greater the prestige
they conferred on their ‘owners’. In the case of the
Mycenaean swords of Macedonia and Kosovo, no
doubt this was the case, but elsewhere it is harder to
sustain this argument. Many fine swords could have
been considered prestige objects in this way, but they
did not end up in graves.
I have referred to the biographies of swords, and
this does seem to be an apt expression to account for
their life histories. Weapons that were consigned to
the ground, intact or damaged, had served their pur-
pose. They had been held, admired, handled, waved
around in mock (or real) battles, used to threaten or
frighten, and in the end, placed where custom and
usage dictated they should go, in the ground or the
water. Across Europe, there was a body of opinion
which held that this was the proper thing to do. Only
in some areas was it permissible for swords to retain
their owner’s identity and be buried with him or her.
Something of the same sort may also apply to
spears, though unfortunately there is too little pub-
lished information for comparable figures to be pro-
duced. I pass over here the whole question of the
method of use of spears as opposed to lances, i.e.
whether or not spears were thrown or held and thrust.
Probably both were done. The question is, in what
circumstances? One study that gives the necessary
detailed information on context is that by Rˇíhovsky´
(1996) on the Moravian spears and arrows (Table 4).
In other words, in this area at least spears were
placed predominantly in hoards, while arrowheads
occur in them infrequently, appearing instead with
burials and on settlements – the latter potentially in
their role as attacking weapons. It is notable that
there seems to be no evidence in this area for depo-
sition in wet places – though this is information that
is not readily available. Spears occur in burials only
in certain instances of very high status burials, such
as at Velatice where they were found along with a
sword and other rich grave goods (Rˇíhovsky´ 1958).
But can we take these figures at face value? In
particular, what are we to make of the fact that in
most Urnfield cemeteries the amount of bronzework
deposited with burials is trivial, compared with what
we know from hoard finds was around at the time?
Thus a cemetery with many inhumations such as
Przeczyce in Upper Silesia (Szydtowska 1968-1972)
has graves that might be furnished with trinkets like
buttons, but only a tiny minority have tools and
only one or two have weapons (daggers, not swords).
Does this mean that for most people acquisition of
a sword was an impossibility? Or does it suggest that
deposition practices dictated that in that cemetery,
at least, swords were not to be deposited with the
dead? If the former, then large parts of Europe were
warrior-less, which, in view of the British-Irish situ-
ation, is hard to believe. Graves like that from
Wollmesheim (Schauer 1971: 168f), or the Seddin
‘Königsgrab’ (Kiekebusch 1928), were surely those
of elite warriors; here, it was acceptable for this
warrior identity to be preserved in death, whereas
at Przeczyce and other sites like it this was not the
done thing.
How does this information relate to the function
and role of weaponry? Arrowheads were used for
attacks on sites, especially fortified sites, but also as
part of the archer’s personal possessions. Spearheads,
like swords in the latest phases of Bronze Age Britain,
were taken out of the personal sphere and placed in
the realm of the inaccessible.
Does this relate to other things that were hap-
pening at the time? From various lines of reasoning,
it is possible to conclude that the dominant form
of warfare in Late Bronze Age Europe was raiding,
coupled with the rise of personal display and combat
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Table 3: Context of sword deposition in South Germany,
Austria and Switzerland (after Schauer 1971; Krämer
1985; Quillfeldt 1995)
Context No. %
Water 286 26.7
Hoards 67 6.3
Single 222 20.7
Burials 305 28.5
Settlements* 42 3.9
Unknown 149 13.9
Total 1071 100.0
* The settlement finds may in fact represent ‘water’ depositions,
as all are from Swiss lake sites, where some authors have consid-
ered the deposition of bronzes to be non-functional (Müller 1993).
or duelling (Osgood 1998; Harding 2000). The quasi-
territorial nature of fort spacing across landscapes
can hardly be called state formation except in Greece
and Italy, but it was a process of coalescing of small
groups into larger groups, centred on strongholds.
In terms of elite manifestations, there is little or no
evidence of special marking out within settlements;
high status individuals were only marked in certain
ways. In some areas, those individuals were able to
utilise the need for common strategies to assure
defence (and where appropriate, attack) to bolster
their personal position in terms of enhanced visi-
bility. There are areas of high visibility of personal
status, and areas of low or no visibility, and at present
we cannot discern what rules applied to determine
which would be dominant.
There is abundant evidence that fighting was inti-
mately connected with the ritual sphere, for instance
parade armour that was not intended for actual use,
the deposition of weaponry in wet places, the curi-
ous positioning of some forts in ‘special’ places that
were not chosen for defence. Does the pattern of
weapon use and deposition then become intelligible
if seen as predominantly a part of the ritual sphere?
Deposition consists of a series of prescribed and
apparently repeated actions. Weaponry was thus pref-
erentially removed from the personal sphere and
put into the ritual one, out of reach of everyday use.
So the answer to that question is probably yes; but
it brings us back to the variability of the record.
At the end of the day, weapons tell us what was
possible and what was probable in terms of warfare
practices. They also shed unexpected light on the
way they were used in terms of deposition. We can
also use the weapons to give the lie, finally, to the
notion that the past was ever a ‘pacified’ place. The
manufactured controversy that Keeley (1996) intro-
duced was never appropriate, at least not in a Bronze
Age context, since we have always known from the
volume and variety of weapons that it was a far
from peaceful time. We may not know exactly how,
when and where the weapons were used, but no
serious Bronze Age scholar would maintain they
were not used at all. The Bronze Age world was a
dangerous place to live in, however exciting its tech-
nological, political and ideological advances.
N O T E
1 I thank Henrik Thrane for the observation that the bow
and arrow are well attested in Danish weapon offerings of
the Roman period.
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The constitution of Homeric society is the main
focus of this article, which in particular highlights
aspect of gender, warfare, and materiality. The under-
lying expectation is that such a study may ultimate-
ly lead to a better understanding of the social world
of the illiterate Bronze Age north of the Alps. A
social study of Homer1 can, it may be argued, form
the basis of a contextually based comparison with
Bronze Age societies in temperate Europe, using the
principle of relational analogy (Wylie 1985; Ravn
1993). However, such a comparative enterprise is
not the immediate objective of the present study,
which merely aims at calling attention to the exis-
tence of such a potential. The issue of ideology,
which is important in Homer’s epics as well as in
current archaeology, will receive a few theoretical
comments at the end of the article.
The Research Council project ‘War and Society.
Archaeological and Social-Anthropological Perspectives’
has put me on the track of past war heroes, martial
ideologies and, not least, military societies or warrior
bands. Evidently the warrior role has a strong influ-
ence on our understanding of European prehistory
(Vandkilde and Bertelsen 2000; Vandkilde 2003).
When we speak of war and warriors we are not only
speaking of social organisation, ideology, prestige
and power, but also to a great degree of gender.
More or less exclusive men’s clubs, encompassed
by the German term Männerbünde, exist in many
societies, often with a strong martial strain (Mallory
1989: 110f; Ehrenreich 1997: 117ff; Vandkilde chap-
ter 26). To be a warrior is therefore a demonstration
of a specific male identity, which, of course, cannot
be assessed without including other gender identi-
ties: all in all, the specific social context cannot be
ignored.
It is central to the discussion undertaken that the
warrior identity can only be understood in its social
context against the background of other social iden-
tities and confronted with the current warrior ideal.
The Dutch scholar Hans van Wees (1992; 1997) has
thoroughly studied the Iliad and the Odyssey in a
social perspective, primarily the relationship between
status rivalry, war and social hierarchy. Van Wees has
indeed been a source of inspiration, particularly in
the sense that the epics are considered a meaningful
entity. I have, however, extended van Wees’ main
theme and added new themes and approaches espe-
cially as regards material culture, gender identities,
and the warrior retinue. In particular, material cul-
ture cannot be ignored, forming as it does the fore-
most source material in archaeology in addition to
being a powerful silent discourse in any society, past
or present. Inspiration has also come from studies
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by Moses Finley (1972), Ian Morris (1987), and Otto
Steen Due (1999a; 1999b). It may be added that the
approach to Homer in the present study is archaeo-
logical in the sense that it focuses upon relevant
themes in the discipline’s discourse and in that it
attempts to uncover ‘layer by layer’ levels of social
practice in Homeric society (cf. Foucault 1985).
In the following attention is upon the Homeric
epics, especially the Iliad, as a structured entity, but
I do think that the archaeological value of the two
interconnected stories has been widely underesti-
mated. To use the Homeric epics as a supplement to
the archaeological sources has long been faut passé,
although there are brave exceptions (Frankenstein
and Rowlands 1978; Rowlands 1980). The rejection
can – in the case of Northern and Central Europe –
be blamed on the geographical distance but also on
the fact that the Iliad and the Odyssey are the written
final products of a century-long oral epic tradition,
in the same way as for example, the Beowulf-epic of
the Early Medieval Period. In a chronological-his-
torical sense, the epics do not therefore comprise an
entity, as they incorporate elements and situations
from different eras. It can nevertheless be argued that
the epics are relevant to the study of the European
Bronze Age. This is partly because the historical focal
point of the epics is around 1200-900 BC, the so-
called ‘Dark Ages’, although with distinct Mycenaean
elements (see Page 1959; Finley 1972; 1973: 29; also
the discussion in Morris 1987: 44ff; Morris and
Powell 1997), partly because the epics are a logically
reasoned, thoroughly elaborated whole, describing a
specific society over a period of 20-30 years.
The epics may then, to a certain extent, be source
material for the illiterate European Bronze Age, but
they mainly emerge as a meaningful and complete
whole, describing ideal and real features of a specific
aristocratic society (cf. van Wees 1992). The epics
are valuable as a relevant analogy, which can lead us
to reflect on the social dimension in mute archaeo-
logical material. 
Homer as an analogous social context
Opinions have differed within Greek Bronze Age and
early Iron-Age archaeology, but after a long period
of rejection, Homer has again been accepted and is
used as a supplementary text to archaeology (see
Morris 1987: 22ff; Morris and Powell 1997).
The epics contain antiquated features in language
and content, which directly refer to the character-
istic Late Bronze Age material culture and political
structure of the Aegean area. Certain types of
weapons, especially boar’s tusk helmets (Fig. 1.) and
the tower or figure-eight-shaped shields, as tall as a
man (The Iliad X: 261-271; IV: 404-405), for example,
clearly belong to the Late Bronze Ages (Lorimer 1950:
133ff, 212ff; Page 1959: 218ff; Snodgrass 1964;
Bloedow 1999). The same goes for the landscape of
power, with the well-known cities and palaces like
Pylos, Knossos, Tiryns, Mycenae and Orchomenos
(Page 1959: 218ff; Chadwick 1976: 180ff; van Wees
1992: 262; Bennet 1997).
The grouping of warriors around the most out-
standing heroes, the individualising hero worship of
the warrior company, its asymmetrical construction
and its internal rivalry belong to the Late Bronze
Age and/or early Iron Age, since this form of mili-
tary organisation differs distinctively from warfare
in later Greek periods. In the Archaic and Classical
periods, the military hoplite-system was a regular
army with anonymous soldiers and a communal
expression, which is in harmony with the collective
ideology of the city-states (Runciman 1999: 732f).
However, the attitude towards death, the descrip-
tion of burial rituals and the social organisation in
the epics is not really in keeping with the evidence
from the Linear B texts and the archaeology the Late
Bronze Age (Dickinson 1994: 81). It is more in accor-
dance with the post-Mycenaean Period’s simpler
hierarchy and varying burial rituals, which shift
between inhumation and cremation in ceramic con-
tainers (see Finley 1972: 51ff; Morris 1987: 18ff, 46,
53, 178; van Wees 1992: 1ff, 262).
Despite discussions about the historical reference
point of the individual parts of the epics, and despite
uncertainties about the exact time of writing,2 it is
often forgotten that the Homeric epics, with their
maximum dispersion between 1700 BC and 500 BC
(cf. Bennet 1997: 531), are the only writings from the
European Bronze Age seen as a geographic whole3.
Precisely that fact makes the epics suitable to be
brought into interaction with archaeological sources,
but caution obviously should increase with geograph-
ical distance. However, the epics may be considered
– in terms of time, place and subject – a more obvious
choice than the ethnographic observations and
analogies often used in archaeology.
The Homeric epics can therefore – on a complete-
ly general level, and with the above reservations in
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mind – be regarded as an alternative way in to the
illiterate Bronze Age societies north of the Alps. Far
more important, however, is the fact that the epics
have an internal logic that makes them useful for
comparative purposes. Mind you, this logical struc-
ture reflects on the societies that created them. In
our source-criticism, we must recognise that the
epics are an ideological construction made by and
for a male-dominated social élite. In the epics there
are social groupings whose points of view are
oppressed or disregarded. Above all, the conditions
of the lower classes are out of focus, and they have
no voice. Women are only rarely the centre of atten-
tion, and it can be argued that the point of view is
primarily male. This special perspective of the epics
can, at least partly, explain their more recent popu-
larity; from Antiquity to the Middle Ages and up
to the present, the two epics have been diligently
used in reproductive strategies of the social élite, in
the cultivation of a violent masculine identity as a
war hero, and to legitimate men's authority over
women.
Basically, the epics, especially the Iliad, are about
men and war (Due 1999b); ‘the world’ according to
a male warrior élite. This imbalance or distortion may
especially cause problems of interpretation if you
want to use Homer as a source for specific historical
conditions. This report, on the other hand, views
the Homeric epics as an analysable context with a
value in themselves; as a closed social context with
a complexity of real and ideal ingredients. An analy-
sis of these various ingredients – at times full of con-
trasts – can give new insight, although the narrowly
elitist, male-dominated point of view that the nar-
rator holds must naturally be taken into considera-
tion and kept in mind in the evaluation of the inter-
pretations. Despite these reservations as to sources, I
think that it is possible to form a fairly exact impres-
sion of social practice, including class relations and
ideals, identities and gender dominance. In other
words, the Homeric epics can be used as an archae-
ological ‘manual’ on heroes, war and society, precise-
ly because they comprise complete social contexts
with many layers of meaning: something which
archaeology does not exactly lack, but which is more
difficult, and especially more demanding, to recon-
struct. This is in keeping with recent Homer research
(van Wees 1992: 262; Morris 1987: 22ff, 44ff, 53,
90f, 196ff with references) which agrees that the
epics deliver a coherent, meaningful picture of an
aristocratic society. Even the structural contrasts that
also characterise the epics make sense when they are
seen on the basis of the social contexts in which
they are found.
The Iliad and the Odyssey can be understood
against the background of three different contexts.
The first is the epics in themselves, i.e., the aristo-
cratic society that the poet describes, and which con-
stitute a frame for the actors’ thoughts, stories and
actions. That is the context on which the following
analysis is based. The second is that of the society
which created, recreated and developed the epics
through verbal recital, mainly in the period between
the 13th and 9th century BC,4 the Late Mycenaean
and post-Mycenaean periods. The third is that of
the society which had the epics ‘frozen’ by writing
them down, probably around 700 BC or later, i.e.
the period when the Greek city-state took form.
The two epics can, with their explicit ideals regard-
ing, for example, gender, status, political leadership,
war, trade and gifts, be explained with reference to
their social potential in the user-societies, which are
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F I G .  1 : Head of a warrior wearing a boar’s tusk helmet;
lid of small ivory box (pyxis) dating to c. 1400 BC.
Mycenae, chamber tomb 27 (after Borchhardt 1972).
the second and third contexts. The societies which
used the epics were aware of their historical back-
ground, and they used history actively and strategi-
cally. In the post-Mycenaean Period, the epics repre-
sented respectable aristocratic ideals from a glorious
but not so-distant past – perhaps in contrast to a
chaotic present. In the early Greek city-state, the
epics offered a common identity through glorifica-
tion of a heroic past, thus making them suitable to
legitimise a new type of state society, the polis
(Morris 1987; van Wees 1992). The glorification of a
heroic past, but with a material expression, is also
substantiated in Archaic times by the hero cult,
which took place in front of the monumental graves
of the Bronze Age (Whitley 1995). However, the
epics also legitimise asymmetry and action on other
levels, especially men’s authority over women, and
war as a means of attaining prestige in society. The
following analysis concentrates on the first of these
three contexts, i.e., the epics as a logically structured
whole.
Ideology and social organisation 
in Homeric society
The ideals of the epics do not always correspond to
reality; there are both large and small deviations in
a number of areas. Put simply, unrealistic elements
inspired by the ideology of society are introduced
into the story (van Wees 1992: 153). The epics are
contradictory in places, especially the way that ideals
of equality are contradicted by a hierarchical reality.
Homeric social stratification as a distinctly bi-
partite pyramid, with a ruling class of aristocrats at
the top, is well documented5 (Finley 1972: 61ff).
Thus there are two distinct classes: the people and
the aristocracy (Iliad II: 365f), added to which were
slaves, often prisoners of war. The boundaries can-
not be overstepped, since class affiliation is deter-
mined by birth (Morris 1987: 94ff). The relationship
between the lower and upper classes is not ideolog-
ically coloured, probably because the allocation of
power between those who dominate and those who
subject themselves is undisputed. The ideology has
free play, but only in the upper part of the pyramid.
The poet uses an inordinate amount of space in
describing the personal qualities of the individual
heroes and the advantages and disadvantages of
their activities, and in so doing indicating their
social position in the group of heroes. The aristo-
cratic warriors seem almost obsessed with their need
for performance. Thus they constantly compete for
social status on- and off the battlefield; therefore the
nickname ‘status warriors’ (van Wees 1992; also
Finley 1972: 132ff). In this way, the epics create an
impression of an egalitarian state amongst the aris-
tocrats, in which social status and authority depend
on personal qualities, strength, influence, and suc-
cess in war (van Wees 1992). This focus on individ-
ual performance is, however, misleading, because
fame and success have no real influence on the
social order.
If we look beneath the surface, it is evident that
the aristocracy itself is subordinate to a strict hierar-
chical structure, where kinship, inheritance, politi-
cal power and wealth are determining factors. The
aristocracy divides into a ruling élite of kings and
princes, and a non-ruling élite. Power and social
position are inherited in certain families according
to the principle of male primogeniture. Each aristo-
crat takes his position in the social hierarchy of aris-
tocrats, defined in relation to the local dynasty, and
the kings themselves are placed in a superior hier-
archy in relation to the Dynasty of Pelopides of
Mycenae (see below) and in relation to measurable
property such as wealth, slaves and the size and geo-
graphical position of the kingdom. Thus the aristo-
crats form their own hierarchy, in which allegiance
and contracts of service, for example of a military
nature between ruler and subordinates (vassals) on
several levels, seal power relations, as in a feudal
society (see Finley 1972: 109ff).
Personal ability is good to have, but not a require-
ment, and there is a limit as to how far individuals
can advance through the system purely on the basis
of determination, ability and bravery on the battle-
field. First-class war heroes exist both among kings
and their aristocratic companions, but this status
actually seems unimportant. Although competence
in war is appreciated, it does not change the essen-
tial point, which is that hierarchy is predetermined.
For example, Agamemnon has a supreme hereditary
status in the hierarchy of princes, with given privi-
leges and obligations which are not dependent on
personal capability (Finley 1972: 87), and actually,
his personal accomplishments on the battlefield
are quite moderate. Besides, he is described as ‘first
among equals’, which, all things considered, is an
idealistic description, since he single-handedly and
arbitrarily distributes honours and the spoils of war.
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However, Agamemnon can assume an egalitarian,
paternalistic, image precisely because he is the king
of the most powerful state, namely Mycenae, with
‘many isles and all of Argos’ (Iliad II: 108). It is with-
out doubt a strategic choice of tone and expression.
The Iliad bears witness to the existence of a cen-
tralised structure, in which the ruler of Mycenae –
although to an unknown extent – exercises authority
over other political units (see Page 1959: Maps I-III
p. 121ff). This authority is sealed through gifts and
services (Iliad II: 254f; IX: 129ff; XXIII: 296f). And
Homer does describe Agamemnon with the suffix
wanax, which, in contrast to the more common word
for king, basileus, has the significance of paramount
ruler – a post which is symbolised by a special
sceptre, and sanctioned by the gods (see Iliad II:
100-108). Thus Agamemnon must necessarily be
‘king over men’ while the other princes bear more
neutral labels. For example, Achilles is ‘the fast run-
ner’, Odysseus is ‘clever’ and ‘brave’, Diomedes is
‘good at war cries’ and Nestor ‘the old Gerenian
charioteer’. This is a reflection of the actual power
relations, which are clearly revealed when Achilles,
for example, is thoroughly put in his place by
Odysseus; ‘Though thou be valiant, and a goddess
bare thee, yet he (Agamemnon) is the mightier, see-
ing he is king of more’ (Iliad I: 280-81).
Ideology comes in as a manipulative element
amongst the aristocrats where, as mentioned, an
ideal of equality flourishes. The background for this
contrast between an ideal of equality and an actual
hierarchical structure amongst the aristocracy can of
course be debated, but two possibilities, which do
not exclude each other, must be mentioned. Power
is never permanent and unchangeable. It may there-
fore be the ruler of Mycenae who forces a ‘false con-
sciousness’ on the elite in order to retain power. On
the other hand, the aristocrats could have assumed
the ideal of equality as a part of their self-image as a
class and as a part of a strategy in which they see
power relations as partly unclear. Basically, it gives
them more freedom of action; an incentive to com-
pete on and off the battlefield. The use of the prince-
ly appellation ‘first amongst equals’ can therefore be
read either with emphasis on the ‘first’ or on the
‘equals’, depending on the person’s position in the
hierarchy of aristocrats and depending on the strate-
gy the individual aristocratic warrior adopts.
Material culture and society in Homer
In Homer, material culture reflects to a greater degree
the social hierarchy than the ideology of equality.
Palaces, castles, spectacular gifts and drinking equip-
ment, magnificent weapons and stately burial rituals
are reserved for the aristocracy, and luxurious pres-
entation of material goods increases concurrently
with the position in the hierarchy of society. As
mentioned, the hierarchy also saturates the upper
classes of aristocrats, and also here the material
culture follows along. In the so-called catalogue of
ships ‘the well built citadel of Mycenae’ provides by
far the strongest force, and can present the best and
wealthiest war material: 
... of these was the son of Atreus, lord Agamemnon, captain of
an hundred ships. With him followed most warriors by far and
goodliest; and among them he himself did on his gleaming
bronze, a king all-glorious, and was pre-eminent among all the
warriors, for that he was noblest, and led warriors far the most
in number. (Iliad II: 575ff: also XI: 15ff)
It is a huge demonstration of power and social status.
It is also a clear demonstration of violent potential –
not only to the Trojan enemy but to a great degree
also to the allied princes of the Achaean army. In
exactly the same style, Agamemnon offers Achilles
great fortunes and privileges to forget his anger and
return to the ranks of the fighters (Iliad IX: 120ff).
No other king could afford to be that generous.
Burial rituals and personal equipment follow the
hierarchy to a large extent, whereby the ruling élite
presents itself in the best equipment and receives
the stateliest funerals. For example, in the Odyssey
(XXIV: 32) we are told that the whole Achaean army
would have co-operated in the construction of a
grave mound for Agamemnon, which forms a con-
trast to the more moderate funerals of common aris-
tocrats in the epics. It is, however, important to
notice that the great hero Patroclus receives a funer-
al worthy of a king (Iliad XIII). But Patroclus is not a
king, but a common aristocrat, and besides foster
brother to the king of the Myrmidons, Achilles.
Through a stately funeral, ending with the construc-
tion of a monumental mound, and followed by
grandiose burial games in Patroclus’ honour, a far
higher social status is reflected than his position in
the social hierarchy and his fame as a war hero can
justify. The ideology of equality and free competi-
tion is expressed here when the material world –
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especially weaponry and burial rituals – supports the
idea of personal achievement and fame as a source of
power and influence. Weapons and burial rituals are
actively used in the constant status rivalry amongst
the heroes; but the reality is that both high and low
social positions are controlled by other, less easily
manipulated mechanisms than the ability to wage
war. Neither Patroclus’ heroic deeds on the battlefield
or the, to say the least, conspicuous burial perform-
ance changes his social position in the hierarchy;
roughly speaking, society is ideologically reproduced.
But there is more to it: when Achilles arranges a
state burial for Patroclus, he also questions the exist-
ing power relations. This material display may well
be in accordance with the ideology or, if you like,
with the latitude for social rivalry allowed by the
social system. But the whole séance has a more pro-
found meaning, which can be readily understood by
everyone in Homeric society: even power is nego-
tiable; power is never unchangeable! Social identi-
ties, existing – or, as here, under construction – are
communicated through material culture. Material
culture has obviously tangible practical and social
functions as well as more abstract symbolic meanings
attached to the social organisation, ideology and
history of society (Vandkilde 2000: 21ff).
Certain material things can have legends and sto-
ries attached. This is illustrated by the story about
the boar’s tusk helmet (Fig. 1), which Odysseus puts
on before he and Diomedes leave for a nightly spying
expedition:
And Meriones gave to Odysseus a bow and a quiver and a
sword, and about his head he set a helm wrought of hide, and
with many a tight-stretched thong was it made stiff within,
while on the outside the white teeth of a boar of gleaming
tusks were set thick, to and fro, well and cunningly, and on
the inside was fixed with a lining of felt. This helmet
Autolycos on a time stole out of Eleon when he had broken
into the stout-built house of Amyntor, son of Ormenus; and
he gave it to Amphidamas of Cythera to take to Scadeia, and
Amphidamas gave it to Molos as a guest-gift, but he gave it to
his own son Meriones to wear; and now, being set thereon, it
covered the head of Odysseus. (Iliad X: 260-71)
It is truly a helmet with soul and personality that
Odysseus puts on his head. The expedition into the
enemy camp means that a new story can be added
to the helmet's cultural identity, which is therefore
constantly changing. The story of the helmet shows
how things can be bearers of history and memory,
which are thus transferred in time and space. The
helmet and its symbolic goods become a part of
Odysseus’ personality and social identity as a war
hero in that situation.
The Homeric world is a highly hierarchical society,
which becomes a natural state through material
means. As a whole, the material culture follows the
steps of the hierarchy but reflects to a certain degree
the ideology of the upper classes. The war heroes and
other people in the poems consciously or uncon-
sciously use material culture in strategies and actions
which maintain and create social identity. In addi-
tion, we can see how the material culture so to speak
influences the actors recursively. Material visibility,
not least bodily appearance, is effective in itself,
although within already designated limits.
War and aristocratic warriors 
in Homeric Society
In the epics, war and violence are closely connected
to status rivalry (van Wees 1992). Moses Finley
(1972: 131) expresses it this way: ‘Warrior and hero
are synonyms, and the main theme of a warrior
culture is constructed on two notes – prowess and
honour. The one is the hero’s essential attribute, the
other his essential aim.’ War is officially waged to
defend insulted honour, to gain the respect of friends
and enemies, and to achieve fame. But, really, war is
instead waged in order to confirm power and as a
means of enrichment and expansion of territory.
Wealth is a goal, which ideally is achieved through
gift-giving, trade and exchange, but actually more
often reached through war and raiding expeditions
(van Wees 1992: 101).
The significance of the status rivalry expressed in
duels between the heroes on the battlefield is no
doubt highly exaggerated in the poems, again as a
consequence of ideological distortion. The Homeric
society is a warrior culture, in which war and violence
are important structuring elements. It is the fine
heroic duels that attract attention, because through
them the warrior ideal can be reproduced almost
infinitely, and the ugly face of war, which is also a
part of it all, tends to be hidden. Attacks, piracy, and
pillaging are clearly a very substantial part of the
war actions, and at the same time an economic
necessity both before and after Troy. For example,
Odysseus reports on a predatory attack in this way:
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From Ilium the wind bore me and brought me to the Cicones,
to Ismarus. There I sacked the city and slew the men; and
from the city we took their wives and much treasure, and
divided it among us, that so far as lay in me no man might go
defrauded of an equal share. (Odyssey IX: 39-42)
Homer gives the classic institution of war heroes a
prominent place in society; in war and peace. A war-
rior band can be defined as a more or less exclusive
club of specialised warriors. Ethno-historically, the
institutionalised warrior band divides itself into three
categories, with different recruiting, leadership and
internal structure (Vandkilde chapter 26): first, war-
rior institutions in which access is regulated through
age (age grade), second, warrior institutions in which
access is regulated through personal qualities (inde-
pendent companionship), and third, warrior insti-
tutions in which access is regulated through dis-
tinctions of rank (dependent companionship). The
Homeric warrior institution belongs among the last
two categories, mostly the last category (cf. van
Wees 1997: 670). It is a company of warriors, an elite
team of aristocratic warriors who accompany a war
leader of high descent. Such a band of warriors is
mentioned in several places but most comprehen-
sively in the catalogue of ships (Iliad II: 494ff). Thus
the warriors of Myrmidon accompany Achilles, with
his foster brother Patroclus as second in command.
Nestor's following of warriors is probably the same
aristocrats who, at home in the palace in Pylos, sit
in the place of honour at the high table during
Telemachos’ visit (Odyssey III: 469-574). The follow-
ing of warriors surrounding Odysseus also accompa-
nies him on his way home from Troy to Ithaca. The
Cretan warriors are led by their king, Idomeneus, etc.
Not surprisingly, here too, the ideal differs from
reality. Personal qualities seem definitive for the
recruiting of the company of warriors, for internal
status differentiation, and for such an important
issue as leadership; in particular, martial ability must
constantly be proven on the battlefield. Nevertheless,
wealth, birth and political position are the most
important criteria for the composition of the group
of warriors. Men of the people are apparently
excluded from the company. Each king is the born
leader of a permanent, dependent following of aris-
tocratic warriors, and in that context, honour,
respect, achievements and fame are less important.
Furthermore, the size of the company of warriors
depends on the position of its leader in the superior
political hierarchy; thus Agamemnon’s following is
by far the largest. In addition there is a superior
company: Agamemnon has surrounding him –
besides a company of noble warriors from his own
kingdom – a sworn guard of princely warriors, name-
ly the other Achaean kings.
Actually, this structure calls to mind the Germanic
retinue (Gefolgschaft, hird) in the 5th century AD. In
the first centuries AD, the military alliance of war-
riors is gradually developed by the Germanic tribes
from a loosely knit, independent band of warriors,
built around mutual respect, prestige, and martial
abilities to a dependent, hierarchic system of aristo-
cratic warriors who are bound by oath to a powerful
royal family, i.e. a system of retainers (cf. Steuer 1982:
55ff; Hedeager 1990: 184ff; Jørgensen 1999: 156ff).
First and foremost, however, the Homeric military
institutions of aristocrats make us think of the Late
Bronze Age military system in the Aegean area as it
can be roughly reconstructed from the Linear B
texts. We are now a few centuries earlier than the
focal point of Homer’s epics, but the connection
seems evident despite interpretative difficulties.
The clay tablets from the Pylos palace from
around 1200 BC contain information about a series
of offices in the Pylian state administration (Page
1959: 183ff; Chadwick 1976: 71ff; Bennet 1997):
Wanax is thus the highest and most lucrative post,
probably the king himself. Besides the wanax, there
is another important post, the lawagetas, which could
be intended for the heir to the throne, or maybe the
king himself in another role. The actual word means
‘leader of the people’ but as ‘the people’ in Homer
often refers to the warriors, the best translation is
perhaps army leader or ‘leader of the warriors’. In
addition, there is a third category, the so-called heque-
tai which, directly translated, means companions.
Here we are probably being introduced to the com-
pany of warriors who in later interpretations are the
king’s drinking companions and close attendants in
war and peace. The hequetai of the tablets are often
named with their father’s name as well as their own,
and this careful use of the patronymic indicates an
especially high social position. The clay tablets from
Knossos from around 1400 BC (Page 1959; Chadwick
1976; Bennet 1997, op. cit.) tell us that hequetai had
the right to keep slaves, wore distinctive garments and
drove special chariots, which, of course, supports their
interpretation as warrior aristocrats with a close
connection to the king or his deputy commander.
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The walls in the secondary megaron in the south-
west wing of the Pylos palace were decorated with
warrior scenes, both battles between infantrymen and
processions with warriors and chariots (Fig. 2). While
the primary megaron was most likely the king’s
reception hall, with the warrior scenes in mind, it is
natural to assume that the secondary megaron was
the seat of the commander, lawagetas (Davis and
Bennett 1999: 117f), and his attendants, the hequetai.
Male institutions of warriors exist in many con-
temporary and historical societies where they can be
more or less bounded and more or less exclusive in
their recruitment. An interesting aspect is the built-in
contrast on two levels in these warrior institutions:
first of all, it is an exclusive club, which almost by
definition excludes women and children, but in many
cases also men of non-aristocratic descent. Although
the military club thus comprises a potentially oppres-
sive extension of power, there are often well-defined
obligations based on the well being of society; includ-
ing religious, political and defensive functions. Second,
war is a more or less important part of the activities of
the association. A martial appearance, in which a mas-
culine expression is intensified through spectacular
weaponry, often misrepresents, to some degree, a life
which also includes peace. The Homeric military insti-
tution of warriors also has such contrasting features.
In Homer, the military institution occupies above all,
a male domain, which is in sharp contrast to a female
domain based on a stereotyped feminine ideal.
Odysseus and Penelope: gender in Homer
In Homer’s society, women have no access to the
company of warriors and regardless of their position
in the social hierarchy, men and women live in sep-
arate worlds. Men’s actions and feelings are more
closely connected to those of other men than to
those of women, whether their wives or other women
in or outside the household (Finley 1972: 148).
Within the aristocracy there are two gender
ideals, a masculine and a feminine. These gender
ideals are represented in Homer by King Odysseus
and his wife Queen Penelope, who both live up to
the ideal in an exemplary manner in everything
that they do. Whereas Odysseus is the cosmopolitan
warrior who fights his own and others’ battles,
Penelope stays at home and guards the family and
its properties. Significantly, the Homeric word kre-
demnon means both city wall and the marriage veil
of a woman (Morris 1987: 192). In a way, Penelope
is a heroine, defined on the basis of specific female
values and certain moral codes. The division of
labour between the two main characters is explained
in the Odyssey, where Penelope relates a conversa-
tion with her husband shortly before his departure
to Troy. Odysseus says: 
Therefore I do not know whether the god will bring me back,
or whether I shall be cut off there in the land of Troy: so let
all here be your care. Be mindful of my father and my mother
in the halls even as you are now, or yet more, while I am far
away. (Odyssey XVIII: 265-68)
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F I G .  2 :  Restored wall paintings with warrior processions and fighting scenes in the second megaron (Hall 64) of the
palace of Pylos in Messenia. It was destroyed around 1200 BC. The megaron may well have been the seat of lawagetas,
the leader of the warriors and the hequetai, the following of warriors – as discernible in the Linear B texts (after
Borchhardt 1972).
The Homeric epics are more or less one long idolisa-
tion of the heroic man. Not many verses are dedi-
cated to the lives and world of women, which, how-
ever, are clearly present as a necessary contrast.
While the warrior hero is the ideal for male aristo-
crats, the female aristocrat finds her ideal in a nar-
row gender identity as a peaceful, caring person who
looks after the home during the frequent absences
of her husband. Early European written sources thus
document the presence of what you could call sym-
metric gender ideals, in which a violent, extroverted,
masculine cosmopolitan is contrasted with a peace-
ful feminine counterpart in the domestic sphere.
This ideal is surprisingly similar to certain gender
stereotypes in our own world, and it is kept alive in
the same way by separate gender domains, where
women and men to a great extent do what culture
expects.
In Homeric society, the war hero cannot exist
without his female counterpart, who gets her iden-
tity from oikos, the Homeric word for the domestic
domain. The war hero even rejects any connection
to oikos, which stands for peace, and therefore life.
In a way, the war hero denies life, achieving his
identity through violence and death. However, he
exists qua his opposite – the peaceful, home-fixated
woman. Thus men and women ideally each rule
their world:6
Masculine Feminine
International domain Private domain – oikos
Adventure Stability
War Peace
Change Reproduction
Death Life
Lion7 Human being
In Homeric society, too, gender ideals are kept alive
by social practice in that area, at the same time as
they help to maintain a certain image of society.
And as a rule, concepts of gender are very close to
the reality of the actors. The gender ideal – Odysseus-
Penelope – has its roots deep in the real world, in
which women typically are from Venus and men
from Mars, to use a modern expression. The Trojan
women stay inside the palace or stoically watch
their men on the battlefield from towers and walls
of the citadel8 (e.g., Iliad III). Neither do the wives,
women servants and female slaves of the Achaean
heroes move outside oikos, by which is meant the
palace at home and the camp by the beach. Women
servants and female slaves are typically booty of
war, captured during raiding expeditions during the
period leading up to the siege of Troy. The ideals and
roles of the aristocracy spread downwards in society,
in that ordinary women typically work as servants
in the palaces, while men’s jobs are out in the coun-
tryside, even though not primarily in battle. There
is, however, a clear division of labour according to
gender, originating in and interacting with the con-
trasting male and female ideals. The image of two
gender domains is supported by material culture,
which in the epics gives a ‘true’ picture, with mag-
nificent weapons for men and more peaceful things
for women.
The female role is the most constant, but there
are interesting deviations which far from fit the
ideal: dangerous women with special abilities and a
disturbing power over men, such as Helena, Calypso,
Circe and Cassandra. There are also goddesses who
can join in the turmoil of the battle, apparently with-
out surprising anyone; especially the virgin warriors
Pallas Athena and Artemis, but also the more femi-
nine of the species, like Aphrodite, Iris, and Hera.
The world of the gods is definitely not a simple
reflection of the world of humans.
Amongst the men, there are several examples of
warriors who cannot quite live up to the ideal of a
war hero, and they are exposed to public ridicule.
Magnificent, terrifying weapons cannot change the
fact that the beautiful Prince Paris is not made for
the horrors of war and the role of hero. Helena mocks
him and incites him to fight (Iliad III: 42), since her
honour, too, is at stake. The woman in the role as the
one who is ultimately responsible for the honour of
the family and therefore must incite to revenge and
war (without participating herself) is found in many
tribal societies, such as Polynesian chiefdoms,
Arabic Bedouin tribes, Scottish Highland clans and
village communities in the Balkans and in Greece.
The province of Mani at the southernmost point of
Peloponnese is, like Crete, known for its warrior
culture, vendettas, and endemic war on a family-
and clan level. Women’s attitude towards war and
violence in Mani can be expressed thus: ‘If I were a
man, you would see bloody revenge!’ (Ambatsis and
Ambatsis 2000: 21, my translation from Swedish).
Women in Homer and in these tribal societies there-
fore not only aid in creating and recreating war and
violence as legitimate means to achieve certain goals,
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but also certain standards concerning what women
and men can do.
Separate gender domains – as they exist in many
cultures – in themselves tell us nothing about rela-
tions of dominance, namely because their exact
content and the relationship between them are cul-
turally specific. In Homer, however, there is not
only a gender asymmetry in the sense that the male
domain takes up a disproportionately large amount
of space in the story, but also in the sense that men
have distinct authority over women. Women in the
Achaean camp have no say at all; they are objects
who can be moved around and given away in the
same way as material things (e.g., Iliad I: 183f, 345ff;
IX: 128f). After marriage the aristocratic women
have acquired a certain authority – if nowhere else,
then within their own household. In the royal house-
hold of the Phaiakians (Odyssey VIII) Queen Arete
clearly has a certain influence, but it is King Alcinous
who has the final word (see Finley 1972: 103).
Unmarried women of high descent are, however,
completely reified, as they fill the role of services
and gifts for the sealing of alliances. With no more
ado, Agamemnon offers the difficult, sulky Achilles
important members of his household, who are obvi-
ously his private property:
Three daughters I have in my well-built hall Chysóthemis,
Laodíke, and Ifiánassa. Of these let him lead to the house of
Peleus which one he will, without gifts of wooing, and I will
furthermore give a dower full rich, such as no man ever yet
gave with his daughter. (Iliad IX: 144-48)
But another facet of the Homeric dominance pat-
tern in the area of gender is of course that women
themselves contribute to a great degree to the sys-
tem by doing exactly what culture expects.
Homeric society
In the Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, the
narrator gives the audience an insight into a martial
culture, which is described from the social élite’s
point of view. After that, the story is primarily about
men and war. Access to the resources of society is
hierarchical, and family, inheritance, power, and
wealth structure the social hierarchy.
The ideology of society introduces certain unreal-
istic elements, especially in how an ideology of
equality reigns amongst the aristocracy. We are given
the impression that personal qualities, especially mar-
tial ability, give access to social position and power,
but for much of the time, the hierarchy amongst the
aristocracy is a foregone conclusion. The ideology of
equality is probably one of denial, which is cleverly
manipulated by the high king, but at the same time
it is a part of the aristocratic lifestyle and self-image
amongst ‘equals’, because it gives a certain freedom
of action and can be used to question power. It is
with this background in mind that the constant sta-
tus rivalry between the heroes should be under-
stood.
In principle, material culture supports the hierar-
chy by directly reflecting it, but is also used in social
strategies which attempt to shift the balance of
power. Certain things have special stories and mem-
ories of the past attached, and these symbolic qual-
ities reflect on the user and become a part of his per-
sonality. Things and personal belongings create and
recreate different types of social identity, although
within fixed limits.
The Homeric society can best be summarised as
an aristocratic warrior culture in which war is an
important part of social reproduction, both on an
ideological and a socio-economic level. War is
described with strong ideological undertones, and
reality is misrepresented, in that status-charged duels
are given excessive space and attention. A stereo-
typical warrior ideal, which again confirms a certain
type of male identity, is thus reproduced, while the
less flattering side – namely looting, piracy and pil-
laging of foreign settlements – is an ideologically sup-
pressed, but economically necessary, part of society.
The classic male institution of warriors is an
important part of society’s social organisation, acting
on two political levels: partly as a company of fol-
lowers for individual princes, partly as a superior
following of princes for the paramount king. The
whole system of followers is strongly asymmetric in
its structure. It is implicit in the nature of the system
that it excludes women, children, and certain groups
of men, and that it misrepresents a reality which is
also peaceful. This is because there are also peaceful
moments at home and away, and because the warrior
groups also take part in peaceful activities, such as
those of a religious or sporting nature. However, war
takes up a lot of space in Homeric society, and
doubtless contributes to society’s being held fast in
monotonous and very limited ideas of, and stan-
dards for, what men and women can do.
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Thus two contrasting gender ideals face each
other, based on separate, but existentially dependant
gender domains. The male aristocrat is portrayed as
a martial adventurer and cosmopolitan, while the
female aristocrat is described as peaceful and domes-
tic in everything she does. There is, however, a clear
asymmetry, as men exercise authority over women;
actually, women are reified. There is a great degree of
accordance between ideals and reality in the gender
area, indicating that power in this case is not con-
tested. To a very large extent, Homer’s men and
women act – like ourselves – in accordance with the
stereotypes of culture, also in fields where, strictly
speaking, they need not. Thus society and its cul-
turally determined ideas of gender roles are appar-
ently reproduced with no opposition, and these
repetitive patterns are legitimated through different
types of cultural consumption, including personal
appearance and material culture.
From Homer to archaeology
Homer’s epics demonstrate a significant point for
archaeology, namely that ‘things’, especially equip-
ment for war, can have extraordinary value because
of the tales they have attracted during their life
cycle. By utilising such a memorable object, the actor
is enriched by the attached history, simultaneously
ensuring a continuation of the tales. It is reassuring
to see that in this particular elitist setting material
culture really makes culture material, not only by
reproducing the hierarchical social order, but also –
though to a more limited extent – by being utilised
in strategies that question the same order. Through
their visibility material things are in themselves
powerful by influencing in turn the actions and
thoughts of human actors. However, archaeology can
gain further assistance from Homer’s epics. 
Considered as a narrative – note the parallel to
the Homeric epics – the burial finds of the illiterate
Bronze Age societies in temperate Europe, almost
regardless of time and place, mainly tell of the social
élite. It is difficult to separate ideal from reality in
the archaeological burial material, and often it is
not possible to do so from the graves alone, which
must be seen as presentations of gender, war and
society. Certain aspects can possibly be misrepre-
sented consciously or unconsciously, actually in the
same way and for the same reasons as they were by
Homer. War can be more than status rivalry, and
peace can also be a part of the image. Likewise, gender
ideals can seem clearer than everyday gender identi-
ties, and monumental graves can be an attempt to
legitimise hierarchies which are not generally
accepted. It is, of course, best to include other archae-
ological sources into a ‘complete’ context, wherever
this is possible. To examine structures of duration
and change over a long period of time is also a way
of evaluating ideals compared to realities in the illit-
erate past. 
Warfare, male companionship, overt material
and immaterial rivalry, and opposing gender ideals
and identities are perhaps universal components of
elitist culture, whereas the constitution of power
between coercion and persuasion and between
cooperation and resistance varies from case to case.
The archaeologically most interesting thing about
Homeric society is the way its various constituents
are wholly integrated: how it is virtually impossible
to understand one element of social practice with-
out considering other elements, and how social
organisation and ideology exhibit various levels of
agreement and disagreement depending on the
extent to which power is questioned, i.e. whether or
not power is in need of being legitimised. It is, for
instance, easy from a superficial reading of the text
to assume that society is based on the outcome of
overt status rivalry rather than on other less manip-
ulative mechanisms, or that warfare is predominant-
ly enacted as honourable sporting duels between
aristocratic champions. Only a more in-depth analy-
sis reveals that violent and cruel acts of warfare are
equally important constituents of society.
My main point is here that superficial interpreta-
tions of for instance Bronze Age burials would lead
to similar mistakes. 
Concluding reflections 
on ideology and action 
Ideology has played a key role in much recent
archaeology and furthermore intersects inevitably
with the issue of warfare and warriors. The concept of
ideology is therefore discussed briefly as a concluding
remark to the issue of Homer and archaeology and
particularly in relation to the interplay of social
action and structure highlighted by modern sociol-
ogy. A central problem is most clearly revealed when
looking at the constitution of Homeric society.
Roughly analogous to the situation in the earliest
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Scandinavian Bronze Age Homer’s epics portray a
society in which significant social fields related to
kingship, politics and alliance, subsistence and
exchange, and indeed warfare, are affected by a dis-
cord between what might be termed an egalitarian
ideology and an institutionalised hierarchy. The egal-
itarian ideology could, alternatively, be regarded as
a structural residual from a previous social order, still
being active in certain situations of power enact-
ment and therefore part of the social system as such.
The disharmony in Homer’s epics between, on
the one hand, actions and discourses of an egalitar-
ian nature and, on the other hand, actions and dis-
courses in tight accordance with a fairly rigid social
hierarchy bring forth the difficult discussion of the
position of ideology in society. Homer, in other words,
highlights the impossible choice between ideology
and reality. The general relationship between burial
and society has evoked much discussion in more
recent archaeology due to the high proportion in this
discipline of sources to ritual practices, even result-
ing in a major research field labelled ‘archaeology of
death’ (see Tarlow 1999: 1ff for a recent survey). The
positions have tended to follow paradigmatic shifts.
Much post-processual archaeology has notably
had a strong idealist tone in that ideology is believed
to direct the social world, as opposed to a generally
earlier materialist attitude that ideology and religion
merely reflect the current mode of production. The
question has been whether the burial record reflects
social structure or ideology, but it is not unusual to
find expressions that mix these two terms such as
‘ideological reproduction of social structure’ (e.g.,
Sørensen 2000: 85). The implies that we are suppos-
edly not dealing with real social structure, but with
ideology, or an ideologically distorted version of
social structure – even cases of ‘false consciousness’.
It also illustrates the ambiguity of the whole matter.
In Bourdieu’s work a similar division is re-found in
what he calls a double reality between what people
say and what they actually do – a recurring theme in
his studies of the Algerian Kabyle (e.g. Bourdieu
1998: 92ff). The entire discussion about the ‘double
truth’ as one between saying and doing – between
discourse and action – is definitely difficult to trans-
fer directly to archaeology, not least because of the
material and fragmentary nature of the sources.
Bourdieu, in contrast to Giddens, emphasises the
ideological component of social structure probably
because of his schooling in ethnographic fieldwork.
The structurationist approach possibly offers a
key to the solution of this problem, namely its basic
assumption of a double existence of structure and
agency. Ideology, says Giddens, cannot be concep-
tualised independently of action, structure and dis-
course, and refers only to circumstances of asymme-
tries in the systems of domination, notably when
sectional interests are being signified and legit-
imised (Giddens 1984: 33). Structuration theory is
weakly developed at this point, but it may follow
that action can be more or less loaded with ideolog-
ical thinking. It may prove useful, and this makes
sense also in the Homeric context presented above,
to distinguish roughly between two types of action:
a habitual, culture-bound, and almost objective
kind of action, which is accepted and carried out as
‘the way things should be done’ without question-
ing as opposed to a strategic, political and ideologi-
cal kind of action, which is constantly negotiated
and which continuously questions the social condi-
tions of action9. Both kinds of action are of course
signified, for example through material culture, but
their meaning is different.
Some funerary activities in prehistory obviously
possess an ideological tone rooted in strategic think-
ing, whereas other funerary activities appear much
more habitual and culture-bound, and this is also
valid for activities in other domains; ritual, domestic
or otherwise. Strategic, political and ideologically-
influenced action and interaction seem especially
frequent during shifts in systems of domination –
thus agreeing with Giddens’ second dictum about
the nature of ideology. Both types of action are,
however, socially embedded in that that they are
simultaneously preconditioned by, and produce,
social structure. Homer highlights this point, which
in the study of the longue durées and conjunctures
of prehistory gains a long-term perspective. What we
can see in European prehistory is, in fact, time-space
patterns of human action – more often continuous
and reproductive than changeable and strategic, but
no matter how much or little motivated all these
practices involve past, present and future social
structures. 
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laoì has been changed from ‘people’ to ‘warriors’, since
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with the aristocratic upper class of society. Likewise in the
passage with the boar’s tusk helmet, I have made small
corrections to Murray’s original translation. This is in
keeping with Due’s new translations as well as Wilster’s
(1979a; 1979b) old translations of the poems into Danish.
2 The historical position of Homeric society is much debated.
My view is close to Moses Finley’s, namely that Homeric
society has its basis in 10th-9th century Greece after the
fall of the complex Mycenaean state societies but prior to
the formation of the early Greek polis in the 8th century
BC. This is an intermediate phase, which seems to have
features in common with the chiefdom type of society
described in ethnography and social anthropology. The
poems were probably written down late in the 8th century
BC, in connection with or after the invention of the
alphabet (Morris 1987: 23f). However, 6th century BC
Athens of the age of Peisistratos is also a possibility (see
Finley 1972: 44ff).
3 Except the Linear A and B tablets, which are administra-
tive lists of a redistributive political economy. The tablets
completely lack the overriding character of the epics.
4 Some elements can, however, only be explained by assum-
ing that the epics must preserve a memory of much earli-
er occurrences. The tower-shaped shields for instance go
out of date after the Shaft Grave Period. Perhaps a contin-
uous oral epic tradition existed, even dating back to early
Mycenaean times of the 17th and 16th centuries BC. 
5 Kurt Raaflaub (1997) has recently argued for the preva-
lence of a more egalitarian structure in the society of the
poems. This is in contrast to Moses Finley’s more elitist
view, which is more in line with my own readings of the
epics, especially the Iliad. 
6 Michael Shanks (1993: 97) finds similar binary opposi-
tions on a proto-Corinthian perfume bottle.
7 The lion is often used as a synonym of the war hero; e.g.,
Hector is a lion (Bloedow 1999).
8 Later Classical vase paintings show an advanced situation
in which the citadel of Troy is being attacked: here the
women no longer act passively, but defend themselves
with kitchen implements (Lise Hannestad, pers. comm.).
It also shows that function is dependent on context, and
is a very mobile quality in material things.
9 I have discussed this classification of action with Torsten
Kolind, who suggested it in the first place. 
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